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NHS research ethics committees (RECs) serve as the gatekeepers of health research 
involving human participants. They have the power to decide, through a regulatory 
‘event licensing’ system, whether or not any given proposed research study is 
ethical and therefore appropriate to undertake.  
RECs have several regulatory functions. Their primary function has been to protect 
the interests of research participants and minimise risk of harm to them. Yet RECs, 
and other actors connected to them, also provide stewardship for the promotion of 
ethical and socially valuable research. While this latter function traditionally has 
been seen as secondary, the ‘function hierarchy’ is increasingly blurred in 
regulation. Regulatory bodies charged with managing RECs now emphasise that the 
functions of RECs are to both protect the interests of research participants, and also 
promote ethical research that is of potential benefit to participants, science, and 
society. Though the UK has held in some of its previous regulations (broadly 
defined) that RECs equally function to facilitate (ethical) health research, I argue 
that the ‘research promotionist’ ideology has moved ‘up the ladder’ in the 
regulation of RECs and in the regulation of health research, all the way to 
implementation in law, specifically in the Care Act 2014, and in the regulatory 
bodies charged with overseeing health research, namely the Health Research 
Authority.  
This thesis therefore asks: what impact does this ostensibly twinned regulatory 
objective then have on the substantive and procedural workings of RECs? I invoke a 
novel ‘anthropology of regulation’ as an original methodological contribution, 
which enables me to study empirically the nature of regulation and the experiences 
of actors within a regulatory space (or spaces), and the ways in which they 
themselves are affected by regulation. Anthropology of regulation structures my 
overall empirical inquiry to query how RECs, with a classic primary mandate to 
protect research participants, now interact with regulatory bodies charged with 
promoting health research and reducing perceived regulatory barriers. 
I further query what this changing environment might do to the bond of research 
and ethics as seen through REC processes of ethical deliberation and decision-
making, by invoking the original concept of ‘regulatory stewardship’. I argue that 
regulatory stewardship is a critical, but hitherto invisible, component of health 
research regulation, and requires fuller recognition and better integration into the 




NHS research ethics committees (RECs) decide whether a proposed research study 
involving human research participants is ethical. The purpose of RECs is to protect 
the interests of participants and minimise risk of harm to them. RECs also seek to 
promote ethical and socially valuable research. Though this latter function 
traditionally has been seen as secondary, recently, regulatory bodies that manage 
RECs now emphasise that these two functions are of equal value. What impact does 
this twinned regulatory objective of protection and promotion have on RECs? 
Through a novel ‘anthropology of regulation’ approach, I explore how RECs work 
in practice to both protect research participants and also promote ethical research. I 
claim that RECs and other actors seek to fulfil these two functions, which they 
acknowledge and appreciate, through a ‘regulatory stewardship’ role in guiding 
researchers through stages of research. I argue that regulatory stewardship is a 
critical component of health research regulation and requires fuller recognition and 
better integration into current regulatory regimes. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
Research ethics committees (RECs) occupy a critical position in health research 
governance. In the UK, 86 National Health Service (NHS) RECs review 
approximately 6,000 research applications each year that seek to involve potential 
research participants who are in the NHS system. One of the tasks of NHS RECs is 
to ensure ‘that any anticipated risks, burdens or intrusions will be minimised for the 
people taking part in the research and are justified by the expected benefits for the 
participants or for science and society’.1 Through their discretionary power to 
modify an applicant’s research design, RECs can impact what knowledge is 
produced and can significantly affect the relationship between researchers and 
research participants. They make for a fascinating object of investigation, 
particularly in light of recent regulatory changes. Having held a personal and 
academic interest in ethics committees for a number of years, this PhD affords me a 
unique opportunity to uncover their workings and relationships within a network 
of connected actors, both regulators and regulatees, state and non-state-affiliated.  
This socio-legal-driven PhD project is part of a larger, interdisciplinary, five-year, 
Wellcome-funded project researching the ‘liminal spaces’ of health research 
regulation. I am interested in the roles and practices of RECs in light of recently 
implemented health research regulation that explicitly seeks to promote health 
research in the country, in part by streamlining regulation itself. It is unclear how 
these recent regulatory changes, stressing efficiency and maximisation of UK 
competitiveness for health research and maximisation of return from investment in 
the UK, may affect the substantive and procedural workings of RECs. It is also 
                                                     
1 Department of Health, Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees: A Harmonised 
Edition (Department of Health 2011, updated April 2012) para 1.2.2 [colloquially known as 
and cited hereinafter as GAfREC].  
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unknown whether the modification of research regulation at the level of legal 
architecture to promote research—seen, for example, in the Care Act 2014 and in the 
mandate of the Health Research Authority (HRA)—‘trickles down’ to the day-to-
day practices of RECs, which the HRA is responsible for managing directly in 
England and partially across the UK. 
More granularly, we lack good understanding about how and why RECs make the 
decisions they do, and how the dynamics of RECs and central ‘managing’ regulators 
play into decisions in this emerging regulatory backdrop. This research project fills 
this lacuna by: 1) going inside RECs to ask and examine how they, as individual 
members and as a collective body, see themselves in a changing regulatory 
environment; and 2) going inside a managing regulator (the HRA) to gather 
perspectives on the roles of RECs and the relationship between the HRA and RECs, 
which in turn provides deeper understanding of the meta-level contributions of 
these entities as regulatory agents, both in their own right and in an interconnected 
way.  
Thus, this project involves an original, empirical investigation of health research 
regulation and RECs, examining how these entities, designed to essentially give an 
ethical ‘licence’ to researchers, undertake ethics deliberation and work under the 
umbrella of regulation that is becoming more streamlined and research-promoting. 
As this research constitutes a doctoral dissertation in the School of Law, my primary 
aim is to provide both an original, critical understanding of what RECs and 
regulators actually do (and see themselves doing), and also to explain and 
understand the nature of health research regulation. The objective is to provide my 
intended audience of academics, lawyers, regulators, and policymakers, as well as 
the Wellcome Trust, a crucial contribution to understanding the roles RECs and 
members within them (and connected to them) play in regulating health research.  
The research findings, as I suggest in Chapters 7 and 8, could further offer 
normative assessments of RECs and health research regulation, thereby informing 
policy decisions. Indeed, a secondary aim is to encourage a reimagining of 
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‘regulatory spaces’ if they are seen to be under-delivering in what they set out to 
achieve. Ultimately, then, this PhD may show how the success of the REC system 
directly reflects on the effectiveness of the overall regulatory and governance 
structures in place. Through theoretical insight and empirical investigation, this 
research will suggest what regulation and regulators can do to stimulate meaningful 
research oversight. 
1.2 Research questions 
The primary research question that this study addresses is: 
How do RECs act among themselves and interact with other actors 
within the context of ‘next-generation’ regulation that aspires to both 
protect research participants from harm and also promote health 
research through streamlining perceived regulatory barriers—and 
what might this mean for the bond of research and ethics as seen 
through the ostensible REC processes of ethical deliberation and 
decision-making?   
The overarching research question engenders two specific subsidiary questions to 
guide my investigation: 
1. What is the precise nature of the interaction between central regulators and 
RECs? and 
2. What are the functional operations and deliberative processes of RECs in an 
era of twinned regulatory objectives of participant protection and research 
promotion? 
The main purpose of this study is to empirically investigate whether, and if so how, 
regulatory changes emphasising efficiency and research promotion have impacted 




1.3 Anthropology of regulation as methodology 
In exploring these research questions, I undertake a modified socio-legal analysis, 
drawing on an ‘anthropology of regulation’ methodology that I have developed and 
which is influenced by regulatory theory and the anthropological concept of 
liminality. Liminality refers to a threshold phase in social transitions characterised 
by processual (temporal and spatial) dynamics.2 Harnessing liminality as a 
sensitising concept in an anthropology of health research regulation enables one to 
examine the ways in which practices, people, and entities are structured in and by 
regulation, and vice versa. 
As argued principally in Chapter 4, anthropology escapes the trap of a purely law-
based approach that examines and often reifies bounded spaces by instead focusing 
on what happens within the regulatory spaces and under the layers of regulation 
across time. This thesis transcends the relatively narrow confines of law as an object 
of investigation (particularly with its positivist connotations about state 
organisation, rules, rule-making bodies, and judiciary and enforcement agencies) 
and the logic of boundaries. Through a focus on both time and space(s), it also goes 
beyond the relatively broad range of social patterns of interaction and forms of 
internal normative orderings within various communities that characterise much 
sociological and regulatory studies research (e.g. institutionalism approaches). The 
research questions aim to explore and explain—through documentary research 
comprised of historical tracing and present-day regulatory analysis that explicates 
the internal constitution of regulation, as well as through observation and 
interviews—the experiences and behaviours of specific individual actors in the 
health research regulatory space who govern the ethics of health research involving 
participants, namely RECs and their managing regulators. Anthropology of 
regulation allows me to investigate both the nature of regulation as a social form (an 
ontological concern), as well as what regulation does to actors and what actors do to 
                                                     
2 Samuel Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression: Confronting the 




regulation (a functional and experiential concern). Regulatory theory is necessary to 
help provide potential explanatory background; empirical research is equally 
necessary to help provide understanding of everyday practice. In essence, 
anthropology of regulation allows the researcher to bring theory and practice 
meaningfully together by focusing on capturing the experiences of regulators in 
their multiple contexts. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
In order to answer the three research questions outlined above, this thesis contains 
eight chapters divided into three main parts: 
Part I – Conceptual Framework and Historical Regulatory Tracing 
Following this introductory Chapter 1, Part I (consisting of Chapters 2 and 3) 
provides a conceptual framework and historical regulatory tracing of RECs. Chapter 
2 offers an overview of the UK REC system. It raises the question of whether the 
roles and practices of RECs are shifting in response to ‘next-generation’ regulation 
(particularly regarding research promotion), and whether modifications to the 
health research regulatory space at the levels of statutory law and central regulatory 
authorities (i.e. central administrators) ‘trickle down’ to the day-to-day practices of 
RECs. At the end of the chapter, I pose several questions that drive the empirical 
investigation. 
Chapter 3 traces the regulatory development of RECs and health research regulation 
within the UK, with a view to demonstrating both the growth of health research 
regulation and the increasingly central role that RECs play in regulating health 
research. The central claim I make is that while to a certain degree, research 
promotion has always been embedded in the regulatory techniques of RECs, it has 
not until now been instantiated in law with the creation of the HRA and rules 
promulgated under the Care Act 2014. The subsequent and fundamental research 
question to explore is whether this instantiation of research promotion in law has a 
(hitherto absent) trickle-down effect that impacts the day-to-day practices of RECs, 
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and if so, how, or indeed, whether the law is only now coming to reflect an 
everyday practice that has long existed.  
Part II – Methodology and Methods 
Part II (consisting of Chapters 4 and 5) describes the methodology and methods. In 
Chapter 4, I explain the research approach, theoretical underpinnings, and 
analytical concepts that drive my thesis. I show how regulatory theory provides a 
solid but ultimately insufficient foundation on its own for the empirical 
investigation that informs this thesis. I argue that there is a need for an empirically-
grounded discussion of regulatory practice. I propose an anthropology of regulation 
that contributes to extant socio-legal studies by blending the theoretical with the 
empirical, which affords critical methodological improvements to common research 
approaches. As anthropology of regulation draws explicit attention to processes, 
passages, and change, I further draw on the anthropological concept of liminality, 
which serves as a sensitising concept in addition to concepts provided by regulatory 
theory. Together with regulatory theory, liminality helps us to better understand the 
nature of transformations of actors within the regulatory space, the form of 
regulation in this space, as well as the behaviours and experiences of actors as they go 
through processes of change. 
In Chapter 5, I describe the research methods undertaken for my empirical work 
and which define an anthropology of regulation, including the justification for 
undertaking a ‘research trinity’ of document analysis, semi-structured interviews, 
and naturalistic observation. I explain how my research methods serve as the most 
robust platform for answering my research questions and making sense of the 






Part III – Empirical Research Findings: Engaging with RECs and Regulators in 
Practice  
Building on the examination of protection and promotion from an historical basis in 
Chapter 3, Part III (consisting of Chapters 6 and 7) then provides an empirical 
evaluation of the research questions and, based on the findings, proposes several 
modifications to the regulatory framework of ethics review.  
In Chapter 6, I engage with the empirical data collected from the interviews and 
observations and, coupled with the findings from the document analysis, make 
sense of them through an anthropology of regulation approach. Through 
investigation of three main themes (the ‘black boxes’ of ethics review; regulatory 
connectivity; and regulators as facilitators and stewards), I explore what happens in 
REC meetings, consider the operationalisation of ‘next-generation’ health research 
regulation (particularly in light of the twin aims of protection and promotion), and 
investigate the procedures and substance behind risk-based regulation. I do this by 
querying whether risk-based regulation is being practised by RECs and the HRA, 
and more fundamentally, by querying the nature and function of the interactions 
among RECs, researchers, and the HRA. Throughout, I draw on the implications of 
space and time in ethics review, signifying the importance of liminality to this thesis 
and its contribution to the normative discussion to come in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 then further unpacks the significance of liminality of RECs and the ability 
of actors within the health research regulatory space to serve as ‘regulatory 
stewards’. I do so by suggesting a normative model of what a new regulatory 
framework for health research oversight ought to look like if it were to explicitly 
endorse regulatory stewardship. I also chart how protection and promotion can and 
should work together. I conclude that a reformulated regulatory framework could 
work to improve regulatory conversations between actors, provide ongoing 
opportunities for ‘regulatory play’ to emerge, and shift the burden and emphasis 
away from more procedural work and towards flexibility and experimentation in 
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ethics review. What I suggest, in other words, is a refinement of the extant 
regulatory framework, not wholesale change.  
The final chapter (Chapter 8) reflects on the data, discussion, and regulatory 
framework presented, and proposes future directions for research.  
Having laid out my research questions, introduced anthropology of regulation as a 
methodology, and mapped the structure of the thesis, I now turn to provide a 
















Conceptual framework—setting the scene for 
‘protection’ and ‘promotion’ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Health research3 is a highly formalised, institutionalised, and regulated activity, 
replete with actors, rules, tools, policies, and diffuse sets of social constraints. 
Researchers who wish to gather data, investigate questions, test hypotheses, and 
build new generalisable knowledge in areas that involve human participants 
confront at the earliest stages of their study design the application of abstract ethical 
principles such as respect for persons, social value, beneficence, and justice, not to 
mention ethical rules and norms such as informed consent and confidentiality. 
Additionally, researchers confront a panoply of law and regulation.4 When it comes 
                                                     
3 The Care Act 2014, s 110(3), defines health research as ‘research into matters relating to 
people’s physical or mental health’. I define ‘health research’ as research involving human 
participants, their data, or their tissue, which seeks to understand the biology of disease and 
health and to prevent ill health. This closely track the terms ‘biomedical research’ and 
‘clinical research’, and would include, for example, genetic research, clinical trials, and 
research into medical records. Such studies may be non-intrusive—with no direct contact 
with human participants (e.g. epidemiological research) or intrusive—and either invasive 
(e.g. administering drugs) or non-invasive (e.g. psychological inquiries). ‘Health research’ as 
I use it in this thesis would exclude, however, social science-driven research that seeks to 
understand e.g. patients’ experiences with a health service. The latter could be termed 
health-related research. Health-related research may still involve the same rules and actors 
that govern health research (e.g. NHS research ethics committees, NHS R&D offices).  
4 Both law and regulation are notoriously tricky to define, not the least because of cultural 
variation in ascribing meaning to phenomena that are ‘legal’ or ‘regulatory’. In this thesis, 
law (at least in its positivistic sense) is taken to mean a system of rules, codes, and 
pronouncements promulgated by state or state-like actors within a particular community 
(e.g. sub-national, national, international) with the aim of regulating the actions of its 
members and which it may enforce by the imposition of penalties. Examples of law include a 
statute and statutory instrument (i.e. an Act or Statutory Instrument approved by 
Parliament) or a case judgement from a law court. By contrast, ‘[r]egulation is a broader 
category and includes much more flexible and innovative forms of social control.’ See Neil 
Gunningham and Cameron Holley, ‘Next-Generation Environmental Regulation: Law, 
Regulation, and Governance’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 273, 274. I 
define regulation as a set of rules, principles, mechanisms, strategies, or activities 
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to health research involving humans, determination of its ethical acceptability has 
taken a particularly regulated, technocratic, and structured form, with specific 
groups of individuals wielding power to decide whether a research study may 
proceed on ethical grounds. This group is known as a REC.5  
This thesis will explore the mandate and operation of one particular type of REC in 
the UK, the NHS REC, drawing on both governance instruments and policies and 
original empirical research. 6 This chapter begins the process by querying whether 
the practices of these RECs align with their recently established regulatory 
mandate—as set out in instruments promulgated by the UK government, devolved 
administrations, and regulatory bodies—which has modified the ‘regulatory space’7 
applicable to health research involving humans. In particular, it explores a shift 
                                                     
promulgated by state or non-state actors that either affect behaviour as an incidental effect or 
are designed to steer behaviour in a socially, politically, and/or economically desirable way. 
It may involve self-regulation, persuasion, and co-regulation. Thus, regulation is broader 
than law and can encompass anything from codes of practice of professional bodies to traffic 
lights and signs in a neighbourhood. My definition of regulation does not privilege the state; 
the state is simply one node among many actors sharing control of resources. Law and 
regulation are components of governance. Governance refers to the constellation of actors 
and mechanisms that promulgate, implement, or enforce norms across sites of authority; it is 
the managerial version of politics. 
5 Different jurisdictions use different names for these committees (or ‘boards’), though the 
underlying regulatory structure and functions (‘regimes’) are often similar. For example, in 
the US, RECs are referred to as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs). In Canada, they are 
referred to as Research Ethics Boards (REBs). In Australia, they are referred to as Human 
Research Ethics Committees (HRECs). Often the biggest distinction between these 
committees is whether they are a) governed by law or policy; and b) institution-based (as is 
the case for IRBs, REBs, and HRECs)—implying greater private ordering – or region-based 
(as is the case for NHS RECs)—implying greater public ordering.  
6 ‘NHS RECs’ is a shorthand way for describing those RECs tasked by regulation with 
‘reviewing research that relates to areas of responsibility of the UK Health Departments’. 
This refers to the fact that the NHS is one service, albeit a critically important one, offered by 
each of the four nations’ health departments. Each of the UK Health Departments has a 
Research Ethics Service that manages RECs within their health system. See GAfREC (n 1). As 
discussed below, NHS RECs may also review research studies that fall into areas outside the 
responsibility of the UK Health Departments. 
7 The concept of ‘regulatory space’ can be defined as an analytical construct for determining 
the range of regulatory issues subject to public decision by a variety of actors. See Leigh 
Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organizing Regulatory Space’ in Leigh Hancher and Michael 
Moran (eds) Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (OUP 1989). 
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from a protectionist model that has been seen by some as paternalistic, with 
regulators disproportionately focusing on research risks in comparison to research 
benefits and inexplicably road-blocking otherwise ethical research, to a more 
broadly facilitative model, undergirded by law, that could be called ‘next-
generation’ in that it seeks to foster an environment that both protects research 
participants and also facilitates responsible health research through proportionate 
risk-based regulation and coordinated alignment of ethics review and other 
regulatory processes. Seemingly invigorating a public interest aim of health research 
oversight—to promote valuable research that advances human health for the benefit 
of the public—this next-generation regulation has emerged most clearly in the last 
decade (through policies and guidelines) and is reflected most overtly in the 
statutory Care Act 2014 and in the body that exemplifies this new way of regulating 
health research—the HRA. This work is the first of its kind to conduct qualitative 
research that reveals a critical understanding of what RECs actually do and the 
nature of health research regulation involving RECs in the UK. This research thus 
offers a crucial contribution to understanding the roles actors play in health research 
and how these roles transform over time. 
This chapter raises the question of whether the roles and practices of RECs are 
shifting in compliance with this next-generation regulation, which was driven 
foremost by persistent criticism from research communities (e.g. academic, 
industry) regarding the perceived clogged regulatory space of ‘human subjects 
research’. As such, I query whether modifications to the health research regulatory 
space (composed of public and private actors with ‘cross connections between 
domains of authority’8) at the levels of statutory law and central regulatory 
authorities (i.e. central administrators) ‘trickle down’ to the day-to-day practices of 
RECs. In other words, I explore the following overarching question: 
                                                     




How do RECs act among themselves and interact with other actors 
within the context of ‘next-generation’ regulation that aspires to both 
protect research participants from harm and also promote health 
research through streamlining perceived regulatory barriers—and 
what might this mean for the bond of research and ethics as seen 
through the ostensible REC processes of ethical deliberation and 
decision-making?   
In exploring this overarching question, I undertake a modified socio-legal analysis, 
drawing on an ‘anthropology of regulation’ methodology that I have developed and 
which is influenced by regulatory theory and the anthropological concept of 
liminality. Liminality refers to a threshold phase in social transitions characterised 
by processual (temporal and spatial) dynamics.9 Harnessing liminality as a 
sensitising concept in an anthropology of health research regulation enables one to 
examine the ways in which practices, people, and entities are structured in and by 
regulation, and vice versa. The overarching research question engenders two 
specific subsidiary questions to guide my investigation: 
1. What is the precise nature of the interaction between central regulators and 
RECs? and 
2. What are the functional operations and deliberative processes of RECs in an 
era of twinned regulatory objectives of participant protection and research 
promotion? 
To begin this exploration, I first provide an overview of the UK REC system. 
 
                                                     
9 Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression’ (n 2) 150. 
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2.2 An overview of the UK REC system 
RECs serve as gatekeepers of research involving humans. While the characterisation 
of RECs as ‘gatekeepers’ is not uncontroversial,10 I contend that they are gatekeepers 
in that they serve to control access to the potentiality of research involving humans, 
and as such occupy a central position in research governance.11 Governments 
around the world have delegated to RECs the power to decide, through a regulatory 
‘event licensing’12 system and in some cases on the pain of sanction,13 whether or not 
any given proposed research study involving humans (or their data or tissue) is 
ethical and therefore appropriate to undertake or to continue. RECs are, therefore, 
‘discretionary bodies with the power to apply the principles of research ethics, and 
the rules relating to particular fields of experimentation on human subjects, to 
research proposals and research in progress’.14 Largely self-regulatory creations that 
first arose in the US in the mid-20th century in response to both research scandals 
and concerns about institutional liability,15 RECs have evolved from ad hoc, 
unstructured committees of peer reviewers in a few hospitals—fellow physicians or 
biomedical researchers assessing the ethical acceptability of a proposed study—to 
institutionalised, regulated bodies of diverse members existing worldwide, 
prospectively reviewing, deciding upon, and, to a limited degree, monitoring the 
‘ethical acceptability’16 of all types of research involving humans, from 
                                                     
10 See e.g. Nathan Emmerich, ‘When is a REC not a REC? When it is a Gatekeeper’ (2016) 12 
Research Ethics 234.  
11 Research governance can be defined as the system of ‘administration and supervision 
through which research is managed, participants and staff are protected, and accountability 
is assured’. See Sara Shaw, Petra Boynton and Trisha Greenhalgh, ‘Research Governance: 
Where Did it Come From, What Does it Mean?’ (2005) 98 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 496, 497.  
12 Carl Schneider, The Censor’s Hand: The Misregulation of Human-Subject Research (MIT Press 
2015) 33. 
13 Brazier and Cave write that, ‘…outside the remit of the UK Clinical Trials Regulations a 
researcher contravenes no law in carrying out research without ethical approval. However, 
other sanctions and ethical guidance deter any such practice.’ See Margaret Brazier and 
Emma Cave, Medicine, Patients and the Law (6th edn, Manchester University Press 2016) 478. 
See also The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, regs 49, 52.  
14 Paul McNeill, The Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (CUP 1993) 205.  
15 The regulatory development of RECs is charted in Chapter 3. 
16 See Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International Ethical 
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epidemiological or observational studies to clinical trials. As the leading 
international guideline on health research, the Declaration of Helsinki, states: ‘The 
research protocol must be submitted for consideration, comment, guidance and 
approval to the concerned research ethics committee before the study begins.’17 
RECs regulate not just the ethical acceptability of health research, then. Because of 
their gatekeeping and monitoring role, they regulate very much the production and 
use of health research knowledge itself through ex ante control of which research is 
approved, which research questions can be asked, and how they may be answered. 
The UK has a hybrid, and one might say uncoordinated, system of RECs. Some are 
institution-based. Others are location or region-based; some are centralised, 
covering the whole country. Several different types of RECs exist. They can be split 
into two main categories of non-NHS RECs (e.g. institution-based higher education 
RECs18) and NHS RECs.19 Here, I discuss only the latter. 
 
 
                                                     
Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans, Guideline 23: ‘All proposals to 
conduct health-related research involving humans must be submitted to a research ethics 
committee to determine whether they qualify for ethical review and to assess their ethical 
acceptability...’ <https://cioms.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-
EthicalGuidelines.pdf> [hereinafter CIOMS Guidelines]. 
17 World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association 2013) para 
23 (emphasis added). The Declaration of Helsinki was first published in 1964 and is updated 
(and expanded) every few years. Illustrating the growth in research and complexity of 
regulation, the first edition contained four paragraphs (with several containing 
subparagraphs) and 713 words. The latest edition from 2013 contains 37 paragraphs and 
2124 words. 
18 See e.g. Anthea Tinker and Vera Coomber, University Research Ethics Committees: Their Role, 
Remit and Conduct (King’s College London 2004). 
19 Health Research Authority, ‘Determine Which Review Body Approvals Are Required’ 
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/research-community/before-you-apply/determine-which-review-
body-approvals-are-required/>. In this thesis, when using the term ‘RECs’, I intend it to 
mean NHS RECs only, unless otherwise specified.  
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2.2.1 NHS RECs 
NHS RECs, also known more formally as ‘RECs within the UK Health Departments’ 
Research Ethics Service’ (RES),20 are region-based committees. Officially overseeing 
a local health area within the NHS system,21 in practice they operate within a 
centrally administered system that enables them to review research applications and 
provide an ethics opinion22 on health research involving humans in the NHS taking 
place anywhere in the UK. The Care Act 2014 defines a NHS REC as: 
a group of persons which assesses the ethics of research involving individuals; and 
the ways in which health or social care research might involve individuals 
include, for example—(a) by obtaining information from them; (b) by 
obtaining bodily tissue or fluid from them; (c) by using information, tissue 
or fluid obtained from them on a previous occasion; (d) by requiring them to 
undergo a test or other process (including xenotransplantation).23 
Across the UK, the 86 currently existing NHS RECs review approximately 6,000 
research applications each year that seek to involve potential research participants 
(including patients) who are in the NHS system.24 Formally existing since 1991,25 
                                                     
20 See n 6 above. 
21 This means NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts for England, Health Boards for 
Scotland and Wales, or the whole of Northern Ireland. 
22 There are five categories of opinions a REC can make: (1) ‘favourable with standard 
conditions’, which means that the study has ethical approval to proceed, as long as HRA 
Approval/local R&D is in place prior to the study starting; (2) ‘favourable with additional 
conditions’, which means that the study has ethical approval in principle but there are 
certain issues which need to be addressed prior to the study starting; (3) ‘provisional 
opinion’, which means that there are more substantial changes which need to be made and 
re-reviewed by certain members of the REC (usually the Chair and one or two other 
members) before the study starts, or that a final opinion cannot be issued until further advice 
has been sought from a referee; (4) ‘unfavourable opinion’, which means that the study does 
not have ethical approval to proceed and a further application would need to be submitted 
should the applicant choose to proceed with the study; and (5) ‘no opinion’, which applies to 
Proportionate Review only, and means that the Proportionate Review sub-committee 
(generally consisting of three REC members) has deemed that the proposed study contains 
‘material ethical issues’ and will therefore need to be reviewed by the full committee. 
23 Care Act 2014, s 112(2) (emphasis added). 
24 Health Research Authority, ‘Research Ethics Committees (RECs)’ 
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/our-committees/research-ethics-committees-recs/>. 
There are two RECs in Northern Ireland; seven RECs in Wales; 11 RECs in Scotland; and 66 
RECs in England (including the National Social Care REC in London).  
25 Prior to 1991, some RECs were constituted to serve a NHS health district rather than a 
single institution (e.g. hospital), but this was not a formal policy. This changed with 
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they are committees of between seven and 18 individuals26 (one-third of whom must 
be ‘lay’27) who are independent of research sponsors,28 funders, and investigators, 
and serve to opine on the ethical acceptability of research involving NHS staff, or 
patients and/or their tissue and data, among other kinds of health-related research.29 
Currently, there are over 150 staff members (e.g. REC Managers/Co-ordinators, 
HRA Regional Managers, etc.) and over 1000 volunteer members of NHS RECs 
across the UK. 
REC members are appointed by the HRA in England, the Health & Social Care 
Business Service Organisation through the Office for Research Ethics Committees 
Northern Ireland (ORECNI) in Northern Ireland,30 and the local Health Boards in 
Scotland and Wales.31 Each REC has a Chair, a Vice Chair and an Alternate Vice 
                                                     
Department of Health, HSG(91)5, Local Research Ethics Committees, which through formal 
‘guidance’ (a type of policy circular) created local research ethics committees (LRECs) for 
each NHS health district. Scotland and Wales also published similar guidance to establish 
LRECs: 1992(GEN)3 for Scotland and WHC(91)75 for Wales.  
26 An operational change from a maximum of 18 members to 15 members was formalised by 
the HRA in December 2014; however, the policy is such that RECs may still have up to 18 
members, though ‘the HRA optimum is 15’. See Health Research Authority, ‘Annual Report 
Summary for RECs in England - April 2015 to March 2016’  
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2016/11/annual-report-summary-recs-england.pdf>. 
27 The UK classifies REC members as either ‘expert’ or ‘lay’, the latter category meaning ‘a 
mixture of people who reflect the currency of public opinion’, and the former category 
meaning people who ‘have relevant formal qualifications or professional experience that can 
help the REC understand particular aspects of research proposals’ (i.e. physicians and other 
health care professionals). Lay members ‘are people who are independent of care services, 
either as employees or in a non-executive role.’ See GAfREC (n 1) paras 4.2.3, 4.2.7. The HRA 
has decreed that half of the lay members must be ‘lay plus’ members, who are people who 
have never been care professionals, researchers in a care field, or chairs, members, or 
directors of care service bodies or organisations providing care. 
28 Research sponsors are the organisations responsible for the management and conduct of 
the research. 
29 GAfREC (n 1) para 2.3. 
30 Office for Research Ethics Committees Northern Ireland 
<http://www.hscbusiness.hscni.net/orecni.htm>. 
31 Health Research Authority, ‘REC Membership: HRA Policy and Applying to Join a REC’ 
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/research-ethics-committee-members/rec-membership/>. Even 
though RECs in Scotland and Wales may cover more than one Health Board, or so-called 
‘regions’, (e.g. the two RECs based in Edinburgh, known as South East Scotland REC 1 and 
2, officially cover both NHS Lothian and NHS Borders, together known as the South East 
Scotland region), generally the bigger Health Board (in terms of resources) will make the 
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Chair, and is coordinated by a Manager (as well as an Assistant, who, along with 
REC Managers in England, may cover several RECs).32 Unlike in other countries, 
there is no requirement that a REC include a lawyer, theologian, ethicist, patient 
advocate, or ‘community member’. Instead, the GAfREC state: ‘The membership of 
a REC should allow for a sufficiently broad range of experience and expertise so that 
the rationale, aims, objectives and design of the research proposals that it reviews 
can be effectively reconciled with the dignity, rights, safety and well-being of the 
people who are likely to take part.’33 RECs also ‘should reflect the diversity of the 
adult population of society’.34 Further, so-called lay members are expected to ‘reflect 
the currency of public opinion’, while so-called expert members are expected to 
‘have relevant formal qualifications or professional experience that can help the 
REC understand particular aspects of research proposals’.35 
Though only some kinds of health research must obtain prior REC approval under 
the law,36 convention dictates through institutional or regulatory policies that few 
health research studies may proceed in the UK without an NHS REC receiving and 
reviewing the research protocol and attendant documents, and providing a positive 
(i.e. favourable) opinion. Indeed, the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for NHS 
RECs apply to a variety of health research: ‘The policy of the UK Health 
Departments is that the operating procedures required by the EU Directive and the 
Clinical Trials Regulations should also apply in general to the review by RECs in the 
                                                     
appointment. As the GAfREC states, ‘Where an NHSScotland Health Board is not a REC 
appointing authority, they must contribute proportionately to the running costs of their 
NHS Research Scotland nodal research ethics service.’ GAfREC (n 1) at 41. 
32 GAfREC (n 1) para 4.2.13. In Scotland, REC Managers are termed REC Co-ordinators, and 
unlike in England, the practice is that REC Co-ordinators are responsible for only one REC. 
33 ibid para 4.2.1. 
34 ibid para 4.2.4. 
35 ibid para 4.2.3. 
36 NHS REC review for research within and outwith the NHS may be required by law. This 
would include clinical trials as per the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004, and research involving adults with incapacity as per the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and Adults with Incapacity (Ethics Committee) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2002, as amended 2007 (which requires ethics review by specific REC known as 
Scotland A REC). See also GAfREC (n 1) Annex A. 
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UK of all other health and social care research reviewed under GAfREC.’37 As noted 
by the HRA and the GAfREC, there are ‘requirements’ for ethics review of research 
under statutory instruments (i.e. legal requirements) applying to the UK as a whole 
or particular countries of the UK, and ‘requirements’ for ethics review under the 
policy of the UK Health Departments, where research relates to the services for 
which they are responsible.38 A 2011 Academy of Medical Sciences report also notes 
the wide reach of these RECs: ‘Because positive opinion from a REC is required for 
all studies that take place in the NHS, this review forms a core component of the 
regulation and governance pathway’.39  
In addition to research involving participants identified from, or because of, their 
past or present use of the NHS, common categories of NHS REC review include:40 
 Clinical Trial of an Investigational Medicinal Product (CTIMP), including 
NHS Phase 1 CTIMPs in healthy volunteers; 
 research involving medical devices; 
 social care research; 
 research involving children; 
 health-related research involving prisoners; 
 research involving adults lacking capacity; 
 the establishment of research tissue banks/biobanks; and 
                                                     
37 Health Research Authority, Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees 
(Version 7.2, Health Research Authority 2017), Introduction [hereinafter REC SOPs]. 
38 Health Research Authority, ‘Is NHS REC Review Required?’ 
<http://www.hra.nhs.uk/resources/before-you-apply/is-nhs-rec-review-required/>. As noted 
above, sanctions for failure to obtain REC approval prior to conducting research vary. See 
also GAfREC (n 1) s 2.3. 
39 Academy of Medical Sciences, A New Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of Health 
Research (Academy of Medical Sciences 2011) 76 [hereinafter AMS, A New Pathway]. The 
Academy does not explain in its report why a positive opinion from a REC is ‘required’ for 
all NHS-involved research. While perhaps true according to custom or other regulation 
regimes, under the law, as explained above, this is only the case for some types of health 
research. See also Health Research Authority, ‘Legal Requirements for Research Ethics 
Review’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/resources/research-legislation-and-governance/legal-
requirements-for-research-ethics-review/>.  
40 Health Research Authority, ‘Research Ethics Committees (RECs)’ (n 24). 
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 the establishment of research databases.  
The research applicants who must submit a REC application41 would therefore 
include pharmaceutical and medical device companies; health care professionals in 
the NHS; academic researchers, including students; and prison health researchers.42 
Thus, whether a researcher is conducting clinical, epidemiological, or even law and 
social science-driven health research, if the proposed study involves NHS patients 
or service users as participants, staff, property or records, the researcher must apply 
for NHS ethical approval through application to a REC.43 A favourable opinion from 
a REC is not a licence to immediately begin research. Researchers must also obtain 
research governance (i.e. Research and Development or ‘R&D’) permission from 
each relevant NHS management authority—or since 2016, in lieu of NHS 
management authority approval, approval from the HRA (‘HRA Approval’) for all 
health research led from England and that involves the NHS in England.44 Through 
their ‘consideration, comment, guidance and approval’45 of research applications, 
RECs play a critical role in regulating health research, and therefore can themselves 
be seen as regulatory bodies. I expand this claim in later chapters. 
As noted, a centralised attitude is taken to managing RECs in the UK, compared to a 
more ‘devolved’ institution-based approach seen in other jurisdictions such as 
                                                     
41 An application to a REC would typically include the standard REC form available from the 
Integrated Research Application System (IRAS), often called the ‘IRAS application form’; the 
research protocol; insurance forms; the participant information sheet and consent form; and 
copies of questionnaires and advertisements (if the project involves such methods and 
recruitment strategy).  
42 Health Research Authority, ‘Research Ethics Committees (RECs)’ (n 24). 
43 This is not the case, however, if the proposed research is limited to involvement of NHS 
staff as participants, and thus there is no involvement of NHS patients or service users as 
participants.  
44 HRA Approval replaces the need for R&D checks of legal compliance and related matters 
by each participating organisation in England. See Health Research Authority, ‘HRA 
Approval’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/our-plans-and-projects/assessment-
approval/>. Depending on the type of research study, other regulatory approvals may be 
necessary. For example, if the research involves a CTIMP to be conducted in the UK, the 
sponsor(s) must also seek to obtain a Clinical Trial Authorisation from the Medicines and 
Health products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).  
45 Declaration of Helsinki (n 17) para 23. 
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Canada or the US. NHS RECs are overseen by central regulators, including the 
United Kingdom Ethics Committee Authority (UKECA) for those RECs ‘recognised’ 
to give an ethical opinion on a CTIMP. In England, RECs are overseen by the RES, 
an office under the auspices of the HRA, which itself is an arm’s-length body 
situated in England’s Department of Health. The HRA’s RES operates five offices 
across England (London, Bristol, Nottingham, Manchester, and Jarrow), which in 
turn manage RECs more or less within their region. Each office is led by a RES 
Regional Manager, though currently there are two Managers who manage more 
than one office.46 There are equivalent Research Ethics Services in each of the 
devolved nations. In Scotland, the Health Boards function as the HRA equivalent, 
while four Scientific Officers and a Chief Scientist Office (CSO) ethics ‘point person’ 
function as the equivalent for the RES for RECs within NHSScotland.47 There are 
equivalent bodies in Northern Ireland (ORECNI) and Wales (Division for Social 
Care and Health Research), but as will be seen, in law and practice, the HRA 
through its RES has taken a leading (and coordinating) role for managing RECs 
throughout the UK, albeit to varying degrees and with varying degrees of success. 
Assisting the HRA’s RES is the National Research and Ethics Advisors’ Panel 
(NREAP), which is an independent, multidisciplinary expert panel appointed by the 
HRA that provides ethical guidance and training to RECs and the wider research 
community. The HRA’s RES also delivers a managed structure to support RECs, a 
quality assurance (QA) framework,48 and a training programme.  
                                                     
46 Health Research Authority, ‘Annual Report Summary for RECs in England - April 2015 to 
March 2016’ (n 26). 
47 Scientific Officers are part of the Research Ethics Service within Scotland, itself a wing 
within the Chief Scientist Office (CSO), situated within the Scottish Government Health 
Directorates. However, the four Scientific Officers are hired and paid by the relevant Health 
Boards in their region, which currently are: NHS Lothian (South East Scotland), NHS 
Greater Glasgow and Clyde (West of Scotland), NHS Tayside (East of Scotland), and NHS 
Grampian (North of Scotland). Traditionally, the CSO also has had an ethics ‘point person’ 
to coordinate the Scientific Officers and liaise with the HRA. 
48 NHS RECs are audited every three years and there is a quality assurance ‘check’ every six 
months conducted by the HRA’s quality assurance department. 
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NHS RECs tend to convene once per month (up to 10 or 11 times per year) for a ‘full 
committee’ meeting that can run anywhere from two-and-a-half to five hours. The 
majority of the meeting time is spent reviewing new applications, which generally 
are capped at six per meeting (the norm is between four and six per meeting). In-
between the monthly meetings, a smaller group of REC members discuss up to four 
new applications submitted for ‘Proportionate Review’ (i.e. applications submitted 
for a quicker review because they are said to raise ‘no material ethical issues’). These 
discussions usually take place electronically (i.e. emails) or via teleconference. A 
smaller group of REC members (usually led by the Chair) also meet each month 
outside the formal monthly meeting to discuss ‘substantial amendments’ submitted 
by researchers concerning their applications already approved by the REC. For full 
review, RECs are required to provide a final opinion within sixty calendar days of 
receipt of a valid application, and a provisional opinion within ten working days of 
the application’s review at the meeting.49 RECs are required to provide an opinion 
on a Proportionate Review application within 21 calendar days of receipt of a valid 
application. Summaries of research and the REC opinion are available on the HRA 
website approximately 90 days after the REC opinion.50 
While NHS RECs handle a range of health research studies, there are in fact two 
broad categories of committees. First, some of these RECs are ‘recognised’ (i.e. 
legally recognised by UKECA) to give an ethical opinion on a CTIMP to be 
undertaken anywhere in the UK. These UKECA-recognised RECs may review 
CTIMPs of either ‘Type 1’ (healthy volunteers anywhere in the UK) or ‘Type 3’ 
(patients anywhere in the UK), or both.51 The second category of RECs are 
                                                     
49 GAfREC (n 1) para 3.2.9. The actual average review time is much less—in Scotland, on 
average, it is around 28 days for a full committee review (personal communication with 
Scientific Officer, 5 December 2015). If the REC renders a ‘provisional’ opinion requesting 
further information, the 60 day (for non-proportionate review application) or 21 day (for a 
proportionate review application) clock is suspended until the information is received.  
50 Health Research Authority, ‘Research Summaries’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/news/research-
summaries/>. 
51 These Types were created by UKECA, a regulatory authority created in 2004 by the 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004. Type 2 (patients in a single 
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‘authorised’, which means that they are established under the GAfREC, but are not 
recognised by UKECA, and therefore cannot review applications relating to a 
CTIMP. Since 2007, all NHS RECs are subject to an accreditation scheme now 
managed by the HRA (under its RES). Some RECs also have specialist expertise 
(known as ‘committee flags’) in areas such as research involving children, research 
involving prisoners, the establishment of research tissue banks, qualitative research, 
or research involving adults lacking mental capacity. Proposed research falling 
within these areas is steered towards RECs that are ‘flagged’ to review such 
research. 
Having provided a brief overview of NHS RECs, I now turn to explore their role. 
2.3 The roles of RECs 
As will be further explained in Chapter 3, RECs are not, by and large, creatures of 
statute. Rather, they were created informally by the UK health research community 
in the late 1960s to ensure British researchers could continue to receive funding from 
the US federal government following that country’s newly enacted policy of 
institutionalised IRB review.52 RECs were also created, however, in response to 
private and public concerns about participants’ safety in health research, and in 
response to general guidance from both the Royal College of Physicians of London 
and the Ministry (later Department) of Health encouraging their formation in every 
hospital.53 Thus, RECs have developed through varying forms of non-statutory 
                                                     
region of the UK) is currently in abeyance after the disbandment of the LREC/MREC system 
in 2004, which is discussed in Chapter 2. The HRA has established a ‘Phase 1 Advisory 
Group’ to discuss issues relating to the ethical review of Phase 1 trials in the UK, including 
‘initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ethical review.’ The Advisory 
Group meets twice per year and comprises representatives from the HRA, MHRA, industry, 
phase 1 trial units, and RECs with Type 1 recognition to review phase 1 trials. See Health 
Research Authority, ‘Phase 1 Trials’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/resources/before-you-
apply/types-of-study/phase-i-trials/>. 
52 Adam Hedgecoe, ‘“A Form of Practical Machinery”: The Origins of Research Ethics 
Committees in the UK, 1967-1972’ (2009) 53 Medical History 331. 
53 McNeill, Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (n 14) 66-67. See also Julia Neuberger, 
Ethics and Health Care: The Role of Research Ethics Committees in the United Kingdom (King’s 
Fund Institute 1992) 9. 
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regulation, namely policy, guidelines, and custom. Still, today, no UK law clearly 
defines the role of RECs (other than a high-level statement found in, for example, 
the Clinical Trials Regulations 2004 or the Care Act 2014), nor their procedural and 
substantive aspects, nor their legal status (a situation that, as argued in Chapter 7, 
can be seen as beneficial). Instead, the role of RECs must be inferred through 
statutes (and their regulatory components) such as the Human Tissue Act 2004, 
Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 200454 and the Care Act 2014, 
as well as through interpretation of policies and guidelines. Before unpacking these 
roles, however, it is worth pausing to query what is meant by RECs ostensibly 
undertaking, according to the Declaration of Helsinki, ‘consideration, comment, 
guidance and approval’55 of research applications. 
2.3.1 Ethics deliberation? 
As their name indicates, RECs are expected to consider and comment on the ethical 
aspects of a research application. The HRA considers that REC members will ‘have 
opportunities to debate challenging issues’.56 But what exactly constitutes ethics 
review, or deliberation of an ethical nature, and whether RECs actually engage in 
this as they become more institutionalised through procedures and forms, is 
unclear. What is clear is that RECs must operate according to their mandated 
SOPs,57 but these SOPs speak to procedural standards rather than substantive 
standards. RECs may consider a variety of national and international ethics 
standards, policies, exemplars, and guidelines, as well as to a certain degree, laws 
and regulations, such as the Data Protection Act 1998, Human Tissue Act 2004, and 
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (or, where they exist, their equivalent across the 
devolved nations). These instruments provide a range of rules or broad principles 
                                                     
54 See e.g. The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, as amended, reg 
15(5), which sets out what a REC should consider in its opinion for a clinical trial 
application.  
55 Declaration of Helsinki (n 17) para 23. 
56 Health Research Authority, ‘Information for Potential Research Ethics Service Committee 
Members’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/documents/2015/12/standard-application-pack-rec-
members.pdf>. 
57 REC SOPs (n 37). 
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about aspects of health research. For example, the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) has published several editions of its 
International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans since 1982 
(CIOMS Guidelines),58 which are intended to establish or improve ethical 
justification of research and review mechanisms. The latest edition, published in 
2016, establishes 25 Guidelines that cover a variety of areas, including community 
engagement, research involving children and adolescents, and use of stored 
biological materials and related data.  
But the CIOMS Guidelines and other well-established ethics guidance documents 
do not provide clarity as to how RECs are to evaluate ethical principles such as 
‘social value’ or how to ensure that ‘risks to participants are minimised and 
appropriately balanced in relation to the prospect of individual benefit or the social 
value of the research’.59 Nor do the documents clarify what an ethics evaluation 
must include, and how ethics can provide an answer as to whether a particular 
research study should be undertaken. Indeed, we might ask whether RECs engage 
in ethics deliberation at all—and just as critically, whether this matters to fulfilling 
their putative regulatory role. Can a regulator that is faced with limited resources 
(i.e. a tight budget from the NHS and a strictly volunteer effort by REC members) 
and is pressed for time (as regards, for instance, the turnaround time for opining on 
research applications, and the three or four hours dedicated to a full committee 
meeting once per month) really be expected to engage in deep ethics deliberation? 
This further begs the question as to what would constitute ethics deliberation in any 
case. Would we know it when we see it? Arguably, ethics deliberation suggests less 
a focus on formulaic, bureaucratic (arguably synonymous with ‘regulatory’) 
answers to questions (e.g. ‘is there informed consent?’, ‘Have they used our 
template?’) and more of a focus on seeking deeper, more philosophically-engaged 
answers to penetrating questions, such as: ‘Do we really need informed consent 
                                                     
58 The CIOMS Guidelines were first published in 1982, and were revised in 1993, 2002, and 
2016.  
59 CIOMS Guidelines (n 16) (emphasis added). 
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here?’; ‘What sort of alternative safeguards might there be and why?’; ‘What ethical 
stance are we taking to say that consent is not needed here?’ ‘Is this research in the 
public interest?’; and ‘What public good might come from this research and is the 
financial and social cost commensurate?’ 
At this stage, and to set the scene for the empirical research discussion to come in 
Part III, it will be helpful to further unpack the meaning of ethics deliberation. Ethics 
‘is a generic term covering several different ways of understanding and examining 
the moral life.’60 Ethics can be normative, exploring the identification and 
justification of moral norms, or non-normative, investigating moral beliefs and 
conduct or methods of reasoning in normative ethics. For the purposes of evaluating 
research protocols, ethics can be seen as ‘a system of principles or values that assist 
in decision-making’.61 Ethics should enable REC members individually, and the REC 
in aggregate, to reach an ‘opinion’ and justify that opinion by referencing, explicitly 
or implicitly, wider, socially-accepted norms or values. Levine opines that ethics 
reasoning may be conducted at various levels of systemisation: from the highest 
level of abstraction—theories—and from there to principles (e.g. respect for persons, 
beneficence, non-maleficence, justice), to rules or norms (e.g. good research design, 
competent investigator, favourable balance of harm and benefit, informed consent), 
which in turn yield ethics judgements.62 In theory, each REC member, and the REC’s 
collective opinion, may appeal to and apply a spectrum of theories, such as 
                                                     
60 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, OUP 2013) 1. 
61 Graeme Laurie, Shawn Harmon, and Gerald Porter, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and 
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principlism,63 casuistry,64 deontology65 or utilitarianism,66 not to mention 
pragmatism,67 each of which may consist of a systematic corpus of principles and 
rules. REC members are expected to have face-to-face training in ‘research ethics’ 
through initial induction within six months of appointment, ‘Equality and Diversity’ 
training within the first 12 months of their appointment, and the equivalent of one-
day (five hours) training annually.68 This training may provide a survey of different 
theories and regulations (i.e. rules) that reflect (perhaps implicitly) a particular 
approach to ethics deliberation.  
A REC gives a favourable opinion only ‘if it is assured about the ethical issues 
presented by the proposed research’.69 As the ethical issues may vary, depending on 
the research in question, REC members receive training and guidance about the 
issues they should consider, both in general and in particular cases. According to 
                                                     
63 Principlism, one of the better known ethical approaches, is associated with Beauchamp 
and Childress’ ‘canon’ of bioethics that espouses four foundational principles: autonomy, 
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. See e.g. Beauchamp and Childress (n 60). 
64 Casuistry is case-based reasoning used to resolve moral problems by extracting or 
extending theoretical rules from particular instances and applying these rules to new 
instances. See e.g. Stephen Toulmin, ‘How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics’ (1982) 25 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 736. 
65 Deontology (from the Greek, δέον or deon, meaning duty) is a normative ethical position 
that judges the morality of an action based on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules. It is 
commonly viewed as a rights-, rules-, or duty-based ethical framework. Thus, an action itself 
is evaluated apart from its expected consequences. A strict deontologist might argue that if 
an action is deemed morally wrong, then it cannot be justified on any grounds. See e.g. 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (2nd edn, CUP 2012). 
66 Utilitarianism evaluates the moral rightness of human actions in terms of their expected 
consequences. An action is morally right if it is likely to contribute to the development of 
‘goods’, such happiness or pleasure. In traditional utilitarianism, an action is not evaluated 
on its own for its moral rightness or wrongness; rather, consequences play a strong role in 
evaluating an action. See e.g. R.M. Hare, ‘A Utilitarian Approach’ in Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer (eds), A Companion to Bioethics (2nd edn, Wiley-Blackwell 2009); Jonathan Baron, 
Against Bioethics (MIT Press 2006). 
67 Pragmatism is an American-born approach that believes philosophical topics such as 
ethics are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. Pragmatism embraces 
scepticism, empiricism, and experimentation. See e.g. Glenn McGee (ed), Pragmatic Bioethics 
(2nd edn, MIT Press 2003). 
68 GAfREC (n 1) para 1.1.3 (‘All the committee members are given training to understand 
research ethics’). 
69 ibid para 5.3.1. 
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the GAfREC: ‘The training and guidance reflect recognised standards for ethical 
research, such as the Declaration of Helsinki, and take account of applicable legal 
requirements.’70 Yet even if REC members learn about what ‘research ethics’ is 
supposed to entail, according to ‘recognised standards’ and ‘applicable legal 
requirements’, are the REC meetings themselves reflections of a kind of instantiated 
deliberative ethics—ethics as input, process, and outcome—where members 
individually and collectively evaluate and come to decide on the ethical 
acceptability of research proposals by invoking and deliberating on rules, norms, or 
principles?  
There is room for scepticism when we shift our gaze from theory to practice. As 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues have found in their empirical investigation of REC 
opinion letters to researchers: 
Though clearly RECs are making firm recommendations to researchers in 
these [previously discussed] examples of both inconsistent and consistent 
advice, the source of ethical authority for the REC in coming to their 
conclusions is rarely explicit in the letters. GAfREC—which provides the 
framework within which RECs are expected to work—is not referred to in 
any of the letters in our sample. Specific ethical principles or even guidelines 
are rarely invoked explicitly, and when they are, it is to authenticate or 
legitimise the decisions of the committee […].71 
 
If the REC opinion letter is a reflection of the contents of a REC meeting’s 
discussion, there is some doubt as to whether ethical rules, norms, or principles are 
openly discussed at all. Other empirical research has affirmed this finding.72 As 
Chapter 3 stresses, a common past criticism of RECs has been that they engage in a 
‘tick-box’ bureaucratic ethics rather than a deliberative ethics. The former channels 
otherwise deep analytical and philosophical evaluation of a research application’s 
                                                     
70 ibid. 
71 Mary Dixon-Woods and others, ‘Written Work: The Social Functions of Research Ethics 
Committee Letters’ (2007) 65 Social Science & Medicine 792, 796. 
72 Maureen Fitzgerald, Paul Phillips and Elisa Yule, ‘The Research Ethics Review Process and 
Ethics Review Narratives’ (2006) 16 Ethics & Behavior 377. 
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ethical issues into a formulaic assessment of items that rests on the REC’s self-
created legitimacy. Again quoting Dixon-Woods and colleagues: 
The absence of external referents in these letters reinforces the implication 
that the source of the REC’s authoritativeness is the REC itself. The authority 
of the REC letter derives from its organisational and institutional location 
and status, the processing of the application within the remit and 
procedures granted to the REC, and the REC’s exercise of its role as a moral 
authority.73 
As this thesis will argue, the name bestowed upon these bodies (‘ethics 
committees’), and the related expectation that they should engage (only) in ethics 
deliberation (and related criticism that they do not do enough of this) may in fact be 
misplaced. I suggest through my empirical research that as RECs become 
institutionalised and professionalised, acting as multi-faceted and multidisciplinary 
micro-regulators of health research (concerned with minimising risks, ensuring 
scientific value and social value, and so on), and as more national and international 
regulations come into force that impact health research, RECs might be expected to 
act more as risk-assessing ‘health research regulatory committees’ writ large. Yet 
even if RECs do not engage in something approaching substantive ethics 
deliberation, and this is accepted as an outcome of changing socio-political 
circumstances, might they still be able to fulfil their aim of targeting areas of health 
research that pose moral concern, and might they still be able to mitigate the 
manifestation of those concerns?74 This leads to a query of what exactly the roles of 
RECs are.  
2.3.2 Primary role: protection 
RECs, and arguably some of their individual members as well, have several 
regulatory roles. The primary role of a REC has been to protect the health, welfare, 
and dignity of research participants. They do this by issuing a single, independent 
opinion of a research application, set within a regulatory framework and, more 
                                                     
73 Dixon-Woods and others (n 71) 796. 
74 The normative recommendations in Chapter 7 may help to address this issue, too. 
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broadly, a legal architecture.75 To quote the GAfREC, RECs aim to ensure ‘that any 
anticipated risks, burdens or intrusions will be minimised for the people taking part 
in the research and are justified by the expected benefits for the participants or for 
science and society’.76 As the GAfREC further state emphatically: ‘Whatever the 
research context, the interests of participants come first. Their dignity, rights, safety, 
and well-being must be the primary consideration in any research proposal, as well 
as in REC review.’77 In other words, the primary obligation of a REC is to safeguard 
participants and minimise risk of harm. RECs, then, may be seen to operate to a 
great extent as risk-based regulators.78 They exist to protect participants from possible 
harm in research by means of anticipatory avoidance—serving as independent ex 
ante watchdogs and gatekeepers of ethical conduct in research. 
This primary ‘risk minimising’ or ‘participant safeguarding’ role is crucial to 
understanding the linkages between RECs, other health research regulators, 
researchers, participants, science, and society. RECs ostensibly engage in a variety of 
prospective inquiries, tests, and decision-making processes to determine whether a 
research study is ‘ethical’ and whether potential research participants are 
sufficiently protected. This role has been constant, to varying degrees, in RECs since 
their creation and serves to assuage society that science will proceed in a responsible 
manner.79 This, then, can be seen as a variation of a public interest aim, vis-à-vis the 
                                                     
75 This is distinct from providing a legal opinion, which RECs are neither qualified nor 
authorised to do. 
76 GAfREC (n 1) para 1.2.2. 
77 ibid para 3.2.1.  
78 Annette Rid, ‘How Should We Regulate Risk in Biomedical Research? An Ethical Analysis 
of Recent Policy Proposals and Initiatives’ (2014) 117 Health Policy 409; Michelle Meyer, 
‘Three Challenges for Risk-Based (Research) Regulation: Heterogeneity among Regulated 
Activities, Regulator Bias, and Stakeholder Heterogeneity’ in I. Glenn Cohen and Holly 
Fernandez Lynch (eds), Human Subjects Research Regulation: Perspectives on the Future (MIT 
Press 2014). 
79 See e.g. Robert Levine, ‘Institutional Review Boards’ (1989) 298 British Medical Journal 
1268 (The ‘principal function of these committees is to review proposals to conduct research 
in humans to assure conformity with ethical standards’); Robert Veatch, ‘Human 
Experimentation Committees: Professional or Representative?’ (1975) 5 Hastings Center 
Report 31, 35 (‘At the most general level the purposes of the [REC] are fairly clear. The task 
is to protect human subjects from possible harms and wrongs which they might suffer 
32 
 
public having an interest in seeing its individual members (specifically research 
participants, be they volunteering healthy individuals or patients) sufficiently 
safeguarded against harm. Undertaking this primary role also suggests that the 
process effectively results in an ‘ethical covenant’ whereby the REC must trust that 
the researchers will proceed as they have promised to do; beyond the expectation of 
a filing of an annual progress report and any substantial amendments to the study,80 
there is limited power to monitor or police later.81 This suggests an unmet need to 
survey or even steward research protocols as they move past the approval stage; I 
address the theoretical, practical, and normative implications of this in Part III. 
2.3.3 Secondary role(s): promotion 
Protection of research participants may be RECs’ primary role, but crucially, they 
have also always performed secondary roles. One such role is a variation of the 
public interest aim: RECs have an obligation to society to provide stewardship for 
the promotion of ethical and socially valuable research.82 Similarly, RECs also have an 
obligation to researchers, namely through treating researchers’ proposals with 
                                                     
during the course of biomedical […] research’); Will van den Hoonaard, The Seduction of 
Ethics: Transforming the Social Sciences (University of Toronto Press 2011) 56 (‘Protecting 
“subjects” is the claimed central purpose in all international and national research-ethics 
codes.’).  
80 GAfREC (n 1) paras 3.2.17, 5.2.1. 
81 According to the GAfREC:  
Although RECs must be assured about the planned ethical conduct and 
anticipated risks and benefits of any proposed research, they are not 
responsible for enforcement if the research turns out to be unsafe or is not carried 
out as agreed. This responsibility rests with the relevant regulators or 
comparable bodies, as well as with the researchers’ employer and sponsor 
and with the care organisations where the research takes place (or through 
which the researchers have access to participants, or their tissue or 
information) or where the researchers have contracts. 
See GAfREC (n 1) para 3.2.15 (emphasis added). The GAfREC encourages RECs to notify 
relevant bodies responsible for enforcement if they have grounds to suspect that 
enforcement action is warranted (para 3.2.16), and to reconsider its favourable opinion in 
light of pertinent information that comes to its attention, in the form of annual progress 
reports or otherwise (para 3.2.17). 
82 See GAfREC (n 1) para 3.2.2. 
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respect and due consideration and enabling their ethical research.83 If research is 
seen as a public good (and most would accept that it is) and a morally valuable 
activity through the pursuit of knowledge, RECs serve not just to protect research 
participants from being exploited, exposed to excessive risks, or injured; they also 
serve to evaluate research for its societal benefit and reconcile this with the value of 
participant protection. So, in some sense (and as will be explored empirically in later 
chapters), RECs engage in a value weighting system of protection and promotion. 
This said, the GAfREC indicate that these roles are not equal, but rather secondary, 
even placing ‘science and society’ under a separate heading and below the heading 
‘protection of research participants’: 
Science and society 
The interests of researchers and research are always secondary to the dignity, 
rights, safety and well-being of people taking part in research. RECs also 
take into account the interests and safety of the researchers, as well as the 
public interest in reliable evidence affecting health and social care, and 
enables [sic] ethical and worthwhile research of benefit to participants or to 
science and society.84  
Such a ‘role hierarchy’ or ‘principle hierarchy’, as it were, aligns with international 
statements on research ethics, including the EU’s Good Practice Directive,85 the 
Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being,86 and previous editions of the Declaration of Helsinki. For example, the 
2000 edition of the Declaration of Helsinki stated at Paragraph 5: ‘In medical research 
                                                     
83 Gerry Kent, ‘The Views of Members of Local Research Ethics Committees, Researchers and 
Members of the Public Towards the Roles and Functions of LRECs’ (1997) 23 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 186. 
84 GafREC (n 1) para 3.2.2 (emphasis added). 
85 See Commission Directive 2005/28/EC of 8 April 2005 laying down principles and detailed 
guidelines for good clinical practice as regards investigational medicinal products for human 
use, as well as the requirements for authorisation of the manufacturing or importation of 
such products [2005] OJ L91/13, ch 2, s 1, art 2 (‘The rights, safety and well being of the trial 
subjects shall prevail over the interests of society’). 
86 Council of Europe, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, ETS No 164 (1997), art 2 
[hereinafter Oviedo Convention]. 
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on human subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject 
should take precedence over the interests of science and society.’ This was slightly 
modified in the 2008 edition, which stated at Paragraph 6: ‘In medical research 
involving human subjects, the well-being of the individual research subject must 
take precedence over all other interests.’ The latest edition of the Declaration of 
Helsinki, from 2013, states at Paragraph 8: ‘While the primary purpose of medical 
research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the 
rights and interests of individual research subjects.’87 At Paragraph 5, it states: 
‘Medical progress is based on research that ultimately must include studies 
involving human subjects.’88 These statements on their own do not suggest any kind 
of ‘balancing’ between personal harms or benefits and societal benefits, as some 
claim is the role of RECs;89 one clearly trumps the other. The sentiment appears to be 
that ‘in order for science to progress, good research must be facilitated’.90 This does 
not foreclose a proportionate or other kind of approach to account for the value of 
participant protection and the value of research. Indeed, no guidelines or 
regulations for RECs exhort them to have regard solely for the rights, interests, and 
welfare of participants. What it does mean, though, as Cave and Nichols note, is that 
‘…the goals of research and researcher, while important, should always be 
secondary to the dignity, rights and wellbeing of the research participant’.91 
 
                                                     
87 Declaration of Helsinki (n 17) para 8.  
88 ibid para 5. 
89 Simon Whitney, Balanced Ethics Review: A Guide for Institutional Review Board Members 
(Springer 2016). See also Emma Cave and Christopher Nichols, ‘Reforming the Ethical 
Review System: Balancing the Rights and Interests of Research Participants with the Duty to 
Facilitate Good Research’ (2007) 2 Clinical Ethics 74 (‘The balancing of the imperatives […] is 
the key to ethical research.’). 




2.3.4 Ambiguity in the role hierarchy 
Despite the GAfREC’s text, the role hierarchy of RECs in the UK has long been 
ambiguous.92 In 1984, for example, the Royal College of Physicians of London issued 
a highly-cited document, Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical 
Research (RCP Guidelines), which served as a much-needed source of information 
and opinion on a range of matters concerning the procedures of RECs, with the aim 
of standardising them. The RCP Guidelines viewed RECs as not just protecting 
participants from possible harm. The objectives of RECs, according to the 
Guidelines, were ‘to facilitate medical research in the interest of society, to protect 
subjects of research from possible harm, to preserve their rights, and to provide 
reassurance to the public that this is being done. Committees also protect research 
workers from unjustified attack.’93 Elsewhere, the RCP Guidelines stated that ‘it is 
important [for RECs] to be continuously aware of the need to avoid impeding good 
medical research. The Committee should indeed seek to facilitate good research’.94 
This statement was retained in future editions and arguably strengthened, no longer 
suggesting ambiguity but rather clarity: the latest edition of the RCP Guidelines 
from 2007 states emphatically that ‘RECs have a duty to encourage important ethical 
research’.95  
Similarly, informal guidance for REC members stresses a dual role that involves 
some kind of balancing. For example, the sixth edition of the Manual for Research 
Ethics Committees, last published in 2003, states that: 
Members of Research Ethics Committees have the responsibility of ensuring 
that medical research on humans is conducted in an ethical manner. In order 
                                                     
92 McNeill, Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (n 14) 5 (‘In both Britain and New 
Zealand the purposes for research ethics committees include: (1) the protection of the human 
subjects of research; (2) promoting research; and (3) reassurance of the public.’). McNeill 
found these multiple roles unusual compared to the other jurisdictions he researched. 
93 Royal College of Physicians, Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical 
Research (1st edn, Royal College of Physicians 1984) 1.  
94 ibid 2. 
95 Royal College of Physicians, Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in Medical 




to fulfil this function, Research Ethics Committees must engage in 
reasonable discussion and consideration of the ethical issues in each of the 
research proposals they have to review. This is demanding and time-
consuming work, and the responsibilities entailed are considerable. On the 
one hand there is the need to contribute to the evidence base upon which 
modern medicine is based, on the other is the need to protect those who 
participate in the research process.96 
As discussed more fully in Chapter 3, the language of ‘protection and promotion’ 
has been instantiated in statutory regulation such as the Care Act 2014, and 
operationalised in the mandates of the HRA and its RES branch, as well as the 
mandates of RES offices in the devolved nations. For instance, HRA guidance for 
potential REC members states: ‘The key duty of a REC is to protect the interests of 
research participants whilst at the same time facilitating ethical research.’97 
NHSScotland’s CSO also states this dual role, without specifying a role hierarchy: 
‘[The National Research Ethics Service] has a duel [sic] mission: to protect the rights, 
safety, dignity and well-being of researcher [sic] participants and to facilitate ethical 
research which is of potential benefit to participants, science and society.’98 The 
mission of Northern Ireland’s ORECNI is stated as: ‘To maintain a Research Ethics 
Service to protect the rights, dignity and welfare of research participants within the 
HSC System/NHS, and to protect the rights of researchers to perform ethical 
research and legitimate investigation’.99 In its recent annual report, ORECNI’s 
mission is stated somewhat similarly: ‘To protect the rights, safety, dignity and well-
being of research participants; and to facilitate and promote ethical research that is 
of potential benefit to participants, science and society’.100  
                                                     
96 Sue Eckstein (ed), Manual for Research Ethics Committees (6th edn, CUP 2003) xvii. 
97 Health Research Authority, ‘Information for Potential Research Ethics Service Committee 
Members’ (n 56). 
98 Chief Scientist Office, ‘Research Ethics Structure in Scotland’ 
<http://www.nhsresearchscotland.org.uk/services/research-ethics>. 
99 ORECNI, ‘Mission Statement’ <http://www.hscbusiness.hscni.net/services/orecni.htm>. 





The claim that RECs equally serve to facilitate ‘good medical research’ or ‘important 
ethical research’—perhaps even as a moral duty if we interpret the 2007 RCP 
Guidelines suggesting such—establishes a notably different message regarding the 
regulatory role of RECs in health research, as seen in both the literature and in 
documents such as the GAfREC, and arguably a message that is more pronounced 
than in other countries.  
2.4 To protect and (equally) promote? 
It could be said that regulation is by its nature designed to affect behaviour of some 
kind (whether to restrict or to enable it),101 and therefore in some sense RECs have 
always, even if indirectly, been implicated in the facilitation of ethical health 
research. By considering, commenting on, guiding, and approving research studies 
that are well-designed scientifically and in accordance with law and established 
rules and principles of ethical conduct, RECs do promote a certain desired kind of 
behaviour, and this is what makes them regulators.102 Yet, even if regulation is, at its 
essence, about steering and therefore affecting social behaviour,103 critical questions 
still remain regarding: 1) how twinning the roles of ‘protection and promotion’ 
might influence REC performance and decision-making, and 2) whether there might 
be regulatory misalignment between some of the instruments specifically for 
RECs—emphasising participant protection—and regulatory instruments governing 
central regulators of health research and RECs themselves—imposing research 
                                                     
101 See e.g. Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: 
Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 3. 
102 Sheelagh McGuinness, ‘Research Ethics Committees: The Role of Ethics in a Regulatory 
Authority’ (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 695; Linus Johnsson and others, ‘Making 
Researchers Moral: Why Trustworthiness Requires More Than Ethics Guidelines and 
Review’ (2014) 10 Research Ethics 29. Similarly, Montgomery argues that RECs can be seen 
as a consolidation of bioethical practices into an advisory and regulatory structure. See 
Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Bioethics as a Governance Practice’ (2016) 24 Health Care Analysis 
3. 
103 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and 
Materials (CUP 2007) xiv (‘We understand ‘regulation’ scholarship as a broad and open-
ended category that can readily apply to many forms of intellectual inquiry concerning the 
purposive shaping of social behaviour, particularly state and non-state standard-setting, 
monitoring and behaviour-modification processes’). 
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promotion—that impacts the overall quality and effectiveness of health research 
regulation. 
As briefly noted above, and as will be detailed in Chapter 3, that the UK emphasises 
protection and promotion simultaneously is not new per se.104 For years, the country 
has held in some of its regulations and policies that RECs aim to facilitate (ethical) 
health research. The guidelines for RECs first emanated from the health research-
favourable Royal College of Physicians in 1984. Then, as now, there was scholarly 
concern that ‘the British guidelines have tipped the balance too far in the direction 
of the interests of researchers and have not given sufficient emphasis to the 
protection of subjects’.105 Then, as now, there was a concern that ‘committee 
members are confused by a perceived conflict between the requirement to facilitate 
research and their need to be critical of research’.106 
So, what is different? In short: the regulatory embeddedness of research promotion. 
In my thesis, I demonstrate through an anthropology of regulation—qualitative 
research guided by anthropological and regulatory theory—that the ‘promotionist’ 
                                                     
104 A parallel may be drawn to data protection law, specifically the EU’s Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (EU) 2016/679, which 
also speak of protection and promotion as twin aims (see e.g. Recital 10, which speaks of the 
GDPR seeking ‘…to ensure a consistent and high level of protection of natural persons and 
to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data within the Union’). Yet, what this means in 
practice for data controllers or data protection authorities has never been spelled out, nor is 
it clear that the promotion aim of the GDPR, and its predecessor EU Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC, has ever been achieved. Commentary suggests that the Data Protection 
Directive has been successful in protecting Europeans’ personal data, but less so in 
facilitating data transfers from one member state to another, much less outside the EU. 
Arguably, the Directive’s twenty-year history would suggest that the twin aims of protection 
and promotion have been more rhetorical aspiration than workable success.   
105 Paul McNeill, ‘Research Ethics Review in Australia, Europe, and North America’ (1989) 11 
IRB: Ethics and Human Research 4, 5. 
106 McNeill, Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (n 14) 67, citing the study of REC 
members conducted by Julia Neuberger. See Neuberger (n 53) 44 (‘There is ambivalence 
arising from the sense that REC members should be supporting and facilitating research 
rather than criticising it, and from the knowledge that RECs have inadequate powers, and 
often insufficient status, within their [District Health Authorities].’). Yet Neuberger herself 
also stresses the dual role of RECs, stating that ‘their role is both to act as public watchdog 
and to encourage good quality research’. ibid 45. 
39 
 
ideology has moved ‘up the ladder’ in the regulation of RECs and in the regulation 
of health research, all the way to implementation in law, most pointedly in the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012 and Care Act 2014. What was once custom or 
guidance has now become legal rule. Relatedly, the thesis queries whether this 
ideological movement is unidirectional (top-down), or whether recent legal 
developments reflect already-existing REC practices. To date, we do not really know 
the practical impact (if any) of this explicit legal regulatory shift, especially on RECs. 
Empirically, we remain largely uninformed of how RECs in the UK make decisions 
under the penumbra of ethics, law, and other forms of regulation, and how they 
engage with regulatory bodies such as the HRA in the course of doing their work, 
particularly in this regulatory environment of protection and promotion. As I will 
argue in my thesis, an anthropological approach that draws attention to process, 
time, and space can reveal new understandings of regulatory theory and the nature 
of health research regulation, and what it means to experience being in or in charge 
of a REC. Such an approach will also provide an opportunity to explore the 
relationship between regulation and ethics in operation. At this preliminary, scene-
setting stage, however, we can speculate that several different processes are at play. 
2.4.1 Ethical, political, and regulatory processes 
As McNeill observes, and as will be discussed in Part III, determining the ethical 
acceptability of research is not just a complex and amorphous ethical process; it is 
also a political process.107 REC members may employ discursive strategies to 
convince other members of their position on an issue; power dynamics may arise 
between ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ members, not to mention between the REC Chair and the 
other members. The REC Manager and Scientific Officer themselves may play a 
                                                     
107 McNeill, Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (n 14) 1 (‘It is about balancing one set 
of interests in the community against another set of interests: the interests of science and 
scientists (principally) on the one hand and the interests of human subjects of 
experimentation on the other.’). McNeill clearly states that the primary mechanism 
undertaken by RECs is balance, a claim that I question in my thesis. Without question, 
determining the ethical acceptability of research is also a psychological process within each 
member and in aggregate in a group dynamic. 
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crucial gatekeeping and intermediary role. As a committee, RECs may be drawn 
further into power dynamics with their ‘managing’ regulatory authorities. As this 
thesis will explain, in the current regulatory environment, hortatory guidelines and 
self-regulation have given way to legal regulation and centralised regulatory bodies 
to coordinate and manage RECs. RECs must navigate the complexities of modern 
health research and the challenging cross-cutting demands from their managing 
regulators that encourage both protection of research participant interests and also 
promotion of health research. This entails a working through of the interests of 
researchers and research participants, and of science and society as well—which 
suggests that the process of determining whether research is ethically acceptable is 
also a regulatory process.  
Curran observed many years ago that ‘[t]he use of review committees is a common 
law approach. These committees will be building the law as they go along.’108 
Curran’s comment was more aspiration than observation; nevertheless, the 
regulatory process is observed both in statutory regulations that RECs follow or 
apply to research proposals (e.g. research involving adults lacking capacity), as well 
as in the regulatory techniques they employ to govern research. Indeed, as health 
research regulators themselves, RECs can look not only to what statutory or other 
types of regulations may (or may not) say about a proposal, they can also issue 
researchers many self-generated regulatory commands in their opinion letter, 
concerning, for example, whether a research design is flawed; whether a researcher 
may use human tissue on ethical grounds; whether a participant has mental 
capacity to consent; whether different groups of participants should be included; 
and not uncommonly, whether the information sheet says too little about burdens 
or risks or misrepresents what may happen. Such commands, it seems, reflect a 
                                                     
108 William Curran, ‘Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human Subjects in Medical 
Research: The Approach of Two Federal Agencies’ (1969) 98 Daedalus 542, 585. Curran used 
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hybrid blend of legal and ethical reflection that in toto signify a power to say ‘yes’, 
‘maybe’, or ‘no’. RECs are said to provide an ‘opinion’ on research proposals, but 
this is understated euphemism. The power of a REC opinion is profound. In effect, 
the opinion is a regulatory event licence: without a positive opinion, research simply 
cannot proceed, either by way of law (in the case of clinical trials, for instance), 
policy, or practice (in most other instances of health research, where it likely could 
not be published in any journal or otherwise gain the respect of the research 
community). 
Since the new millennium, and especially as RECs (in England) are now under the 
management of the HRA through the Care Act 2014,109 the role hierarchy of 
participant protection and research promotion has flattened acutely, to the concern 
of some. Previewing discussion in Chapter 3, shortly after the dawn of the new 
millennium, Cave and Holm expressed concern that the EU Clinical Trials Directive 
2001/20/EC ‘led to a subtle change of emphasis from the protection of research 
participants to the facilitation of research’.110 In the same time period, Beyleveld, a 
legal scholar, expressed concerned about a conflict of interest the dual roles could 
create: 
The root of the problem is that, despite the World Medical Association 
Declaration of Helsinki, the management of the REC system believes that 
the role of RECs is not just to protect the rights of research subjects, but also 
to facilitate good quality research. […] [T]his just highlights a conflict of 
interest. A dog cannot serve two masters, and the role of RECs, in fact, is 
solely to try to prevent unethical research. The facilitation of research is the 
role of other bodies.111 
Beyleveld expressed particular concern that the operation of multi-site RECs 
(MRECs), created in 1997 (and later disbanded in 2004 after he wrote the words 
                                                     
109 The relationship of the HRA to RECs in light of the Care Act 2014 is discussed further in 
Chapter 3.  
110 Emma Cave and Soren Holm, ‘New Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics 
Committees: Is Facilitating Research Achieved at the Cost of Participants’ Interest’ (2002) 28 
Journal of Medical Ethics 318. 
111 Deryck Beyleveld, ‘Law, Ethics and Research Ethics Committees’ (2002) 21 Medicine and 
Law 57, 72-3. 
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above), was in the hands of the NHS R&D Directorate, whose role, in part, was to 
promote research. In light of the recent regulatory reform, I believe his message still 
holds force even after the dissolution of local RECs (LRECs) and MRECs. The 
ethical, political, and regulatory processes by which RECs render an opinion may 
well manifest quite differently under the research-transformative HRA. Such a 
change may resolve some or most of the problems that critics (mainly health 
researchers) have levelled against RECs for years, but it may also lead to collateral, 
even unintended changes in how RECs review research studies, such as making 
determinations about balance of harms and benefits, and interpreting the form and 
function of consent. If changes will have emerged in this next-generation regulatory 
environment, it is an as-yet unknown answer what impact it may have on 
participants, researchers, and society. Phrased both empirically and normatively, 
can and should RECs both protect and promote? And if this is a new approach, what 
kind of regulator do RECs become? 
Likely, many in the health research community would respond positively to this 
more explicitly twinned role, claiming that RECs do not just act as a safeguard 
against unethical research, they also encourage ethical research to improve health 
and health care, as outlined above.112 McNeill, a legal scholar, also thinks there is a 
place for research promotion: 
In my view, systems of review by committee in most countries […] are 
systems for allowing research on human subjects with a minimum of 
interference. […] In practice, committees are composed as if the priority is 
the creation of optimal conditions for research on human subjects with a 
minimum of interference. In a sense, the British Royal College of Physicians 
guidelines are more open about the actual function of ethics committees. 
[…] [T]he principle purpose of research ethics committee review is not 
protection of subjects but reassurance of the public so that the research 
enterprise can continue relatively unhindered.113  
                                                     
112 George Alberti, ‘Multicentre Research Ethics Committees: Has the Cure Been Worse than 
the Disease?’ (2000) 320 British Medical Journal 1157. 
113 McNeill, Ethics and Politics of Human Experimentation (n 14) 198. 
43 
 
Similarly, Miller, a bioethicist, argues that research ethics as a whole ‘inherently’ 
suffers from a ‘tension’ between these two ‘ethical’ objectives that must be 
‘balanced’, and seems to suggest that RECs (among other actors) should be charged 
with undertaking this inquiry and ‘balancing’ assessment:  
Research ethics inherently involves tension between two ethical objectives: 
1) promoting socially valuable knowledge aimed at improving medical care 
and public health and 2) protecting research subjects from exploitation and 
harm. Accordingly, the research enterprise and research ethics can err in 
two ways: by excessive restrictions on valuable research and by failure to 
provide adequate protection of research subjects. […] Striking justifiable 
balances between these two ethical objectives is the fundamental task of 
research ethics, which calls for searching inquiry and honest debate.114 
This view may contrast with those held by some within the REC community. For 
instance, a former member of three RECs in two countries found that his fellow 
members do not actively seek to facilitate research, but rather focus on the ethical 
acceptability of a given research study by asking four basic, risk-avoiding, 
participant-safeguarding questions: (1) What hazards are raised by the research 
protocol? (2) Can the protocol be redesigned to reduce these hazards without 
compromising its ability to answer the research question? (3) Have the investigators 
taken reasonable steps to minimise the chances that the (remaining) hazards result 
in harm? (4) Are either the hazards or the risk of their resulting in harm 
disproportionately great in relation to the apparent importance of the knowledge to 
be gained?115  
This is not to discount or disfavour the (wider) public interest aim of RECs that 
stresses a view beyond a possibly overly cautious and conservative one focused 
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of Bioethics 34, 35. 
115 Konrad Jamrozik, ‘Research Ethics Paperwork: What is the Plot We Seem to Have Lost?’ 
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solely on research participants. Indeed, some qualitative research supports the view 
that RECs are reflexive of their position in health research governance; they do 
consider how their work could impact research and society. Hedgecoe’s 
ethnographic study of three RECs, for example, found that ‘REC members see their 
role as one of supporting or encouraging research, in addition to the more obvious 
duties of protecting patients and ensuring informed consent’.116 What Hedgecoe’s 
empirical research suggests is that RECs act as the GAfREC encourages them to: 
foremost, to safeguard participants; but also, somehow—and perhaps secondarily, 
but perhaps not—to facilitate research. 
Even if this is the case, though, how does this arguably secondary but important 
reflexive role align with the ‘primary’ role of participant protection? Undoubtedly, 
the roles work together, but they are not necessarily balanced, nor might ‘balance’ 
be the appropriate mechanism. ‘Balance’ is a stalwart in the legal and regulatory 
literature (not to mention case law), but, as is too often ignored, can serve as a 
rhetorical ploy in regulation to mask other techniques to render judgement.117 In 
health research, Veatch has observed that IRBs in the US may employ different 
techniques to interpret and apply the ‘fundamental’ ethical principles of respect for 
persons, beneficence, and justice. These include: 1) a ‘single principle view’, where 
one principle takes precedence; 2) a ‘simultaneity view’, where all principles must 
be satisfied simultaneously for a protocol to be deemed acceptable; 3) a ‘balancing 
view’, where the principles taken together must be satisfied on balance; and 4) a 
‘ranking view’, where principles can be rank-ordered such that the highest ranking 
principle must be fully satisfied before the next rank is considered. Veatch further 
observes that US health research regulation fails to offer a theory of what should 
                                                     
116 Adam Hedgecoe, ‘Research Ethics Review and the Sociological Research Relationship’ 
(2008) 42 Sociology 873, 878 (emphasis added). 
117 Scholars in other fields have deconstructed the term. See e.g. Robert Patterson and Ronald 
Lee, ‘The Environmental Rhetoric of “Balance”: A Case Study of Regulatory Discourse and 
the Colonization of the Public’ (1997) 6 Technical Communication Quarterly 25; Derek Ross, 
‘Ambiguous Weighting and Nonsensical Sense: The Problems of “Balance” and “Common 
Sense” as Commonplace Concepts and Decision-making Heuristics in Environmental 
Rhetoric’ (2012) 26 Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy 115. 
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happen when a proposed research project involves a conflict of principles.118 In this 
thesis, I take up Veatch’s important observation, arguing that it may apply to the 
twin objectives of ‘protection and promotion’, and that, in the absence of an 
expressed theory of how these two objectives should be achieved, a theory (or 
decision framework) should be crafted that may not invariably hinge on balance. 
If we question the rhetorical use of or under-theorised reference to ‘balance’, we 
may further wonder if instead, RECs evaluate research studies implicitly in stages 
and act as gatekeepers or stewards at several thresholds, including a ‘tolerable (risk 
of) harm’ (i.e. protection) threshold and a subsequent ‘social value’ or public benefit 
(i.e. research promotion) threshold.119 That is, once a REC has deemed an application 
prima facie ethically acceptable because the risks to participants are minimised and 
weighed against any possible benefits to them (and often there are few if any 
individual direct benefits), might the REC then move to consider research 
promotion, whereby the prospect of societal benefit or the social value of the 
research is evaluated and considered against the risks to participants? If so, what 
happens in these stages of dual commitment—of accommodating potential harms to 
participants as well as potential benefits to society, not to mention other 
considerations? In this realm of possibility, might a REC take a lead in maximising 
outcomes such as suggesting ‘improvements’ to the research questions, methods, 
proposed uses of findings, and so on? If so, this would suggest less a concern with 
‘balance’ and more a concern with research optimisation. Thus, while ‘balance’ seeks 
to achieve a suitable equilibrium bewteen two at-times competing values at all 
stages of research (along the lines of Veatch’s simulteneity view), optimisation seeks 
to achieve a stage-based satisfaction of ranked, but similarly appreciated, values. 
                                                     
118 Robert Veatch, ‘Ranking, Balancing, or Simultaneity: Resolving Conflicts among the 
Belmont Principles’ in James Childress, Eric Meslin and Harold Shapiro (eds), Belmont 
Revisited: Ethical Principles for Research with Human Subjects (Georgetown University Press 
2005). 
119 Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression’ (n 2). 
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This critical question of balance versus optimisation (or something else) regarding 
protection and promotion remains open. It also raises several additional questions 
about the impact this next-generation regulatory environment may have on RECs—
whether RECs encounter this twin, potentially competing role of protection and 
promotion in their work today (or long before), and if so, how it is operationalised 
in their practices. 
2.4.2 Empirical questions raised by the structure and roles of RECs 
In light of the above discussion, several questions arise under three broad headings 
that will be addressed in the course of this thesis: 
Changing REC characteristics? 
 What is the role today of a REC? Do RECs act as risk-based regulators, and 
how would we recognise this approach in practice?  
 What does ‘good’ ethics review look like for REC members—and what 
supports this, and what gets in the way of it? Do REC members do things 
they should not do according to regulations, and equally, are there things 
they do not do that they think they should do? 
 What are the perceived practical changes in RECs, if any, with next-
generation regulatory reform such as the Care Act 2014 and establishment of 
the HRA?  
Balance, ranking, optimisation—or something else? 
 Do REC members perceive a ‘push’ to both protect research participants and 
also facilitate responsible health research through proportionate or 
streamlined regulation and alignment of REC processes? Are there proxies 
or symbols that suggest mechanisms for aligning (or reconciling) protection 
and promotion? 
 How do regulators (particularly the HRA) and REC members think a 
suitable alignment of research participant protection and research promotion 
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can be achieved in practice (e.g. would proportionality of ethics review 
processes be a manifestation of research promotion)? 
 If RECs are indeed seen to operate in a new regulatory environment, what 
strains might these demands of protection and promotion put on RECs as a 
regulatory body? Could RECs or the devolved nations’ Research Ethics 
Services run into political conflict with the HRA?  
The liminality120 of ethics review? 
 Do REC members and regulators think that health research is adequately 
guided throughout the research lifecycle? Should RECs and/or other bodies 
(e.g. HRA, CSO), or specific actors within these bodies, do more to guide 
researchers and research participants across the research lifecycle, and not 
just at the preliminary stage of ethics review?  
 Do RECs evaluate research studies in stages and act as gatekeepers, or 
stewards, at several thresholds? If so, what happens in this liminal space of 
accommodating risks and potential benefits such as social value, as well as 
other considerations? 
 If the law is creating a regulatory space within which there is more room to 
protect and promote, has it created a space for more epistemic latitude—a 
realm of possibility—for RECs to roam in along with, or together with, other 
actors? If so, what is the relationship of the REC to the ‘space’: do they 
occupy it as one of many actors; do they mould and shape the space, or do 
they create the space—or spaces within spaces? 
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RECs have been a backbone in regulating the ethical acceptability of health 
research—and by extension, much of health research’s very existence—since the late 
1960s. They serve as gatekeepers that determine whether a proposed research study 
is ethically acceptable and therefore may proceed. RECs not only play a central role 
in the health research regulatory space, they also hold tremendous power over what 
knowledge is produced, and from knowledge production across the translational 
divide, what medico-scientific applications are created. While many support the 
underlying idea of ex ante ethics review by a committee as a means of protecting and 
promoting the rights, interests, and welfare of participants, many also have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the structure of the ethics review system and the 
individual processes of RECs. As this thesis will explain, multiple regulatory 
techniques and instruments have been employed over the years in the hopes of 
remedying the many problems attributed to RECs, foremost the concerns of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Many researchers found the regulatory techniques 
and instruments of yore, particularly through the 1990s and in the form of 
‘guidance’, to offer a weak remedy.  
Recent changes may bode differently. Since its formation in late 2011, the HRA has 
been tasked with both protecting research participants from harm and also 
facilitating a productive research environment by streamlining health research 
regulation. The HRA is a central regulatory body that is seen to help make the UK 
once again an attractive place to conduct health research such as clinical trials. 
Money, jobs, and international pharmaceutical and regulatory competition are all at 
stake. One pathway to make the country more attractive for conducting health 
research, and to provide national economic benefit, is to remove perceived 
regulatory thickets. Ethics review has been viewed as part of this thicket.  
The HRA, particularly through its RES, and equivalent bodies such as the CSO and 
ORECNI, are working to make REC processes more effective and efficient. As the 
HRA’s RES website states: ‘We have a duty to provide an efficient and robust ethics 
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review service that maximises UK competitiveness for health research and 
maximises the return from investment in the UK, whilst protecting participants and 
researchers.’121 What is unclear, however, is how this stress on duties of efficiency 
and maximisation of ‘UK competitiveness for health research’ and maximisation of 
‘return from investment in the UK’ may affect the substantive and procedural 
workings of RECs. Can or should efficiency, as well as competition and investment 
maximisation, be accomplished while simultaneously protecting participants? The 
UK is seen by many as a leader in health research regulation, and many have taken 
an interest in its recent reforms. As one author notes in a review of health research 
regulation across four countries: ‘The current regulatory complexity appear[s] to be 
largely irrational, probably arising from piecemeal reactions to specific problems 
and scandals in the past. Thus, the new […] HRA is of great interest in terms of 
future developments. If successful, it may have an impact outside [the UK].’122 
Rich, empirical evidence is needed to investigate these questions. There have been 
relatively few in-depth qualitative studies of RECs, much less from a regulatory 
perspective.123 This undermines effective regulation, as policymakers and regulators 
(through state actors or otherwise) increasingly seek to develop regulation through 
intricately documented evidence of problems and the effects of regulation on 
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Comparison of Finland to England, Canada, and the United States’ (2016) 14 Health 
Research Policy and Systems 5, 9. 
123 There have been several empirical studies of IRBs (US) and REBs (Canada). See e.g. van 
den Hoonaard, The Seduction of Ethics (n 79); Laura Stark, Behind Closed Doors: IRBs and the 
Making of Ethical Research (University of Chicago Press 2012); Robert Klitzman, The Ethics 
Police? The Struggle to Make Human Research Safe (OUP 2015); Jan Federici Jaeger, ‘An 
Ethnographic Analysis of Institutional Review Board Decision-Making’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania 2006); Raymond De Vries and Carl Forsberg, ‘What Do IRBs 
Look Like? What Kind of Support Do They Receive?’ (2002) 9 Accountability in Research 
199. There have been a few qualitative research studies of RECs in the UK. See e.g. 
Fitzgerald, Phillips, and Yule (n 72); Sarah Dyer, ‘Rationalising Public Participation in the 
Health Service: The Case of Research Ethics Committees’ (2004) 10 Health & Place 339; 
Adam Hedgecoe and others, ‘Research Ethics Committees in Europe: Implementing the 
Directive, Respecting Diversity’ (2006) 32 Journal of Medical Ethics 483; Hedgecoe, ‘Research 
Ethics Review’ (n 116).  
50 
 
society—what is termed ‘evidence-based policy’.124 Through document analysis, in-
depth interviews, and observation—and guided by anthropological and regulatory 
theory—we should endeavour to build a knowledge base from which we can 
investigate the nature of health research regulation, pinpoint weaknesses, and 
recommend improvements—in other words, we should embark on an anthropology 
of regulation and build an evidence-based regulatory framework. There is a need 
for qualitative research, asking how and why RECs make the decisions they do, and 
how the nested dynamics of RECs and central ‘managing’ regulators play into 
decisions.  
Documented problems of RECs have largely relied on evidence and anecdote 
proffered by health researchers and physicians. Little evidence has been proffered 
by social scientists or legal scholars who have gone inside RECs to ask and examine 
how they, as individual members and as a body, see themselves and their 
committee in a changing regulatory environment, and inside regulatory bodies to 
gather the regulators’ perspective on the roles of a REC within the health research 
regulatory space. Just what is the power of a word like ‘promotion’? By gaining a 
critical understanding of what RECs actually do and exploring the nature of health 
research regulation, such research could offer a crucial contribution to 
understanding the roles actors play in health research and how these roles 
transform over time and across stages in research.  
The next chapter traces the regulatory development of RECs and health research 
regulation within the UK, with a view to demonstrating both the growth of health 
research regulation and the increasingly central role that RECs play in regulating 
health research. As with all bodies that become institutionalised and gain 
prominence, RECs have faced more external scrutiny. For many years, there were 
repeated calls for structural reform, particularly from the research community—a 
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community, of course, that since the beginning has participated in and been directly 
affected by RECs. The REC system in the UK has indeed now undergone structural 
reform, partly due to ongoing macro-regulatory changes occurring at the European 
Union level that impact on member states’ national regulations. Overall, recent 
reforms appear to have been to the satisfaction of the research community. The 
central claim I wish to make is that while to a certain degree, research promotion 
has always been embedded in the regulatory techniques of RECs, it has not until 
now been instantiated in law with the creation of the HRA and rules promulgated 
under the Care Act 2014. The subsequent and fundamental research question to 
explore is whether this instantiation of research promotion in law has a (hitherto 
absent) trickle-down effect that impacts the day-to-day practices of RECs, and if so, 
how, or indeed, whether the law is only now coming to reflect an everyday practice 
that has long existed. This question, and the methodology and methods that drive it, 





Chapter 3  




The previous chapter provided a conceptual framework of RECs and their roles in 
regulating health research. I claimed that while research promotion—acting to 
advance knowledge and discovery in the interests of science and society—has been 
a longstanding role of RECs in the UK, that role traditionally has been situated as 
secondary in key regulatory instruments and, somewhat less clearly, in practice. I 
claimed further that research promotion is now embedded as a twinned objective of 
health research regulators in law, which is hitherto unseen, and signals a ‘flattening’ 
of the role hierarchy of participant protection and research promotion in RECs. I use 
the term ‘signals’ because ultimately this is a claim that warrants empirical 
investigation. Part I of this thesis provides a space to query, based on regulatory and 
historical analysis rather than empirical investigation, the ‘trickle-down’ effect this 
next-generation, streamline-emphasising regulatory environment has on RECs—
that is, whether RECs can be expected to encounter this twin role of protection and 
promotion in their work today (or before), and if so, how it is felt and 
operationalised in their practices. Through conceptual overview and deep historical 
tracing, Part I serves to make the original claim about the uneasy tension between 
protection and promotion, which consequently demands certain further, empirical-
based research, as covered in Parts II and III, which, reciprocally, also helps better 
make sense of the historical context provided here. 
Thus, this third chapter steps back in time to better understand the present context, 
and to further set the stage for the empirical investigation and analysis presented in 
Parts II and III. Here, I present a historical tracing of the development of RECs as 
health research regulators within the UK. The aim in this chapter is not to provide 
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simply more background to the current environment, but rather to argue that there 
has been growth in the volume and complexity of health research regulation since 
the mid-20th century, with a consequent backlash against negative repercussions for 
research, health, and the economy. I further argue that RECs are a critical node in 
the health research regulatory space, a space comprised of a variety of actors who 
may at times hold cross-cutting resources and motives. To properly examine the 
development of RECs and the responses by various actors to mitigate their many 
perceived problems (most significantly, as a bureaucratic bulwark against otherwise 
ethical research), we would be better served to examine the health research 
regulatory space itself. If there are problems with RECs, to a large degree it is likely 
a reflection of the regulatory space in which they are situated. This chapter claims 
that through significant reforms, RECs and their managing regulators have come to 
serve as a focal point for not only the protection of research participants, but also the 
sustainability and promotion of health research.  
Tracing history over the past half-century, we will see that as health research gained 
prominence in the UK as both a driver of scientific knowledge and economic 
development, self-regulation of health research—ad hoc peer review by fellow 
scientists based on professional norms and local customs—gradually gave way to 
stricter, stronger, more centralised forms of regulation, particularly through policies 
and guidelines set by the UK’s constituent governments. This was done in an effort 
to steer health research in an ethical manner and provide coordination and 
coherence for researchers, research sponsors, and the general public. In the course of 
this regulatory evolution, RECs became institutionalised within the NHS system 
(albeit haphazardly) and proliferated in number. Pressure was placed on RECs by 
different stakeholders to review research applications for ‘consideration, comment, 
guidance and approval’125 as this was seen as conforming to emerging good 
international practice. But this pressure led to RECs facing increased scrutiny and 
opprobrium from members of the research community, many of whom argued that 
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RECs were performing the reviews poorly. The accusation was that they were too 
numerous in number, duplicative in their reviews of the same application for a 
multi-site study, and overly complex, opaque, and inconsistent in their functions. By 
the late 1990s, the picture painted by some was one of regulatory chaos rather than 
order. Despite a degree of reforms in the early 2000s, there remained concern about 
the future of health research in the UK due to ostensibly obstructive, economically 
destructive regulation. Stakeholders made repeated calls for substantial reform at 
the level of regulatory architecture of health research, i.e. the regulatory pathways 
for designing and conducting health research, rather than at the structural level of 
the regulatory nodes, such as abolishing RECs altogether.  
Largely, these calls appear to have been answered. RECs and their overlaying, 
nested regulatory architecture have undergone substantial reform in the past 
decade. Partly this is due to ongoing macro-regulatory and macro-political changes 
occurring at the European Union level that impact member states’ national 
regulations (e.g. the EU’s Clinical Trials Regulation that is expected to take effect in 
the UK in 2019,126 and the still-uncertain outcome of the ‘Brexit’ EU referendum 
result in June 2016). This next-generation health research regulatory reform is 
designed to be ‘streamlined’-attuned and proportionate, calibrated to the ‘scale and 
complexity of the research proposed’.127  
The tone of the current regulatory era is reflected in the HRA’s RES, which states on 
its website: ‘We have a duty to provide an efficient and robust ethics review service 
that maximises UK competitiveness for health research and maximises the return 
from investment in the UK, whilst protecting participants and researchers.’128 This 
appeal to efficiency and a ‘duty’ to maximise UK competitiveness for health 
research and maximise the return from investment in the UK reflects an increasingly 
neoliberal discourse in government policy grounded in regulatory speed and, 
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which, as Flear writes, ‘fuses governmentality with technical reason and means-end, 
or instrumental, market rationality’ and considers economic optimisation the central 
aim of governance.129 Unquestionably, researchers and the pharmaceutical industry 
seem satisfied with the most recent reforms. The number of academic articles 
lamenting the state of ethics review in the UK has dwindled and transformed into 
praise; many look at the UK’s ethics review system today with envy, viewing it as 
comparatively highly coordinated, efficient, and robust.130 But what do these 
regulatory reforms tell us about the nature of next-generation health research 
regulation and what its impact might be on RECs (to say nothing of its impact on 
research participants and publics)? With the creation of the HRA in late 2011, the 
statutory rules promulgated under the Care Act 2014, and ensuing changes in 
regulatory instruments governing RECs, a key question arises: does instantiation of 
research promotion in law and at the governmental level of health research 
regulatory bodies have a trickle-down effect that impacts the day-to-day practices of 
individual, ‘independent’ RECs? Or, is law now merely reflecting a long-standing 
everyday practice of RECs? More broadly, has anything really changed in how ethics 
‘is done’ by RECs, or have the changes only been at a higher, more overtly political 
level of legal and regulatory architecture? 
I begin to answer these questions through a historical tracing from the 1960s, with 
the development of RECs in the UK in the late 1960s and their scattered, at-times 
haphazard entrenchment as health research regulators in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Following this, I explore the formal establishment of LRECs in 1991, MRECs in 1997, 
and the earlier incarnation of the central regulatory bodies (COREC and NRES) that 
sought to manage them, particularly in England. I then discuss the creation of three 
important regulatory instruments in the early 2000s—the Research Governance 
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Frameworks from the four nations, the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics 
Committees (GAfREC) originally issued separately in England and Scotland, and the 
uniform Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees—all set within 
the backdrop of the controversial 2001 EU Clinical Trials Directive131 and the UK’s 
national transposition of the Directive in The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical 
Trials) Regulations 2004,132 which ended the bifurcated and much-maligned 
LREC/MREC system and brought RECs, for the first time, within a legislative 
framework with imposed statutory duties. Throughout this deep historical tracing 
of regulatory reform in the UK across the decades (which has not been done 
previously), I weave in critical commentary proffered by the research community 
that lobbied repeatedly for regulatory reform, particularly in the 1990s and through 
the first decade of the 2000s. I then discuss more recent regulatory reforms such as 
the introduction of the online, centralised Integrated Research Application System 
(IRAS) in 2004; the regulatory streamlining-orientated HRA in 2011; the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012; the Care Act 2014; the Central Booking Service and the online 
HRA Assessment Review Portal (HARP) in May 2014; the harmonised UK Policy 
Framework for Health and Social Care Research that replaces the four nations’ Research 
Governance Frameworks; and recent government white papers and policy papers 
encouraging further streamlined health research regulation. I reflect on the 
sometimes-troubled interaction between different stakeholders and RECs, which in 
turn, enables me to conclude with a reflection on the potential changing regulatory 
nature of RECs.  
My central contention in this chapter is that while research promotion has emerged 
as a recent statutory phenomenon in health research regulation, it has existed, 
somewhat ambiguously, as a critical value throughout the history of RECs, 
appearing in various disguises. Similarly, participant protection has always been a 
driving value of, and role for, RECs; however, this has never been the sole, as 
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opposed to primary, concern of RECs. Indeed, RECs were created as much out of 
pragmatic response and political necessity, driven by concerns of organisational 
liability and financial harm, as they were out of concern for participant protection. 
Participant protection and research promotion have had an uneasy, unequal, but 
sustained marriage across the RECs’ lifespan. And along the way, REC members 
have faced the challenging task of working in regulatory spaces that demand that 
they work with various regulatory actors and that they not only operate within the 
(shifting) regulatory spaces’ confines, but also help shape their contours.  
3.2 REC development in the UK 
The notion of ethical evaluation of a proposed research study by a committee of people 
qualified in some way to assess either or both the study’s methodology and ethics 
has long been viewed by many scholars as necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, 
for the successful functioning of, and public trust in, health research. RECs, it is said, 
reflect a well-designed if not pragmatic system of ‘social control’ by researchers’ 
peers and others. As May opined in 1975: ‘The primary guarantee of protection of 
subjects against needless risk and abuse is in the review before the work is 
undertaken. […] [I]t is the only stage at which the subject can be protected against 
needless risk of injury, discomfort, or inconvenience.’133 Robertson similarly 
concluded in 1979: ‘The [REC] is an important structural innovation in the social 
control of science, and similar forms are likely to be developed for other such 
controversial areas.’134 By regulating research in an event licensing capacity—that is, 
by offering opinion on and ethical approval of a research study before it 
commences—RECs are seen to mitigate risks to researchers, participants, and 
society. 
At the same, with sustained stakeholder support and growing institutionalisation 
through stricter forms of regulation, RECs have come to hold tremendous power 
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over how research is shaped—and thus, what knowledge is produced—and how 
the relationship between a researcher and a research participant is circumscribed. 
As Stark observes, ethics committees ‘are empowered to turn a hypothetical 
situation (this study may be acceptable) into shared reality (this study is acceptable). 
[…] [T]hey change what is knowable.’135  
How did RECs come to hold such power? And, for the purpose of this thesis, what 
were the regulatory roles envisioned for RECs when they were created? 
3.2.1 Pragmatic creation in the 1960s and medical profession self-regulation 
Some of the first RECs in the UK were constituted following recommendations in 
the ‘Responsibility in Investigations on Human Subjects’ policy statement, 
published in the Report of the Medical Research Council (MRC) for 1962-63,136 
which was presented to Parliament in July 1964. However, in his ground-breaking 
historical study of RECs, Hedgecoe carefully details how, as a whole, they were 
born not out of any research scandal, but rather out of the practical and economic-
driven necessity of British researchers to maintain funding from the US Public 
Health Service. Hence, many RECs arose only after the US Surgeon General’s policy 
from 8 February 1966, announcing that all research institutions in the US and 
overseas receiving Public Health Service funds for health research would have to 
receive prior approval from an ethics committee—a committee of the principal 
investigator’s ‘institutional associates’—based at each institution, and with each 
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committee determining what would constitute ethical research.137 RECs were thus 
created as a pragmatic compromise to events unfolding in different locales and to 
concerns by different actors about the smooth operation of medical research and 
maintaining (or increasing) funding for it. The Thalidomide scandal of 1962 and 
Maurice Pappworth’s exposés (to be discussed) had little impact on regulatory 
development.138 As will be seen, the defining feature of REC creation in the UK was 
the maintenance of the medical profession’s self-regulation. 
Many more RECs were created after a July 1967 report from a committee of the 
Royal College of Physicians of London (RCP), which recommended that each 
competent authority (e.g. Board of Governors, Medical School Council, Hospital 
Management Authority) in medical institutions should ensure ‘that all projects 
involving experimentation on humans’ be approved by ‘a group of doctors 
including those experienced in clinical investigation’.139 The RCP report was careful 
to warn that: 
[I]t is of great importance that clinical investigation should be free to proceed 
without unnecessary interference and delay. Imposition of rigid or central 
bureaucratic controls would be likely to deter doctors from undertaking 
investigations, and if this were to happen, the rate of growth of medical 
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knowledge would inevitably diminish with resultant delay in advances in 
medical care.140 
At the same time, the RCP recognised that ‘it has now become necessary for a 
procedure to be available for the ethical guidance of clinical investigators. The 
provision of such guidance would not only serve to allay understandable anxiety in 
the public, but would be appreciated by clinical investigators, themselves, when 
faced with ethical problems.’141 The then Ministry of Health widely circulated the 
RCP report, providing it a form of regulatory approbation, albeit from some 
distance. These early RECs were constituted only to give guidance to staff in 
hospitals or similar institutions. The RCP report ‘deliberately’ did not give specific 
guidance on the structure or functioning of such committees since it considered that 
what might be appropriate in one institution might be inappropriate elsewhere:142 
according to the RCP committee, ‘the way in which this could best be organised 
must vary with different institutions’.143 A green light was given in regulatory 
instruments for local ways of operating RECs, as determined by the medical 
profession.  
Pappworth’s book, Human Guinea Pigs, was published in 1967, which, similar to 
Henry Beecher’s article a year prior,144 laid out damning evidence of unethical 
research carried out in the UK and other jurisdictions.145 Pappworth, an English 
physician, undoubtedly put his finger to the wind and sensed policy changes afoot 
in his country and the US. Pappworth advocated that clinical research studies 
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undergo prospective ethics committee review by physician-researchers’ peers, with 
committees at each hospital board being responsible to the General Medical 
Council, which in turn would be answerable to Parliament. His book meant to 
ensure those policy recommendations were robust and implemented, but few in 
government listened. While his work ‘alerted the public to the ethical issues 
associated with clinical experiments, and contributed to a broader critique of 
professional expertise, it had little impact on the governance of medical research or 
treatment’.146 Changes were soon to come, but only when the self-regulating medical 
profession deemed it necessary in light of political and economic interest. The value 
of Pappworth’s and Beecher’s exposés is that they augmented the general public 
malaise with research oversight on both sides of the Atlantic. As the US and UK 
were both undergoing rapid economic expansion in the post-war era, health 
research and science were seen as key drivers of progress and prosperity. But 
progress and prosperity could only be sustained by a robust regulatory system that 
garnered public trust and avoided scandal. In response—and when the profession 
felt it had to act to retain its power—the era between the late 1960s and early 1970s 
was marked by revolutionary regulatory enactments. 
The Ministry of Health issued its first circular on RECs—HM(68)33: ‘Supervision of 
the Ethics of Clinical Investigations’—in May 1968 to Regional Hospital Boards, 
Hospital Management Committees, and Boards of Governors, and referred to the 
earlier reports of the MRC and RCP. HM(68)33 recommended that hospitals should 
establish ethics committees, tellingly termed ‘informal advisory bodies’. As Gilbert 
and colleagues observe of this development, hospital ‘authorities were not legally 
required to establish ethics committees, and the committees were offered no formal 
legal status. No specific guidelines on practices and methods were given because it 
was thought that strict rules of conduct would not be adaptable to local needs.’147 
And as Hedgecoe observes, the Ministry of Health seemed content to rely on the 
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RCP as a form of ‘proxy’ to ensure the spread of RECs, but the RCP’s powers were 
limited, not least in compelling REC creation at each hospital and ensuring that 
hospitals (and hence the NHS and its Ministers) took legal responsibility for RECs’ 
decisions: 
It is not that RECs were not a form of self-regulation, but rather that this 
informal status was less the result of laissez-faire “drift” on the part of the 
policy makers than a deliberate, active decision to dissociate these 
committees from NHS bodies and thus help preserve the idea of clinical 
autonomy.148 
Following the request of the Chief Medical Officer in 1971 for analysis of the 
supervision of the ethics of clinical research in hospitals and other institutions,149 in 
July 1973, a further report was published by the RCP that provided details of the 
recommended composition and scope of ethics committees,150 including a call for 
‘experienced clinicians with a knowledge of clinical research investigation’ and a 
recommendation that ‘there should be a lay member’.151 The report stated that 
‘supervision’ of research ethics in an advisory role should normally be the sole 
function of the committee rather than as a police watchdog, and that applications 
should be made to an ethics committee for all proposed clinical research 
investigations, including trials of drugs approved under the Medicines Act 1968 and 
teaching demonstrations on students.152 The report stated that the object of ethics 
committees was ‘to safeguard patients, healthy volunteers and the reputation of the 
profession and its institutions in matters of clinical research investigation’.153 
Further, it recommended that ethics committees ‘be small and they must not be so 
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constituted as to cause an unreasonable hindrance to the advancement of medical 
knowledge’.154  
This was the first clear regulatory statement in the UK of the role of RECs in 
protecting participants, but one notices immediately that the aim of protecting 
participants and ‘public safety’ is considered as important as that of protecting 
researchers and institutions and ‘improving rather than blocking’ research. What is 
unclear is how exactly these two concerns of protecting participants and not unduly 
hindering the advancement of medical knowledge were to be reconciled by 
committees. Regardless, this view towards safeguarding the medical profession’s 
reputation and improving research while protecting participants seems to have 
aligned well with what REC members considered their aims to be: protecting 
participants but not stifling research. In a 1979 article, members of one REC stated: 
The ethical committee decided it had three main aims: firstly, to ensure that 
the highest ethical standards are maintained during research investigation 
on man while ensuring that, at the same time, research is not stifled; secondly, to 
ensure the protection, safety, and well being of the patient or volunteer, 
whether or not the procedure is to be of benefit to him; and, thirdly, to 
ensure that subjects are fully informed about any research that affects them 
and also that consent is properly obtained.155 
The RCP’s 1973 report was evidently endorsed and promoted by the government. In 
June 1975, HM(68)33 was replaced by HSC(IS)153: ‘Supervision of the Ethics of 
Clinical Research Investigations and Fetal Research’, which emphasised that ‘all 
proposed clinical investigations should be referred to an ethical committee’.156 That 
same year, a new version of the Declaration of Helsinki was released and for the first 
time mentioned RECs: ‘The design and performance of each experimental 
procedure involving human subjects should be clearly formulated in an 
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experimental protocol which should be transmitted to a specially appointed 
independent committee for consideration, comment and guidance.’157 
By the late 1970s, RECs were a well-established feature at hospitals, but it became 
apparent that their remit should expand to cover much of the health research 
occurring outside of hospitals as well, given the growth of research in universities 
and stand-alone research sites. As early as 1974, the NHS was reorganised such that 
area health authorities158 became responsible for clinical research conducted in all 
premises under their control, so many RECs began to consider research projects in 
the wider community and not just in a hospital. Some changed their name to reflect 
the larger district area and independence from any hospital.159 As a 1981 editorial in 
the British Medical Journal (BMJ) reported: ‘It is now apparent that the ethical 
committees, which were set up to review hospital-based research, should have a 
wider composition and cover research in all fields of medical practice.’160 Taking a 
cue from these regulatory developments, funders such as the MRC began to make it 
a condition of funding that researchers have local ethics committee approval for 
research involving clinical trials and for investigations involving human subjects, 
whether conducted within or outwith a hospital.161 These local RECs that sprang up 
across the country continued to have wide latitude to interpret whether a research 
project was ethically acceptable. The meta-regulatory question that would soon 
arise was whether development of RECs should be spearheaded by the government 
or by the medical profession. Should self-regulation by the medical profession 
continue relatively unabated under the guise of clinical autonomy, or should the 
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government begin to enact stronger forms of regulatory control? As we will see, the 
response in the 1980s reflected the same tone as the previous decades, if not more 
so: strong self-regulation by the medical profession and the absence of centralising, 
state-led regulatory control. 
3.2.2 Limited regulation through the 1980s 
By the early 1980s, RECs were established as ‘satellite regulators’ of health research 
in multiple countries, as recommended by international guidance such as the 
Declaration of Helsinki and the 1982 International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects, published by CIOMS in collaboration with the 
World Health Organization (WHO). The RCP’s report from 1973 was superseded in 
1984 with its now well-known Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees in 
Medical Research (RCP Guidelines).162 As already noted in Chapter 2, the RCP 
Guidelines stated that RECs were ‘to facilitate medical research in the interest of 
society’ and ‘to protect subjects of research from possible harm’.163 No mention was 
made of the value of participant protection ranking above the value of facilitating 
medical research. The RCP Guidelines were seen as the best ‘effective standard for 
RECs in the UK,164 and, apparently, they were needed. As early the late 1970s—little 
more than ten years after many RECs were created—the research community 
maligned both the rapid growth and complexity of RECs, as well as the 
inconsistency in their operations in part due to reorganisations of the NHS.165 One 
commentator lamented: 
Decentralisation of the management of the NHS locally organised research 
scheme was intended to enable regional health authorities to develop 
arrangements best suited to their local circumstances [but] [t]he variations in 
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the structure and practice of regional research committees suggest […] that 
differing standards of adjudication and review may also have resulted.’166  
Similarly, Thompson and colleagues’ survey of 34 RECs in Scotland in 1980 found 
that: 
In their present form research ethical committees do not satisfy fully the 
interests of the public or the research worker. There is inadequate 
representation of lay interests at all levels, and with most committees 
maintaining strict confidentiality over their proceedings there is little other 
scope for public accountability. The limited use of expert assessors and 
capricious monitoring leave the research worker in a state of uncertainty. 
[…] The committees provide only limited safeguards for patients and 
research workers, and more effective, standardised procedures are 
[needed].167 
In 1982, Lewis remarked that while the establishment of RECs was ‘in many ways 
[…] an excellent thing’ because it ‘restrains the over-enthusiastic researcher and 
provides protection to those who take part in research both as subjects and 
investigators’, there were a ‘number of negative aspects of the present system’.168 
Among his system-level concerns was the ‘institutionalisation of ethics’ in medical 
research whereby in approving a study the REC agrees ‘to shoulder a portion of the 
investigator’s responsibility’, meaning the researcher ‘has a measure of 
responsibility lifted from him and begins to act as if his actions were directed by a 
higher authority’: ‘In the state of devolved responsibility between the committee 
and the investigator, each can push its ethical responsibilities off onto the other.’169 
Lewis also voiced concern about the procedural nature of RECs, commenting that 
they were ‘by nature bureaucratic and process applications using guidelines which 
tend to become stereotyped’.170 Most troubling about this bureaucracy was that 
‘most, although not all’ RECs ‘insist that every subject taking part in research 
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projects gives informed consent to the research in writing’.171 For Lewis, there were 
some circumstances (namely trials comparing two accepted therapies for patients 
with a fatal disease) where written consent could ‘be distressing to the subjects and 
hence […] the antithesis of “ethical”.’172 As Lewis rhetorically asked: ‘Why should 
the research ethics committee, which is there primarily to protect subjects, insist on a 
procedure which cannot benefit a patient but which can only cause harm? The 
answer is really administrative convenience, rigidity of procedure.’173 
Concerns were also raised about the inconsistency and randomness of RECs, in part 
a symptom of the self-regulatory, clinical autonomy paradigm long-espoused by the 
government. By the late 1980s, Gilbert and colleagues noted that RECs seemed to 
spring up haphazardly and idiosyncratically across the country: some within 
hospitals, others independently but with responsibility to a district health authority 
or management team that appointed them, and others within pharmaceutical 
companies for phase 1 clinical trial studies.174 RECs were, in other words, operating 
in a hybrid regulatory space where they were seen as under-regulated regulators 
but themselves over-regulating health research. In part, this was due to the 
government’s explicit position of deferring regulatory authority to the medical 
profession and removing regulation where they could. Hedgecoe and others have 
noted that in the early 1980s (and until the Clinical Trials Regulations 2004), the 
government deregulated areas of biomedical research such as phase 1 clinical trials 
to encourage more clinical trials in the country, all but removing regulatory 
oversight from the Medicines Division of the Department of Health and Social 
Security and later the Medicines Control Agency (the predecessors of the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, or MHRA), and placing both ethics 
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and scientific review within RECs alone.175 While RECs could be a thorn in the sides 
of researchers, RECs typically were less stringent than drug regulators and certainly 
one less regulator from which researchers would need to secure approval. 
But all the same, many commentators found the REC system Byzantine. RECs were 
public, private, institutional, and regional. Even though some felt confident in 
averring that ‘[e]thics committees exist to protect patients and to ensure that 
uninformed opinion does not hinder good clinical research’,176 the prevailing 
opinion was that the only common approach of RECs was to bewilder researchers 
and stifle research. Few were clear as to the remit and scope of their review, much 
less the standards by which they undertook evaluation of a research proposal. The 
RCP Guidelines were revised in 1990, but it had become apparent to many in the 
research community that under-regulated, inconsistent RECs were too damaging to 
research, despite the fact that most REC members were researchers or clinicians 
themselves, and guidance from the RCP encouraged them to facilitate research. 
Guidelines were not enough, many felt; it was time for the government to step in 
and attempt to achieve some marked level consistency in how these committees 
were structured and how they functioned. As an editorial in the BMJ in 1990 opined, 
citing articles recently published by researchers in its own journal and a report 
published by the Institute of Medical Ethics in 1986177: ‘evidence suggests that the 
ethical control of medical research remains inconsistent and ineffective’, ‘sensible 
suggestions about the structure and process of ethics committees have been widely 
ignored’, and ‘[t]hirty years should have been adequate for ethics committees to get 
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their act together, yet there are still wide discrepancies in their constitution and 
working’.178  
The problem was that no regulatory network nor central health research regulatory 
authority existed for distributing guidelines and standards to achieve procedural 
and substantive consistency,179 and many RECs seemed to ignore the RCP 
Guidelines and operate as they pleased, revelling in what was little more than self-
regulation and local control within a health district. Julia Neuberger’s in-depth 
empirical investigation of RECs across the UK in the early 1990s found that it was 
lack of statutory regulation for RECs that caused problems, including researchers 
not taking RECs seriously. RECs were fundamentally disempowered regulators of 
research. ‘RECs have not hitherto followed guidelines particularly closely’, she 
reported, ‘lack power, being advisory to [district health authorities] and other 
appointing authorities, and have no policing or monitoring role’.180 Neuberger 
therefore concluded starkly that RECs were neutered regulators: 
However hard they work, however thorough their examination of research 
protocols on a case-by-case basis, however much better constituted and 
trained, and however well supported they may be administratively, unless 
they have the power to ensure that all research is submitted to them and to stop 
research that they regard as unethical, they will not be taken sufficiently seriously. 
For these reasons and others, this report, whilst making detailed 
recommendations for improvements to present practice, recommends that 
there should be proper legislation.181 
3.2.3 Formal LREC/MREC establishment and further criticism: 1990s 
On the heels of Neuberger’s investigation, a degree of regulatory clarity and 
robustness came in August 1991 when the Department of Health issued Health 
Service Guideline (91)5: ‘Local Research Ethics Committees’, which replaced 
HSC(IS)153 from 1975 and formally introduced LRECs in England. (Wales and 
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Scotland passed their own guidelines to establish LRECs in 1991 and 1992, 
respectively.182) Hedgecoe observes that this ‘marked the point where power over 
the shape of ethics review shifted from the medical profession (in the form of the 
RCP) to central government.’183 The Health Service Guideline, colloquially referred 
to as ‘the Red Book’, stated that ‘every [NHS] health district should have a local 
research ethics committee to advise NHS bodies on the ethical acceptability of 
research proposals involving human subjects’.184 LRECs would scrutinise research 
projects involving patients from within the specific health authority. Thus, each 
LREC acted on behalf of and for the local health authority in an advisory capacity, 
so it was ultimately the NHS body (e.g. NHS Trust, Special Health Authority) that 
would decide whether a project should go ahead. However, no sanctions for non-
compliance were mentioned in the Red Book and thus NHS institutions were not 
compelled to adopt the guidelines and institute LRECs.  
This regulatory guidance and the Department of Health taking responsibility for 
RECs failed to quell the research community’s criticism of RECs. And, arguably 
because the guidance was not statutory regulation as advocated by commentators 
such as Neuberger, RECs were still not taken ‘sufficiently seriously’ by many 
researchers.185 Neuberger’s report was written just after the Red Book’s release; 
analysing the new guidance, she concluded that ‘whilst their tone is tougher than 
that of previous versions, they lack the detailed discussion of the RCP guidelines’.186 
Neuberger also observed that the Red Book differed somewhat in substance from 
the 1990 RCP Guidelines (having superseded the original 1984 version). The Red 
Book suggested that multi-centre research could be approved by a single LREC, 
whose decision would then be accepted by other committees, but the details were 
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not specified and so unsurprisingly, this never happened. Each LREC sought to 
approve research conducted in its health district, regardless of the outcome of 
reviews conducted by LRECs elsewhere. Though some RECs voluntarily entered 
into local arrangements to recognise other local REC decisions, this was by no 
means universal and rarely extended beyond a single health authority boundary.187 
The light-touch regulatory approach from the Department of Health only served to 
exacerbate REC differentiation across the country. By this time, there were over 200 
RECs across the UK. Studies from the mid-1990s indicated that large variations in 
application requirements, review procedures, and opinions occurred in practice 
among different LRECs.188 The level of support and accountability to their 
appointing authorities were equally variable.189 Calls for a common, standardised 
research application form were common in medical and science journals. Despite 
the introduction of standard operating procedures for LRECs in 1994,190 members of 
the research community continued to express discontentment with stifled health 
research. 
The REC structure was partially modified in 1997 when new Department of Health 
guidelines sought to simplify the procedure for ethical review of multi-centre 
studies. HSG(97)23191 required research studies conducted in the UK that involved 
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four or more LREC geographic localities (i.e. four or more health authority 
boundaries) to have approval from both a single ‘MREC’ in the country (out of 13 
that eventually existed), and the LREC for each participating site. As a Department 
of Health document, the rationale for the MREC creation was to streamline research 
governance processes to improve the environment for clinical trials: 
…[the] reasons for streamlining the system for LREC review of multi centre 
trials [...] [are] [….] To contribute to improved clinical outcomes by 
approving potentially beneficial research more efficiently [….] To reduce 
delays to good research […] [and] [….] To avoid a large number of LRECs 
all devoting time to the same aspects of identical protocols.192 
The MREC system was overseen by the NHS Research and Development 
Directorate (and was directly accountable to the Department of Health), whereas 
LRECs were overseen by regional health authorities. Research could not proceed 
until each LREC informed the approving MREC of its lack of objection with respect 
to ‘locality issues’, which were later specified in the first edition of the GAfREC 
released in September 2001. This meant that LRECs could provide advice about the 
local acceptability of a protocol and could reject the research protocol for ‘locality 
issues’, but could not amend the study protocol or the study instruments. One 
MREC approval would be valid throughout the UK; if the MREC declined to give a 
favourable opinion on the application, any existing approval by LRECs still stood, 
but those LRECs had to be informed of the MREC’s decision.  
Despite this regulatory change that was intended to smooth approvals for multi-site 
research, many researchers found that in practice, MREC approval did not 
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necessarily lead to more efficient and cost-effective LREC approval.193 As Collett 
notes: 
Many local RECs did not trust these newly-formed MRECs and were 
unhappy to relinquish their perceived responsibility for the ethical review of 
research projects taking place within their patch. This often resulted in 
lengthy delays whilst LRECs and the MREC disagreed over ethical issues 
occasionally resulting in the local REC refusing to approve the study for 
their local site.194 
In summary, though RECs in the NHS system have existed sporadically and 
informally since the late 1960s, they had no formal standing until guidance was put 
forth by the Department of Health in 1991, and it must be emphasised that this was 
only guidance. Through the 20th century, then, RECs in the UK were simply 
ungoverned by statutory regulation. Until the 21st century, when statutory 
regulations were introduced that legally required REC review and approval for 
certain types of health research, there was no legal requirement for health 
researchers to obtain prior REC approval, and there was no statutory regulation that 
governed the practices of RECs. This is not to say that the impact of REC practices 
were unfelt by researchers. On the contrary, as we have seen, their impact on 
controlling research was profound. As Kennedy and Bates would write as late as 
2003, before the national transposition of the EU Clinical Trials Directive:  
Research Ethics Committees do not have the legal status of a statutory body, 
with clearly defined legal powers and duties. Thus, any authority that an 
Ethics Committee wields is informal and extra-legal. Such authority should 
not, however, be underestimated. […] [A]lthough there is no clear legal 
obligation on a potential researcher to submit a protocol to an Ethics 
Committee for approval, researchers within the NHS will be denied access 
to patients and data without such approval. Furthermore, those who fund 
research ordinarily stipulate that research must be approved by a Research 
Ethics Committee if it is to be funded. In relation to the publication of 
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research, it is standard practice, at least in English journals, for editors not to 
publish research results if proper approval was not sought or given.195 
RECs’ informal and extra-legal authority was acute, and for many researchers, 
deeply troubling. Clinical autonomy and self-regulation would have to be reined in. 
3.3 Centralisation and legislation in the new millennium 
By the late 1990s, RECs had become an established if maligned feature in the health 
research regulatory space. In response to 1) criticisms that the functions and 
standards of RECs were imprecise and harmful to valuable research; 2) the coming 
into force of the EU Clinical Trials Directive; and 3) the North Staffordshire research 
scandal that erupted in the 1990s,196 RECs underwent significant changes in the new 
millennium. They became governed by a variety of governance mechanisms—
including top-down, state-led commands and controls—that sought to make them 
work efficiently and harmoniously, and in so doing, impacted more directly how 
they worked. Every few years, new guidance from the UK’s Health Departments 
emerged to ‘update’ RECs to make the process smoother for researchers and more 
robust for the public interest, including: the establishment of the Central Office for 
Research Ethics Committees (COREC) in 2000; a Research Governance Framework in 
2001; governance arrangements for RECs in 2001; the requirement for a single UK-
wide REC opinion in 2004 that replaced the LREC/MREC system; standard 
operating procedures for RECs in 2004; an online Research Ethics Database (RED) to 
enable REC administrators to import application data and documentation and to 
process and control research applications through to the approvals stage and to 
record and track post-approval activity; and the creation of an online portal to 
submit research applications (today known as IRAS) in 2004.  
Despite these many reforms, the growth of health research regulation through 
guidelines and frameworks that sought to make RECs more efficient, consistent, and 
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robust in their processes—coupled with the passage of three major Parliamentary 
statutory instruments on clinical trials, human tissue, and mental capacity—led to a 
perception that research was just getting buried in paperwork and bureaucratic 
acronyms, and that RECs were getting papered over but not fundamentally 
reformed. As RECs were created before there was any national legal requirement for 
their use or adherence to a governing framework, consistency, effectiveness, and 
cooperation were long-standing challenges. Regulatory add-ons did not remedy the 
problems identified by many, or if they managed to plug the hole on one issue, 
others would appear. Deeper regulatory solutions were called for to solve the 
problems created in part by misaligned, siloed regulation itself. 
Researchers were frustrated with the growing amount of bureaucracy in the 
system.197 Some felt that the process of acquiring ethics approval was ‘so onerous 
that it is compromising clinical research’,198 and that the system had become a 
‘rather prescriptive, bureaucratic and rigid process’, with ‘a fairly standardised 
review procedure and application form, leading to standardised research 
procedures.’199 Researchers were particularly unhappy with having to obtain both 
REC approval and ‘R&D permission’ (i.e. research governance permission) from 
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each of the NHS service providers (e.g. NHS trusts) involved in their research study, 
as established in the second editions of the Research Governance Framework.  
Over-regulation and a disproportionate approach to research presenting low risk 
were seen as the main problems. As one group of researchers intoned: ‘In a risk-
benefit arena that is now heavily stacked towards perceived risk, the instigators of 
over-regulation must bear responsibility for the real and emerging risks of a failure 
to deliver the potential lifesaving benefits of clinical research promptly.’200 
Coupled with their criticisms, clinicians and researchers invoked the rhetoric of 
research ‘promotion’. For example, in a BMJ editorial in 2000, the then-President of 
the RCP insisted the REC system needed to be improved as it was obstructing 
‘research that will in the long run improve health care and health’—which was one 
of the ‘two major functions’ of a REC, along with protecting participants and the 
public from possible harm.201 This positioning was strategically important, as 
continuing to frame RECs as carrying two equally important roles would enable the 
research community, including the powerful and politically connected RCP and 
AMS (Academy of Medical Sciences), to lobby the UK government for favourable 
changes to the research regulatory and governance structure.  
In the following sections, I trace the steps of deep regulatory reform in the new 
millennium with a view to demonstrating that the reform was in direct response to 
criticisms made by the research community (and its representative bodies), and that 
the reform was to be led by the central government, which instantiated the dual 
roles of participant promotion and research promotion at the level of legal 
architecture.  
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3.3.1 2000-2010: A series of fundamental reforms 
To address the continuing concerns about the processes around ethics review, and 
to help RECs prepare for future implementation (in May 2004) of the EU’s Clinical 
Trials Directive,202 England’s Department of Health established COREC in 2000. 
COREC’s mission was to improve the system of operation of RECs and to advise the 
Department of Health on necessary policy requirements concerning their 
operation.203 COREC took on the administrative functions for MRECs and provided 
management support for LRECs, including through local Offices of Research Ethics 
Committees (ORECs) situated across ten sites in England, with each led by a OREC 
Manager. The local health authorities (Health Boards and Strategic Health 
Authorities) remained the appointing authorities for the LRECs. While COREC 
acted for the Department of Health in England, it ‘also provided a focus for 
discussion and collaboration with the relevant bodies and individuals in Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. It undertook most of the development work to 
create a common UK system’ for RECs.204 Among the procedural changes instituted 
by COREC early in the new millennium was the creation of a Central Allocation 
System in 2004, a common UK-wide ethics application form, and standard opinion 
letters issued by RECs. Even so, some researchers criticised the application form for 
being too long and cumbersome.205 
In March 2001, the Department of Health published the first edition of the Research 
Governance Framework for Health and Social Care (RGF), which set forth a quality and 
accountability framework within which research was to be undertaken in the 
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NHS.206 Both the RGF and GAfREC were created partly in response to a report 
published in May 2000 that looked into the North Staffordshire scandal, where from 
1990 until 1993, it was alleged that premature infants in North Staffordshire 
Hospital had been put into a controlled trial of an alternative type of ventilator 
without their parent’s knowledge or consent.207 Allegations of lack of consent were 
first raised by a group of parents in the late 1990s, when apparently they first 
became aware that their infants had been enrolled in the controlled trial. The 
controversial inquiry set up in February 1999 and the subsequent report, led by 
Professor Rod Griffiths, recommended a major overhaul of the way in which all 
clinical research was conducted in the NHS, including establishing ‘formal guidance 
on research governance within the NHS’ in the form of a national research 
governance framework,208 as well as clear governance arrangements for RECs. The 
government accepted the key recommendation, and began crafting a research 
governance framework in 2000.209 
Notably, the RGF reinforced the language from previous guidance documents in the 
UK (most notably the RCP Guidelines) that emphasised RECs should also facilitate 
research. But, it declared that participant protection nonetheless was ‘primary’, thus 
ranking roles (or ‘responsibilities’) previously treated equally under the RCP 
Guidelines:  
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Their primary responsibility is to ensure that the research respects the 
dignity, rights, safety and well-being of individual research participants. 
They should also work efficiently to facilitate the good conduct of high 
quality research that offers benefits to participants, services and society at 
large. Unjustified delay to such research is itself unethical.210 
Elsewhere, the RGF also identified RECs as holding two ‘key responsibilities’, 
namely: ‘ensuring that the proposed research is ethical and respects the dignity, 
rights, safety and well-being of participants’; and ‘assuring the scientific quality of 
proposed research’.211 
Working with COREC, the Department of Health also released in July 2001 its 
Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees (GAfREC), which 
replaced the previous guidance issued under cover of HSG(91)5 (which established 
LRECs) and HSG(97)23 (which established MRECs). Scotland published an 
equivalent GAfREC in October that same year.212 Sensing that MRECs and LRECs 
were not operating efficiently, the GAfREC were drafted as guidance to provide ‘a 
standards framework for the process of review of the ethics of all proposals for 
research in the NHS and Social Care which is efficient, effective and timely, and 
which will command public confidence.’213 Meant to be read in conjunction with the 
RGF, the 34-page GAfREC (and its subsequently longer version published in 2011) 
set out ‘general standards and principles for an accountable system of RECs’.214 
Seeking to create a comprehensive national system of RECs, the GAfREC stated that 
RECs provide ‘independent advice to participants, researchers, funders, sponsors, 
employers, care organisations and professionals on the extent to which proposals 
for research studies comply with recognised ethical standards’,215 ‘offer an opinion 
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on research within the NHS’,216 and, ever-careful to preserve their independence, 
‘are advisory committees to, not subcommittees of, NHS organisations’.217 While the 
GAfREC did not require RECs to undertake scientific review and consideration of 
the potential relevance of applicable laws and regulations, it expected RECs to be 
‘adequately reassured’ about the ‘scientific design and conduct of the study’218 and 
have ‘due regard for the requirements of relevant regulatory agencies and of 
applicable laws.’219 Moreover, in line with prevailing international ethics guidelines 
such as the Declaration of Helsinki and the Council of Europe’s Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being,220 and more clearly stated 
than in the RGF, the GAfREC declared RECs as having ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
responsibilities: 
RECs are responsible for acting primarily in the interest of potential research 
participants and concerned communities, but they should also take into 
account the interests, needs and safety of researchers who are trying to 
undertake research of good quality. However, the goals of research and 
researchers, while important, should always be secondary to the dignity, rights, 
safety, and well-being of the research participants.221 
Together, both the RGF and the GAfREC signalled a subtle shift in the evolutionary 
development that was emerging in the UK. These regulatory instruments certainly 
did not jettison research promotion as a responsibility of RECs; rather, they clarified 
that the UK’s RECs would be mandated with a primary role shared with RECs in 
other countries, and which heeded the message of international ethics guidelines, 
namely that in assessing the ethical acceptability of research, participant protection 
must always take precedence over the interests of research and researchers. 
To comply with and give domestic effect to the EU Clinical Trials Directive 
(2001/20/EC), the UK passed The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
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Regulations 2004,222 operative from 1 May 2004. Ushering in ‘root and branch 
reform’ and arguably marking ‘the end of the self-regulation of research ethics’,223 
the Regulations established NHS RECs on a legal basis for the first time, providing 
detailed provisions on their composition and what RECs must, as a statutory duty, 
consider in preparing their ethics opinion.224 The Regulations provided for a single 
UK-wide opinion for multi-centre studies. They also set a defined time period (60 
days) for issuing an ethics opinion. To avoid the confusion that would result from 
having parallel but different operating ethics review systems, the four UK Health 
Departments agreed to make it a policy to apply this approach also to all health 
research within the NHS involving individuals, their organs, tissue, or data—not 
just clinical trials. The Regulations also established the UKECA as a legal entity, 
consisting of the health ministers of the four UK constituent countries. The UKECA 
remains the authority through which the UK government discharges its 
responsibilities for providing an ethics review system under the EU Clinical Trials 
Directive. Thus, its remit extends beyond the NHS. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
UKECA ‘recognises’ certain RECs to review CTIMPs.  
Also in 2004, version 1.0 of the UK-wide Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees (REC SOPs) was produced to meet the obligations of the EU 
Clinical Trials Directive for the operation of ethics committees in relation to 
CTIMPs. As previously mentioned, the SOPs included provision for a single UK-
wide ethics opinion on all types of health research, thus reducing if not eliminating 
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the duplication and inconsistency in opinions rendered by RECs for multi-site 
studies. The SOPs obligated RECs to render a decision on any individual application 
within 60 days, unless the REC asked for more information (in which the case the 
clock stopped until that information was received).  
New statutory and regulatory developments required RECs to consider the 
implications of research ethics in areas previously not considered or minimally 
considered. The Human Tissue Act 2004 was passed to govern the collection and 
use of human tissue (or ‘relevant material’ as the Act states), including for research 
purposes, in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.225 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
followed thereafter, again imposing greater responsibilities for RECs, this time for 
research involving adults lacking mental capacity. Organisational changes also 
occurred; following the Department of Health’s Arm’s Length Body Review,226 the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) took over responsibility for COREC in April 
2005.227  
Also in April 2005, largely in response to the EU Clinical Trials Directive, the second 
edition of the RGF was published by the Department of Health; the three other UK 
nations also published their own shortly thereafter.228 As noted by the Scottish RGF 
(and in language used verbatim in the Welsh and Northern Irish RGFs), and in 
contradistinction to the first edition of the RGF and the GAfREC, the goal of the 
document was to set out a ‘balance’ between participant protection and research 
promotion:   
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The change in the law stimulated wide debate on good practice and 
regulatory process in collaborative trials. The lessons drawn are visible 
throughout this edition [of the RGF] and recognise the need to achieve a 
proper balance by safeguarding the rights of patients involved in clinical trials while 
avoiding a disproportionate impact on those who carry them out.229 
The English RGF, however, phrased its preface to the second edition differently, 
emphasising a risk-based regulatory approach and the need to still primarily protect 
participants: 
Regulations on clinical trials involving medicines took effect in 2004. The 
change in the law stimulated wide debate on good practice and risk-based 
regulatory process. We have drawn lessons throughout this edition. […] There 
has been new legislation on human tissue and on mental capacity, with 
provisions to protect those who participate in research. Whatever the context, 
the interests of research participants come first. Those responsible must be 
satisfied they have taken all reasonable steps to protect the dignity, rights, 
safety and wellbeing of participants. We have to be frank about risks, and 
businesslike about managing them.230 
As clinical researchers continued to express publicly concerns that RECs were 
burdensome and ‘impeded, delayed, and sometimes distorted research’,231 in late 
2004, the UK government appointed an advisory group led by then health minister 
Lord (Norman) Warner to review the operation of RECs regulating research in the 
NHS in England. The review had explicit economic and regulation-streamlining 
aims. It was to consider ‘regulatory blocks impeding research’;232 ‘developments and 
trends affecting the remit, administration, operation and workload of NHS RECs in 
England’;233 and ‘options for investment and measures to contain recurrent costs.’234 
The review was to recommend, among other things, ‘how to reduce the time 
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required of researchers starting high quality research; provide for a single point of 
entry, consistent process, and single decision appropriate for all the types of 
research requiring a NHS REC’s opinion’; and ‘strengthen the systems, structures 
and processes supporting NHS RECs to make their business process as efficient as 
possible and improve users’ and committee members’ experience of it’. The ad hoc 
advisory group published their report in June 2005.  
Critically, this Lord Warner Report at times stressed a dual role of RECs to protect 
and promote: ‘the role of Research Ethics Committees is both to protect the interests 
of human participants in research and to promote research that is of real value.’235 
Yet elsewhere, the report suggested that the roles were not twinned, but rather, as 
stated in the GAfREC, primary and secondary:  
It should remain the role of research ethical review to safeguard the rights, 
dignity, safety and welfare of potential human research participants by 
providing an independent opinion on the ethical implications of a research 
proposal. […] Research of relevance and good quality is essential to 
underpin further developments in health and social care. This gives 
Research Ethics Committees a secondary role – to facilitate ethical research.236 
The report imposed ethical obligations on both regulators (within COREC and 
RECs) and researchers:  
Just as the process of research ethics appraisal needs to be better focused 
and more efficiently carried out, so too researchers, and the research 
community more broadly, have a responsibility to work towards being 
better informed about ethical issues – including the importance of good 
quality medical research and the need to protect potential participants, and 
the relevant legal and governance responsibilities.237 
The Lord Warner Report noted that ‘many of the criticisms’ they heard from 
researchers ‘reflect pent-up frustration with the operation of the REC system over a 
number of years, and do not always take account of improvements that COREC has 
introduced more recently.’238 Thus, ‘major improvement in the efficiency of the 
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process of ethical review in the very recent past […] has not yet been fully 
appreciated’.239 Nonetheless, the report acknowledged that some criticisms were 
valid, including unexplainable inconsistencies among RECs and overcapacity of 
RECs (i.e. too many RECs ‘with very small workloads’240). Systemic reform was 
urged: ‘The achievements of the ethical review system attained so far, whilst 
impressive, have been largely incremental. The time has now come for a step change 
in the system of RECs, to address perceived weaknesses in the system, and provide 
better support for Chairs, members and administrative staff.’241 Among the report’s 
nine recommendations were further rationalisations of the number of RECs in 
England, ‘with more intense operation for the smaller number resulting’;242 the 
creation of ‘Scientific Officers’ in COREC to support the work of RECs;243 
improvements to the national application form and application process; 
improvements to quality assurance and training; substantial improvement to local 
R&D procedures and their interaction with REC review; and a more proportionate 
review process, i.e. excluding from REC review ‘surveys or other non-research 
activity if they present no material ethical issues for human participants’.244 
Following the Lord Warner Report, in August 2006 COREC release its response 
publication, Building on Improvement, based on consultation with stakeholders. 
COREC highlighted its role both to facilitate research and help RECs protect 
participants.245 The report supported pilot screening studies through early provision 
of advice, reviews proportionate to the level of risk presented by a study, the 
establishment of REC centres within certain geographic areas of England, and a 
reduction in the number of RECs in England to 120 by 2006, with further 
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rationalisation thereafter.246 The COREC report also recommended removing the 
nominal distinction between MRECs and LRECs, and that MREC appointing 
authorities be transferred to be in line with those for LRECs.247 Though the COREC 
report did not take up the Lord Warner Report’s recommendation to establish 
Scientific Officers, it did recommend the creation of a ‘new independent group of 
national research ethics advisers’ who would: 
[…] ensure that full committees consider only those studies needing 
intensive scrutiny. They will be able rapidly to review studies with minimal 
ethical dimensions as an executive research ethics sub-committee. In 
England, one or more of these sub-committees will specialise in streamlined 
review. National research ethics advisers will also be able to support the 
development of the service by providing training, advice and feedback to 
RECs and applicants.248 
The COREC report, like the Lord Warner Report and the Cooksey Review from 
December 2006 on UK health research funding,249 signalled an explicit governmental 
effort to streamline extant regulations and make the regulatory approvals and 
governance process smoother for researchers to promote high-quality research and 
national economic benefit.  
Several substantial operational and procedural developments occurred within and 
outwith RECs following COREC’s 2006 report to improve the research landscape 
and ethics review service, and respond to concerns outlined above that RECs were 
under-regulated but, ironically, also burdensome from a regulatory perspective.  
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First, in April 2006, the UK government established the National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR) to better fund and support clinical and applied health and social 
care research, as well as research infrastructure in the NHS. While not directly 
impactful on RECs, the creation of NIHR signalled the government’s intention to 
position health research as a key driver of the UK’s economy. This, in turn, 
necessitated reforming other elements in the research regulatory space to ensure the 
successful realisation of research into innovations. Second, in April 2007, the 
National Research Ethics Service (NRES) was established, incorporating both 
COREC and NHS RECs in England as a means of maintaining a UK-wide 
regulatory framework for ethical review of research within the NHS. Third, that 
same year, the Shared Ethical Debate (ShED)250 scheme was piloted, and became 
operational in 2008. ShED’s main aim over the years has been to address consistency 
among RECs and develop standards in ethics review.251 Other aims are to identify 
and build consensus on an ethics issue (and the need for possible guidance to 
applicants and REC members); identify issues in REC processes (i.e. problems 
regarding minutes); and identify training needs for REC Chairs and members.252 
Fourth, and along the same lines, NRES established in 2007 a three-year rolling 
accreditation programme to audit RECs against agreed standards as detailed in the 
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SOPs and GAfREC. Still ongoing as with ShED, RECs are issued with an audit 
decision (now by the HRA) that is either full accreditation, accreditation with 
conditions (low risk non-compliance identified requiring an action plan), or 
provisional accreditation (high and low risk issues requiring an action plan). More 
recently, this has been coupled with ‘quality control’ checks by HRA Operational 
Managers, who undertake six-monthly quality control checks on RECs against 
agreed standards. This includes an annual observation of a REC meeting. Opinions 
on the value of these reforms, as will be discussed, have been mixed. 
Fifth, in 2009, the National Research Ethics and Advisors’ Panel (NREAP) was 
established. NRES was originally asked by the four UK Health Departments, 
through the UKECA, to establish a central advisory panel to help with the strategy, 
quality assurance, and service development of RECs and improve the research 
environment in the UK.253 NREAP remains an independent body, but is hosted 
within the HRA (previously NRES). It serves as a resource to provide advice and 
support to all RECs funded by the UK Health Departments,254 as well as appointing 
authorities in exercising their responsibilities under the GAfREC and SOPs.255  
Sixth, in 2010, following the earlier pilot study from 2009 based on the 
recommendation from the Lord Warner Report, the Proportionate Review Service 
was introduced across the UK. This ‘PR’ service, as it is called, allows researchers 
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whose studies present ‘no material ethical issues’256—previously determined 
initially by the researcher (who requested to book their application for 
Proportionate Review), now determined by RES staff,257 followed by REC members 
via a Proportionate Review sub-committee rather than at a full meeting of a REC—
to not have to wait as long for a REC opinion as researchers with more ‘ethically 
complex’ studies. Indeed, the aim of PR is to deliver the final opinion letter to the 
applicant within 21 calendar days of receipt of a valid application. 
Finally, a key infrastructural change in the first decade of the millennium was the 
move in 2008 of the NRES online form to the Integrated Research Application 
System (IRAS),258 the online application system used to apply for most permissions 
and approvals for research in health and social care in the UK. In May 2014, IRAS 
was further modified to interact with the newly established REC Central Booking 
System and, for the first time, to allow for electronic submission of applications.259 
IRAS is seen as providing multiple benefits for researchers, not the least of which is 
streamlining the research application process by enabling researchers to enter 
information about their study once instead of duplicating information in separate 
application forms. Other benefits include using filters to ensure that the data 
collected and collated are appropriate to the type of study, and consequently the 
permissions and approvals required; and helping researchers meet regulatory and 
governance requirements. IRAS allows researchers to use a ‘Project Filter’ to select 
the type of research and enable other sections and forms relevant to their project 
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(e.g. ionising radiation, new/existing tissue samples, adults unable to consent) to 
appear. The IRAS NHS REC application form, and especially the questions it poses 
to researchers, has become central to the work of RECs, as will be seen in Part III. 
3.3.2 Ongoing criticisms and the critical AMS 2011 report 
At this point in the historical tracing, it would be beneficial to step back and situate 
the criticisms of and reforms to RECs in a broader context. If many in society 
support the concept of prospective ethics review of a research study by a committee 
of qualified people, many others have not supported the past practices of RECs. For 
as long as they have existed, RECs have been the source of opprobrium by the 
research community and other commentators, mainly because they are seen as 
under-, over- or simply mis-regulated bureaucratic bulwarks against otherwise 
ethical, minimally risky, or non-risky research. Empirical research has indicated a 
high level of variation of decision-making processes in RECs260 and dissatisfaction 
from various stakeholders.261  
Many of the problems encountered in RECs have been due paradoxically to 
accusations of both weak regulation and de-centralisation (leading to duplicative 
review, procedural inconsistency, and substantive inconsistency of decision-
making), and also over-regulation and centralisation (leading to cumbersome rules 
and complex thickets of disproportionate regulation for minimal risk research). Yet 
unlike the US and other jurisdictions, RECs in the UK remain governed relatively 
lightly through statutory regulation.262 RECs hold a long tradition of independence 
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from central or institutional control.263 Indeed, that NHS RECs are not formally 
associated with any specific research institution is what distinguishes them most 
from US IRBs and Canadian REBs that also evaluate research involving patients in 
hospitals and healthy volunteers. Though RECs in the NHS system have existed 
sporadically and informally since the late 1960s, as discussed, they had no formal 
standing until guidance was put forth by the Department of Health in 1991,264 and it 
must be emphasised that this was merely guidance, backed with no legal 
enforceability. Effectively, these guidelines were the standards governing their 
practice, though RECs had the discretion to exercise their judgement as to what 
their primary function should be—and indeed some did not abide by or accept the 
guidelines.265 As a consequence, RECs were permitted to thrive and self-regulate 
independently. Across the UK, local RECs created separate fiefdoms of customs, 
standards, and rules that caused, it is said, administrative nightmares for 
researchers embarking on multi-site and even single-site studies.  
A major criticism of RECs centred (and continues to centre) on their ostensibly over-
bearing emphasis on information sheets and consent forms, and minute 
wordsmithing of both. This can lead to the inevitable elongating of the documents 
and increased risk of non- or miscomprehension by participants, which ironically 
may lead to stigmatisation of or lack of respect for participants and a failure in fact 
to obtain valid consent. Commentators since at least the 1960s266 have argued that 
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consent cannot and should not act as a stand-alone bulwark against unethical 
research. Some commentators argue, however, that RECs continue to fixate on 
consent and information sheets as a locus for determining and setting researchers’ 
ethical behaviour, demonstrating ‘the acme of self-defeating ritual compliance’.267 
Perhaps it is because ‘these documents constitute one of the few aspects of 
researcher interactions with subjects – a very downstream process – that committees 
feel they can control’.268 Garnett argues that a ‘Standard Model’ of consent thus 
permeates RECs, whereby through focusing on the participant’s subjective state of 
mind, they evaluate the potential for a participant to gather sufficient information 
about a research study, even though this is a flawed approach: ‘the informed 
consent “requirement” is viewed as a chore and a ritual, an impersonal incantation, 
a hurried signing of papers. We know this is true, yet we cherish the myth of 
informed consent, skating over its lack of real content or impact.’269 
As RECs arguably have become institutionalised in the health research regulatory 
space and classic bureaucracies in the Weberian sense, they may be seen to 
increasingly focus on measureable procedures demonstrating consistency and 
objective, rational outcomes rather than incalculable substantive matters such as the 
myriad ethical issues at play in a given research study. A bureaucratic preference 
for procedures, rules, and standards, coupled with an uptick in legal (albeit siloed) 
regulation of health research—most significantly the transposing of the EU Clinical 
Trials Directive through The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004, which was widely seen as regulatory overreach and reducing the 
attractiveness of the EU (and therefore the UK) for conducting clinical trials on 
medicines270—led to  complaints about the legalisation in the workings of RECs, 
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which is to say: a fetishisation for more and longer forms and standards and 
procedures set within a positivist paradigm. This is not the ‘good kind’ of REC 
legalisation Curran envisioned in 1969, replete with a common law-like 
generalisable body of precedents and principles of procedure and substance that 
allow the process of deliberation to flourish.271 Instead, to many it is viewed as a 
troubling kind—rigid and standardised, treating ethics as a tick-box, form-ridden 
technological and structured one-off event. 
The criticism levelled against RECs can be reframed as scepticism about the primary 
role of participant safeguarding.272 Some claim that the otherwise admirable 
protectionist function has become reduced to a formulaic exercise to ensure 
compliance with a plethora of regulatory requirements. Others claim that the 
protectionist function of RECs is inherently paternalistic and fails to represent the 
full interests of participants, not to mention the public interest.273 Here, some 
challenge that the other primary role of RECs should be consensus-driven and public 
interest-focused, such that the scales of balance between assessing welfare and risk 
and scientific advance should be recalibrated to see beyond just potential risks to 
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individual participants and more towards the greater range of actors’ interests at 
play and the societal benefit that could accrue from research. In other words, the 
role of RECs should be to balance or otherwise reconcile the at-times cross-
competing interests of individual participants, science, and society (even if society 
can be viewed as an abstracted aggregate of individuals). And yet still others, 
invoking Goffman’s dramaturgical model,274 suggest the protectionist role may be 
more form than function, such that RECs inevitably serve other hidden but more 
realistic roles, ‘the most obvious of which is to appear [to an outside audience] to meet 
the official goal’, thereby keeping the REC above criticism and serving ‘to add 
legitimization to the conduct of clinical research’.275 In other words, RECs may strive 
to appear in the front stage to be protecting research participants, but their ‘real’ 
back stage function is to legitimatise the research enterprise—a perhaps not too-
unsurprising claim if we consider that the majority of REC members are or have 
been researchers themselves. 
There has been a mismatch between REC concept (or Platonic essence) and REC 
practice, and a mismatch between what we seem to have long acknowledged—for 
instance, that consent cannot protect against ethical lapses in health research, that it 
can work against protecting the dignity of participants, and that more paper does 
not equate to better protection276—and what RECs do. The response by the UK 
government in the last decade to the criticism against RECs and health research 
regulation more broadly has been to streamline the regulation of health research, and 
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to make the regulation more proportionate, so as to facilitate more research and 
greater economic prosperity.277 
The persistent criticism levelled against the clogged regulatory space of ‘human 
subjects research’— i.e. not within RECs alone—was evidently (and some would 
add, eventually) heard by the UK government. In March 2010, the still-ruling 
Labour government (through the Secretary of State for Health Andy Burnham) 
asked the AMS, an independent body in the UK founded in 1998 that represents 
medical science,278 to undertake a ‘rapid independent review’ of health research 
amid concern that strict regulation was driving research abroad.279 The Academy 
convened a work group of senior doctors and scientists; only three of the nineteen 
members were drawn from outside the NHS or the biomedical research sector. Its 
now well-cited report, A New Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of Health 
Research,,280 published only several months later in January 2011, found much to 
criticise and sounded alarm bells: ‘UK health research activities are being seriously 
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undermined by an overly complex regulatory and governance environment’,281 it 
intoned, without any evidence of improved participant or patient safety.  
The AMS report recommended that the UK’s regulation and governance framework 
around health research be underpinned by four principles, the first two of which 
were ‘to safeguard the well-being of research participants’, and ‘to facilitate high-
quality health research to the public benefit’.282 Crucially, similar to the RCP 
Guidelines but dissimilar to the GAfREC and first edition of the RGF, when it came 
to discussing recommendations for RECs, the report pinned them with two equal 
responsibilities: ‘Research proposals are reviewed [by RECs] to consider whether 
they provide sufficient protection for the interests and safety of research 
participants and to enable ethical research that is of benefit to society.’283  
Though RECs came away relatively unscathed in the AMS report,284 the health 
research regulatory and governance environment as a whole was seen by the AMS 
in need of substantial pruning, including the need for ‘a proportionate approach to 
ethics review’ in line with US and Canadian approaches.285 With respect to ethics 
review, the AMS report found that: 
High ethical standards in research can only be partially achieved through 
regulation and governance and researchers need support to identify and 
address the ethical issues arising in their research, outside of applying for an 
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284 In recognition of the changes by COREC and NRES (which undoubtedly included the 
introduction of Proportionate Review a year earlier in 2010), and as was acknowledged in 
the Lord Warner Report a few years prior, the AMS report observed:  
NRES and its predecessor, the Central Office for Research Ethics 
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of ethics review. The development of a single UK-wide opinion has been an 
important success in streamlining regulatory and governance processes in 
the UK. […] The balance of evidence submitted to this review highlights that 
ethics review is rarely a rate-limiting step.  
ibid 73, 76. 
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ethics opinion. In addition to the need to embed a proportionate approach 
within the ethics system, including implementation of ‘proportionate 
review’ following the NRES pilot, we recommend that […] NRES should 
lead on improving support and advice for researchers by providing centralised, 
coordinated guidance and training on ethical issues for health researchers. 
Institutions engaged in health research should also improve the local 
availability of ethics advice and the training of local support staff.286 
Significantly, the AMS report recommended the establishment of an independent, 
central ‘Health Research Agency’ ‘to rationalise the regulation and governance of all 
health research’.287 It also recommended the establishment of a National Research 
Governance Service within the proposed HRA to perform all study-wide NHS 
governance (i.e. R&D) checks and recommend research projects as suitable for 
undertaking within the NHS. In the AMS’ view, the HRA would be capable of 
providing ‘the necessary oversight and impetus’ to oversee the regulation and 
governance of health research, as well as ‘removing complexity and streamlining 
the pathway as a whole’.288 It would also provide a ‘home for some aspects of 
regulation and governance that urgently require better coordination and clearer 
governance’.289 Other recommendations included providing greater access to patient 
data for research while protecting individuals’ interests and embedding a culture 
that would value research within the NHS. 
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3.3.3 Government response: 2011 – present 
The coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat government quickly took up the AMS 
report’s recommendation as announced that same year in its March 2011 budget 
statement,290 agreeing with the report’s findings and clearly emphasising the 
economic gains to be reaped through streamlining of regulation: ‘The complexity of 
health research regulation and governance has increased over the last twenty years 
through successive legislative changes. National complexity was then compounded 
by diverse local approval systems, inconsistent, sometimes risk-averse, local 
interpretations, and confusion about the standards for compliance that apply to 
different types of research.’ The government announced that it would: 
[…] set up a new health research regulatory agency to streamline regulation 
and improve the cost effectiveness of clinical trials. […] At national level [sic], the 
Government will create a health research regulatory agency to combine and 
streamline the approvals for health research which are at present scattered across 
many organisations. This will reduce the regulatory burden on firms, improve the 
timeliness of decisions about clinical trials and hence the cost-effectiveness of their 
delivery in the UK, and has clear support from the Academy of Medical 
Sciences Review of health research regulation and governance. As a first 
step, the Government will establish this year a Special Health Authority 
with the National Research Ethics Service as its core. The new agency will 
work closely with the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency to create a unified approval process and promote proportionate standards 
for compliance and inspection within a consistent national system of research 
governance.291 
Thus, the HRA was established by the UK government as a central health research 
regulator for the UK and a one-stop-shop for approvals and accompanying 
guidance.292 As recommended by the AMS, and which was presumably already in 
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This said, the HRA was expected to act more boldly than NRES and the NPSA. Baroness 
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to facilitate and promote research related to the health service through the research 
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think everybody would agree that the provenance of this initiative is the 
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line with the government’s wishes, the HRA was created rapidly—on 1st December 
that same year—as an interim Special Health Authority.293 The creating order made 
clear the HRA’s role in promoting research: 
Functions of the Authority 
3.—(1) The Authority is to exercise—  
(a) such functions in connection with—  
(i) the facilitation and promotion of research;  
(ii) the establishment of Research Ethics Committees, and the 
appointment and indemnification of members of Research Ethics 
Committees; and 
(b) such other functions; 
as the Secretary of State may direct.294 
In May that year, the GAfREC was revised, replacing the first editions of the policy 
previously issued separately in England and Scotland in 2001, and also applying in 
Wales and Northern Ireland (indeed, this still-current edition is referred to as a 
‘harmonised edition’).295 Taking up the AMS report’s call for a more proportionate 
ethics review, the revised GAfREC introduced several streamlining moves, 
including the removal of required REC review for certain types of research (e.g. 
research involving NHS staff recruited by virtue of their professional role; research 
                                                     
Academy of Medical Sciences’s review, which was published in January, 
and that the urgency arises from the abolition of the National Patient Safety 
Agency. ibid col GC225 (emphasis added). 
293 The Health Research Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2011, 2011 No 
2323. See also The Health Research Authority Regulations 2011, 2011 No 2341. The HRA was 
abolished as a ‘Special Health Authority’ in the Care Act 2014, s 109(3), when it became a 
statutory body corporate (i.e. Non Departmental Public Body) as of 1st January 2015. See The 
Care Act 2014 (Health Education England and the Health Research Authority) 
(Consequential Amendments and Revocations) Order 2015, SI 2015/137 and see also SI 
2014/3090. It is important to note that The Health Research Authority (Establishment and 
Constitution) Order 2011 applied in relation to England only. The HRA’s legal remit covers 
England only; however, it works closely with the devolved administrations in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland to support UK-wide compatibility. The Health Research 
Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2011 defines a REC at s 1(3) as ‘a group of 
people appointed to assess whether research proposals relating to the health service conform 
to recognised ethical standards’. 
294 The Health Research Authority (Establishment and Constitution) Order 2011, s 3(1). 
295 GAfREC (n 1). 
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limited to use of or access to a care organisation’s premises or facilities). At the same 
time, however, the current edition of the GAfREC retains the language about 
primary and secondary responsibilities of RECs. 
Since its formation in December 2011, the HRA’s mission has been: ‘to promote and 
protect the interests of patients, streamline regulation and promote transparency in 
health and social care research’.296 Proportionate regulation297 and streamlined 
research processes are a driving aim of the HRA. Through its RES and other arms, 
the HRA aims to ‘improve and transform the health research process’.298 According 
to its website, participant protection and research promotion are inextricably linked: 
It is already clear that there is a fundamental link between promoting the 
public’s interests in health and social research and protecting it, and that 
these are complementary. Patients, participants and the public share an 
interest with researchers and sponsors in ensuring good, ethical research is 
carried out, subject to proportionate regulation. Our role in streamlining the 
research processes will not only increase opportunities for patients and the 
public to take part in research, but will also make this country a more 
attractive place for companies to do research. This investment will, in turn, 
benefit patients and the public.299  
Emphasis on research promotion was reflected explicitly in statutory regulation for 
the first time in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, which imposed new duties on 
the Secretary of State and Clinical Commissioning Groups to promote research 
relevant to the NHS and to use the evidence obtained from such research.300 
Emphasis on research promotion is further reflected most pronouncedly in the most 
recent change in the regulatory apparatus of RECs (at least in England)—the Care 
Act 2014, which is a watershed piece of statutory regulation of health research.301 It 
                                                     
296 Health Research Authority, ‘Who We Are’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/who-
we-are/>.  
297 The nature of ‘proportionate’ regulation will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
298 Heath Research Authority, ‘Our Plans and Projects’ <http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-
hra/our-plans-and-projects/> (emphasis added). 
299 Health Research Authority, ‘Who We Are’ (n 296). 
300 NHS Act 2006, ss 1E, 14Y. 
301 Most of the provisions in the Care Act 2014 extend only to England, save where specified 
otherwise. But see Care Act 2014, Explanatory Notes, Territorial Extent and Application 
(paras 34-54).  
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establishes the HRA as a non-departmental statutory body corporate (otherwise 
known as a Non-Departmental Public Body) to foster the HRA’s UK-wide 
responsibility for health and social care research governance.302 The main objective 
of the HRA in exercising its functions is stated in the Care Act 2014 as two-fold: 
 (a) to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care research 
and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and ethical, and 
(b) to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants and the 
general public by facilitating the conduct of research that is safe and ethical (including 
by promoting transparency in research).303 
In exercising its functions, the HRA—under the law—‘must promote the co-
ordination and standardisation of practice in the United Kingdom relating to the 
regulation of health and social care research; and it must, in doing so, seek to ensure 
that such regulation is proportionate’.304 Elsewhere, the Act states that ‘[a] reference to 
research that is ethical is a reference to research that conforms to generally accepted 
ethical standards’,305 though it is unclear what ‘generally accepted ethical standards’ 
might constitute.306 The Care Act 2014 requires the HRA and eight key regulators 
and government bodies to ‘co-operate with each other in the exercise of their 
respective functions relating to health or social care research, with a view to co-
                                                     
302 Care Act 2014, s 109. The HRA became a statutory body corporate on 1st January 2015. As 
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ordinating and standardising practice relating to the regulation of such research’,307 
while having regard for the need (mimicking the same language in the previous 
section of the Act):  
(a) to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care research 
and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and ethical, and  
(b) to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants and the 
general public by facilitating the conduct of such research.308  
Similarly, the Act states that the ‘HRA and each devolved authority must co-operate 
with each other in the exercise of their respective functions relating to the regulation 
of assessments of the ethics of health and social care research, with a view to co-
ordinating and standardising practice in the United Kingdom relating to such 
regulation’.309  
The Act also speaks directly to RECs, covered under sections 112-115. The HRA is 
authorised by the Act to recognise, establish, and abolish RECs in England310 and 
‘must ensure’ that these RECs ‘provide an efficient and effective means of assessing 
the ethics of health and social care research’.311 In other words, the HRA now has 
statutory power to directly manage RECs, including for example, the power ‘to 
require RECs to impose conditions on approvals for clinical trials’.312 The HRA must 
publish a ‘REC policy document’ (currently the GAfREC313) that ‘specifies the 
                                                     
307 Care Act 2014, s 111(1). These regulators or bodies are: the Secretary of State; the licensing 
authority for the purposes of the Medicines Act 1968; the Health and Social Care Information 
Centre (HSCIC, now known as NHS Digital); the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of 
Health; the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA); the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA); the Care Quality Commission; the Administration of Radioactive 
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308 ibid s 111(2) (emphasis added). 
309 ibid s 111(4). 
310 ibid s 115. 
311 ibid s 112(1). See also s 110(1)(b) (‘The main functions of the HRA are – […] functions 
relating to research ethics committees.’). 
312 R (on the application of Richmond Pharmacology Ltd) v The Health Research Authority [2015] 
EWHC 2238 (Admin), para 4. 
313 As the Explanatory Notes to the Care Act 2014 state at para 108:  
104 
 
requirements which it expects research ethics committees it recognises or establishes 
[…] to comply with’ and ‘must monitor their compliance with those 
requirements’.314 The HRA is also empowered to ‘do such other things in relation to 
research ethics committees it recognises or establishes […] as it considers 
appropriate’.315 Explicitly mentioned examples include: ‘co-ordinate their work; 
allocate work to them; develop and maintain training programmes designed to 
ensure that their members and staff can carry out their work effectively;’ and 
‘provide them with advice and help (including help in the form of financial 
assistance)’.316 
In sum, the Care Act 2014 has explicitly imported the twinned language of 
participant protection and research promotion317—language that has graduated 
from RCP Guidelines, literature from the research and academic community, 
commissioned reports, and governmental policy—to statutory regulation governing 
a central regulatory body that has direct managerial oversight of RECs. It is clear 
that the Care Act 2014 seeks to promote the collective value of health research 
through the streamlining of its regulation. Certainly, this reflects a broader push by 
the UK government, which through its statutory and thus binding Regulators’ Code, 
requires regulators to ‘avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens through 
their regulatory activities’, to ‘choose proportionate approaches to those they 
                                                     
Subsection (3) [of Section 112] requires the HRA to publish a REC policy 
document to set out the requirements that RECs recognised or established 
by the HRA would be expected to comply with and must monitor their 
compliance. These requirements are currently set out in the Governance 
arrangements for RECs (GAfREC) document published by the Department 
of Health. 
314 Care Act 2014, s 112(3). 
315 ibid s 112(4). 
316 ibid. 
317 Albeit in language that wraps ‘promotion’ around the presumed ‘interests’ of participants 
and potential participants. 
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regulate’, and to consider, among other things, ‘how they might support or enable 
economic growth for compliant businesses and other regulated entities’.318  
What remains unclear, however, and what must be uncovered, is how the HRA 
intends to ‘streamline’ regulation and deliver ‘proportionate’ regulation vis-à-vis 
those regulators it governs, namely RECs. The AMS report recommended that the 
HRA ‘should lead on the development of proportionate approaches to regulation 
and governance that take into account the benefits and risks of a research study, 
rather than applying a “one-size-fits-all” model. This should be embedded through 
a new edition of the Research Governance Framework.’319 As the four nations’ 
Research Governance Frameworks have now been transformed into a harmonised UK 
Policy Framework for Health and Social Care Research,320 through what mechanisms will 
the HRA manage RECs? In turn, will RECs heed the HRA’s steering (i.e. catalysing) 
or rowing (i.e. controlling) role321—and what will be the response in the devolved 
nations?  
Based on recent white papers and policy papers from the Scottish and English 
governments, there seems to be a strong degree of consistent approach in principle. 
The Department of Health has published several policy papers advocating further 
system efficiencies, such as a governmental commitment ‘to simplify how research 
is regulated as part of our plans to increase innovation in medical science’;322 and 
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giving ‘the NHS a duty to encourage medical research, so more patients have the 
chance to take part in clinical studies’.323 The most recent NHS Constitution for 
England now reflects this, stating: ‘The NHS aspires to the highest standards of 
excellence and professionalism […] through its commitment to innovation and to 
the promotion, conduct and use of research to improve the current and future 
health and care of the population’, and that the NHS ‘pledges […] to inform you of 
research studies in which you may be eligible to participate’.324 
Likewise, but even more resoundingly, the Scottish Government announced in 
October 2015 that while it was pleased with its nation’s ethics review system, 
further efficiencies could be gained: 
…it is imperative that Scotland continues to lead the agenda on streamlining 
the approvals process and reducing bureaucracy; and there is scope for 
further improvement. 
A high percentage of ethics submissions across the UK receive a provisional 
opinion, requiring the submission of additional information and further 
ethics consideration before a full opinion is forthcoming. Many of these 
resubmissions could be avoided by the provision of advice to researchers 
prior to their submission of documents. Similarly in R&D permission early 
contact with, and support for, researchers can significantly reduce delay 
later on in the process. However much activity is focused currently on 
gatekeeping rather than assisting researchers, driven by the Research 
Governance Framework which focuses on responsibilities rather than 
outcomes. CSO believes that through the provision of early advice 
supported by a revised Research Governance Framework that recognises the 
importance of facilitating good research, greater efficiencies will be 
forthcoming in the handling of applications.325 
To that end, the Scottish Government announced that the CSO would seek to 
combine the Scottish Research Ethics Service and NHS Research Scotland (NRS) 
R&D Offices into a ‘single integrated service for researchers while retaining the 
independence of the REC decision making function’; that CSO would arrange for 
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324 Department of Health, The NHS Constitution for England 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england/the-nhs-
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325 Scottish Government, Delivering Innovation through Research - Scottish Government Health 
and Social Care Research Strategy (Scottish Government 2015) 11, 16.  
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‘shared access to study data for ethics and R&D staff through the HRA’s HARP 
database, streamlining access to electronic documents for R&D staff throughout 
Scotland’; that CSO would ‘work with the HRA to revise the Research Governance 
Framework and implement an efficient ethics and R&D permission system across 
the UK that both builds on the efficiencies already delivered through [NHS 
Research Scotland] and operates seamlessly for sponsors and researchers across the 
UK’; and that CSO would ‘refocus the early contact of ethics and NHS R&D staff 
with researchers on facilitating study approvals, with named R&D contacts being 
given to support the researcher in obtaining those approvals’.326  
As Hedgecoe reminds us, even as the REC SOPs have allowed for some regulatory 
control over REC processes by the state, ‘the content of REC decisions remains 
largely outside Department of Health control’.327 The HRA and CSO do not have the 
legitimacy or statutory authority to directly amend statutory regulation, and the 
independence of NHS RECs is a highly cherished value, as reflected in the Scottish 
white paper mentioned above. What the HRA and CSO can do, though, is 
‘transform the health research process’328 by amending regulatory instruments 
affecting RECs, and acting itself, or helping RECs and the actors therein act, as a 
steward for researchers to guide them through the process (i.e. the multiple stages) of 
embarking upon a health research study.329 The HRA is working closely with its 
equivalent regulatory bodies in the devolved nations to foster education and 
training for REC members, staff, and the research community,330 and harmonisation 
                                                     
326 ibid 16-17. 
327 Hedgecoe, ‘A Deviation from Standard Design?’ (n 175) 74. 
328 Heath Research Authority, ‘Our Plans and Projects’ (n 298). 
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of ethics review processes through its publishing of multiple policies and guidance 
documents, and (in England) with HRA Approval, which is largely an instantiation 
of the recommendation in the 2011 AMS report to create a National Research 
Governance Service with the HRA.331 Indeed, greater harmonisation and 
simplification of forms is most recently manifest in the HRA’s announcement in 
June 2017 that a combined IRAS form that merges the REC and R&D forms, 
previously only in place for projects where the lead NHS R&D office is based in 
England, is now available for use across the UK, which will save time and effort for 
applicants and sponsors and help build UK-wide consistency.332 Almost certainly 
these arrangements will further assuage many of the concerns levelled against RECs 
over the years. Indeed, as this Chapter 3 has emphasised, very few criticisms are 
levelled against ethics review and RECs today, especially compared in the recent 
past to the NHS trust R&D approvals process.333  
Consequently, the long-standing criticisms of RECs mostly have been quelled, first 
through influential reports authored by the research community itself in the past 
decade that were directly taken up by the government, and more recently, through 
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332 Health Research Authority, ‘Four Nations NHS/HSC Compatibility Programme: 
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the alignment of the research community, industry (particularly as sponsors or 
funders of research), and government in designing a regulatory regime that 
optimises competition (through efficiency and accelerated review pathways) and 
economic gain. This does cause one to wonder, though: how, if at all, does this next-
generation regulatory reform impact the independence and primary function of 
RECs, which must, under the stewardship of the HRA and its mandate to streamline 
regulation, work to ‘provide an efficient and effective means of assessing the ethics 
of health and social care research’?334 As Kerrison and Pollock remarked a decade 
ago following the passage of the Clinical Trials Regulations 2004 and the creation of 
the UKECA, ‘…by taking control of the ethics review, a government intent on seeing 
biomedical research as an economic driver will be in a good position to ensure that 
[ethics] committees do not raise difficult ethical barriers to such research’.335 
Increased regulatory speed, coded as ‘efficiency’ and embedded in the regulatory 
documents governing RECs and in the practices of RECs, certainly begs questions 
about the role of industry promoting competitive edges and in the wider 
implications of such a regulatory feature in health research. 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that while the value and REC role (or responsibility) 
of research promotion has emerged as a recent statutory phenomenon in health 
research regulation, perhaps as a kind of beacon to encourage a more proportionate 
or streamlined approach to regulating health research, promotion has nevertheless 
existed throughout the history of RECs, appearing in various disguises alongside 
the role of participant protection. I have also argued that having become entrenched 
in the regulation of health research for more than half a century, and through 
‘steady, incremental institutional change’,336 RECs are now governed by the 
government and by central regulatory agencies, administrative staff and offices, 
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standardised forms and communications, lengthy governance arrangements337 and 
SOPs—the latest version of which stands at a daunting 325 pages—up 63 pages 
from the previous version released one year prior.338  
As advisory but fundamentally research gatekeeping bodies, RECs are a key node 
situated at the centre of the health research regulatory space, working, perhaps 
increasingly, with potentially competing values of participant protection and 
research promotion. The criticisms have been intense, historically marked by 
concerns of both under-regulation of RECs and over-regulation by RECs of research 
studies. As one REC member observed after twenty years of service:  
In the 1980s the research ethics world seemed much simpler. The 
Declaration of Helsinki informed our discussions and decisions, and we 
supplemented this when the need arose from those few guidelines that 
existed. We weren’t hamstrung by ‘Europe,’ acts of parliament, regulations, 
and a clock obsessed set of standard operating procedures; nor were we 
working in a climate of constant criticism. I feel increasingly caught between 
a rock and a hard place as we try to protect patients from silly research and 
researchers from silly regulations.339 
What we have seen in the UK is a march, aided by health research interest groups 
such as the AMS, towards significant regulatory reform underpinned by a 
neoliberal discourse stressing market rationality and economic optimisation. 
Hedgecoe suggests that ethics review is a form of ‘professional self-regulation 
without a profession’, where ‘the overall aim of such review centers on the needs of 
researchers and research funders, as opposed to the idea that ethics review is driven 
by the need to increase protection for research subjects’.340 This thesis will test that 
claim. Undoubtedly, the march towards reform has culminated recently in a turn 
towards the law for a facilitative remedy—as indeed law is often seen as the 
ultimate guide for bringing order to rough regulatory terrain. Law, seen in the Care 
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Act 2014, is viewed as a beacon of clarity and power, providing the HRA a firm 
legal footing and a legal mandate, albeit set within a flexible framework, for 
streamlining health research regulation and facilitating research.  
But law alone cannot provide a complete remedy to the concerns expressed by so 
many for so many years. Ethical judgements and the workings of these committees 
of diverse individuals must occupy the liminal spaces in the regulatory gap that 
exists between documented law and everyday practice, and in the space between 
protection and promotion. The Care Act 2014, GafREC, SOPs, and the UK Policy 
Framework alone cannot dictate the behaviour and everyday practices of RECs. 
Ethical behaviour and regulatory stewardship practised by regulatory actors must 
be co-produced with regulation, and regulation and ethical judgement are co-
dependent. What remains unknown, though, is if these next-generation regulatory 
reforms signal a fundamental shift away from the instrumental, techno-rational 
compliance, and indeed, gatekeeping function that has characterised health research 
regulation and RECs for years, or, given their neoliberal underpinning, remain 
entrenched in a regime of technical solutions.  
Thus, the critical questions that arise from the historically-grounded argument laid 
out in this Chapter 3 are as follows:  
(1) What is the precise nature of the regulation that now governs RECs?  
(2) In turn, what is the nature of the regulation that RECs exhibit toward 
research studies, and what do these everyday practices and ethical 
judgements by individual RECs and actors therein look like in the backdrop 
of recent regulatory reform at the national and international level that seeks 
to promote a more proportionate and streamlined approach?  
(3) More broadly, what is the methodology for realising the objective—or 
reconciliation—of protection and promotion in practice?  
In the next chapter, which opens Part II, I explain how these questions will be 
addressed in my empirical research guided by qualitative research methods and a 
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Methodology—research approach, theoretical 
underpinnings, and analytic concepts 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Part I provided a conceptual framework and historical regulatory tracing of RECs, 
arguing that the roles and practices of RECs may be shifting in response to next-
generation health research regulation. I showed how the previous generation of 
regulatory design, which was notably marked by self-regulation of health research 
involving participants—that is, ad hoc ethical peer review by fellow scientists based 
on local customs and guidance from the medical profession (and the RCP 
especially)—gradually gave way to stricter, stronger, more centralised forms of 
regulation, particularly through statutes, policies, and guidelines set by the 
government. This was done to provide better coordination and coherence for 
researchers, research sponsors, and publics, in large part as a response to years of 
criticism that generated a crisis of reputational risk to RECs, threatening their 
legitimacy. This was also done in response to developments in EU regulation, such 
as the Clinical Trials Directive. Part II situates the thesis’s conceptual framework of 
protection and promotion and the historical tracing in the present context by 
sketching the possible regulatory techniques and behaviours employed by RECs 
and their managing regulators. Part III will consider the empirical question of 
whether and if so, how, these regulatory techniques and behaviours appear in 
practice. 
This Chapter 4 introduces Part II by explaining the research approach, theoretical 
underpinnings, and analytical concepts that drive my thesis. Together, this is 
commonly known as the research methodology: the overall approach to a research 
project that is linked to a paradigm or theoretical framework. I have made a 
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conscious decision to separate in this Part II the chapters covering methodology and 
methods. As Caelli and colleagues write: 
When engaging in any qualitative research, methodology must be clearly 
distinguished from method. Methodology reflects the beliefs about 
knowledge and existence that arise from the values in the philosophic 
framework that is to be employed. Methodology also represents theoretical 
frameworks that guide how the research should proceed, and implies a 
concern for constructing a particular type of knowledge. […] Methods, on 
the other hand, refer to the tools, techniques, or procedures used to gather 
the evidence.341 
Applying this insight and desire to obtain greater clarity in my own qualitative 
research, in Chapter 4 I discuss the methodology for the empirical investigation—
my philosophical and theoretical underpinnings and analytic lenses. To make sense 
of my empirical data, I employ the method of thematic analysis (explained in 
Section 2 below), which is informed by ‘sensitising concepts’342 drawn from 
regulatory theory and anthropology. Specifically, I explore regulatory theory, 
design, and strategy, focusing on the concepts of ‘regulatory space’, ‘decentred 
regulation’, ‘proportionate regulation’, and ‘risk-based regulatory approach’. These 
sensitising concepts add further analytic weight to the historical tracing undertaken 
in Part I. They also allow us to better understand the precise regulatory form and 
functions of RECs, as well as the regulatory strategies employed by RECs and other 
regulators of health research, which will be presented in Part III.  
Part I suggested that RECs are risk-based regulators. Foremost it seems that they 
exercise a role of participant protection (i.e. protecting participants from harms that 
might manifest from a research study) largely informed by assessment of risk—and 
through this role they operate as key actors in the health research regulatory space, 
                                                     
341 Kate Caelli, Lynne Ray, and Judy Mill, ‘“Clear as Mud”: Toward Greater Clarity in 
Generic Qualitative Research”’ (2003) 2 International Journal of Qualitative Methods 6. 
342 A sensitising concept is an interpretive device and starting point for a qualitative study 
that draws attention to important features of social interaction and provides guidelines for 
research in specific settings. It serves as a background idea that informs the overall research 
problem. See Glenn Bowen, ‘Grounded Theory and Sensitizing Concepts’ (2006) 5 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods 1. 
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controlling what research may be approved, and thus what knowledge may be 
produced. We discovered that since its formation in December 2011, the HRA’s 
mission has been not only to promote and protect the interests of participants in 
health research, but also to ‘streamline regulation’343 of health research.  
Now, we unpack these concepts in Chapter 4. The central question that will emerge 
from the theoretical discussion in this chapter is: what do the empirical research 
findings tell us about the nature of the interaction between central regulators and 
RECs in the health research regulatory space, and the functional operations and 
deliberative processes of RECs in an era of twinned regulatory objectives of 
participant protection and research promotion? Another central question that will 
emerge is: do the empirical research findings reflect and validate the suggestions 
supplied in Parts I and II that RECs engage in risk-based regulation, and that health 
research regulation is increasingly streamlined and proportionate? In other words, 
are RECs really risk-based, proportionality-attuned regulators, or is something else 
going on, and if so, what? What might proportionate and ‘streamlined’ regulation 
mean? Is ‘decentred’ regulation at play in health research, whereby an array of state 
and non-state actors is influencing behaviours? Or, is something else occurring, such 
as increasingly ‘centred’ regulation where the state is exercising growing influence 
and control?  
I will argue in this chapter that there are limits to what regulatory theory can tell us 
about ‘what is going on’ based on the research questions posed, and that extant 
research approaches (e.g. legal anthropology, socio-legal studies) do not sufficiently 
answer my research questions as they are commonly designed to understand law 
and legal practice rather than regulation and regulatory practice—fields that I have 
endeavoured to show are ontologically distinct. I explain the justification for going 
beyond regulatory theory and harnessing a novel methodological approach that I 
call an ‘anthropology of regulation’, which structures my overall empirical inquiry. I 
                                                     
343 Health Research Authority, ‘Who We Are’ (n 296).  
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claim that this is both an (inter)disciplinary and a methodological development of 
existing anthropological and socio-legal research approaches that are currently 
insufficient to answer the kinds of research questions that this thesis poses. As 
anthropology of regulation draws explicit attention to processes, passages, and 
change, I further draw on the anthropological concept of liminality. Liminality thus 
also serves as a sensitising concept, in addition to those concepts provided by 
regulatory theory. Together with regulatory theory, liminality helps us to better 
understand the nature of transformations of actors within the regulatory space, the 
form of regulation in this space, as well as the behaviours and experiences of actors as 
they go through processes of change. In short, anthropology of regulation as an 
approach and field of enquiry adds explanatory power to my empirical data and to 
the kinds of contributions that socio-legal work might also make. 
Thus, the key aim of this Chapter 4 is to explain and justify the strength of my 
research approach. I do this in several steps. First, I show how regulatory theory 
provides a solid but ultimately insufficient foundation on its own for the empirical 
investigation that informs this thesis. Second, I explain that there is a need for an 
empirically-grounded discussion of regulatory practice, but that extant socio-legal 
and legal anthropology approaches are also insufficient to address fully the 
questions raised in this thesis. Therefore, I propose an anthropology of regulation 
that blends the theoretical with the empirical, and which affords a methodological 
contribution to the fields of socio-legal studies and legal anthropology, in part by 
drawing attention to (regulatory) processes and change, which was illustrated in the 
conceptual framework and historical tracing in Part I. Together with the conceptual 
framework and historical tracing, and methods described in the subsequent Chapter 
5 that are constructed from an anthropology of regulation, I argue that this 
approach, underpinned by regulatory theory and liminality, serves as a robust 
platform for making sense of the empirical data, as well as setting those data in a 
more meaningful context relative to the historical account. It offers a rich account of 
the steady, incremental transitions in health research regulatory practice across 
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time, as well as new ways of imagining the regulatory framework for ethics review 
of health research and of understanding how liminality provides a powerful, 
unique, and useful heuristic for making sense of how RECs navigate participant 
protection and research promotion in an era of next-generation health research 
regulation. 
4.2 Research approach 
My empirical investigation is guided by an (inter)discipline and methodological 
approach that I term ‘anthropology of regulation’. I elucidate this (inter)discipline 
and approach below. Anthropology of regulation draws on specific theoretical 
underpinnings in regulatory theory and anthropology, which are explained later in 
this chapter, and specific research methods, which are detailed in Chapter 5. 
However, I highlight at this point that the empirical data are interpreted through 
thematic analysis, an analytical approach that is most appropriate for answering my 
research questions (compared to, for example, phenomenology or grounded 
theory). Thematic analysis is a popular qualitative analytic method for ‘identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and 
describes [the] data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, 
and interprets various aspects of the research topic.’344 Several scholars describe 
thematic analysis as a process for encoding qualitative data, rather than a theoretically 
informed model for research and analysis.345 Indeed, thematic analysis is an analytic 
tool for making sense of the data, whereas anthropology of regulation is 
underpinned by sensitising concepts that are brought to bear in the encoding 
process. The encoding requires explicit ‘codes’, which are ‘a form of shorthand that 
researchers repeatedly use to identify conceptual reoccurrences and similarities in 
the patterns in the data’,346 and which are usually situated in a ‘codebook’, which is 
                                                     
344 Virgina Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 
Qualitative Research in Psychology 79. 
345 Richard Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development (SAGE 1998); Greg Guest, Kathleen MacQueen, and Emily Namey, Applied 
Thematic Analysis (SAGE 2012). 
346 Melanie Birks and Jane Mills, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide (2nd edn, SAGE 2015) 89. 
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the compilation of the codes in a study. A theme is ‘a pattern found in the 
information that at the minimum describes and organizes the possible observations 
or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon’;347 it ‘captures something 
important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some 
level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.’348  
Thematic analysis is distinct from grounded theory. Unlike grounded theory, which 
contains an arguably rigid list of ‘essential methods’349 and calls for a continual 
interplay between data collection and analysis to produce a theory during the 
research process,350 thematic analysis allows for flexibility in data analysis to 
produce conceptually-informed interpretations of the data. Examples of this 
flexibility include choices between rich, thematic characterisations of a data set or an 
account of just one particular theme (or group of themes) within the data, a ‘bottom-
up’ or ‘top-down’ analytic process, and themes identified at a semantic or a latent 
level. Further, unlike grounded theory, thematic analysis does not demand that the 
researcher develop a substantive theory as the research output; though theoretical 
models can be devised, the key purpose is to ascribe meaning to the data by 
developing concepts and themes and an understanding of the relationship between 
the various themes.351 While both thematic analysis and grounded theory involve 
coding, generation, and interpretation of broader patterns in data, grounded theory 
fundamentally is a methodology, containing an inbuilt theoretical framework with 
epistemological positions and a set of analytic procedures, whereas thematic analysis 
is a (pragmatic) method, independent of theory and can, therefore, be applied across a 
                                                     
347 Boyatzis (n 345) 161. 
348 Braun and Clarke (n 344) 82. 
349 Birks and Mills (n 346). The ‘essential’ grounded theory methods Birks and Mills identify 
are: initial coding and categorisation of data; concurrent data generation or collection and 
analysis; writing memos; theoretical sampling; constant comparative analysis; theoretical 
sensitivity; intermediate coding; identifying a core category; and advanced coding and 
theoretical integration. 
350 Bowen (n 342). 
351 Ji Young Cho and Eun-Hee Lee, ‘Reducing Confusion about Grounded Theory and 




range of theoretical and epistemological approaches. This is why thematic analysis 
is an approach that is well-suited for an anthropology of regulation. As 
anthropology of regulation is itself a methodology that contains a theoretical 
framework and epistemological and ontological positions, as well as a set of analytic 
procedures, grounded theory can unduly constrain the interpretive flexibility and 
theoretical underpinnings needed to answer the research questions. To be clear, 
thematic analysis as an analytic process serves as a component of an anthropology 
of regulation, whereas grounded theory serves as a complete approach on its own. 
To facilitate coding and the generation (and interpretation) of themes in the data, 
the empirical investigation has been theoretically informed by two key strands of 
literature that form the theoretical backbone of anthropology of regulation: 
regulatory theory and liminality.352 I begin with a discussion of regulatory space, 
decentred regulation, risk-based, and proportionate regulation. I then move to 
discuss anthropology of regulation, and end with discussion of why liminality 
serves as a crucial sensitising concept that unifies the elements of my approach 
overall.  
4.3 Regulatory theory 
4.3.1 Regulatory space(s) 
Regulatory theory is defined as ‘a set of propositions or hypotheses about why 
regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence and typical patterns of 
interaction between regulatory actors’.353 To be clear, my research project is not 
hypothesis-driven, but regulatory theory nonetheless serves as an important 
underpinning because it helps provide explanation for what is going on. The 
discussion in Part I argued that RECs are regulatory actors situated within a 
                                                     
352 It should be noted that some proponents of grounded theory, especially one of its 
‘founders’, Barney Glaser, advocate not engaging with the relevant literature prior to 
beginning data analysis, to avoid the analysis being shaped by preconceptions from existing 
research. I disagree with this approach, which is another reason I have eschewed grounded 
theory. 
353 Morgan and Yeung (n 103) 16. 
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hierarchical and nested regulatory structure within at least a part of the health 
research regulatory space, as depicted in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  
Figure 4.1. Hierarchical representation of RECs within (part of) the health 
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Figure 4.2. Nested regulatory structure of RECs within (part of) the health 










RECs are regulators of health research in that they quite clearly serve as social 
controls of science. They are ‘independent’ bodies charged with assessing the ethical 
acceptability of health research proposals through application of ethical standards 
and analysis of social and scientific value and risk-benefit assessment, and thereby 
determine whether the study should be undertaken. Since their establishment, RECs 
have been delegated authority from the government and regulatory agencies to 
determine, often through norms of practice set by the medical and science 
professions, the ethical acceptability of a research study. On a case-by-case basis, 
RECs set the conditions around how a given study should be conducted. Always, 
their independence from both managing regulatory authorities and other 
organisations (be it NHS Trusts or Health Boards, universities, or otherwise) is 
emphasised.  
While RECs regulate the activities of researchers, above them sits a Research Ethics 








activities. Each Research Ethics Service is itself situated within a regulatory 
authority (e.g. CSO in Scotland, HRA in England) that issues sets of commands to be 
applied by the Research Ethics Service, and through them, RECs, within their 
respective but coordinated jurisdictions. The HRA is the primary authority for RECs 
in England but cooperates with equivalent authorities in the three other nations in 
the exercise of their respective functions relating to the regulation of assessments of 
the ethics of health and social care research, with a view to co-ordinating and 
standardising practice in the United Kingdom relating to such regulation.354 Thus, in 
many ways, the HRA is the UK’s primary health research authority with regulatory 
command of RECs (primes inter pares) as seen through its control of regulatory 
instruments such as the REC SOPs, GAfREC, and the UK Policy Framework.355  
The ethnographic work of Stephens and colleagues at the UK Stem Cell Bank356 
suggests, however, that even if a (meta- or managing) regulator has ultimate legal 
authority, it may not necessarily have day-to-day authority. Stephens and 
colleagues found that despite what formal regulations mandate regarding the 
quality and origins of the stem cell lines received from depositors, scientists engage 
in a kind of interpretive flexibility when it comes to interpreting and operationalising 
the regulations. Scientists at the UK Stem Cell Bank engage in ‘bridging strategies’ 
to reconcile the written demands of regulators and the social demands of scientific 
practice. Efforts to resolve tensions in the practical implementation of regulatory 
guidance are done through ‘instantiated regulation’, which describes the processes of 
translating written regulatory guidance into practical action (‘making the 
                                                     
354 Care Act 2014, s 111(4). 
355 See e.g. Health Research Authority, ‘UK Policy Framework for Health and Social Care 
Research’ (n 320) s 2.2 (noting that the UK Policy Framework ‘will be supported by 
operational arrangements and guidance provided by the HRA and the Devolved 
Administrations, working in collaboration to ensure a consistent approach to co-ordinating 
and standardising regulatory practice. This will achieve compatibility across the UK for the 
management and conduct of health and social care research.’). 
356 Neil Stephens, Paul Atkinson, and Peter Glasner, ‘Documenting the Doable and Doing the 




documented doable’), and serves as ‘a response to the interpretative flexibility of 
regulatory texts’.357 For Stephens and colleagues, regulatory instantiation 
demonstrates the inherent interpretive and procedural flexibility of regulatory 
scripts (i.e. law) and that regulation is always distributed and locally managed by 
the actors on the ground: 
In these different settings, members have to find organizationally and 
situationally specific ways to implement rules, regulations and equivalent 
normative frameworks. In principle, no ‘rule’ (which for our purposes also 
includes ethical and regulatory protocols) can specify precisely how it shall 
be applied in specific cases. In practice, this does not result in an endless 
regress of rules-about-rules or rules-of-application, because social actors 
routinely find and collectively negotiate practical, doable solution. Everyday 
solutions depend on finding formulations that can be held to justify actions 
that (arguably) reflect the ‘spirit’ of the regulation, or that can be found to be 
‘good enough’ for the purpose at-hand: a property of rule use termed the ‘et 
cetera clause’ of background expectancies by Garfinkel (1967).358 
In the case of the UK Stem Cell Bank, regulatory instantiation was demonstrated in 
the 1) iterative modification of the Cell Line Information Form by the UK Stem Cell 
Bank working together with laboratories; 2) visits to the laboratories by the UK Stem 
Cell Bank, which built trust through networks; and 3) the shaping of both laboratory 
and UK Stem Cell Bank practices as a result of these interactions.  
The insight from Stephens and colleagues ties in with the discussion of the 
interstitial nature of many regulatory spaces within the formal regulated space. 
Their insight suggests that as both regulators and regulatees, RECs, too, must 
navigate situationally-specific ways to implement risk-calibrated regulations (from 
the SOPs, GAfREC, and so on) that govern their practice in determining the ethical 
acceptability of research applications. It also further suggests that RECs may have 
more regulatory flexibility than we may think and that part of this flexibility is 
based on ‘interpersonal trust in instantiating and maintaining system trust’.359 In 
Part III of the thesis, the insights from Stephens and colleagues will be invoked in 
                                                     
357 ibid 794.  
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discussions surrounding the key theme of ‘regulatory stewardship’ and its 
connection with liminality. 
Describing the nested regulatory structure of RECs and opportunities for 
instantiated regulation is distinct from exploring why ethics review regulation 
emerged in the first place, which actors contributed to that emergence, and the 
patterns of interaction between RECs, the Research Ethics Service, and other 
regulatory actors, to say nothing of what the day-to-day regulatory practice of RECs 
looks like. What constitutes ethics review in the practices of RECs, particularly as 
they become more institutionalised and this ‘next-generation’ regulation is brought 
to bear on them? 
Regulatory theory helps frame these questions. RECs first emerged because of 
historical contingency and political manoeuvring by lawyers, policymakers, and 
legislators in Washington, DC in the mid-1960s.360 Out of concern for ongoing 
research scandals, potential legal liability, and governmental regulation, NIH 
policymakers enacted a delegated ‘satellite regulator’ model as an adaption of the 
‘group consideration’ structure from the NIH Clinical Center’s Clinical Research 
Committee. In this model, committees of self-regulating medico-scientific peers at 
local institutions would review protocols submitted by fellow physician-researchers 
at their institutions and give ‘due consideration’ to ‘pertinent ethical issues’.361 Some 
American commentators take issue with the regulatory choices made or rationales 
for the creation of ethics committees. Schneider, for example, finds that the IRB 
system in the US ‘has proved a poor tool because it is compounded of ill-judged 
regulatory choices. It was born of scandal, not study of the extent and nature of 
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ethical problems and of possible solutions to them. Its framers were too inexpert in 
regulation to appreciate the costs of event licensing.’362  
In the UK, we saw a follow-on effect from this American creation, with hospitals 
establishing RECs beginning in the late 1960s as a pragmatic response from the US 
Surgeon General’s policy.363 But growth and development of RECs were incremental 
and patchy; they were distinctly not in response to research scandals.364 Contrary to 
the US, it was not until the new millennium that statutory regulation was enacted 
that set legally binding requirements on RECs’ form and function—and technically, 
this was only for CTIMPs. Thus, for much of their history, RECs were unique 
products of actively designed decentred regulation,365 whereby the government 
shifted authority to and trust in the medical and scientific professions as well as 
independent regulatory authorities to set the principles and standards for their 
operation. However, as we will see, RECs exhibit a unique kind of regulatory design 
as compared to common understandings of decentred regulation in that the locus of 
the activity of regulating RECs has been gradually shifting towards the state. 
Surveying the history, three rationales appear to have been at play in the aim of 
creating health research ethics regulation beginning in the 1960s, both voluntarily 
from within the profession and top-down from state actors. These were: 1) to protect 
research participants from potential harm by minimising the risks exposed to them 
by the proposed research; 2) to address information deficits between the researcher 
and participant in terms of the proposed study by requiring researchers to explain 
clearly (e.g. through information sheets) what would be involved in the study, 
including the potential risks and benefits, to allow (healthy) volunteers and patients 
                                                     
362 Schneider, The Censor’s Hand (n 12) xxx (Introduction) . 
363 US Public Health Service, ‘Memo’ (n 137).  
364 Hedgecoe, ‘Scandals’ (n 137). 
365 Decentred regulation can be defined as ‘a shift (and recognition of such a shift) in the 
locus of the activity of “regulating” from the state to other, multiple, locations, and the 
adoption on the part of the state of particular strategies of regulation’. See Julia Black, 
‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103, 112. 
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to make an informed decision about whether to participate in the study; and 3) to 
broker a compromise between public welfare-attuned politicians and regulators 
concerned with safety and public trust (not to mention being perceived to act in the 
public interest), and professional physician-researchers who were concerned with 
maintaining freedom of science and minimising the impact of external regulation 
that might hinder their research (the argument for ‘clinical autonomy’). In the early 
age of RECs’ creation, a mixture of public and private interests drove regulation in 
this nascent regulatory space.  
However, the historical tracing in Chapter 3 also suggests that regulatory 
developments in this area have never purely been a matter of ‘public’ or ‘private’ 
interests (or some hybrid mix thereof), though certainly both exist, and the recent 
legal instantiation of research promotion may signal a surge of private interests, 
particularly from the research community (including industry). More is occurring in 
health research regulation than a prolonged war between public welfare and 
research autonomy punctuated by battles or scandals. Instead, even from the 
nascent stage of the REC system’s creation and the emergence of regulatory controls 
on science, there has been an emphasis on social processes and how they shape 
health research ethics regulation. The historical tracing in Chapter 3 demonstrates 
that the progression of regulatory controls, both on RECs and of research involving 
participants, is symptomatic of incremental process rather than action:reaction 
punctuated by nodal points in regulatory history. Through an anthropology of 
regulation, this thesis thus bridges the historical tracing with present understanding 
and with future outlook: we cannot understand where we are and where are going 
with health research regulation unless we understand where we have been. The 
past, present, and future are inextricably linked in time and place and bonded by 
processes of gradual change reflected in the actions of various actors.  
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The analytic concept and metaphor of ‘regulatory space’, first described by Hancher 
and Moran,366 and already referred to above, provides useful spatial-temporal 
framing of the processes here. Regulatory space proponents argue that local context 
and historical configuration (i.e. time and space), as well as institutional dynamics, 
affect the relevant regulation and influence the practices that happen within the 
space.367 As to the metaphor itself, regulatory space focuses on networks of regulation 
and mixing of regulators and strategies: 
The ‘space’ here is conceived of as a cluster of regulatory issues, decisions, 
or policies (a ‘regulatory arena’) that involves the interplay and competition 
between various interests. Regulatory authority is widely shared between 
private and public actors (therefore making the distinction largely 
meaningless), and regulatory approaches are shaped by location, timing, 
and history. […] In the world of regulatory space, as in the world of 
regulatory networks, the idea of ‘capture’ makes only limited sense; 
regulatory authority is inherently shared, and private interests are driven to, 
or accept, playing legitimate roles in the regulation of themselves, of 
industry sectors (through associations), and of wider society.368    
According to Scott, the regulatory space concept posits that the ‘resources relevant 
to holding of regulatory power and exercising of capacities are dispersed or 
fragmented’; the resources ‘are not restricted to formal, state authority derived from 
legislation or contracts, but also include information, wealth and organisational 
capacities.’369 Moreover, ‘the possession of these resources is fragmented among 
state bodies, and between state and non-state bodies’.370 Scott elaborates: 
Put another way, capacities derived from possession of key resources are not 
necessarily exercised hierarchically within the regulatory space, regulator over 
regulatee. We recognise the presence within the space not just of regulators 
and regulatees, but of other interested organisations, state and non-state, 
possessing resources to a variable degree. Relations can be characterised as 
complex, dynamic and horizontal, involving negotiated interdependence. This re-
conceptualisation of regulatory processes is important in understanding the 
limits of law within regulation. The dispersed nature of resources between 
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organisations in the same regulatory space means regulators lack a 
monopoly both over formal and informal authority. This observation draws 
our attention to the need to conceive of strategies of regulation as consisting 
of a wide range of negotiated processes, of which rule formation and 
enforcement are but two.371 
Further elucidation of the regulatory space is provided by Black, who suggests that 
three principal regulatory functions can be mapped across a range of actual or 
potential regulators—standard setting, monitoring, and enforcement—and a wide 
variety of institutional actors can be ‘enrolled’ to carry out, alone or in collaboration, 
one or more of these regulatory functions.372 Burris and colleagues extend this 
concept with discussion of polycentric, or ‘nodal’ character of, contemporary 
governance, which ‘is an elaboration of contemporary network theory that explains 
how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact along networks to 
govern the systems they inhabit’.373 They posit that institutions (which I would 
broaden to ‘actors’) are substantially comprised in nodes, having a set of 
technologies, mentalities, and resources that mobilise the knowledge and capacity of 
members to manage the course of events: ‘Networks are a prime means through 
which nodes exert influence.’374 Burris finds that there are a number of nodes that do 
or could help regulators (including ethics committees) regulate how researchers 
treat research participants. This can range from medical journals to professional 
organisations to courts to ethicists, all of whom can act as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in 
formulating and disseminating new standards.375 
The concept of regulatory space, along with insights from polycentric contemporary 
governance, helps us understand why the current regulation of health research 
                                                     
371 ibid (emphasis added). 
372 Julia Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial 
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373 Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, and Clifford Shearing, ‘Nodal Governance’ (2005) 30 
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involving human participants is less a matter of public authorities versus private 
interests. Indeed, the underlying institutionalist framework of research ethics 
review by dispersed expert ethics committees and pluralist organisational 
involvement was established already by the 1970s, and this was in large part due to 
a conscious effort by the state to delegate much of the decision-making authority to 
private interests in the form of the RCP and other non-state actors.  
Interestingly, then, what appears to exist in the UK is not the ‘decentred’ regulation 
of health research that scholars like Black emphasise is a modern characteristic of the 
regulatory world,376 where the state is increasingly joined by other (non-state) 
institutional actors precisely because the state is shifting the locus of the activity of 
regulating to these non-state actors. Rather, the health research regulatory space, or 
at least in the particular space of health research ethics as it pertains to RECs, 
reflects an increasingly pronounced positioning by the state. What we see today is a 
shifting of the locus of regulating towards the state, with more ‘centred’ or truly 
polycentric regulation. State actors such as the NHS (via Trusts, Foundation Trusts, 
and Health Boards and the R&D offices within them), Department of Health (and 
their equivalents in the devolved administrations), and the HRA assert much firmer 
control with rules- and principles-driven regulation (e.g. Care Act 2014, UK Policy 
Framework, GAfREC, The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004, REC SOPs) that both seek to streamline ethics review processes and also 
remove a degree of autonomy from RECs.377  
But the state is not alone, of course. It is situated next to the long-standing and 
previously dominant presence of non-state regulatory actors and sources of 
authority such as researchers and physicians, industry (e.g. pharmaceutical 
                                                     
376 Black, ‘Decentring Regulation’ (n 365). 
377 Cave and Nichols (n 89) 74, 78 (‘Following the introduction of the Clinical Trials Directive 
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companies), organisations within the medical and scientific profession (e.g. RCP), 
and new(er) organisations explicitly promoting a pro-research agenda (e.g. AMS). 
Unlike standard accounts of decentred regulation, then, here we see that the state 
has only recently asserted itself into the mix of regulatory actors. Not unusually, 
each of these actors can exert cross-competing demands and the polycentric nature 
of the space exhibits potentially cacophonous forms of standard setting, monitoring, 
and enforcement. In sum, while the state has recently asserted itself and the HRA 
has emerged as a central regulatory actor, the latter is not a ‘one-stop shop’ for the 
regulation of health research as marketed. One can today delineate multiple actors 
(or ‘nodes’) that populate the health research regulatory space in the area of 
research ethics, including: 
 RECs; 
 sponsors and institutions (i.e. research employers); 
 NHS (e.g. (Health Boards, Trusts, Foundation Trusts); 
 Department of Health / devolved administration equivalents; 
 Health Research Authority / devolved administration equivalents (including 
the Research Ethics Service); 
 UKECA; 
 MHRA; 
 regulatory licensing authorities (e.g. HFEA, HTA); 
 regulatory advisory committees (Confidentiality Advisory Group, 
Administration of Radioactive Substances Advisory Committee, Public 
Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health and Social Care); 
 industry (e.g. commercial firms); 
 Data Monitoring Committees; 
 funders (e.g. Wellcome Trust; MRC); 
 courts; 
 professional organisations (e.g. Royal College of Physicians; British Medical 
Association; World Medical Association); 
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 interest groups (e.g. Academy of Medical Sciences); 
 research colleagues; 
 ethicists; 
 journals; 
 news media; 
 research participants; and 
 publics. 
Clearly, many actors (or ‘nodes’) populate this regulatory space, which, it must be 
stressed, merely covers one discrete area: regulation of the ethics of health research 
involving human participants. Indeed, some argue that in health research, the 
regulatory space is not unitary but in fact comprised of ‘a multiplicity of spaces 
ostensibly engaged in the same endeavour but with little means to learn lessons 
between them’.378 How, then, can we put these nodes under the analytic microscope 
and make sense of this space or these spaces? Vibert recommends that one helpful 
approach to thinking about the regulatory space is not an overarching account of 
system behaviour, but rather a bottom-up account of the individual units that 
regulate or are subject to regulation. Certainly, this approach plays better with 
anthropology of regulation and my research design, which focuses on RECs as 
individual units (or more accurately, as individual nodes, with supra-units and sub-
units or supra/sub-nodes within or connected to them, such as the HRA, Research 
Ethics Service, Chairs, Managers, and Scientific Officers). As Vibert says: ‘[t]his 
involves selecting a technique of analysis, relevant to regulation, that provides a 
point of entry into the more general logic and workings of the regulatory system 
and serves to open up wider issues.’379  
Law is important to consider here, and it is worth highlighting that in the 
institutionalist and polycentric theory of regulation, law is facilitative rather than 
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prohibitive, ‘emphasising non-legal organisational and systemic dynamics as crucial 
to regulatory objectives’, and helping ‘to structure the interactions between 
regulatory participants rather than directly to shape the substance of the regulatory 
issue’.380 Yet law also polices the boundaries of the regulatory space where actors 
interact, and is limited in what it can achieve, or holds itself out to achieve. As Scott 
observes: 
[L]aw is more marginal to actions within the regulatory space than lawyers 
might assume. That political systems seek to use law instrumentally for 
regulatory purposes does not give law the pre-eminence in ordering society 
which some argue it had when adjudication was a central form of 
governance in an earlier period. Indeed, the argument that law is 
increasingly used to co-ordinate ‘pre-existing relationships of power’ is at 
odds with the dominant, but symbolic conception of law as being exercised 
hierarchically.381 
So, even if we find, for example, that the Care Act 2014 has bestowed formal legal 
authority on the HRA to regulate RECs (directly in England and indirectly in the 
devolved nations) and a duty to promote the co-ordination and standardisation of 
practice in the UK relating to the regulation of health and social care research, as 
well as a duty to co-operate with each devolved authority in the exercise of their 
respective functions relating to the regulation of assessments of the ethics of health 
and social care research, this does not mean that the HRA necessarily possesses 
actual regulatory authority over health research. What it means is that the HRA has 
ultimate (legal) authority, but this is not equivalent to saying that it can or does 
dictate what happens on the ground or within the regulatory space(s). Things might 
‘work well’, but not in ways that the HRA foresees or would necessarily sanction. 
The insight from Scott about the limits of law tells us that ‘authority’ can take many 
forms, legal and extra-legal, depending on how it is defined, who wields it, when, 
and in what ways, and who in return is impacted by it. Scott’s insight thus draws 
attention to the problems inherent in a law-centric approach. We must be open to 
the possibility that authority may be wielded in myriad ways and at different times 
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by RECs and other regulatory actors, such as R&D offices, researchers, and 
sponsors, who possess key resources of information and organisation even if not 
sanctioned with these resources by law.  
Thus, we see that the value of regulatory space as an analytic concept is its 
usefulness in demarking the range of actors and processes in health research, and 
for ‘drawing in perspectives which question the capacities of instrumental law and 
regulation, and envisage greater reflexivity or responsiveness in systems 
characterised variously as post-bureaucratic or post-interventionist’.382 As Scott 
writes, ‘[b]efore we conclude that all key resources are possessed by a single 
regulatory agency, we ask first whether those resources are in fact dispersed 
through a more fragmented pattern.’383 Lastly, an openness to surprise is warranted 
when applying a nodal analysis of the regulatory space in this context. For Burris: 
The positive potential of a nodal [analytic] view is clear: when the available 
regulators are identified and their capacities assessed, ‘unregulated’ 
activities can be revealed as highly regulated, or potentially so. In the case of 
human subjects regulation, a diversity of regulators may be creating 
problems of over-regulation, over-punishment, and over-deterrence.384  
Ongoing or further recourse to the law as a means of achieving a robust health 
research regime, it seems, may not be appropriate.   
It bears noting that some commentators consider a drawback to the regulatory space 
metaphor to be its difficulties in ‘accounting for the boundaries of regulatory spaces 
and in explaining the different dimensions that characterize the “topology” of the 
space—notably: the relative power of the different actors; the distribution of 
resource dependence relevant to the space; and the nature of the communication 
flows between actors.’385 As will be argued, this, in fact, is where liminality adds key 
support to the metaphor, especially in making sense of the spaces in-between 
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boundaries. Additionally, an anthropology of regulation rounds out the call for 
richer characterisation of the ‘topology’ of the space by paying close attention, 
through empirical research, to the dynamics of interaction between actors and how 
resources are distributed. It complements socio-legal research approaches by 
investigating the extra-legal elements of social practices from the inside out and 
paying attention to the processual nature of regulation. Engaging in anthropological 
investigation of regulation accounts for a deeply contextual understanding of the 
behaviours and experiences of actors who intentionally intervene in the activities of 
a target population (i.e. regulators), as well as those actors whose activities have 
been regulated (i.e. regulatees).386 
4.3.2 Regulatory design: risk-based and proportionate regulation 
If regulatory space serves as a useful frame to make sense of the range of nodes that 
share regulatory authority of a given activity, what can be said of regulatory 
design—the structures, techniques, and strategies deployed by regulatory actors to 
accomplish their tasks? Risk assessment and management is a classic modus operandi 
of regulators. Baldwin and colleagues observe that ‘regulation can be seen as being 
inherently about the control of risks’,387 while Lodge argues that we live in ‘the age 
of risk-based regulation’.388 Recent changes in health research regulation described 
in Part I of this thesis suggest a pronounced move towards this risk-focused 
approach, which also accords with the UK’s Hampton Review in 2005 that 
recommended all UK regulators operate a risk-based system,389 and the statutory 
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Regulators’ Code, which requires regulators to ‘base their regulatory activities on 
risk’ and ‘choose proportionate approaches to those they regulate’.390 
Risk, a key theme in contemporary societies,391 can be defined simply as an ‘adverse 
event that may occur in the future’.392 The CIOMS Guidelines define risk more 
thoroughly as ‘an estimate of two factors: first, how likely it is that a participant will 
experience a physical, psychological, social or other harm; and second, the 
magnitude or significance of the harm’.393 
Risk-based regulation is defined as ‘the prioritizing of regulatory actions in 
accordance with an assessment of the risks that parties will present to the regulatory 
body’s achieving its objectives’.394 Surveying the literature, one finds that it 
generally contains the following key elements (Box 4.1):395 
Box 4.1. Elements of risk-based regulation. 
1. There are three sequential phases: 1) assessment (framing and forecasting the 
probability and consequences of identified hazards); 2) management 
(designing and implementing actions and remedies to address risks through a 
consideration of potential risk treatments and selection of the most 
appropriate); and 3) review (decision-making processes are transparent and 
open to revision in light of new information); 
2. The regulator’s aim is to control relevant risks rather (or more) than 
compliance with sets of rules; 
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3. Once assessed, a range of responses can be applied to manage the risks, such 
as risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk retention, and risk transfer; 
4. There is clear identification of risks that the regulated organisations (i.e. 
researchers and their studies) may present to the achieving of the regulator’s 
objectives; 
5. There is a comprehensive system for assessing such risks and scoring these in 
either a quantitative or qualitative manner, underpinned by scientific 
evidence and a robust decision methodology; 
6. There is a linkage of risk scoring mechanism/risk evaluation with resource 
allocation (e.g. more resources to regulate the higher risk organisation or 
activity); 
7. There is recognition that risk tolerance and use of a risk-based framework is 
more political art than pure technical application; and 
8. The risks that the regulator is concerned with may not align with the risks on 
which regulatees are focused. 
 
Throughout their history, RECs have been designed to focus much of their attention 
on assessing risks and expected benefits. They are charged with assessing, or 
weighing a favourable ‘balancing’ of, the harms (i.e. the adverse events) and 
benefits of a given research study, or phrased another way, risks against the 
probability of benefit. As the GAfREC state: ‘The committee has to be assured that 
any anticipated risks, burdens or intrusions will be minimised for the people taking 
part in the research and are justified by the expected benefits for the participants or 
for science and society.’396 Elsewhere, it states that ‘RECs must be assured about the 
planned ethical conduct and anticipated risks and benefits of any proposed 
research’,397 and that ‘research can sometimes involve an element of risk, because 
research can involve trying something new. It is important that any risks are 
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minimised and do not compromise the dignity, rights, safety and well-being of the 
people who take part.’398 At least on paper, there would appear to be two general 
levels of risk in the assessments undertaken by RECs: minimal risk, and greater than 
minimal risk.399 For their part, investigators are expected to prepare descriptions of 
risks and intended benefits for REC members, potentially other regulators (such as 
the MHRA), as well as research participants. Together, the risk-benefit calculus is 
said to operationalise all three of the ‘classic’ (principlist) ethical principles of 
beneficence, respect for persons, and justice.400 It is also said to reflect a 
consequentialist approach, where the ‘right choices are those with the best overall 
consequences’—the potential benefits of a research study must be proportionate to 
the risks borne by participants.401  
Assessing the elements outlined in Box 4.1 and turning our attention to the context 
of ethics review, we can speculate that RECs most often engage in risk management 
techniques of risk reduction (e.g. setting conditions on the research study for it to be 
ethically acceptable) and risk avoidance (e.g. prohibiting certain research studies or 
activities within them by not granting a favourable opinion).  
Further and relatedly, we can surmise that risk-based regulation is linked with 
notions of ‘proportionate’ regulation. In law and regulation, proportionality 
connects ‘the exercise of legal power with doctrines and ideas of reason, fairness, 
fittingness, and order circulating within broader political and indeed cultural 
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discourse’.402 As Meyer notes, there has been ‘a global trend toward “risk-
proportionate” regulation of [human subjects research]’ […] It aims for two 
politically unassailable goals—the safety and welfare of research participants and 
the efficient use of scarce resources—and wraps these goals in the seemingly 
unobjectionable language of “proportionality”’.403 An OECD report from 2010 
observes that ‘[a] risk-based approach to regulation explicitly acknowledges that the 
government cannot regulate all risks and that regulatory action, when taken, should 
be proportionate, targeted and based on an assessment of the nature and magnitude 
of the risks and of the likelihood that regulation will be successful in achieving its 
aims.’404 It finds that for central regulators (in this case, the HRA for example): ‘A 
significant objective of incorporating a better treatment of risk in regulatory 
management is to improve regulatory design and administration, to reduce the 
fiscal costs of administering regulation and minimise the burden that regulation 
imposes on business and the community.’405 This language accords with the UK’s 
Regulators’ Code, which states that: ‘Regulators should carry out their activities in a 
way that supports those they regulate to comply and grow’, which means that, 
among other things, they ‘should avoid imposing unnecessary regulatory burdens 
through their regulatory activities’ and ‘should consider how they might support or 
enable economic growth for compliant businesses and other regulated entities 
[…]’.406 
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For RECs specifically, an early shift towards risk-proportionate regulation can be 
traced to the Lord Warner Report from 2005, which recommended proportionate 
ethics review such that ‘[t]he remit of NHS RECs should not include surveys or 
other non-research activity if they present no material ethical issues for human 
participants.’407 COREC’s response publication in 2006, Building on Improvement, 
acknowledged that the Lord Warner Report sought ‘proportionality of review’ as a 
means to streamline the extant regulation, and in response, COREC recommended 
introducing ‘a research ethics service incorporating RECs working in structured 
networks, where decisions are made as a result of review proportionate to the level 
of risk provided by the study.’408 As noted in Chapter 3, in 2010, following the 
earlier pilot study from 2009 based on the recommendation from the Lord Warner 
Report, the Proportionate Review Service was introduced across the UK to 
operationalise a proportionate regulatory approach based on the level of risk a 
study proposed.  
Similarly, the AMS emphasised the need for proportionate regulation in its report 
from 2011, recommending it as a key principle underpinning health research 
regulation (indeed, it was one of the four principles they advocated): ‘…the 
application of regulation should be both proportionate and symmetrical. A “one-
size-fits-all” approach to regulation damages us all. Instead, regulation of health 
research should be proportionate to the risks and benefits to individuals and 
society.’409 Throughout its report, the AMS recommended that an ‘ideal’ health 
research regulatory system would, among other things, apply regulatory 
requirements in a way that is proportionate to the potential benefits and harms of 
the research. Within ethics review, the AMS encouraged NRES (as it then was) to 
roll out Proportionate Review to all RECs, charging that ‘[i]t is particularly 
important to adopt a proportionate approach to ethics review because of the 
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diversity of research that undergoes this assessment, which includes: questionnaires 
for staff and patients, minimally interventional studies and clinical trials of new 
drugs. The benefits of a proportionate approach are recognised in both the US and 
Canadian ethics review systems…’410  
Even after the HRA’s creation, the research community has continued to advocate 
for a turn towards streamlined and proportionate regulation in the hopes of 
‘increasing value and reducing waste in biomedical research regulation and 
management’.411 In an influential article published in The Lancet in 2014, University 
of Edinburgh clinical neurologist Rustam Al-Shahi Salman and colleagues 
(including Janet Wisely, then Chief Executive of the HRA) wrote alarmingly of ‘the 
increasing burden, inconsistency, and complexity of regulation in the past two 
decades, sometimes out of proportion to the risk of the research’412 that ultimately 
had led to a ‘threat to public health’.413 Chief among their concerns was that: 
‘Although the conceivable risks of research vary, regulatory requirements do not 
seem to have been designed to be proportionate to the extent to which safety of 
patients is likely to be jeopardised.’414 In this context, they cited the example of 
requiring consent for ‘low-risk’ epidemiological research and biobanking and the 
application of the Clinical Trials Directive to non-commercial trials assessing 
licensed treatments that have already been adopted in practice. Though they noted 
examples from the UK of solutions to some sources of waste and inefficiency in 
regulation of clinical research (e.g. the development of COREC to NRES to the HRA 
and the latter’s strategic plan from 2013), they also noted much more could be done 
to reduce ‘wasteful regulation and management of research’.415 As they wrote: ‘The 
main solution to disproportionality is to limit regulation to whatever is essential, 
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both to protect the autonomy and wellbeing of research participants and to be 
proportionate to the plausible risks posed to them.’416 The authors did not, however, 
clearly explain what entails ‘essential’ regulation. 
A final example of proportionate regulation is seen in the Care Act 2014, which 
mandates the HRA to ‘promote the co-ordination and standardisation of practice in 
the United Kingdom relating to the regulation of health and social care research; 
and it must, in doing so, seek to ensure that such regulation is proportionate’.417 
Operationalising this legal mandate in practice, the UK Policy Framework for Health 
and Social Care Research ‘recognise[s] the value of their proportionate application to 
different types of research’418 and throughout, emphasises a proportionate approach, 
including as a principle for regulators: ‘The HRA has a specific role to ensure the 
following. […] a. The regulation of health and social care research is proportionate, 
so that research that is clearly lower-risk gets processed accordingly.’419 
Based on the foregoing discussion, a question arises as to whether this next-
generation health research regulation implements a risk-based and proportionate 
approach for RECs that fulfils the elements described in Box 4.1 above. Are RECs’ 
deliberative processes ‘informed by an assessment of the probability of harm 
expected to arise’ from a given research study, or if the probability of harm cannot 
be calculated, do RECs demonstrate ‘a rational and transparent consideration of 
other relevant factors that for want of evidence remain uncertain’?420 This is a critical 
and empirical question that will be explored in Part III. At this stage, in setting the 
methodological foundation for the empirical research, it may be beneficial to look at 
what the UK regulations state.  
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In short, what the regulations state about risk assessment by RECs is minimal. The 
REC SOPs provide no detailed guidance on how risk is to be assessed. Somewhat 
clearer guidance is provided by international regulatory instruments such as the 
CIOMS Guidelines,421 but as Rid points out, ‘there is no explicit upper risk limit 
when informed consent is obtained, provided the net risks to participants are 
reasonable in relation to the scientific or social value of the research’.422  
Risk-proportionate assessment also lacks clarity. The REC SOPs state that: ‘The 
Proportionate Review Service (PRS) provides for proportionate review of research 
studies raising no material ethical issues, including projects involving 
straightforward issues which can be identified and managed routinely in 
accordance with standard research practice and existing guidelines.’423 It then 
proceeds to discuss procedural guidance on how the PRS is to operate. The GAfREC 
specify that ‘REC review is proportionate to the scale and complexity of the research 
proposed’,424 neither of which are attributes that necessarily equate to risk, but 
nevertheless are seen as linked. A ‘No Material Ethical Issues Tool’ published by the 
HRA (though no longer active on its website) lists seven categories (i.e. types of 
research) considered to present no material ethical issues (e.g. research using 
prospectively collected data or tissue that is anonymous to the researcher), followed 
by an eighth category, which is described as ‘Studies which do not fit categories 1-7 
but do not have any “Material Ethical Issues”’. According to the HRA, these 
categories prima facie raise no material ethical issues because they ‘have minimal 
risk, burden or intrusion for research participants’.425  
Such is how the ethics review system is currently designed for the purposes of 
assessing risk. Detailed regulatory guidance is lacking, which can raise conceptual 
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and practical challenges. Few scholars have closely analysed the risk-based 
regulatory design of RECs to assess its strengths and weaknesses,426 particularly as 
seen through the behaviours and experiences of RECs (who experience risk-based 
regulation imposed from the HRA and other central managing regulators), 
managing regulators (who seek to design and influence risk-based regulation), and 
regulatees (i.e. researchers, who must navigate the demands of the regulatory 
system). Rid, one of the few scholars to research this area outside the US, argues that 
‘frameworks for risk-benefit evaluations of biomedical research remain surprisingly 
vague’,427 ‘arguably places too much emphasis on informed consent as a condition of 
acceptable net risk to participants’,428 and that the ‘documented variation and 
inconsistency of risk judgments between RECs’429 raises concerns about both over- 
and under-protection of participants from risks, not to mention possible stifling of 
‘valuable research for overall marginal gains in subject protection’.430 In Part III of 
this thesis, the empirical research will shine light on the extent to which RECs 
engage in risk-based regulation, and examine how RECs (and the HRA) address the 
conceptual and practical challenges raised by the lack of clarity surrounding risk 
assessment. 
So far in this chapter, I have argued that sensitising concepts from regulatory 
theory, namely regulatory space and risk-based regulation, along with its related 
concept of proportionality, help us understand why regulation emerged in this 
space and the different array of actors who share in regulating health research. 
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However, regulatory theory has its limitations. On its own, it cannot validate 
whether models (or propositions) hold up in reality; regulatory theory can be highly 
abstracted and pay too little attention to the ‘human’ roles in regulatory practice, be 
they emotions, instincts, and relations, not to mention the connections between 
regulated objects and the subjects.  
The research questions this thesis poses demand an empirically-grounded 
investigation of regulatory practice. We have learned from an ethnographic study 
(of the UK Stem Cell Bank) that instantiated regulation brings nuanced insight into 
how regulation is actually done on the ground, and what it means to be a regulatee 
who—it turns out—has more of a regulatory role than theory or law might suggest. 
Other behaviours and experiences of actors may be missing from law and theory 
that require a fresh perspective and a new lens. In the following sections, first, I 
introduce anthropology of regulation as a response to the empirical demand and to 
extant socio-legal and legal anthropology approaches that are insufficient; and then, 
I argue that liminality is a critical component to anthropology of regulation and a 
strong response to the need to fill in the knowledge gaps of process and 
transformation in regulation. 
4.4 Anthropology of regulation 
This thesis contributes to emerging forms of socio-legal scholarship. Fundamentally, 
this is a study of the form and function of regulation rather than law, and of the 
behaviours and experiences of those that impact and are impacted by it. Here, I 
want to make the claim that a novel methodology is required to drive this research 
forward in a comprehensive way. The rationale behind anthropology of regulation 
can be summed up by paraphrasing a well-known quote from the socio-legal 
scholar Lawrence Friedman:431 Regulation is a massive vital presence in the world; it 
is too important to be left to regulators—or even to the realm of pure thought. 
Anthropology of regulation is both an (inter)discipline and a methodology 
                                                     




grounded in interdisciplinary dialogue and mixed research methods. It sits neither 
fully within anthropology nor within law or regulatory studies; it is a mode of 
enquiry in its own right within the broader social science tradition. It is a study of 
the nature of regulation and of the behaviours and experiences of actors within a 
regulatory space (or spaces), and the ways in which they themselves are affected by 
regulation. It draws on insights provided from law, regulatory studies, socio-legal 
studies, and anthropology. As a methodology, it draws on empirical qualitative 
research through methods of document analysis, observation, and interviews. 
Anthropology of regulation contributes to the fields of legal anthropology (also 
known as anthropology of law) and socio-legal studies. Legal anthropology is a 
similar field, of course, as it aims to understand the nature of law and how it is 
integral to culture, and culture to law; in other words, it explores how law is a 
window into the nature of culture itself. Socio-legal studies (and its cousin, legal 
sociology) employ ‘various empirical methods to study what is legal about legal 
processes, legal institutions and legal behaviour’.432 It draws attention to the 
interfacing social context within which law exists, and concerns itself with the 
empirical study of law as a set of social practices or as an aspect of a field of social 
experience.433  
The limitation of both approaches is that they tend to take law (or legalities) as the 
primary focus of investigation. As the above discussion of regulatory space 
elucidates, in making sense of the form and function of regulation, law 
fundamentally provides boundaries around space(s). Or, as Sarat and colleagues 
put it: ‘In its basic operation, law attempts to create, police, and occasionally 
transgress social, spatial and temporal boundaries. […] Within law’s spatio-
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temporal grid, complex classifications are established, creating boundaries that 
define individuals, communities, acts and norms…’434 As discussed above, law’s 
role within the regulatory space is limited; fundamentally, a focus on law alone 
would not adequately answer my research questions that examine not the logic of 
boundaries, but rather the logic (or illogic) of processes and regulatory spaces. 
Moreover, the regulatory spaces with which I am concerned—being those occupied 
by RECs that are explicitly focused on ethics and not law—require an approach to 
their study that does not put law as the central object of attention. This said, 
anthropology of regulation does not appear out of thin air; it builds on the work of 
different strands of methodology from legal anthropology and socio-legal studies, 
as outlined below. 
First, several scholars have undertaken ground-breaking observational studies of 
human behaviour in the context of regulatory compliance or regulatory enforcement 
by a public agency or official.435 To some extent, anthropology of regulation owes its 
allegiance to these pioneering observational (typically ethnographic) studies. 
However, to my knowledge, none of these studies have investigated non- or semi-
public regulatory bodies such as RECs. Nor have these studies attempted to branch 
out from compliance and enforcement reflected in command-and-control regulation 
so as to analyse both the form and function of non-rules-based regulation and its 
impact on regulators and regulatees. My research focuses on risk-based approaches 
and ethical reflection and governance rather than rules-based compliance or 
enforcement. In the REC world, there is limited ‘stick-beating’; at worst, research is 
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not approved by the REC and thus cannot commence, or the REC revokes its ethics 
approval following a material ethical breach. Thus, the focus of anthropology of 
regulation, and specifically my research, is different. As I discuss further below, 
anthropology of regulation builds on these empirical regulatory studies through its 
theoretical underpinning of liminality, which draws our attention to the processual 
nature of regulation and the importance of human experience during periods of 
uncertainty and transition. Anthropology of regulation also extends this work as it 
does not seek merely to identify, document, and understand observed regulatory 
practices. Through its multi-method approach, it also seeks to provide larger 
theoretical and normative insight into regulatory processes within a given space and 
within a given society. That is, it aims to prescribe and evaluate the desirability of 
different regulatory strategies and styles. The descriptive and normative arms of 
anthropology of regulation appear in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 
Second, Moore’s ground-breaking ‘sociological study of reglementation’, which she 
defines as ‘the study of the way partial orders and partial controls operate in social 
contexts’,436  provides foundational support to anthropology of regulation. She too 
desires a qualitative exploration of social processes and order that occur beyond 
state-based law, considering ‘reglementation’ as covering both ‘government law and 
non-governmental sites of rule-making and/or rule-enforcing’.437 Nevertheless, 
Moore quite clearly bases her approach on rules, coded as elements of order and 
control, which consequently envelops regulation within a narrow paradigm. I have 
made clear that this thesis concerns itself with regulation, which is much broader 
than law, even if law is defined as including non-state forms of normative ordering. 
And, to reiterate, unlike Moore, I believe regulation must include not only rules, but 
also principles, mechanisms, strategies, or activities promulgated by state or non-
state actors that either affect behaviour as an incidental effect or are designed to 
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steer behaviour in a socially, politically, and/or economically desirable way.438 This 
notion of regulation privileges neither the state nor rules. It does, however, accept 
and incorporate Moore’s message that a researcher should take ‘into account that 
there is a constant struggle between deliberate rule-making and planning, and other 
more untameable activities and processes at work in the social aggregate, [which] 
should be inspected together’.439 
Third, institutionalism (e.g. sociological institutionalism, historical institutionalism, 
political institutionalism) is an approach that examines, often through empirical 
methods, how actions and decisions by individual actors may be influenced (or 
structurally determined) by higher-level institutional factors and contexts.440 While 
anthropology of regulation certainly acknowledges that social processes shape 
regulation (and indeed it is influenced by the institutionalist approach of regulatory 
space), it does not presume that institutions and institutional frameworks influence 
or constrain decision-making. More importantly, it does not focus its analysis on the 
structural level of institutions (e.g. laws, the HRA, RECs) to explain processes and 
outcomes at a lower level (e.g. decision-making by a REC or individual REC 
members). It does not ask how institutions affect the behaviour of individuals, nor 
how individual behaviour affects the evolution of institutions. Rather, anthropology 
of regulation engages in investigation of regulation itself as both an ontological and 
functional concern. It examines the ways in which regulatory actors affect and are 
affected by processes of regulation, which in turn sheds light on regulation as a 
social form. The unique contribution of anthropology of regulation is that it focuses 
on the behaviours and experiences of regulatory actors within a space (or spaces) 
and the ways in which they themselves are affected by regulation, but it does so by 
scaling up of the units of analysis, from the individual-level to the social level and 
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drawing insights from empirical research to accomplish what the regulatory space 
metaphor seeks to do: examine ‘how the actions and intentions of regulatory actors 
are embedded in larger systems and institutional dynamics’.441 And indeed, the 
research questions in this thesis aim to explore and explain—through documentary 
research comprised of historical tracing and present-day regulatory analysis that 
explicates the internal constitution of regulation, as well as through observation and 
interviews—the experiences and behaviours of specific individual actors (i.e. units 
or nodes) in the health research regulatory space governing the ethics of health 
research involving participants, namely RECs and their managing regulators.  
In sum, there are limits to law-based or even rules-based methodological 
approaches. Anthropology as a discipline escapes the trap of a law-based approach 
that examines and often reifies bounded spaces by instead focusing on what 
happens within the regulatory spaces and under the layers of regulation across time. 
This thesis focuses on regulatory spaces, which are less explored than the classic 
sites of empirical legal research, though there are signs that legal anthropology is 
beginning to explore these spaces.442 This thesis transcends the relatively narrow 
confines of law as object of investigation (specifically with its positivist connotations 
about state organisation, rules, rule-making bodies, and judiciary and enforcement 
agencies) and the logic of boundaries, but it also goes beyond the relatively broad 
range of social patterns of interaction and forms of internal normative orderings 
within various communities that characterise much sociological and regulatory 
studies research.  
Thus, anthropology of regulation allows me to investigate both the nature of 
regulation as a social form (an ontological concern) and what regulation does to 
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actors and what actors do to regulation (a functional and experiential concern). In so 
doing, it permits recognition of the limits of regulation, taking up Moore’s apt 
message (at least through the prism of rules) that we should be cognisant of ‘social 
processes which operate outside the rules, or which cause people to use rules, or 
abandon them, bend them, reinterpret them, side-step them, or replace them’.443 
Regulatory theory is necessary to help provide potential explanatory background; 
empirical research is equally necessary to help provide understanding of everyday 
practice. In essence, anthropology of regulation allows the researcher to bring 
theory and practice meaningfully together. 
Anthropology of regulation consists of theoretical underpinnings drawn from 
regulatory and anthropological theory and is grounded in a trinity of empirical 
research methods to provide ‘a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility’.444 The 
approach is interpretivist rather than positivist: it considers people as products of 
their environment and as those who construct the environment through their 
understandings of it. The focus is on subjective understandings: the ‘inner worlds’ 
of people and their understanding of the world.445 It does not seek to produce 
‘objective’ findings about human activities (of which regulation is part) precisely 
because it rejects that such a position is possible. Documentary research uses 
interpretive methods to examine sources of regulation to determine how regulation 
has developed and been applied over time. It asks both what the law is on a 
particular issue and how an activity is regulated and how that regulation has 
developed over time. It is, in other words, research into regulation, regulatory 
concepts, regulatory practices, and the symbioses between them. The result of such 
interpretation is both descriptive analysis (explaining how a segment of regulation 
fits within the larger regulatory space) and normative evaluation of the processes of 
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regulating an activity. The empirical evidence gathered through observation and 
interviews add to our understanding of human behaviours and experiences, and 
also are analysed qualitatively. While the specifics of the epistemological and 
ontological positions, as well as the detailed steps in the empirical research, are 
described in Chapter 5, the claim I wish to make here is that anthropology of 
regulation’s detailed attention to regulatory sources and human behaviours and 
experiences allows us to take special notice of context—historical, political, legal, 
economic, social, cultural, organisational—to explain and understand the nature of 
regulation as well as the experiences of regulatory actors who both regulate and are 
regulated. While this might, tangentially, touch on understandings of law, legal 
concepts, and even legal consciousness of actors,446 this approach extends socio-legal 
studies and legal anthropology by fundamentally focusing on the regulatory. 
Box 4.2 summarises the key elements of anthropology of regulation. 
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Box 4.2. Key elements of anthropology of regulation. 
1. Definition: the study of the nature of regulation and of the behaviours and 
experiences of actors within a regulatory space (or spaces), and the ways in 
which they themselves affect and are affected by processes of regulation. 
2. Theoretical underpinnings: Informed by theoretical underpinnings from 
regulatory theory (i.e. regulatory space) and anthropology (i.e. liminality) that 
together draw attention to the human factors that determine the nature of 
regulation and how regulators actually work, as well as the connections 
between regulated objects and the subjects (e.g. humans) connected to them. 
3. Methodological approach: empirical research set within an interpretivist 




















                                                     
involves the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking 
questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in 
fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on issues that are the emerging 
focus of inquiry’. See Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in 
Practice (3rd edn, Routledge 2007) 3.    
trinity’) of document analysis, interviews, and observations to make sense of 
the form and function of regulation (i.e. what it is and how it is expressed) 
and its impact on regulators and regulates (i.e. how it is experienced).  
o Document analysis: qualitative analysis (e.g. content analysis and 
thematic analysis) of regulatory sources (e.g. texts) covering a 
particular area that provides context and historical tracing of how 
regulations developed and have been applied over time. This 
includes analyses of the relationship between regulations and 
regulatory actors. The research is a two-part process that first 
involves locating regulatory sources (historical and current), and 
then interpreting and analysing the sources to make sense of 
processual developments. The outcome of the analysis can be both 
descriptive and normative. 
o Observations and interviews: evidence of the behaviours and 
experiences of regulatory actors who both regulate and are regulated 
gathered through direct observation. The gathered evidence is 
typically analysed qualitatively (i.e. thematic analysis), which, as 
with document analysis, can be both descriptive and normative. The 
observation may be naturalistic or participant-based; the interviews 
may be unstructured or semi-structured. 
4. Goals: 1) to explain and understand the processual nature of regulation and 
the behaviours and experiences of regulatory actors who both regulate and 
are regulated (i.e. how they understand their own actions); and 2) to provide 
larger theoretical and normative insight into regulatory processes within a 




I have mentioned that anthropology of regulation focuses on the processual and is 
underpinned in part by theory drawn from anthropology. I have not yet discussed 
the intricacies of anthropological theory and why it serves as a crucial component of 
the thesis. In the following section, I expand on liminality as a key anthropological 
concept (and as another ‘sensitising concept’) that underpins anthropology of 
regulation and is a crucial component of this thesis’s investigation of RECs and 
next-generation health research regulation. As I will argue, liminality helps us to 
understand the processual dimensions of regulation—the passages of actors from 
one stage to another, to document and understand experiential dynamics in 
regulatory spaces, and to reconceptualise the nature of health research regulation. 
4.5 Liminality 
4.5.1 Its value to this thesis 
As defined by Thomassen, liminality is an anthropological concept that ‘refers to 
moments or periods of transition during which the normal limits to thought, self-
understanding and behaviour are relaxed, opening the way to novelty and 
imagination, construction and destruction.’448 Thomassen argues that liminality is a 
universal concept because ‘cultures and human lives cannot exist without moments 
of transition, and those brief and important spaces where we live through the in-
between’.449 In this PhD’s context, liminality is central to everyday regulatory 
practices and mechanisms governing health research involving humans. Given its 
universality, Thomassen argues liminality should be posited as a central concept in 
the social sciences, akin to ‘structure’ and ‘practice’, for it gives meaning and 
understanding to how humans experience and react to change—and indeed, liminality 
is foremost based on experience, because to experience something means, 
etymologically, to go through something. Liminality is thus not so much an 
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explanatory concept as it is a state of affairs: it exists, it happens, and humans ‘react 
to liminal experiences in different ways’.450 It constantly ‘emerges in the in-between 
of a passage’451 and through its constant appearance, it helps us understand 
transition periods and social processes of change. Liminality can apply to 
individuals, groups, and even societies, and may occur in a single moment, over a 
period, or across an epoch. Similarly, liminality has a spatial dimension that can 
relate to specific places or thresholds (e.g. a doorway in a house), areas (e.g. border 
areas between countries, airports), and countries or larger regions (e.g. Ancient 
Palestine).452 Examples of liminal experiences include marriage, baptism, puberty, 
graduation ceremonies, New Year, natural disasters, and revolutions. 
Liminality serves as an integral component of anthropology of regulation and, as 
further advantage, accords well with regulatory theory. Both regulatory space and 
liminality affix themselves to the temporal and spatial dynamics of various actors. 
However, whereas regulatory space affords a metaphysical mapping of the actors 
involved in the space (or spaces), liminality affords a processual and experiential 
understanding of those actors and the ways in which they are affected by 
regulation, particularly at moments or periods of transition where uncertainty is 
paramount. The value of liminality is that it serves as a lens to make sense of the 
processual nature of health research regulation and RECs (and individuals therein) 
as key nodes in the health research regulatory space. It shines analytical light on the 
kinds of potentially transformative activities RECs both perform and experience. It 
offers perspective on what it means to be a regulator of health research, and also 
indirectly through my empirical investigation, draws attention to the experiences of 
researchers and research participants who, individually and collectively, undergo 
the transformative experience of becoming these embodied actors.  
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Liminality also supplements the concept of risk-based regulation. Risk-based 
regulation is about dealing with uncertain futures through the prism of risk 
identification and management. Liminality often—indeed, usually—occurs when 
there are moments of change and uncertainty. A lens of liminality therefore helps us 
both to recognise uncertainties, embrace them to a certain extent, potentially even 
exploit them, and pay attention to what is required to work through them. 
Liminality thus has the potential to yield novel insights into the nature of health 
research and its regulation—and the limits thereof, namely by helping us to uncover 
alternative paths to governing the behaviour of various actors and enforcing norms 
across sites of authority in research ethics oversight. It further helps us consider the 
importance of transition and transformation among critical components of health 
research.  
In what follows, I trace liminality’s conceptual evolution. 
4.5.2 Conceptual evolution 
Liminality as a concept emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1909, the 
anthropologist Arnold van Gennep wrote that upon analysis of ‘detailed 
descriptions and monographs concerning magico-religious acts’ throughout the 
world, he could ‘attempt a classification of these acts, or rites, that would be 
consistent with the progress of science.’453 Van Gennep found that all cultures 
exhibit ritual behaviour (i.e. ceremonies or rites) to mark the passage of an 
individual or social group from one status to another. However, van Gennep 
singled out ‘rites of passage’ in his study as he found them to serve as a critical 
component of the reproduction of social order: ‘The life of an individual in any 
society is a series of passages from one age to another and from one occupation to 
another.’454 ‘The underlying arrangement is always the same. Beneath a multiplicity 
of forms, either consciously expressed or merely implied, a typical pattern always 
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recurs: the pattern of the rites of passage.’455 In each of these series of passages, 
ceremonies are invoked by the society in which the individual is situated to enable 
him or her ‘to pass from one defined position to another which is equally well 
defined’,456 and consequently, these ceremonies share a wide degree of similarity 
(seen, for instance, in birth, childhood, marriage, and funerals).  
Though he did not invoke the noun ‘liminality’ as such, nor ever define it, van 
Gennep posited a tripartite conceptual schema of these ceremonial patterns that 
‘accompany a passage from one situation to another or from one cosmic or social 
world to another’,457 and selected rites of passage as a special category of transition, 
which he then subdivided into: (1) the symbolic separation of individuals (or a 
group) from their existing social position (rites of separation); (2) the transformation 
of their social status as they pass through an adjacent space (liminal or transition 
rites); and (3) their spatial and symbolic reincorporation into society (rites of 
incorporation). Van Gennep clarified that ‘although a complete scheme of rites of 
passage theoretically includes preliminal rites (rites of separation), liminal rites 
(rites of transition), and postliminal rites (rites of incorporation), in specific instances 
these types are not always equally important or equally elaborated’.458 Indeed, van 
Gennep reiterated several times in his seminal work that the ‘liminal’ stage often 
takes on an autonomy of its own. 
Often during the transition (liminal) periods in the rites of passage, van Gennep 
observed that: 
…a special language is employed which in some cases includes an entire 
vocabulary unknown or unusual in the society as a whole […]. This 
phenomenon should be considered of the same order as the change of dress, 
mutilations, and special foods (dietary taboos), i.e. as a perfectly normal 
differentiating procedure.459   
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Van Gennep further found that the passage from one social position to another is 
associated with a territorial passage, seen for example in the crossing of streets or 
entrance into a house or moving from one room to another. ‘This identification 
explains why the passage from one group to another is so often ritually expressed 
by passage under a portal, or by an “opening of the door”.’460 This focus on 
territorial passage draws attention to the passages that research protocols go 
through as they wend their way through the stages of the research lifecycle, an 
observation that I will return to in Part III. 
Building on this interpretation of ritual practices, in the 1960s, the anthropologist 
Victor Turner ‘re-discovered’ the work of van Gennep, which was largely unknown 
in the English-speaking world, and extended his analytic framework by turning 
attention to liminal experiences in non-ritual, Western societies. In so doing, the 
‘ritual moment’ could be less structured, more informal, and lend itself to wider 
application. Turner expanded the concept in several ways. First, he argued that the 
liminal state could be distinguished from the ‘liminoid’ states. Whereas a liminal 
state is a crucial aspect of the ceremonial process, a liminoid state speaks to the more 
optional, playful kinds of activities characteristic in the modern world (e.g. music 
festivals, plays, sporting events). Second, Turner advanced the claim that liminality 
must be tied to an experientially-based process approach, and he did this by 
invoking the portmanteau of communitas. This refers to moments of transition from 
one structural status to another where ‘a strong sense of “humankindness,” a sense 
of the generic bond between all members of society’461 comes into being such that 
pre-existing formal structures disappear and are replaced by an unstructured or 
loosely structured, spontaneous, ethereal moments of a coming together of 
individuals on an equal plane. 
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In 1971, the sociologists and ‘founders’ of grounded theory, Glaser and Strauss, also 
sought to advance van Gennep’s work by arguing that ‘status passages’ (which they 
considered the modern vocabulary for rites of passage) could be characterised by at 
least thirteen properties, as outlined in Box 4.3 below.462 Glaser and Strauss found 
that by focusing on these properties during analyses of status passages, the more 
systematic such analyses would be, which in turn would better ‘account for the 
behaviors of, and consequences for, the persons involved in any given status 
passage’.463 In their own work, Glaser and Strauss organised the properties of status 
passage around six principal considerations: reversibility, temporality, shape (i.e. 
periods, control over the passage), desirability, circumstantiality (i.e. whether the 
passage is made by one person or in aggregate or collectively), and multiplicity (i.e. 
multiple status passages experienced by every person).  
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Box 4.3. Properties of ‘status passages’, as described by Glaser and Strauss. 
1. The passage may be considered in some measure desirable or undesirable by 
the person making the passage or by other relevant parties. 
2. The passage may or may not be inevitable. 
3. The passage may be reversible to some degree. 
4. A passage may be repeatable or non-repeatable. 
5. The person who goes through the passage may do so alone, collectively, or in 
aggregate with any number of other persons. 
6. It follows that when people go through a passage collectively, or in 
aggregate, they may not be aware that they are all going through it together or 
at least not aware of all aspects of their similar passages. 
7. Although aware, the person may be unable to communicate with the others. 
8. The person making the passage may do so voluntarily or have no choice in the 










Following Glaser and Strauss’s call that ‘primary analysis should be organized 
around those core properties which seem especially relevant to the substantive area 
under study’,464 attention will be paid to several of these properties in Part III’s 
presentation of the empirical data, particularly the temporality, shape, and 
multiplicity of passages in the health research regulatory space.   
Liminality has been further developed in recent decades by scholars who apply the 
concept from various disciplinary perspectives to modern social settings and social 
theorising of modernity, be it political revolutions, earthquakes, gambling, or 
bungee jumping.465 Thomassen argues that liminality is omnipresent in modernity, 
thus completing a circle from what might otherwise seem like a marginal and old-
fashioned (if not colonial) anthropological account of status passages in exotic lands 
to a central conceptual device that helps to capture key features of many moments 
of modern life.466 Scholars increasingly also have plumbed the analytic depths of 
liminality. Diverging from the findings of Glaser and Strauss, who argue that 
liminality need not be strictly controlled and rigid, Szakolczai contends that any rite 
of passage ‘must follow a strictly prescribed sequence, where everybody knows 
what to do and how’ and that ‘everything is done under the authority of a master of 
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9. There is a degree of control which various actors, including persons 
undergoing the passage, have over various aspects of the passage. 
10. The passage may require special legitimation by one or more authorised 
actors. 
11. The clarity of the signs of passage, for the various actors, may vary from great 
to negligible clarity. 
12. The signs of passage may be disguised by relevant actors. 




ceremonies, the practical equivalency of an absolute ruler […] whose word is Law – 
though only during a rite, when there is no law.’467 Other scholars, however, 
gravitate closer towards Glaser and Strauss; they qualify Szakolczai’s observation 
by suggesting liminal experiences need not always be demarcated with an 
institutionalised transition ‘rite’ with identifiable masters of ceremony,468 such as in 
moments of ‘spontaneous liminality’ which is unforeseen and resulting from 
crisis.469 Yet Szakolczai’s contention that there is often an independent actor serving 
as a master of ceremonies to guide people through rituals, moments, or periods of 
transition may have some powerful resonance in health research regulatory 
encounters; it is one I will return to in Part III.  
For this thesis, the key relevant and important features of liminality are its focus on 
processual change and transformation, and the numerous actors that experience 
uncertainty and transformations as a result of health research and regulation, both 
of which in turn cause reflection on how regulatory apparatuses structure process 
and transformation. Liminality also draws attention to authority figures that may 
guide actors through status passages. The regulatory theory literature notes that 
significant coordination challenges can arise in getting actors within regulatory 
space to operate effectively. Various modes can be devised in response. One such 
mode is hierarchy, where, often through a legal framework, a top-down 
arrangement is instituted such that a central control body lays down rules that 
direct lower-rung institutions within the network. Through the lens of liminality, 
this is something to consider as existing between the HRA and RECs. For example, 
the HRA Approval process could be seen as a liminal period in itself. This new 
procedure has been instituted as of March 2016 for researchers and RECs in 
England, with direct impact on how they do their work (researchers in putting 
together the application; REC members in changing which aspects they should be 
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reviewing). The HRA has instituted HRA Approval with the express purpose of 
smoothing the regulatory approvals process for researchers. Yet the roll-out has 
been controversial for REC members, many of whom remain unfamiliar with the 
regulatory changes and feel left in the dark from the HRA about how these changes 
bear upon them. Not uncommonly, REC members expressed concern to me that the 
HRA had imposed something top-down on them, perhaps for a good reason, but in 
a way that also created uncertainty and frustration. A second example of a liminal 
period includes the HRA’s gradual move to a paperless system via HARP—a 
significant change when one considers the amount of paper that dominates REC 
operations—which also has caused some controversy among REC members.  
Another key feature of liminality is the attention drawn to rituals, which reflect the 
fundamental values of a group of actors. Additionally, a regulatory network 
coordination mode itself can be based on rituals. Rituals can serve as ‘structured 
processes that serve to organize not only the actions taken by network members but 
the meanings that participant individuals or organizations give to events or 
decisions’.470 They may be imposed or voluntarily adopted by the network, ‘but the 
essence of ritualistic network coordination is that embedded processes drive forward 
the collaborations that are found within the network’.471 For many regulators, the 
central motivation is to employ ritualistic processes ‘in a manner that serves their 
own organizational interests. Their broad attitude will be that interactions with 
other agencies can best be seen in terms of their impacts on achieving success in 
rituals. Claims and responses will be processed through embedded procedures and 
will be structured accordingly.’472 From within the literature on regulatory theory, 
Baldwin and colleagues elaborate: 
In ritualistic cohabitations, processes can be used to allocate institutional roles 
and to encourage the development of common aims and approaches by 
ordering experiences, creating shared meanings, building feelings of 
community, and encouraging trust. They may be used to facilitate the 
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development of discourses that generate bodies of common knowledge, 
generalized ways of seeing challenges and problems, and authoritative 
versions of situations and values. The difficulty, however, is that, in the 
absence of authority, rituals may not suffice to reconcile all interests and 
perceptions and this may impede the establishing of objectives and an 
organized regime for delivering on these. Rituals, moreover, can lead to 
stultification if they are following unthinkingly.473  
Yet, despite recognition of rituals in regulatory theory, the notion is underexplored 
both theoretically and empirically. Machado and Burns, some of the few scholars to 
explore rituals in regulation, explain that ‘complex social organisations’ (e.g. a state, 
university, corporation, nuclear system, regulatory agency, large-scale medical 
system) consist of heterogeneous modes of organising, with each mode containing 
its own principle, constitutive rules, norms, identity, and so on.474 These 
heterogeneous modes can generate benefits, such as creativity, reflectivity, and 
innovation, but they also can sometimes be drawn into incongruencies, tension, and 
conflict. To mitigate these problems, organisational spacing, mediators, discourses, 
and rituals can play a key role. Rituals for Machado and Burns are defined as ‘a type 
of patterned or institutionalized symbolic action, collectively defined and 
constituted within a group or organization. It consists of words, gestures, and 
actions and use of objects and artefacts to express a conception, symbolic meaning, 
feeling or sentiment within a group or collectivity.’475 They are ‘one of the most 
important devices to define and “re-structure” the experience of situations and 
events’.476 Machado and Burns explain that rituals minimise incongruence and 
tension in non-discursive and non-rationalised ways; this is seen, for example, in 
hospital rituals that range from rituals of caring (e.g. fixing pillows, touching the 
patient, taking temperature, writing down information) to rituals of authority and 
deference such as medical rounds, consultation, case conferences, and mortality and 
morbidity conferences. These rituals are embedded to a significant degree in the 
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schedules, procedures, and practices of a hospital: ‘Through institutionalized rituals 
within hospitals, professionals structure their own experiences and the experiences 
of their clients and avoid or negate considerably incongruent or disequilibrating 
information and experience.’477 As they further elaborate:  
Ritual helps to: (a) order the experience in critical situations by creating and 
re-creating a sense of order in a chaos of experiences, and gives a sense of 
security through a pattern of predictability (where for example an 
individual knows what is, has and will be done in such situations); (b) 
enforce a given meaning in an unclear situation; and (c) strengthen the sense 
of community that shares knowledge about what is to be done in ambiguous 
and critical situations. An important characteristic of ritual (and ritualized 
behaviour) – that to a large extent accounts for its effectivity and cultural 
persistence – is that it enables actors to collectively handle ambiguous and 
incongruent situations in a non-discursive (i.e. non-verbalizable) way.478 
We can draw a parallel here to the HRA and the RECs they manage, and in turn, to 
the interface between RECs and researchers. Though they cite Turner, Machado and 
Burns do not fully draw attention to the rich linkages between rituals, regulation, 
and liminality, especially the notions of transition from one stage or threshold to 
another, nor to the importance of transformation and experience by actors as part of 
the reproduction of social order. Liminality is particularly helpful in adding value to 
the analytical framing, which regulatory theory on its own offers only so much. It 
demonstrates how rituals and processual developments across time and space in fact play 
a crucial role in regulatory coordination when we consider the ways in which an 
activity (e.g. research) may be regulated by a network of regulators (e.g. RECs, 
MHRA, HRA) through a variety of rituals (e.g. ritual of consent, ritual of research 
application construction, ritual of ethics review at REC meetings) that work across 
numerous thresholds, and which in turn can have a tangible impact on the 
regulatory actors’ behaviour, particularly when those rituals are disrupted by regulatory 
change. Liminality thus supplements regulatory theory by encouraging us to identify 
and pay attention to symbolically and practically significant stages or thresholds. 
And, given the processual nature of regulation and the regulatory spaces that exist 
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within health research, liminality also buttresses anthropology of regulation by 
providing a lens for understanding human experiences within health research and 
the roles of regulation within these spaces.    
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described and justified the strength of my research approach, 
theoretical underpinnings, and analytical concepts that drive this thesis. Particular 
attention was drawn to ideas from regulatory theory and anthropology, namely the 
metaphor of the regulatory space, decentred regulation, risk-based (proportionate) 
regulation, and liminality. I argued that there are limits to what regulatory theory 
can tell us about ‘what is going on’, how and why an anthropology of regulation 
contributes to and extends common socio-legal research approaches, and how it 
naturally aligns with liminality. Anthropology of regulation draws attention to 
experience, time, and space(s) that is otherwise often overlooked in analyses (too 
narrowly) fixated on law as the object of investigation or (too broadly) fixated on 
social patterns of interaction. I closed this chapter with discussion of the evolution 
of liminality and its contribution as a sensitising concept to anthropology of 
regulation. With the methodological framework now developed, in Chapter 5, I turn 
attention to research methods by explaining the procedural steps undertaken to 
embark on this anthropology of regulation. I discuss serendipitous encounters as 




Chapter 5  
Methods—research steps, techniques, and tools 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described and justified the research approach, theoretical 
underpinnings, and analytical concepts that drive my thesis. I argued that 
regulatory theory provides a solid but ultimately insufficient foundation on its own 
for the empirical investigation that informs this thesis. I explained that there is a 
need for an empirically-grounded discussion of regulatory practice, but that extant 
socio-legal and legal anthropology approaches are also insufficient. I therefore 
proposed an anthropology of regulation that blends the theoretical with the 
empirical, and that supplements common research approaches, in part by drawing 
attention to processes, passages, and transformation.  
In this Chapter 5, I build on that methodology discussion by describing the research 
methods undertaken for my empirical work and which define an anthropology of 
regulation, including the justification for undertaking a ‘research trinity’ of 
document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and naturalistic observation. 
Research methods can be defined as ‘the procedures and activities for selecting, 
collecting, organizing and analysing data’.479 Bryman expands on this definition to 
claim that: 
By ‘methods’ we typically mean the techniques that researchers employ for 
practising their craft. ‘Methods’ might be instruments of data collection like 
questionnaires, interviews or observation; they might refer to the tools used 
for analysing data, which might be statistical techniques or extracting 
themes from unstructured data; or the term might refer to aspects of the 
research process like sampling.480 
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Bryman contrasts methods with methodology, the latter of which he defines as ‘the 
study of the methods that are employed. It is concerned with uncovering the 
practices and assumptions of those who use methods of different kinds.’481  
Applying the definitions above, here I link anthropology of regulation methodology 
with its methods by discussing procedural aspects such as recruitment strategy, 
interview topic design, data analysis, ethical considerations, and potential 
limitations to my methods. This is done on the basis of both description and 
personal reflection of the challenges and successes experienced. The key aim of this 
Chapter 5 is to explain how my research methods serve as the most robust platform 
for answering my research questions and making sense of the empirical data. The 
aim is also to show how the empirical data presented in Part III will speak for 
themselves, grounded as they are in an inductive approach, but with recognition 
that the analysis is drawn explicitly from the anthropology of regulation 
methodology (including its theoretical underpinnings) described in Chapter 4. 
5.2 Research methods 
In this section, I describe the choices and steps made in designing the empirical 
investigation, from the data collection stage through data analysis, as well as the 
challenges and serendipitous moments experienced.  
5.2.1 Research questions and purposes 
As noted in Part I, the overarching research question of this thesis is: 
How do RECs act among themselves and interact with other actors 
within a reformed health research regulatory space that aspires to 
both protect research participants from harm and also promote health 
research through streamlining perceived regulatory barriers—and 
what might this mean for the bond of research and ethics as seen 




through the ostensible REC processes of ethical deliberation and 
decision-making?   
The overarching research question engenders two specific subsidiary questions to 
guide my investigation: 
1. What is the precise nature of the interaction between central regulators and 
RECs in the health research regulatory space? and 
 
2. What are the functional operations and deliberative processes of RECs in an 
era of twinned regulatory objectives of participant protection and research 
promotion? 
Together, these questions indicate that this study is interested in description and 
exploration, which are hallmarks of qualitative research,482 but, taking up a thematic 
analysis approach,483 I am equally interested in explaining and understanding the 
beliefs and practices of regulatory actors, such as RECs and the HRA, and the social 
and cultural phenomenon of regulatory practice. Thus, these questions are more 
than description-generating; they are also designed to yield normative insight into 
health research regulation based on the data, potentially generating a robust 
evidence-base for regulatory change. To be clear, given its pragmatic orientation, 
there is nothing that prevents a researcher using thematic analysis from building 
theoretical models or finding solutions to real-world problems.484 Though thematic 
analysis is more commonly applied to locate meaning in the data, it can equally be 
applied to develop complex and sophisticated conceptual interrogations of the 
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underlying meaning in data in a systematic way that provides explanation for ‘what 
is going on’. 
The empirical research questions address how RECs navigate the regulatory 
demands of protection and promotion, and set the socio-historical context of RECs 
within the UK, with a view to demonstrating both the evolution of health research 
regulation and also the increasingly central role that RECs play in regulating health 
research. The questions allow me to understand what RECs actually do in assessing 
the ethical acceptability of research applications. The questions also provide insight 
into how individual actors within and connected to RECs (such as REC Managers, 
Chairs, and Scientific Officers) see their roles and practices, and insight into what I 
perceive their roles and practices to be. REC members and regulators who have 
served in their role for many years presumably should be able to provide deeper, 
richer insight into any perceived changes in regulatory practice, but this study is not 
intended to look exclusively at such perceived changes across time in light of recent 
regulatory reform. Though historical perspective from these informants is valuable 
(and, of course, the historical tracing of RECs and health research regulation that 
was done in Chapter 3 is crucial for understanding regulatory processes), the 
research questions behind this thesis and situated within an anthropology of 
regulation focus attention on present practices to understand how and why RECs 
make the decisions they do, and how the dynamics of RECs and central ‘managing’ 
regulators play into regulatory decisions and practices.  
Anthropology of regulation, underpinned in part by liminality, draws the 
researcher’s attention to process, time, and place. Health research regulation, and in 
particular the practice of research protocol approval, is an inherently processual 
activity. The sensitivity required for an anthropology of regulation encourages the 
researcher to recognise ‘multiple orders’ of the social fields within health research 
regulation; the disparate ways in which regulatory texts are made doable (including 
through rituals); the processes involved in health research regulation; and the 
importance of detailing encounters with regulatory actors to illuminate the 
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interconnected strands within health research. In what follows, I describe my 
procedural approach to undertaking the empirical investigation and the challenges 
and successes experienced.  
5.2.2 Research strategies and concepts 
There is little positive law in the form of judgments and statutes that directly cover 
RECs, and in any event, I have already explained why analysis of such positive law 
alone, even through a socio-legal studies prism, would not provide an adequate 
assessment of the health research regulatory space based on the primary empirical 
questions I seek to answer. Going beyond the narrow confines of traditional 
doctrinal and even socio-legal research is necessary as RECs and health research 
oversight are rooted in multiple disciplines and social contexts, and are situated 
outside the confines of the juridical field. An anthropology of regulation allows for 
exploration of not only the regulatory aspects of ethics review of health research, 
but also the nature, function, and social ramifications of health research and actors 
within the space, such as RECs and the HRA. For human health research protection 
and promotion to be meaningfully understood, it should be reflected in faithful 
reporting of the experiences of REC members and regulators who are legally, 
sociologically, and ethically ‘key’ informants in the space. As such, my research 
weaves together elements from the social sciences and regulation, as well as positive 
law (where this is relevant to the enquiry).  
To conduct this anthropology of regulation, I undertook an empirical investigation 
based on qualitative research methods.485 Specifically, I employed qualitative 
research methods of observation and interpretation of conversations, behaviours, 
and documents to understand human behaviour and the reasons that govern such 
behaviour. I employed an inductive research strategy: data were collected that could 
relate to certain pre-identified concepts (namely regulatory space, risk-based 
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regulation, liminality) and were analysed to produce generalisations and themes 
that emerged from the data.486 Similar to phenomenology, I wanted to ‘enter’ the 
social world of the regulatory actors being investigated; I wished to understand how 
they construct the idea and practice of ‘ethics review’, and understand their 
regulatory mandates and the tasks and meanings and motives associated with 
research ethics oversight. In turn, I wished to re-describe these motives and 
meanings through the theoretical framings of regulatory space and liminality, and 
situate these within previous empirical research findings regarding RECs, thereby 
providing more systematic explanatory accounts of what is going on in RECs and 
health research regulators in our present context. This research strategy, focused on 
thematic development but also theoretical openness, encouraged me to adopt a 
‘subtle realist’ ontological assumption and a ‘constructionist’ epistemological 
assumption.487 That is, ontologically, I assumed that an independent, knowable 
reality exists, but also that, epistemologically, knowledge is uncertain and based on 
cultural assumptions. My aim was to discover why REC members and regulators do 
what they do based on discovery and description of an ‘insider’ view.488 What is 
presented in this thesis then are not positivist, Baconian ‘true’ discoveries through 
empirical observation, but rather, technical and theoretical reflections of my own 
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5.2.3 Data sources, types, and forms 
Following the design of my research strategies and concepts, I set out to determine 
what procedural steps would best answer the research questions. Anthropology of 
regulation as I have described it is constructed around a multi-method approach 
(‘research trinity’) of document analysis, interviews, and observations. Together, 
these research methods allow for a rich understanding of why RECs are seen as a 
fundamental part of health research ethics and regulation, and of how RECs operate 
in practice. It also helps frame the debate about the nature and scope of RECs in the 
current era. The insights afforded by this multi-method approach also help furnish 
normative insight into evaluating RECs and health research regulatory oversight. 
These normative insights form the basis of the recommendations in Chapter 7. 
For this chapter, procedurally, the expectation was that the first arm of the trinity—
document analysis—would commence in 2015 from my desk, and that the other two 
arms—the interviews and observations—would commence in January 2016 
following regulatory approvals and would last the duration of the calendar year (i.e. 
largely comprising a data collection year), with 2017 comprising data analysis and 
writing. 
As regards the first arm of the research trinity, I undertook a literature review that 
centred on qualitative document analysis of legal rules and academic and grey 
literature from different disciplinary fields—primarily law, anthropology, sociology, 
and biomedical science—as well as ‘human subjects’ research regulations. These 
texts were examined both for substance and context through thematic analysis. 
Examples of the legal and regulatory sources providing sense of the principles and 
rules governing RECs include the GAfREC, Research Governance Frameworks and the 
more recent UK Policy Framework, REC SOPs, The Medicines for Human Use 
(Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004, and the Care Act 2014. Examples of academic and 
grey literature include the many past articles in the BMJ criticising RECs; books on 
ethics committees, liminality, and regulation; articles from legal and regulatory 
scholars and sociologists; annual reports and other statements from the HRA; and 
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governmental and non-governmental reports such as the Lord Warner Report and 
the AMS’s A New Pathway for the Regulation and Governance of Health Research. 
In the second year of my PhD (2016), this document analysis was coupled with 
obtaining primary data in word and visual form (through interviews and 
observations) from individuals and groups in natural and semi-natural settings, as I 
explain below.490  
There are several reasons why interviews are a suitable method to answer my 
research questions, including methodological reasons and more pragmatic reasons 
such as ease of access and structure compared to focus groups, and suitability for 
my skillset, unlike questionnaires or surveys, which require knowledge in 
quantitative research methods and analysis.491 I viewed the interview method as the 
most appropriate method in which to gather REC members’ and regulators’ rich, 
detailed points of view and to illuminate the meaning of ethics review. It is also a 
robust method to converse with people to get a sense of their perspective as a 
stakeholder in research ethics and, together with the interviewee, to produce new 
knowledge about ethics review and research regulation.492 Conversing with those 
directly implicated in the field of ethics review is seen as a beneficial method to 
draw out insights and perceptions into research ethics oversight, as well as to gather 
insight on and interpret the challenges of ethics review and uncover potential 
solutions to those challenges. The goal is not to discover some objective ‘truth’ about 
RECs and the regulation of ethics review; rather, it is to understand these 
individuals’ subjective accounts of everyday practice and the issues at stake.493  
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A limitation of interviews is that the data are restricted to what participants say they 
do. Observational data reveal what they actually do (at least in the eyes of the 
observer), strengthening ecological validity.494 This is especially crucial in a 
regulated area such as health research, which begs for deep investigation. As Moore 
observes: ‘The more “rational” a society seems in its parts, and its rules, and its rules 
about rules, the thicker the layer of formalism and ideological self-representation to 
be penetrated to find out what is really going on.’495  
Therefore, in the second year I also observed REC meetings to gather data on actual 
behaviours and practices and develop a detailed description of how RECs operate 
and make decisions as actors within the health research regulatory space. By 
observing RECs, I aimed to witness what members of these committees do in their 
natural settings.496 This meant that I observed not only REC members, but also a 
fluctuating array of other actors that form part of the ethics review system, e.g. REC 
Managers, REC Assistants, investigators, patient advocates, and other Observers. 
Some of these other actors varied from one meeting to another for different reasons. 
Individual REC members could be absent for a meeting due to illness or scheduling 
conflict, investigators and patient advocates would appear only for their specific 
application, REC Assistants and REC Managers occasionally would be replaced by a 
substitute, and Observers generally would attend only one meeting. On one 
occasion, for example, the REC Chair was ill and a Chair from another REC in 
another city came in to replace him, creating an interesting dynamic with the other 
REC members. Observations took place at the site where full committee REC 
meetings occur; usually these are in hotel conference rooms, NHS Health Board 
buildings, or NHS hospital conference rooms. I took photographs of the meeting 
rooms (a couple of these photographs appear in Chapter 6). I also collected, with 
permission, some social artefacts of RECs, such as the agendas of each meeting and, 
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occasionally, a REC member’s review of an application as written in the HRA 
Ethical Review Form.  
A point of clarification: I use the term ‘naturalistic observation’ in contradistinction 
to ‘participant observation’, as the latter implies that the observer becomes part of 
the group being observed to get a deeper insight into their lives. As an ‘Observer’ of 
RECs who was required to remain silent during the meetings, the term ‘participant’ 
seems inappropriate, even if I attended multiple REC meetings over one year. 
Moreover, naturalistic observation describes the technique of observing people in 
their natural environment, usually episodically rather than continuously (e.g. REC 
members at their monthly full committee meetings) without any manipulation by 
the observer, which more accurately describes my research. 
5.2.4 Selection of data sources: REC observations 
The sample size for interviews and observations was largely dictated by resource 
and time constraints. I had three years to complete my PhD and had to ensure that 
the data collected were robust enough to answer my research questions, but not so 
large to make it impossible to analyse them in the time allotted to me by the 
University. I determined at the end of the first year of my PhD, in October 2015, that 
it would be sufficient to select four RECs across both England and Scotland for 
observation over the period of approximately one year (the majority of which would 
be in the second year of the PhD in 2016), though as I explain below, this eventually 
increased to five RECs. Consulting with my supervisors, I identified RECs on both 
sides of the border. This was not out of an explicit desire for a comparative 
approach in either a legal or social science methodological sense, but rather, to 
collect data in different settings. Nonetheless, throughout my research trinity, I 
intended to account for any perceivable cultural and legal differences between these 
two nations. RECs were also identified relatively early on in my PhD, just after my 
First Year Panel and simultaneous to my ethics application to the Edinburgh Law 
School Research Ethics and Integrity Committee (REIC). This enabled me to leave 
sufficient time to navigate the necessary regulatory approvals from my own Law 
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School’s REIC, the HRA, and the Health Boards in Scotland (as well as the Scottish 
Government through the CSO), which could be further subject to tailored 
arrangements for each REC based on what each REC Chair felt comfortable agreeing 
to. 
One REC was identified through a serendipitous encounter with an academic 
colleague who is a member of a REC in England. In September 2015, when chatting 
with her at a biobank conference in London, she suggested that I write to her REC 
Chair to see if it would be possible to observe it. Accepting her advice and 
invitation, I did so, and the Chair invited me to observe the REC over the course of 
the year. The other three RECs I purposively selected through browsing the HRA’s 
online REC directory:497 I selected one REC in England and two RECs in Scotland. 
These RECs were deliberately chosen for their geographic differences and for their 
different ‘committee flags’, which is the term used by the HRA to denote specific 
areas of health research that RECs are authorised to review (e.g. gene therapy 
clinical trials, phase 1 studies in healthy volunteers). The fifth REC also was added 
serendipitously. I encountered it after an interviewee suggested I speak with the 
Chair of this REC; I then did so, and he invited me to observe his REC. I also was 
invited by two interviewees to observe two of the HRA’s five offices in England: the 
Skipton House office in London and the Jarrow office, which is situated outside of 
Newcastle. A third interviewee (REC Manager) invited me to the NHSScotland 
Health Board office where her REC meets to get a sense of how her job and the 
HARP system works.498 Table 5.1 lists attributes of each of the five RECs observed. 
Below I explain why the Scotland A REC is explicitly identified. 
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Table 5.1. Attributes of RECs observed in 2016/17. 
REC Location Committee type HRA committee flags 
REC 1 England  RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
patients - type iii 
 IRB Registered 
 Research Involving Children 
REC 2 England  RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
patients - type iii 
 Establishing Research 
Databases  
 Establishing Research Tissue 
Banks 
 Phase 1 Studies in Patients 
 Research Involving Adults 
Lacking Capacity 
 Research Involving Children 
REC 3 England  RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
healthy volunteers - 
type i 
 RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
patients - type iii 
 Gene Therapy or Stem Cell 
Clinical Trials 
 IRB Registered 
 Phase 1 Studies in Healthy 
Volunteers 
 Phase 1 Studies in Patients 
 Research Involving Children 
REC 4 Scotland  Authorised REC  No flags 
Scotland 
A REC 
Scotland  RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
healthy volunteers - 
type i  
 RECs recognised to 
review CTIMPs in 
patients - type iii 
 Gene Therapy or Stem Cell 
Clinical Trials 
 IRB Registered 
 Phase 1 Studies in Healthy 
Volunteers 
 Research Involving Adults 
Lacking Capacity  
 
I agreed with the REC Chairs to not identify the observed RECs in my thesis. 
However, I obtained explicit consent to identify one of the RECs, the Scotland A 
REC, which meets monthly in Edinburgh.499 This was done because of the unique 
nature of this REC; indeed, it would be impossible to adequately anonymise since it 
is the only REC in Scotland that is authorised to review ‘Phase 1 studies in healthy 
volunteers’ and ‘research involving adults lacking capacity’, as the HRA parlance 
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terms it. Even a brief amount of description of the REC and its dynamic likely 
would enable someone to identify it. The Scotland A REC was specifically 
constituted by statutory regulation in 2002500 following the enactment of the Adults 
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Uniquely, members of the Scotland A REC are 
appointed not by a Health Board, but by the Scottish Ministers. That I can explicitly 
identify this REC bodes well for the analysis to come in Part III, particularly 
regarding exploration of the legal constraints of the Scotland A REC. In unpacking 
what the rules say, this sui generis, legally constrained entity can be compared to the 
other, comparatively less regulated RECs and it may be observed whether this REC 
feels more constrained in its regulatory behaviour (‘room to roam’) than others. 
5.2.5 Selection of data sources: interviews 
As to the third arm of my ‘research trinity’, I planned to approach targeted RECs 
and regulatory bodies to interview individuals situated within RECs (as members, 
Chairs, and Managers) and regulatory bodies (e.g. HRA, NREAP situated within the 
HRA), or straddling both (Scientific Officers). These were conducted as one-on-one, 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The interviews were conducted in a semi-
natural setting, specifically in-person at the individual’s office or over Skype, to 
discuss the activities in which these individuals were engaged in their natural 
settings: REC(s) or regulatory authorities that oversee RECs.  
My strategy for the (managing) regulator-associated interviewees was to 
accumulate names through snowball sampling. After initially identifying a couple 
of individuals based on recommendations to me from a Scientific Officer and the 
HRA’s Head of Research Ethics Service (England), I asked interviewees who else 
they thought would be valuable to speak with, whether they be regulators or REC 
members. This strategy worked well in accumulating a list of names, including the 
Chair of the fifth REC I came to observe. My strategy for the REC-associated 
                                                     
500 Adults with Incapacity (Ethics Committee) (Scotland) Regulations 2002, as amended 2007. 
Originally, two RECs were authorised to review adults with incapacity research in Scotland: 
MREC A and MREC B. They merged in 2008 to form the Scotland A REC. 
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interviewees was to approach the Chairs of the two initially identified RECs in 
England to see if they would be willing to be interviewed. Both obliged. I also asked 
each Chair if they would be comfortable asking their members and the REC 
Managers to share their email addresses with me, so that I could then contact those 
members who responded affirmatively. Again, the REC Chairs obliged with this 
request, the first one very early on in 2016. A somewhat different strategy was 
employed in Scotland, where the responsible Scientific Officer requested that I work 
through him/her and the REC Co-ordinators rather than directly contacting the REC 
Chairs. This difference signified to me quite early on the crucial gate-keeping role of 
the Scientific Officer in the Scottish RECs.  
Remaining mindful of resource and time constraints, I intended to interview no 
more than 25 individuals, constituting a mix of REC members and regulators 
involved in health research ethics and RECs particularly. Ultimately, emails were 
sent to 30 individuals, some of whom were REC members that contacted me first 
after my email address and interview request was shared with their REC Chair. In 
the end, 28 individuals were interviewed after two failed to respond to follow-up 
emails after expressing initial interest (both of whom were members of a REC in 
Scotland). Of these 28, seven were affiliated with the HRA (one was a member of the 
HRA’s NREAP), and the rest were REC members or Scientific Officers.501 This 
number exceeds what is deemed necessary to achieve both ‘code saturation’ (i.e. 
adequate identification of the range of thematic issues) and ‘meaning saturation’ 
(i.e. adequate textured understanding of the issues).502 Eleven of the participants 
were located in Scotland; the remainder were located in England. The average 
interview time was 65 minutes (ranging from 27 minutes to 99 minutes). I sought 
and obtained written consent (via email) and verbal consent (prior to the interview 
                                                     
501 Several of these participants emphasised to me that they were speaking in their individual 
capacity and not on behalf of their organisation. 
502 Monique Hennink, Bonnie Kaiser and Vincent Marconi, ‘Code Saturation Versus Meaning 
Saturation: How Many Interviews Are Enough?’ (2017) 27 Qualitative Health Research 591. 
The authors find that code saturation is reached at nine interviews, while 16 to 24 interviews 
are needed to reach meaning saturation. 
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commencing) from each interview participant. Table 5.2 below lists attributes of 
each of the interviews. In the remainder of this thesis, I refer to each interview 
participant as P1, P2, and so on. 



















P1 England 29 January Regulator (HRA) In-person 
P2 England 29 January Regulator (HRA) In-person 
P3 England 1 February REC (Chair) Skype 
P4 England 3 February Regulator 
(NREAP) 
In-person 
P5 England 8 February REC (member) Skype 
P6 England 9 February REC (member) Skype 
P7 England 11 February REC (Vice Chair) Skype 
P8 England 12 February REC (member) Skype 
P9 England 15 February REC (Vice Chair) Skype 
P10 England 16 February REC (Chair) Skype 
P11 England 25 February REC (Chair) Skype 
P12 Scotland 3 March REC (member) In-person 
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P13 England 3 March  Regulator (HRA) Skype 
P14 England 7 March REC (member) Skype 
P15 England 11 March REC  (Manager) Skype 
P16 Scotland 14 March Both (Scientific 
Officer) 
In-person 
P17 England 30 March Regulator (HRA) Skype 
P18 Scotland 19 April REC (member) Skype 
P19 Scotland 11 May REC (member) Skype 
P20 Scotland 13 May REC (member) Skype 
P21 Scotland 17 May REC (member) Skype 
P22 Scotland 19 May REC (member) Skype 
P23 Scotland 4 July Both (Scientific 
Officer) 
Skype 
P24 Scotland 4 July Both (Scientific 
Officer) 
Skype 
P25 Scotland 7 July REC (Manager) Skype 
P26 England 13 July Regulator (HRA) Skype 
P27 Scotland 13 July Both (Scientific 
Officer) 
Skype 






5.2.6 Interview guides 
As these interviews were semi-structured, two interview guides were designed, one 
for REC members (including Chairs and Managers), and another for the regulators 
at the HRA and Scientific Officers.503 The interview guides were formulated based 
on findings from the document analysis conducted in 2015 and were influenced by 
an anthropology of regulation methodology: many of the questions were crafted to 
draw out the experiences of REC members and regulators, and to understand the 
ways in which they themselves affect and are affected by processes of regulation. 
Though the structure of questioning was consistent in the interviewees (beginning 
with biographical background and ending with questions about overall satisfaction 
with the ethics review system), many of the specific questions were modified as the 
study progressed to iteratively explore themes that appeared to emerge in prior 
interviews. After making a brief introductory statement about my research project 
and emphasising confidentiality and confirming consent with participants to audio-
record and transcribe the interview, the interview then proceeded to explore several 
broad topics as follows. 
Regarding the REC member interview guide, I first asked for the participant’s 
background information, including their involvement in ethics review and a 
summary of their current activities, with the expectation that their life experiences 
(within and outwith research ethics) might shape their views as a REC member. I 
then asked about their REC characteristics (e.g. the ‘usual procedure’ in their REC 
for reviewing and monitoring, if one existed; the ethical standards of research 
applications), to see whether REC members might have widely varying ideas as to 
what constitutes a ‘good’ REC and a ‘good’ ethics review, and how (if at all) ethics is 
instantiated in reviewing and monitoring a research project. I then discussed with 
them the ‘next-generation’ regulatory environment of health research regulation so 
                                                     
503 Both interview guides are available in the Appendices (Appendix 1 and 2). 
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as to gather perspectives on whether participant protection and research promotion 
were perceived as regulatory objectives in their work as members. I also asked for 
their views on whether the REC system was operating well and whether any 
improvements could be made. Finally, I closed the interview by asking whether the 
participant had any points to discuss, and any questions they may have. I thanked 
the participant for their time, reminded them of my duty to respect confidentiality, 
and, in some instances, asked if they had suggestions for other individuals I could 
interview. The interview guide for regulators and Scientific Officers was similar; the 
only difference was that some questions were either focused more on health 
research regulatory dimensions or were tailored to be broader to cover the state of 
RECs across the UK, England, or Scotland. Though the interviews were semi-
structured, they were also open-ended, leaving participants free to form and express 
multiple associations with the concepts of ‘protection’ and ‘promotion’ and how 
these twin regulatory demands were seen to be operationalised in everyday practice 
of RECs, again, if at all. 
5.2.7 Navigating regulatory approvals 
Following identification of the RECs I wished to observe and drawing up an initial 
list of interviewees, in September 2015, I made inquiries with the Research 
Governance & QA Office at the University of Edinburgh concerning the regulatory 
approvals I may need for my empirical research. The Office suggested that I contact 
one of the Scientific Officers responsible for the RECs in the South East Scotland 
area (which covers Edinburgh), who could advise on the regulatory approvals 
needed. I did so in late September 2015. The Scientific Officer very quickly replied, 
stating that Edinburgh Law School’s REIC would be appropriate and sufficient for 
ethics approval, and that NHS ethics approval (via a NHS REC) was unnecessary 
for my project as there was no policy requirement as per the REC SOPs (e.g. 
research involving NHS patients, data, or tissue) and no legal requirement (e.g. 
ionising radiation, adults lacking capacity). The Scientific Officer also informed me 
that I would need to obtain ‘management’ approval from each of the HRA and the 
relevant Health Boards in Scotland, as well as the CSO since Scotland A REC 
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members are appointed directly by the Scottish Ministers and the CSO runs the 
Research Ethics Service in Scotland. This necessitated completing the electronic 
IRAS Application Form (Parts A-D),504 along with other documents, for review and 
approval by both the HRA and the Health Boards and CSO in Scotland. 
Following the Scientific Officer’s confirmation, in late September 2015, and with the 
assistance of the Scientific Officer, I was put in contact with the HRA’s Head of 
Research Ethics Service (England) to begin the process of obtaining HRA 
management approval to observe the RECs in England and interview individuals. 
She informed me that she could arrange my observation of REC meetings and 
interviewing of REC members in England if I let her know which RECs I was 
interested in; she also suggested that I approach REC members via the REC Chair or 
Manager, which she also could arrange, and that ultimately it would be up to the 
individual REC members to decide whether to participate.  
Late September through November 2015 was dominated by preparatory regulatory 
approvals work. I submitted a ‘Level 2’ ethics application form (and related 
documents, such as consent forms and interview topic guides) to Edinburgh Law 
School’s REIC on 7 October 2015; approval was received on 25 November 2015.505 In 
October and November, I drafted the IRAS application in consultation with the 
point person in the Research Governance & QA Office at the University of 
Edinburgh, who kindly commented on draft versions of the 29-page IRAS NHS 
R&D application form, and informed me of the relevant materials I would need to 
include with my submission, including a ‘study protocol’, interview topic guides, 
and consent forms. On 10 November, the Research Governance & QA Office ‘signed 
                                                     
504 Integrated Research Application System <https://www.myresearchproject.org.uk/>. 
505 Edinburgh Law School’s REIC does not compose written approval letters, nor keep a 
numbering system for applications received and reviewed. However, I have retained the 




off’ on my IRAS form,506 which enabled me to submit it for review by the HRA and 
Health Boards. That same day (much to my surprise), I received approval from the 
HRA’s Head of Research Ethics Service (England) and the following day, received 
R&D acknowledgement from NHS Lothian Health Board in Scotland.507 On 9 
December, I received confirmation from the CSO that they had no objection to my 
approaching NHS RECs in Scotland for the purpose of my project.508  
Thus, by the end of 2015 and much to my delight, I had achieved the target of 
securing all necessary regulatory approvals to commence my empirical research in 
England and Scotland, and following these approvals, secured the first several 
interviews to commence in late January 2016, coincidental with observations of the 
two initially identified RECs in England. The first REC observation in Scotland took 
place in February 2016, following the Scientific Officer speaking with the two 
identified Scottish RECs and securing approval from each of the REC’s Chairs. 
5.2.8 Data collection and timing 
The research questions call, in part, for a historical tracing of RECs and health 
research regulation to make connections between the milieu of REC members and 
regulators and the wider social and historical forces in which they are enmeshed. 
This is a classic approach in social sciences and socio-legal research.509 For the most 
part, however, this was a cross-sectional project aiming to explain and understand 
REC members’ and regulators’ motives and meanings in the current regulatory era, 
which necessitates an anthropology of regulation that draws on empirical research 
that bridges theory and practice. Data from the interviews were collected at one 
                                                     
506 IRAS ID 194243; Study title: ‘The changing health research regulatory environment and 
NHS RECs’. The University of Edinburgh is my project Sponsor. This approval letter is 
available in Appendix 3. 
507 An R&D letter from NHS Lothian (covering the Edinburgh area) waiving approval is 
available in Appendix 3. 
508 A copy of the confirmation email from the CSO is available in Appendix 3. 
509 See e.g. C Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (OUP 2000 [1959]). 
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point in time in 2016, while data from the REC meeting observations were collected 
at multiple points in 2016 and early 2017.  
As noted in Chapter 2, RECs meet monthly at full committee meetings up to 11 
times per year. Knowing that two of the identified RECs had overlapping meeting 
dates and that I had cross-competing academic commitments in my diary, I aimed 
to observe at least four meetings for each REC over 2016, though this would come to 
depend not only on my own schedule, but in the case of Scotland, unforeseen 
situations such as one of the RECs cancelling a meeting when no new applications 
were received. This would also depend on the ongoing need of approval from the 
REC Chairs via the Scientific Officer and REC Co-ordinators, which seemed to turn 
on whether other Observers were already scheduled to attend a meeting (a 
reoccurring issue for the Scotland A REC), and thus eliminating my ability to do so. 
The concern was that that REC Chairs did not want too many Observers attending a 
meeting, which might distract the REC members and/or the investigators attending 
in person. In total, I attended 24 REC meetings. The REC observation schedule in 
2016/17 is reflected in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3. Schedule of REC observations in 2016/17. 
REC Times observed 
REC 1 5  
(2016: January, March, July, September, October) 
REC 2 6 
(2016: March, April, May, August, October, November) 
REC 3 5 
(2016: April, June, August, November, December) 
REC 4 5 
(2016: February, June, July, November, December) 
Scotland A REC 3 




Before each REC meeting commenced, I would greet the REC Chair and 
Manager/Co-ordinator, the latter of whom would sometimes hand me a standard 
HRA confidentiality agreement form (tailored only to state which REC it applied 
to), which I was asked to sign and date. (Other times, the REC Manager/Co-
ordinator would email the form for me to sign and return email in advance of the 
meeting.) The confidentiality agreement required me, as an Observer (a term 
discussed in the GAfREC and SOPs510) to agree to treat in complete confidence all 
information disclosed to me either in the meeting documentation or matters 
discussed at the meeting.511 In addition, some of the Chairs would verbally inform 
each investigator who attended the meeting that I was an Observer conducting PhD 
research on RECs, and give the investigator an opportunity to object to my presence 
(if there was an objection, I would have been asked to leave the meeting room for 
the REC’s face-to-face discussion with the investigator). No investigator ever 
objected to my presence; indeed, the most common reaction was one of casual 
indifference, focused as they were on soon being interrogated by the REC members. 
This action by the Chairs is recommended (phrased as a ‘should’) in the SOPs,512 and 
indeed, it was not always followed. Some Chairs would never inform investigators 
of my presence as an Observer; others would sometimes inform the first few that 
                                                     
510 The GAfREC state that ‘REC meetings are not public meetings. External observers may 
attend following a written invitation which states the terms and conditions of their 
attendance. Attendance will be agreed by the REC and minuted accordingly.’ They also state 
that ‘Observers play no part in the deliberations of the REC.’ See GAfREC (n 1) paras 4.2.22, 
4.2.23. Similar language is in the SOPs, with the added proviso that: 
External observers may be invited to attend REC meetings, subject to 
written invitation setting out the terms under which observer status is 
permitted, the signature of a confidentiality agreement, and the agreement 
of the REC at the meeting to be attended.  
See REC SOPs (n 37) para 2.68. 
511 An anonymised version of this confidentiality agreement is available in Appendix 4. To 
adhere to this agreement signed at each REC meeting observed, Part III discusses matters 
observed at these meetings in a general sense; I do not disclose any information specific to 
individuals, institutions, or research projects. 
512 REC SOPs (n 37) para 2.72. 
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would appear at the meeting but then apparently forget my presence as the hours of 
the meeting progressed.  
To ensure that the data were accurate and comprehensive, I audio-recorded the 
interviews with the permission of each participant. To record behaviours, actions, 
and settings of the REC meetings, I wrote fieldnotes on a tablet computer.513 This 
was not an extraordinary sight; at each of the REC meetings, at least one member 
would operate from a tablet or laptop. 
5.2.9 Data analysis 
Digital files of the audio-recorded interviews were immediately uploaded securely 
and transcribed in intelligent verbatim by a digital audio transcription typing 
specialist company based in Midlothian, Scotland (1st Class Secretarial). Via written 
agreement, the company agreed to treat all transcribed interviews in confidence. 
Once the transcribed interviews were completed by the professional transcribers, I 
would compare the transcription with the audio recording to ensure accuracy. The 
transcripts and fieldnotes were then anonymised by removing all identifying 
information that enabled indirect or inferential identification. The audio file of the 
interviews would then be deleted both from my computer and the company’s server 
within three months from the recording. Once both the interview transcripts and the 
majority of the fieldnotes were completed in late 2016, I printed out hard copies of 
both and put them into binders. Coding was done manually and in multiple stages, 
with Microsoft Office Spreadsheet and Microsoft Word used as electronic aids (e.g. 
keeping tabs of codes, development of a systematic and iterative codebook), as I felt 
I could obtain a deeper connection with the data and see patterns more clearly than 
I could with qualitative research software such as NVivo, which, though a powerful 
tool to assist in data analysis, is more prone to overwhelm than enlighten me. 
Several scholars have noted that simple word processing and spreadsheet 
                                                     
513 Knowledge of how to write ethnographic fieldnotes, as well as how to analyse them, was 
gained through reading Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz, and Linda Shaw, Writing Ethnographic 




applications can be used effectively with qualitative data.514 During the coding 
process, I took notes in a memo-style format by writing down words and thoughts I 
considered could be of use during the data analysis and serve as a reference for 
potential coding ideas. 
The analysis was inductive (i.e. data-driven) in that I coded the data without 
attempting to fit them into a pre-existing coding frame or analytic pre-conceptions. 
This is not to say that I coded the data absent any theoretical and epistemological 
commitments, as anthropology of regulation is underpinned by theoretical concepts 
drawn from regulatory theory and anthropology (such as regulatory space, risk-
based regulation, and liminality). However, I made a conscious effort to strongly 
link the identified themes discussed in Part III of this thesis to the data themselves, 
rather than casually map or force the data onto any of my theoretical underpinnings 
or analytic interests in the area.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the data from both the interviews (transcripts) and 
observations (fieldnotes) were coded using qualitative thematic analysis, which is 
the most commonly used method of analysis in qualitative research, though it is 
much less well discussed in the research methods literature compared to 
approaches such as grounded theory. Thematic analysis offers theoretical freedom 
and flexibility to yield rich and detailed, yet complex, accounts of data, providing an 
understanding of the ‘big picture’.515 Thematic analysis can be divided into six 
phases: 1) becoming familiar with the data (i.e. creating a ‘start list’ of potential 
codes in a journal or in memos prior to reading the transcripts or fieldnotes); 2) 
generating initial codes in a cyclical process; 3) searching for categories and themes 
(i.e. examining how codes combine to form over-reaching themes in the data); 4) 
                                                     
514 Daniel Meyer and Leanne Avery, ‘Excel as a Qualitative Data Analysis Tool’ (2009) 21 
Field Methods 91; Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (3rd edn, 
SAGE 2016). 
515 Braun and Clarke (n 344). 
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refining and reviewing categories, subthemes, and themes; 5) defining and naming 
subthemes and themes; and 6) producing the report.516  
The process was such that I generated initial codes by comparing each of the 
transcripts and fieldnotes. I started ‘open coding’ by reading each transcript and the 
fieldnotes (collated into five bundles for each observed REC) word-by-word and 
line-by-line. After completion of the open coding, I constructed initial codes that 
emerged from the text and then coded the remaining transcripts and fieldnotes with 
those codes. When I encountered data that did not fit into an existing code, I added 
new codes (the total number of codes exceeded 250). I then grouped the similar 
codes and placed them into categories. These categories were reorganised into 
broader, higher order categories, then grouped, revised, and refined, and finally 
checked to determine whether the categories were mutually exclusive. At this point 
I formed final categories, identifying subthemes both within and across the 
categories, which were then organised into main themes.517 This process of coding 
using qualitative thematic analysis enabled me to fulfil the goal of anthropology of 
regulation: to explain and understand the processual nature of regulation and the 
experiences of regulatory actors who both regulate and are regulated (i.e. how they 
understand their own actions), thereby providing larger theoretical insight into 
regulatory processes within a given space and within a given society. The results of 
this analysis comprise Part III. 
5.2.10 Research method limitations, challenges and successes, and ethical 
issues 
There are some limitations with my research design. Regarding the research 
strategy, analysis revealed from an inductive approach is limited in time and 
space—in my case, broad generalisations from research regarding RECs, the nature 
of ethics review, or health research regulation are not possible. I can only present 
themes and concepts that emerged from the data as situated in the locations under 
                                                     
516 ibid. 
517 This inductive approach is taken from Cho and Lee (n 351). 
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study and in the time period in which the data were collected. But, as Moore says, 
‘life in society should always be conceived in a time-conscious frame, as in process, 
as in motion, and as a conglomeration of diverse activities noted at a particular 
time’.518 For anthropology of regulation to have methodological integrity and 
resonance with liminality, attention to time-conscious frames and processes are a 
sign of strength rather than weakness. Semi-structured interviews are also 
necessarily limited to capturing a moment in time. This does not mean, however, 
that the themes and normative findings to be described in Part III cannot be 
abstracted beyond the RECs observed and individuals interviewed, nor that the 
findings cannot be situated in their larger political, social, and regulatory contexts 
(which themselves contain past and present stories).  
There are limitations to the naturalistic observations. First, I observed only a snippet 
of what happens in ethics review processes. The full REC meetings that occur 
monthly are but one of the many activities that RECs perform; for example, 
previous chapters have noted that there is sub-committee work (e.g. Proportionate 
Review, substantial amendments) conducted ‘by correspondence’ (i.e. email), and 
there are multiple documents that circulate among the REC members that I never 
had access to, the most important of which were the research applications and 
attendant documents themselves. This limited my ability to understand the intricate 
details of the discussions during REC meetings; I could only surmise what REC 
members were talking about for a given research application as I never could see the 
documents themselves. Second, the observations do not constitute a representative 
sample of RECs across the UK and may not be reliable as variables cannot be 
controlled, which also means cause and effect relationships cannot be established 
(e.g. that the Care Act 2014 and the HRA’s regulations cause RECs to instantiate 
research promotion in their practices). I did not perceive any pronounced observer 
effects, however. This was likely due to the fact that Observers are a regular 
                                                     
518 Sally Falk Moore, ‘An Unusual Career: Considering Political/Legal Orders and Unofficial 
Parallel Realities’ (2015) 11 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1, 2. 
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presence at REC meetings and I sat quietly either at a corner of the conference table, 
or in a chair in the corner of the room, taking notes by hand or on my tablet 
computer. Occasionally, REC members would make a joking remark to the effect of, 
‘Are you recording that, Edward?’, but my impression was that my presence did not 
impact the style and substance of meeting dynamics. 
Reliability with thematic analysis causes some concern as a limitation (particularly 
for those within a positivist tradition) because of the wide variety of subjective 
interpretations that arise from the themes, as well as applying themes to large 
amounts of data (in my case, a daunting corpus of approximately 1000 pages of 
transcripts and fieldnotes). To increase reliability as much as possible, I monitored 
themes and code tables throughout the data analysis process through memos and 
detailed progress tracking.519 Regarding limitations to the sampling strategy, it may 
both under- and over-represent particular groups (e.g. RECs and individuals) 
within the sample. For instance, many of the REC member interviewees were 
members of the same REC in England; also, I interviewed only two REC Managers 
and three REC Chairs, which consequently may not provide a comprehensive 
portrait of these roles. Since the sample of interviewees and RECs was not chosen at 
random, there is an inherent selection bias such that the samples are unlikely to be 
representative of the target population of RECs, REC members, and regulators. 
Again, this can undermine my ability to make generalisations from my sample to 
RECs and health research regulation at large.520 Nonetheless, purposive and 
snowball sampling afforded me relatively easy access in a short amount of time and 
yielded significant data that, in my firm belief, addressed my research questions.  
One of the challenges anticipated was access to meetings. RECs (and REC members) 
are notoriously difficult to access for those wishing to make them the object of 
                                                     
519 Guest, MacQueen, and Namey (n 345). 
520 One example of this was my observation that the demographics of RECs do not match 
that of Scotland or England. There was noticeable gender balance among REC members, but 
all members in the five observed RECs were white (save for one) and well-educated, and 
appeared to be of a relatively high socio-economic status.  
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investigation.521 Similarly, regulators can be difficult to access and may not speak 
forthrightly about their views. Yet few access difficulties were encountered. Though 
I was expecting the HRA, the CSO, or a specific REC Chair to decline my requests, 
none did, and on the contrary, all were quite accommodating. I was particularly 
surprised at how accommodating the HRA was in both allowing me to speak with 
employees within the Authority, and also expressing interest in my project. This is 
not to say that no challenges were encountered during the course of the empirical 
studies. Gaining ongoing access to RECs and REC members in Scotland, particularly 
the Scotland A REC, proved more challenging than I had expected. This was due to 
the Scientific Officer and REC Chairs acting as first-order gate-keepers, something I 
had not appreciated until I had largely completed the data collection in 2016. It was 
not unusual for the Scientific Officer or REC Manager to inform me that I could not 
attend a REC meeting, even if previously agreed, because other Observers 
(including from the Scottish Government) had requested to attend the meeting and 
they took priority. Though this was a frustrating experience in terms of slightly 
delaying the period of data collection, overall, it did not impact my research 
findings. I was able to attend each REC several times and gain access to the 
individual members with whom I wanted to speak. 
Regarding ethical issues, in the course of drafting the ‘Level 2’ ethics application 
form (i.e. application for research involving humans) for Edinburgh Law School’s 
REIC and drafting the R&D application form for the HRA and Health Boards, I 
reflected on the subject matter of the empirical studies and the ethical issues they 
might present. There were no physical risks involved in participating in this project. 
I expected that the personal or emotional risks involved would be small, basically 
equivalent to the possible stress faced by participants who discuss their professional 
experiences with friends, family, or workplace colleagues. Should participants feel 
                                                     
521 Such access challenges for empirical investigations of ethics committees were noted, for 
example, by van den Hoonaard, The Seduction of Ethics (n 79) 10, 39 and Klitzman (n 123) 360-
61. See also Raymond de Vries, ‘How Can We Help? From “Sociology in” to “Sociology of” 
Bioethics’ (2004) 32 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 279. 
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uncomfortable sharing their opinion or experience at any time during the interview, 
I informed them that they could refuse to answer any question at any time. While 
the subject matter in the interviews was not deemed sensitive, nor were the 
interviewees deemed vulnerable, I endeavoured to protect the confidentiality of 
both interviewees and the RECs. All data collected from the interviews and 
fieldnotes have been kept strictly confidential. All personally identifying 
information was removed from the transcripts and coded with a number. Only 
three individuals had access to the raw data in identifiable form, namely myself and 
my two PhD supervisors.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I described the research design for my empirical research, including 
the procedural steps undertaken. This comprised discussion of data sources (and 
justification for my ‘research trinity’ of document analysis, semi-structured 
interviews, and naturalistic observations), data collection and analysis, and the 
ethical issues encountered. I also highlighted both difficulties and successes in the 
course of undertaking the empirical research, such as gaining access to RECs and 
securing the necessary regulatory approvals. Overall, there was great satisfaction in 
how the data collection and analysis stages developed; the collection was more or 
less within the projected timeframe, and the data analysis has yielded rich findings. 
The limitations of this research have been acknowledged, though they do not 
undermine the integrity and strength of my findings.  
Both Chapters 4 and 5 covered how I conducted my research about health research 
regulation, regulatory processes, and RECs from the distinct methodological 
standpoint of anthropology of regulation. Anthropology of regulation was 
constructed because there was no pre-existing and prescribed method that enabled 
me to investigate regulation and regulatory actors in the ways I desired, while 
remaining mindful of the importance of presenting an original, systematic, reliable, 
and rigorous contribution to the interdisciplinary field of health research regulation. 
I desired a more creative approach to this investigation that would draw on 
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theoretical diversity and innovation, particularly inspiration from Hancher and 
Moran’s concept of regulatory space and van Gennep’s notion of liminality, to 
provide understanding about the nature of transformations of actors within the 
health research regulatory space, the form of regulation in this space, as well as the 
experiences of actors as they go through processes of change. The anthropology of 
regulation methodological approach enabled me to craft both the research questions 
and specific research methods, as well as to methodically analyse the empirical data 
so as to draw out themes concerning the processual nature of regulation and the 
experiences of regulatory actors who both regulate and are regulated. This thesis is 
interdisciplinary; anthropology of regulation integrates aspects of regulation, 
anthropology, and law into one single, coherent approach that transcends the 
theoretical and methodological limitations of each of the disciplines in question. The 
result is the formulation of a new form of analysis and the creation of a new 
interdisciplinary space. To reiterate, the methodology, its theory, and the methods 
are inextricably linked: the methods are a direct output from the methodological 
approach and employed in deference to the theoretical perspective, and in turn, the 
chapters that follow in Part III present the empirical research findings based on my 
anthropology of regulation-grounded research questions. This means that the 
findings are presented in a way that is sensitive to anthropology of regulation. They 
will be tethered to sensitising concepts drawn from regulatory theory and 
anthropology, which add further analytic weight to the historical tracing 
undertaken in Part I, and deeper explanation and understanding of the precise 
regulatory form and functions of RECs, as well as the regulatory strategies 
employed by the various actors in health research regulation today. 
Having described the methodological approach and its connected methods, I now 
turn to present what the empirical research findings tell us about the nature of the 
interaction between central regulators and RECs in the health research regulatory 
space, and the functional operations and deliberative processes of RECs in an era of 
twinned regulatory objectives of participant protection and research promotion. We 
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will see whether the empirical research findings reflect and validate the suggestions 
supplied in Parts I and II—that RECs engage in risk-based regulation, that health 
research regulation is increasingly streamlined and proportionate, and that health 
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6.1 Introduction 
The principal aim of this final Part III is to engage with the empirical data collected 
from the interviews and observations and, coupled with the findings from the 
document analysis, make sense of them through an anthropology of regulation 
approach, as outlined in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I explore what happens in REC 
meetings, consider the operationalisation of ‘next-generation’ health research 
regulation (particularly in light of the twin aims of protection and promotion), and 
investigate the procedures and substance behind risk-based regulation. I do this by 
querying whether risk-based regulation—as discussed in Chapter 4—is actually 
being practised by RECs and the HRA, and more fundamentally, by querying the 
nature and function of the interactions among RECs, researchers, and the HRA. 
Throughout, I draw on the implications of space and time in ethics review, 
signifying the importance of liminality to this thesis and its contribution to the 
normative discussion to come in Chapter 7. 
Inevitably, difficult decisions had to be made in constructing Chapter 6. A number 
of other themes emerged from the data, such as the struggle for RECs to maintain 
‘consistency’ internally and across other RECs; materiality in ethics review 
documents and a ‘liminality of things’; the contentious transition from paper-based 
to digital documentation on HARP;522 and the value of the REC Chair in preserving 
committee harmony and promoting efficient review and respectful dialogue with 
researchers. As these themes are not, in my opinion, directly related to the research 
                                                     
522 HRA Assessment Review Portal (HARP) <https://www.harp.org.uk/Account/Login>. 
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questions driving this thesis, and I am limited in the amount of space in this thesis, I 
do not address them. I do intend to address them in future publications.  
So, in what follows, I present three themes (subdivided into categories) that: 1) 
emerge from the data; 2) speak directly to the research questions; and 3) focus on 
key actors (i.e. RECs, REC Chairs and Managers, Scientific Officers, the HRA) and 
their interactions. As Chapter 5 indicates, my findings consist of evaluative 
statements based on an overall assessment of the raw data informed by an 
anthropology of regulation. Where direct quotes or extracts of fieldnotes specifically 
enrich the analysis, I rely on them. Given the wealth of data in my notes, however, I 
cannot do this everywhere. A significant category within the third theme—
regulatory stewardship and its connection with liminality—will serve as a bridge to 
Chapter 7 in Part III, which further unpacks the significance of liminality and, 
taking up the normative dimension of anthropology of regulation, provides 
recommendations for refining the health research regulatory framework. 
6.2 Themes to emerge from an anthropology of regulation 
Each of the three themes focuses on different aspects of regulation and transition. 
Combined, they paint a picture of a health research regulatory system that both REC 
members and regulators support, but do not always praise. For both REC members 
and regulators, the current system demonstrates vast improvement in the last 
decade. To this end, most members are supportive of the HRA’s efforts to further 
centralise research ethics and create common standards that aim to improve quality 
and consistency, as well as efficiency. At the same time, however, many REC 
members are also critical of certain aspects within the system, including the at-times 
fraught relationship between the HRA and its equivalent bodies in the devolved 
administrations, and—perhaps surprisingly—between the HRA and RECs 
themselves. 
Most importantly for this thesis, my findings suggest that research promotion is not 
a ‘new’ twinned role for RECs—some additional primary responsibility only 
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recently foisted upon members—but, the findings reveal that the practices of REC 
members vary greatly in how this role is both conceptualised and instantiated. In 
enacting their regulatory roles, whether for risk/burden-benefit analysis, assessment 
of the consent process, or legal and scientific checks (itself a questionable role), REC 
members and regulators demonstrate the symbolic value of leadership and 
stewardship—most notably expressed through the work of REC Managers, REC 
Chairs, and Scientific Officers—to set an example for others to follow, and guide 
REC members and researchers alike across the stages of the research application 
process. Within this latter observation, we uncover key insights into the liminal 
spaces RECs occupy and the potential role they may play across various thresholds 
of the research lifecycle, including those beyond the current ex ante-dominant 
positioning of ethics review.  
In light of the methods described in Chapter 5, the following subsections investigate 
three themes, namely: 1) the ‘black boxes’ of ethics review; 2) regulatory 
connectivity; and 3) regulators as facilitators and stewards. And, in light of the 
methodology described in Chapter 4, we will find that elements of anthropology of 
regulation appear in each of the three themes identified.  
1. Regarding the first theme of ‘black boxes’ of ethics review, anthropology of 
regulation helps frame the regulatory behaviour of RECs as an instance of 
internal flexibility, where individual and group behaviour impacts and 
indeed helps shape a liminal regulatory space wherein RECs and researchers 
alike explore and deliberate the ‘ethics’. Liminality, in turn, draws our 
attention to rituals and how they play a crucial role in regulatory 
coordination. The rituals in ethics review serve to organise the REC’s actions 
and reinforce its authority, but they also drive collaboration and 
coordination with other actors, particularly researchers.  
2. Regarding the theme of regulatory connectivity, anthropology of regulation 
invites us to consider the influence of law, science, and ethics in REC work. 
Rather than viewing each of these as disciplinary and regulatory 
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‘boundaries’, we are better placed to view them as connected regulatory 
spaces that call for guidance to work through and across each of them. Law, 
science, and ethics are all wrapped up together in the making of an ethics 
opinion.  
3. Finally, regarding the theme of regulators as facilitators and stewards, 
anthropology of regulation suggests that particular actors can serve as 
‘masters of ceremony’ in guiding other actors (often regulatees) through 
stages and thresholds of regulatory processes, where uncertainty often is 
paramount. This last theme therefore teases out the finding that actors 
within and connected to RECs serve as ‘stewards’ who help guide 
researchers, and their applications, across stages of the research lifecycle, 
and that the HRA can taking a leading role here. 
I now proceed to explore each of the three themes, commencing with the ‘black 
boxes’ of ethics review. 
6.2.1 The ‘black boxes’ of ethics review 
Learning by observation 
As Part I of this thesis underscores, much is unknown academically about how REC 
members learn to ‘do’ ethics reviews and what actually happens in the course of 
their work both before, during, and after a committee meeting. As anthropology of 
regulation aims to investigate the nature of regulation and the behaviours and 
experiences of actors within a regulatory space (or spaces), and the ways in which 
they themselves are affected by regulation, I was interested in understanding how 
people learn to become REC members and perform the regulatory task of assessing 
the ethics of research. I was interested in knowing whether REC members felt their 
knowledge—or indeed expertise—was formed primarily by formal training sessions 
and regulatory documents, or by the experience itself—learning by doing, in other 
words.  
By and large, REC members felt that they learned how to ‘do’ ethics reviews simply 
by observing other REC members in action. They watch, listen, and learn, but what 
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REC members pick up is not necessarily carbon copied into their own particular 
ways of doing committee work. Their observations are individually interpreted and 
subsequently manifest themselves in unique ways based on their own values, 
experiences, and expertise. Training, such as the mandatory induction for new 
members, provides a cursory overview of research ethics and points them in the 
right direction for additional resources if they are uncertain about specific areas, but 
the actual practice of ethics review—the process of working through applications; 
adopting the rituals, mannerisms, jargon, and ways of speaking during meetings; 
evaluating forms; questionning researchers face-to-face; writing up reports; and 
contributing to the discussions in meetings—is learned by observing other members 
who have this experience. It is through learning by observation and individual 
interpretation that members come to contribute ‘effectively’ and produce a culture 
of ethics review. As one REC member explained: 
I wasn’t expected to contribute for the first few meetings – so if I wanted to I 
could have done – but it was mostly, ‘you’re here to learn about how things 
operate and what sorts of things we’re going to be discussing’, and then just 
picking it up from those meetings. […] The best way to learn is by listening 
to what the other members come up with. (P6) 
If REC members learn by observing other members and also individually interpret 
applications based on their own values and experiences, what might the process of 
an ethics review look like? How might one describe it? In a surprisingly frank 
moment, an HRA regulator described ethics review as a ‘black box’ where the 
process of review itself constitutes the outcome: 
To some extent you just have to sometimes, I think, look at the RECs as a 
black box and you just say, ‘well, that’s how we have decided in this 
country and across the world to deal with that ethical decision making’. 
That’s it, that’s the black box – it’s up to 18 people around a table discussing 
it and out pops the opinion. And it’s a bit of a difficult one to get into that 
black box and mess around with it. It’s almost that the process is the ethical 
decision. We’ve just decided that’s the process and what pops out and we’ll 
live with it. You know, you can train the people who are inside the black 
box and do everything you can, but I think to some extent this is probably as 
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good as it gets when you get [86] committees with up to 18 people sitting 
around a table making ethical decisions. (P1) 
It was the reference to RECs as a black box and the process of deliberation as 
constituting the ethics opinion in this first interview that propelled me to look more 
closely inside RECs. Does the practice of ethics review align with what the 
regulations would suggest happens, or should happen? Do REC members have any 
sense of what other RECs do, any curiosity about it, or any desire to know if they 
are being ‘consistent’? As opposed to a singular black box, could there be a 
multiplicity of unconnected black boxes operating in fairly splendid isolation—and 
yet with still a fair degree of homogeneity in culture? How exactly does the process 
of ethics review itself constitute an opinion—not input and then output, but input as 
output, and arguably process as product? 
Ethics review—peering inside the black boxes 
The HRA’s guidance document, ‘Information for potential Research Ethics Service 
Committee members’, outlines a process of ethics review in RECs that focuses on 
the utilitarian calculus of risk-benefit, a robust consent process, and adherence to the 
REC SOPs and relevant guidance and legislation.523 The evidence from my research 
suggests that RECs follow this guidance. They dedicate a great deal of effort and 
time to three areas: 1) ensuring that consent ‘is done properly’ whereby participants 
are fully informed in a Participant Information Sheet (PIS) and are able to make a 
voluntary decision; 2) ensuring that the burdens or risks to participants are 
minimised as far as possible, and risks to the researchers are minimised; and 3) 
ensuring that ‘the science is right’ (this focus on scientific quality is discussed 
further below).  
Within these three areas of focus, all five RECs approached research studies with a 
strong degree of liberalism. As one REC Chair explained: ‘I think sometimes we 
have to remind ourselves that if the risks to the participants are minimised as far as 
                                                     
523 Health Research Authority, ‘Information for Potential Research Ethics Service Committee 
Members’ (n 56). 
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possible then that research should probably be allowed to happen’ (P3). The 
prevalent view that I observed from the meetings is that provided risks are 
outweighed by potential benefits (or there is a ‘fair balance’ between risk or burden 
and potential benefits), and participants are provided all material information 
during the consent process, then the choice to participate should be theirs to make, 
not the REC’s. A member elucidated this liberal approach as follows: 
…sometimes you have to be careful not to be paternalistic in that 
actually…well, so long as people have a choice, they don’t have to do the 
study, and if they don’t like the fact that they’re not going to get paid or 
they’re not going to get travel expenses, we might suggest, ‘Well, it would 
be nice if you could pay them, but if you’re not going to pay them then the 
person won’t do the study.’ There’s a fine balance between thinking a 
participant hasn’t got the brains to work things out for themselves and they 
have to be mollycoddled every step of the way. It’s really hard to think of 
things that you just want to go: ‘No, you can’t do that.’ (P8) 
In REC meetings, ethical issues within the three areas mentioned above are 
transformed into questions of refinement, or what might be called technical 
questions (e.g. inconsistencies between the protocol, PIS, or IRAS form; missing 
information in the PIS; clarification on the recruitment process; whether there will 
be continuation of a drug after the study ends). Fundamental questions demanding 
deep ethical reflection (e.g. the ethics of gene therapy; the ethics of ‘me-too’ drug 
applications) rarely manifested themselves in REC meetings. Instead, there was a 
cumulative gathering of information: members tended to reinforce other members’ 
comments and add their own. This may be a pragmatic matter driven by time and 
resource constraints. Or, this may be a matter where REC members do not think it 
appropriate or think themselves capable of engaging in deep ethical reflection or 
debate. RECs do not function as a national bioethics council where there are 
resources and an explicit mandate to deep dive into matters of concern. Rather, they 
function more as regulatory event-licensing bodies that individually evaluate and 
collectively deliberate on submitted documents and render a decision underpinned 
by standards and intuition. This reinforces Schneider’s claim that the REC system ‘is 
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not an engine for abstract ethical thought. It is an agency regulating research’,524 and 
Montgomery’s claim that a REC ‘rarely engages directly in ethical reflection, but is 
concerned with ensuring compliance with established standards’.525  
As such, to the extent that there is an underlying ethic guiding these RECs, I would 
claim it is liberalism and pragmatism. Each member is tasked with interpreting and 
applying abstract ethical standards (and to some degree, laws and regulations) to 
concrete research plans. How ethical standards and regulation are instantiated vary 
among individual members and, to some extent, among RECs. But, while the 
individual interpretations can vary, they are not limitless.  
In her empirical work on IRBs in the US, Stark invokes an ‘ethics of place’526 to 
denote the peer review model of IRBs—institutional review boards—that attaches 
ethics to a specific physical place—a particular building—rather than a classic code 
of ethics that attaches to an individual physician or researcher. Peering further into 
the ‘black box’ of ethics review in the UK, several key findings emerge that suggest 
RECs, unlike their institutional counterparts in the US, symbolise an ethics of space. 
Ethics is attached to the REC within their meeting space at an NHS trust hospital, 
Health Board, or hotel conference room, yet as a node within a network, theirs is 
also an ethics informed by a larger regulatory framework such that moral authority 
for a decision rests not just in the REC itself, but also in the institutional apparatus 
of the Research Ethics Service(s). As bodies that have become centralised and tack 
closer to the state, their ‘room to roam’ is wide, but it is not infinite. Ethically 
appropriate research must fit within the personal sensibilities of REC members, as 
well as institutional sensibilities set by the HRA and equivalent bodies that 
prescribe boundaries of ethical acceptability. Invoking an anthropologically 
informed view of regulatory practice by RECs, we find that the ‘ethics’ within 
research ethics committees is a proving ground of debate, deliberation, and 
                                                     
524 Schneider, The Censor’s Hand (n 12) 107 (emphasis added). 
525 Montgomery (n 102) 11.  
526 Stark (n 123) 83. 
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negotiation, and a liminal regulatory space that accommodates diversity, 
disagreement, and dissent across applications and across time. 
Within this ethics of space, I discovered that a common behaviour exists across 
RECs. Intriguingly, relative to each other, RECs are black boxes, existing in multiple 
spaces. Several REC members I spoke with perceive a top-down command from the 
HRA (while HRA regulators told me they perceive a collaborative ethics co-
produced with RECs); several REC members also perceive that they have little 
interaction with other RECs. Beyond the regional REC Chair meetings held twice a 
year (across regions in England), ‘ordinary’ REC members do not have common 
opportunities to engage with other RECs, and they do not seem to have much desire 
to do so. Yet, despite these black boxes existing between black boxes, there exists a 
surprising degree of group homogeneity in terms of approach and rituals. What drives this 
homogenous REC group culture across the different black boxes may be in part 
HRA standards driving consistency, but this can only be a partial explanation. 
Many of the rituals and routine performed by REC members are not simple 
instantiations of HRA standards. RECs have a wide latitude in which to roam, but 
they appear to roam in similar ways and in similar spaces. Even more intriguingly, 
elements of REC culture—interpretive flexibility, self-policing behaviour, 
sensitivities with regard to relationships with researchers—would ordinarily 
suggest heterogeneity and militate against homogeneity. And yet, a strong degree of 
group cultural and regulatory homogeneity exists. What is going on here?  
The ethics of space illustrates the symbolic importance of inviting various actors 
into the black box, such as researchers, and how the physical dimensions of space 
impact on the processes therein. The space that is created is on the REC’s terms, 
even if it may be part of the physical space of the health research community. For 
instance, a clinical researcher may be on her ‘home turf’, residing in the same NHS 
trust hospital as where the REC meets, but she must still face the black box by 
entering the conference room, presenting her research before the members, and 
submitting to their judgement as the REC casts its opinion on whether her 
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application is ethically acceptable. One might think that this is a recipe for 
controversy, where a clash of spaces could emerge. On the contrary, researchers 
invariably seem to ‘submit’ to the REC and work together alongside them in moving 
the research application along towards acceptance. There is no evidence from my 
data that the individual black boxes of RECs set up a confrontational dynamic 
between them and researchers. Indeed, only once did I observe an overtly hostile 
situation where a researcher was unwilling to participate in the REC’s ethics of 
space. The REC Manager later told me that this researcher had been to the REC 
before and had a bit of a ‘reputation’. Even so, this hostile situation did not seem to 
have any bearing on the REC’s view towards the research application. The outcome 
recommended by the Lead Reviewer and agreed by the REC as a whole was 
‘favourable with conditions’. 
In sum, an ethics of space constitutes a connected regulatory space of RECs across the 
UK where homogeneity reigns. A researcher can submit an application in 
Southampton or Aberdeen and experience a startlingly similar ethics review (and a 
REC whose members are rather similar in composition). RECs themselves may not 
be aware of how similar they are. More than once REC members asked me how 
their REC ‘compared’ to the others I was observing, and whether I found any 
differences. As I responded to them, the differences are few and far between. 
Despite, or perhaps because of this homogeneity, there is a strong desire by RECs, 
including REC Managers, to preserve the sanctity of their black box and ethics of 
space. As will soon be shown, initiatives by the HRA that try to improve the 
regulatory pathways for researchers can backfire if there is improper consultation 
with RECs. Specifically, the ‘Ethics Officer’ pilot, discussed later in this chapter, can 
be interpreted as an invasion of this ethics of space. Researchers who enter this 
space do not create tension, yet other regulators who enter into it can. The irony, 
then, is that in the present context, regulatory tension or failures exist between 
regulators, not between regulators and regulatees. 
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 i) A liberal approach to risk and potential benefit 
The GAfREC state: ‘The [REC] has to be assured that any anticipated risks, burdens 
or intrusions will be minimised for the people taking part in the research and are 
justified by the expected benefits for the participants or for science and society.’527 
Elsewhere, the GAfREC state that ‘research can sometimes involve an element of 
risk, because research can involve trying something new. It is important that any 
risks are minimised and do not compromise the dignity, rights, safety and well-
being of the people who take part.’528 Specific guidance is not provided as to how 
this evaluation of anticipated risks and benefits is to be conducted, and how risk 
minimisation may be done. As we saw in Chapter 4, this concerns scholars such as 
Rid, who argues that ‘frameworks for risk-benefit evaluations of biomedical 
research remain surprisingly vague’.529  
Compared to Jaeger’s ethnographic study of IRBs in the US, which found that 
‘[m]ost of the time that an IRB spends on a proposal review is focused on 
identifying and deliberating about risk’,530 my findings suggest that RECs do spend 
some time per application discussing risk, but it does not comprise anywhere near a 
majority of the REC’s meeting time. Surprisingly, to the extent that the risk-benefit 
or burden-benefit calculus is invoked in decision-making, I observed a number of 
REC members who tended to focus their discussion more on the prospective 
evaluation of burdens to participants (usually framed as ‘mere inconveniences’, 
typically of a temporal or financial variety) than risks of a physical, psychological, or 
emotional variety. The CIOMS Guidelines define burdens as ‘harms of a very small 
magnitude that are almost certain to occur’.531 Only on occasion were potential 
benefits discussed.  
                                                     
527 GAfREC (n 1) para 1.2.2.  
528 ibid para 2.2.1. 
529 Rid, ‘Rethinking Risk–Benefit Evaluations’ (n 399) 153.  
530 Jaeger (n 123) 94. 
531 CIOMS Guidelines (n 16) Guideline 4, Commentary.  
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One Scotland A REC member agreed that, at least as far as her REC is concerned, 
the members look at ‘the burden probably more than the risk actually. We do 
occasionally get quite risky looking things, but they’re usually in people who are 
really not well, I mean, really end of life’ (P12). This may be because many REC 
members feel that risks in most studies are in fact relatively minimal (even though 
they are not non-material as compared to Proportionate Review applications); that 
there is a high level of unambiguity and certainty in the risks present in most 
research studies (and thus they do not need to be assessed in any systematic way); 
or that the scientific aspect of risk assessment is outwith their scope (unlike, say, the 
MHRA).  
Risk discussions in REC deliberations were often limited to identification of risks or 
burdens, the majority of the time by the Lead Reviewer. Some risks and burdens are 
explicitly identified before they reach the REC; others may be implied, theoretical, 
or unknown. Explicit risks, burdens, and benefits may be gathered from the IRAS 
form: question A22 of the form asks the Chief Investigator to list ‘potential risks and 
burdens’; question A24 asks for a list of potential benefits; and question A26 asks for 
potential risks for researchers. Non-explicit forms of risk, burden, and benefit may 
be drawn out in the HRA Ethical Review Form’s question 3, which asks REC 
members to consider whether the risks to the research participant are proportionate 
to the benefits to the research participant and society. Thus, some risks and burdens 
are explicitly identified already; others may be implied (i.e. drawn out by REC 
members in their review and discussion), theoretical (i.e. remote), or unknown (i.e. 
risks or burdens that the REC cannot identify due to missing or inaccurate 
information).  
Chapter 4 explored risk-based regulation, which can be defined as ‘the prioritizing 
of regulatory actions in accordance with an assessment of the risks that parties will 
present to the regulatory body’s achieving its objectives’.532 Looking back at the 
                                                     
532 Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (n 101) 281. 
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elements listed in Box 4.1 in Chapter 4, risk-based regulation tends to encompass a 
broad sweep of risk assessment (or appraisal), risk management, and review, 
including scoping the various dimensions of a risk, considerations of framing (i.e. 
how different stakeholders may have conflicting views concerning a risk), scientific 
risk assessment, and the broader social, institutional, political, and economic 
contexts that must be taken into account in risk-related decision-making.533 RECs do 
provide written opinions and allow for appeals and at times engage in analogical 
reasoning, but they do not seem to follow specific rules governing particular aspects 
of the risk assessment process. As Noah argues, risk assessment is a separate 
endeavour than burden or risk-benefit assessment;534 the latter may not necessitate 
‘objective’, scientific measurement so much as an intuitive balancing and effort to 
minimise (that is, manage) risks that may manifest. 
And indeed, in the full committee meetings I observed, RECs, and in particular REC 
Chairs, strived to enact a liberal policy in ethics review while avoiding a 
paternalistic stance towards risk. No member seemed wantonly unconcerned about 
risk; none would allow unfettered risks and burdens to be placed on participants. At 
the same time, though, the REC meeting discussions did not give me the impression 
that risk was a central focus. Members did not frame their approach to ethics review 
as a calculus such that their level of scrutiny of a research project was definitively 
determined by the level of risk it posed to participants. Risk was discussed as but 
one part of a much larger whole of ethics evaluation. Commonly, risk was a matter 
to be made clear and explicit in a PIS, and for a potential participant to weigh. As a 
Scottish REC member explained: ‘Nobody wants to stop research being done; we 
just want it to be done so the person being studied is fully aware of everything 
that’s going to happen to them and to make an informed choice about whether they 
want to participate or not’ (P18). 
                                                     
533 International Risk Governance Council, An Introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance 
Framework (IRGC, 2012) 8-10. 
534 Noah (n 426). 
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An example of this liberal stance can be drawn from my fieldnotes. As I was leaving 
at the end of a REC meeting, I stopped to chat with the REC Chair. I explained that I 
was interested in how issues such as risk are conceptualised and assessed by RECs. 
The Chair thought for a moment and said, ‘I don’t think this is really a philosophical 
issue; it’s a practical issue. Most research is not at all risky. Where’s the evidence 
that research is risky, beyond a Phase 1?’ he asked. ‘Who’s died from research? 
Some people have, but more people have died from un-researched care. Actually, if 
you look at the meta-analyses, taking part in phase 3, phase 4 research is neither 
good for you nor bad for you.’ Pausing a moment for further reflection, he then 
added, ‘I wonder what health research regulation would look like if we considered 
research to be good for you’.  
This prevalent liberal stance towards risk, burden, and potential benefit may work 
at some level to address the ‘heterogeneity problem’ raised by Meyer.535 While I 
argue that RECs as a group exhibit homogenous cultural and regulatory behaviour, 
scholars such as Meyer argue that individual research participants are 
heterogeneous in their preferences and other circumstances; thus the same research 
protocol will offer a different risk-benefit profile for different participants. Likewise, 
individual members of ethics committees assess risks and benefits based on their 
individual interpretation of their regulatory mandate to do so. Thus, REC members 
can engage in interpretive flexibility536 when it comes to interpreting and 
operationalising the regulations regarding risk-benefit assessment. As Stephens and 
colleagues demonstrate, interpretive flexibility can be a positive outcome in 
regulation. To overcome this heterogeneity problem, Meyer advocates greater 
private ordering whereby individual prospective research participants, rather than 
the ethics committee, decide whether it is reasonable for them to accept the risks of 
participating in a particular research study. In the REC meetings I observed, the 
liberal approach enacted a form of private ordering. RECs fulfilled their regulatory 
                                                     
535 Meyer, ‘Regulating’ (n 403); Meyer, ‘Three Challenges’ (n 78). 
536 Stephens, Atkinson, and Glasner (n 356). 
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mandate to assess burdens, risks, and potential benefits, yet the most common 
occurrence for the REC was to insist on clear provision of risks (and honest 
portrayal of potential benefit) in a PIS. RECs preferred to allow for individual 
prospective participants to decide whether it was reasonable for them to accept the 
risks of taking part in a given research study. 
In my view, then, it cannot be said that RECs operate strictly as risk-based 
regulators. Were they acting as such, we would expect to see, among other things 
(recalling Box 4.1), more objective forms of risk assessment (e.g. a system for 
assessing risks and scoring them, beyond Proportionate Review applications), 
management, and review; systematic improvement of decision-making processes 
based on new evidence and insights into potential risk; and allocation of resources 
where risk is greatest.537 Instead, RECs’ regulatory positioning towards research 
applications encompass elements of risk assessment and risk management (such as 
communicating risks to participants), although the regulatory positioning extends 
beyond this. RECs regulate not on the basis of risk alone; value and benefit also 
factor into their deliberative processes. That is, the social and scientific value of a 
research study and its likely risks, burdens, and benefits are weighed by RECs; 
RECs decide whether burdens and risks to participants are ethically justified in light 
of, and reasonable in relation to, the potential benefits and scientific and social value 
of a study.538 Thus, just as critical to RECs’ operative deliberation is the facilitation of 
a context in which a fair choice is offered to participants whereby they can decide 
whether to participate in a study that presents ethically acceptable risks and 
burdens (as determined by the REC) and is likely to answer, or at least contribute to, 
the research question it purports to address. Moreover, the facilitation is directed 
                                                     
537 See e.g. OECD (ed), Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of Risk (OECD 
2010). 
538 See also Jeffrey Cooper and Lindsay McNair, ‘Assessing Research Benefits: Practical 
Ethicist’ (2017) 12 Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 191. 
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not just to research participants, but also to researchers themselves, as I discuss 
further below. 
Interestingly, this focus on facilitating participant choice aligns with the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics’ report on children and clinical research, which suggests that: 
…the fundamental role of ethical review is to ensure that an invitation to 
participate in research would constitute a ‘fair offer’ to children, young 
people and their parents, where the value of the research and its likely risks, 
burdens and benefits have been carefully weighed up. 
In focusing on the role of the REC in ensuring that research involving 
children constitutes a fair offer to children and parents, it is also important 
to recognise the REC’s second and equally important function: its facilitative role, 
which arises in recognition of the essential social good of well-designed and 
well-conducted research. It is not an ethically neutral act to say ‘no’ to a 
research proposal that might potentially lead to better outcomes for 
children’s and young people’s healthcare.539 
To preview the discussion to follow, here we begin to see one element of (ethical) 
research promotion. To the extent risk is assessed, managed, and communicated, 
RECs concern themselves with risk vis-à-vis its identification and mitigation (as set 
forth in the HRA Ethical Review Form) in a personalised (read: subjective) and 
socialised way (i.e. in the course of REC deliberation), but the scope of risk 
assessment and management is mitigated by a liberal, facilitative approach.  
A final key finding within this theme is that different moral considerations apply to 
different types of research studies, in a twist to the risk-proportionate approach 
advocated by the HRA, which focuses on reducing the regulatory burden for 
research that presents ‘no material ethical issues’ for human participants. RECs 
approve research studies involving high-risk treatments for late-stage cancer 
patients (e.g. phase II and III CTIMPs), even though this means there might be 
known (quantifiable) risks associated with the treatment, or even unknown risks. 
They approve such studies on the basis that participants could accept the treatment 
                                                     
539 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Children and Clinical Research: Ethical Issues (Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics 2015) xxvii (emphasis added). 
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with the full knowledge of the risks, and that without taking the treatment, they 
could well die rapidly. One reason for this is that, unlike a phase I healthy volunteer 
study, at least some of the risk-bearers may well also stand to benefit from the risks 
taken. As Ross and Athanassoulis write, ‘while we normally tend to think of risks as 
something we want to avoid, research risks can be very attractive, especially for 
those whose last hopes for a treatment lie with the potential research benefits’.540 In 
these situations, RECs do make ethical decisions knowing that there are associated 
high risks. For them, the emphasis is placed on making that knowledge explicit and 
clear to the participants. It is about making sure potential participants have adequate 
information to make an informed decision. The REC cannot speak on behalf of 
potential participants, but it can ensure that potential participants have accurate, 
up-to-date, and understandable information. From there, liberal autonomy seems to 
dictate: the choice is theirs to make.  
This was evident in a REC review of a gene therapy CTIMP that I observed. The 
REC’s main concern was the balancing of safety and efficacy of the therapy. 
Following the initial discussion, three researchers were invited into the committee 
room, where the REC Chair began by asking them to describe their study. In a calm, 
cool, and well-spoken manner, the Chief Investigator described the proposed study. 
When the REC Chair then asked him about weighing safety and efficacy, the Chief 
Investigator, in a powerful show of rhetorical flourish, narrated a story about how 
participants understand risk better than we think. Apparently, a potential 
participant once asked the Chief Investigator to sign his will before participating in 
a clinical trial, in case death occurred. The Chief Investigator, speaking deliberately 
at this point, said to the REC: ‘And I didn’t sign that will. And you know, I was glad 
not to because the man had planned to give everything to his girlfriend, and they 
then broke up six months later!’ This drew laughter from the REC. ‘He knew he was 
putting his life on the line’, the Chief Investigator continued. His point, of course, is 
                                                     
540 Allison Ross and Nafsika Athanassoulis, ‘The Role of Research Ethics Committees in 
Making Decisions About Risk’ (2014) 26 HEC Forum 203, 205. 
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that RECs should not assume participants cannot understand risks in research, 
much less substitute their judgement for a competent adult participant. If the 
information provided to them is honest and complete, the research should proceed. 
Following the face-to-face discussion, when the researchers got up to leave, the REC 
Chair beamed. ‘Thank you very much, that was fascinating!’ After they left, the REC 
Chair looked up at his committee members and said: ‘What do you want me to do, 
team? He’s quite persuasive, isn’t he?’ All agreed, and the outcome of this 
application was a ‘happy provisional’ opinion. 
 ii) Pragmatic ethics 
REC members explained to me that there is rarely a conscious thought process 
behind an ethics review. The HRA disseminates guidance and policies driven by 
procedures; they do not offer guidance on ethical principles or how to conduct an 
ethics review by reference to substantive ethics. It is, as I discovered, up to REC 
members and key ‘stewards’ such as REC Chairs and Scientific Officers to help 
guide the REC members towards an ethically-informed decision. REC members 
were hard-pressed to pinpoint the ethical deliberative content in a committee 
decision; when asked to explain the process, they provided a procedural description 
that focused on the steps involved in working through the contents of the 
application form and attendant documents. Members reach an ethically-informed 
decision of some type, but the decision-making process appears to be performed 
intuitively or pragmatically. Just as researchers rarely frame ethical scenarios in the 
moral philosophical language of deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics,541 
hardly ever is an ethical principle, be it a Kantian invocation of categorical 
imperative, autonomy, justice, or otherwise, relied upon to justify an opinion or 
articulate a reason. Members might have taken utilitarian perspectives or objective 
dignitarian perspectives when considering risk-benefit analysis (i.e. weighing risks 
against benefits, as the regulation largely dictates, or suggesting a particular risk of 
harm could never be justified, regardless of any consideration of benefits), but none 
                                                     
541 David Johnson and Elaine Howard Ecklund, ‘Ethical Ambiguity in Science’ (2016) 22 
Science and Engineering Ethics 989. 
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articulated them as such. Foremost, educated (or experiential) gut reactions and 
feelings drive ethical decision-making processes to render an opinion that seems 
suitable to and workable in the context at hand.  
This finding accords with Mary Warnock’s argument that ‘morality cannot be 
divorced from sentiment’542 and ‘[e]thical decisions cannot be taken without the 
examination of ethical feelings’.543 Each member brings their own culture of moral 
reasoning to bear on applications, which is then negotiated contextually and 
situationally in the circumstances that arise for a given application before the 
committee. This moral intuition, built up from a lifetime of cultural experience, 
manifests in an ethics assessment undergirded as much by reason as it is by feeling:  
I think in ethics committees, as in life, we make very quick decisions, ‘oh, 
that’s right’, or ‘that’s wrong’, and most of the time we’re okay. And if 
there’s very little contention, if there are no particular problems, it’s a very 
efficient way to make decisions. (P10) 
This is not to say RECs and individual members were incapable of justifying their 
reasoning; rather, it is that the moral reasoning could manifest ex post rather than a 
priori, or as one REC Chair put it: ‘The actual ethical review process is almost tick 
box’ (P3).  
Part of this can be explained both by the growth in volume of forms provided by the 
HRA to REC members, and by the lack most REC members have in formal ethics 
training. As noted already, REC members receive basic training in research ethics 
issues and are encouraged to engage in self-directed learning,544 but no one thought 
such training would transform them into philosophers or bioethicists. Few members 
were interested in academic ethics articles or debating abstract ethical issues. In this 
                                                     
542 Mary Warnock, ‘Moral Thinking and Government Policy: The Warnock Committee on 
Human Embryology’ (1985) 63 The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. Health and Society 
504, 518. 
543 ibid 520. 




sense, pragmatism drives the decision-making process: members apply rules, 
standards, and at times, principles that are practically useful for rendering a 
decision and that work best for the situation at hand. As a regulator told me, ‘there’s 
a disconnect between where ethics is going as an academic discipline and where it 
talks about research ethics, and the knowledge of RECs about that and that sort of 
coming together to discuss, so that one informs the other’ (P1). This seems to bother 
neither the HRA, nor RECs, nor, from what I saw in my observations, researchers 
and sponsors. The important point that regulators and REC members equally 
stressed is that a REC must be able to justify an outcome that has a grounding in 
reason: provided an opinion is grounded in reason, it will be seen as valid, 
legitimate, and ethical. As a REC Chair elaborated: 
I can’t tell you how to think, and that actually what I want to try and do is to 
get people to think: ‘How am I deciding? What are the reasons for my 
decision? How am I reflecting on this? Where can I turn? What questions 
should I ask myself?’ I think if one can provide that sort of framework, then 
it has to be down to the individual to look back to see, what are my own 
values? When you come to an ethics committee, when you come to 
induction training at say whatever age you are, 30, 40, 50, 60, there’s so 
much in your life that you bring to that, that this meeting for one day is 
going to barely touch. So I try to help people and say: ‘Look, if you’re going 
to make decisions, just work out what your reasons are because those are 
the crucial…why have you made that decision?’ By and large, if people 
think about reasons and think through their reasons, I think they usually 
come to the right decision. (P10) 
As I continued to peer into these black boxes, I also discovered that in bringing their 
life experiences to bear in the ethics review process, REC members engaged in 
rituals that helped coordinate relationships, overcome potential disagreement, and 





 iii) Rituals  
Ritual patterns are often present in highly ‘rationalised’ settings such as hospitals, 
and are embedded to a significant degree in the schedules, procedures, and 
practices of the setting.545 RECs and the spaces in which they meet and constitute 
form a highly rationalised setting. In creating and reinforcing their ethics of space, 
REC members adopt rituals (that is, a type of patterned or institutionalised symbolic 
action546) that manifest throughout the process of ethics review. These include: 
 the refrain of phrases expressed by a REC Chair to the REC and attending 
researchers (a REC Chair might say to the attending researcher: ‘Thanks 
very much for attending today. We’ve had a really good discussion of your 
application, and as you might expect, have a few questions for you.’; 
following a face-to-face meeting with a researcher, a REC Chair might 
jokingly say to the researcher, ‘Right, now run for the hills!’, or always begin 
the group deliberation following the face-to-face researcher meeting with, 
‘What do we think, team?’);  
 the ordering of questions gathered by the REC Chair (i.e. distilling the 
REC’s discussion of an application into three or four key questions for the 
attending researchers so as to keep the meeting on time and also not 
overwhelm researchers);  
 rituals of placement, such as the seating arrangement of REC members, 
researchers, and staff (e.g. the Chair and Manager always sitting side-by-
side, researchers sitting at a right angle to the REC Chair and Manager, as 
opposed to directly across from them, which minimises a sense of 
confrontation and encourages a more research ‘promotionist’ approach); 
 the shuffling of the bundles of papers, which perpetually swathe the 
conference tables during meetings; 
                                                     




 the presentation by Lead and Second Reviewers to the REC by reading from 
their filled-in HRA Ethical Review Form;  
 the meeting structure (e.g. on-time starts and a strong collective desire to 
stick to time); and  
 the working through of an application (the structure of Lead and Second 
Reviewer presentations followed by structured discussion by other REC 
members).  
Rituals play a crucial role in how members formulate comments on an application 
and approach their ethical decision-making. Similar group rituals were present 
across all five RECs, and within each, members had individual rituals vis-à-vis their 
review process. Thus, how rituals of ethics review played out varied across 
members. REC members bring their own idiosyncrasies and predilections to their 
reviews; they have ‘certain bugbears’ that can make them sound like ‘a bit of a 
broken record’ (P12), but this, members explained, helps ensure a well-rounded and 
consistent review. As a Scientific Officer told me: ‘You also have to find your own 
way [as a REC member], because if everybody reviews an application the same way, 
you’re going to miss something’ (P23). Indeed, subjectivity and idiosyncrasy of 
individual members is a natural outcome of most independent committee 
structures. The committee structure allows for a more thorough review than if only 
one reviewer is to pour over an application. Yet, it was rarely the case that 
subjectivity among individual members led to diametrically opposing viewpoints 
on the ethical acceptability of an application. Consensus forms the backbone of 
ethical deliberation, which is reached in large part through rituals: 
…if there wasn’t at least an element of opinion and subjectivity in the 
review process you wouldn’t need committees. You could do the entire 
review with checkboxes on a computer. […] But I also think it’s true to say 
that if you canvassed the committee members about what the decision for 
this month’s applications would be before the meeting started, there would 
be almost complete unanimity on every application. (P14) 
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Some members review applications from only a narrow perspective, such as 
through their niche area of expertise (e.g. statistics, pharmacology). Others, 
particularly lay members, invoke a process of projection: they read applications 
from the perspective of a potential participant, reminding themselves to ‘think like a 
patient’ and raise issues that may concern even only a few patients. In ‘thinking like 
a patient’, the lens may not be ethical per se; instead, it may be grounded in 
relationality with participants, tied in with an ethic of care:  
…I take a step to the side and I think from the patients’ or the participants’ 
perspective; not that I sit and think I’m here because I’m a professional with 
a background in certain things. I would definitely highlight if I thought that 
the scientific integrity of a protocol wasn’t robust, but really because I’m 
there as not a specialist or not an expert person; I give my opinion from the 
more personable side, patients’ side. (P22) 
Some members think it inappropriate, however, to substitute their opinion on 
whether to participate in a given study with that of an adequately informed 
potential participant. For these members, relationality with participants is risky; 
avoidance of paternalism should predominate. An ethical research project for them 
is one that discloses all material information to participants: 
I remember commenting on a particularly onerous…I think it was 
pancreatic cancer study. Even if I had the cancer and was as sick as I needed 
to be to enter the study, I personally would not be prepared to enrol in the 
study because of the demands it would place on me. It was too onerous. 
Having said that, was it ethical? Yes, absolutely, because you’re telling the 
patients precisely what’s going to be required of them. And whilst I 
wouldn’t agree to it, that doesn’t mean to say that other people can’t. And 
that’s actually potentially a difficult distinction to make. […] It was an 
interesting one for me because I wouldn’t volunteer for the study, but I 
wouldn’t say it’s wrong for other people to do it. (P14) 
As noted, one of the key rituals is the meeting and agenda structure for RECs. 
Established by the HRA in a template form, the meeting agenda was consistent 
across all five RECs I observed, namely in the order of: Apologies for Absence; 
Minutes of the Meeting Last Held; Matters Arising; Items for Information and 
Discussion; REC Manager’s Report; Declarations of Interest; New Applications for 
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Ethical Review led by the Lead Reviewer and then Second Reviewer; Any Other 
Business; Date of Next Meeting. Within this structure, the timing was constant, too. 
Items 1-6 rarely extended beyond five minutes discussion in total. The vast majority 
of each meeting was dedicated to Item 7: New Applications for Ethical Review. 
Following the presentation by the Lead Reviewer (typically ranging from seven to 
15 minutes), the Second Reviewer added a few comments (typically ranging from 
three to seven minutes) in a gap-filling manner, raising further queries to be posed 
to the researcher or areas of concern within an application. Then, the REC Chair 
would invite other REC members to comment on the application. Following this 
open discussion, the REC Chair would write down the ‘main issues’ to discuss with 
the researcher, assuming the researcher was attending in-person. (REC Managers 
were always taking minutes of the meetings, portions of which are then transformed 
into opinion letters that are sent to the researchers). Once the list of questions was 
formulated to all members’ satisfaction, the REC Chair or Manager would retrieve 
the researchers (along with, on occasion, a representative from the sponsor or a 
student’s supervisor) waiting outside (assuming they were attending in person), 
invite them inside, and ask questions regarding the application. Following this back-
and-forth dialogue, the researcher would leave, and the REC Chair would invite 
members to deliberate further on the application, culminating in a decision.  
Rituals of expertise manifested themselves often in meetings. For REC members 
with a particular niche area of expertise, such as statistics, quite often the REC Chair 
would turn to a specific member and ask, ‘Are the statistics okay?’ The member 
would reply, and then the REC Chair would move on. This indicated that the power 
of the member’s expertise was such that other members did not feel able to 
adequately comment on the specific matter of concern (though often other REC 
members would ask general questions about a niche area to the expert member, 
such as a pharmacist, prefacing their question with self-effacing and self-professed 
ignorance of the area).  
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Routine in the ethics reviews undertaken by individual members and routine in the 
meetings themselves does not necessarily mean there is a predictable outcome in 
any given application, even though the vast majority of applications (71 per cent 
from the meetings I observed) are deemed ‘provisional’.547 Interestingly, a 
provisional opinion is a forward-focused step in ethics review. The application moves 
from the pre-review threshold at submission to the threshold of approval during the 
REC meeting. A provisional opinion rendered by a REC almost always leads to a 
favourable opinion once the researcher has addressed the REC’s concerns, which are 
expressed in the opinion letter. (Indeed, members in all five RECs sometimes would 
use the phrase ‘provisional favourable’ in announcing their verdict on an 
application, which symbolically differs from HRA’s term of ‘provisional opinion’, 
which signals no pre-determined final outcome.) Upon receiving a provisional 
opinion, a researcher likely will amend the relevant documentation, which is then 
reviewed by the REC Chair and sometimes one or two other members, and then this 
‘sub-committee’ will render a final decision. 
REC Chairs and others often have a sense of where an application is heading in the 
course of discussion at a meeting, but how the discussion unfolds is not always 
foreseeable. A Scientific Officer believes the outcome for any given application is 
unpredictable: 
…the thing is, with committees, you can’t predict what they’re going to pick 
up on. Even after all this time, the things that I think they’re going to pick 
up on, they don’t, and the things I think are going to sail through, they have 
huge problems with. They’re really difficult to predict. And it depends on 
their mood, as well. It depends on the weather, I think! I would love to do a 
study, you know, when you do a committee meeting and the sun’s shining, 
and, you know, the lambs are skipping in the field, the applications always 
                                                     
547 Out of the 24 meetings I attended, I observed deliberation of a total of 119 new 
applications: six were approved outright as favourable, 22 were granted favourable with 
conditions, 85 were deemed provisional, and six were rejected as unfavourable. This 
compares well to the HRA statistics for RECs in England, which find that of applications 
reviewed at full committee meetings, over 70 per cent are deemed provisional. See Health 
Research Authority, ‘Annual Report Summary for RECs in England April 2015 to March 
2016’ (n 26). 
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get an easier run, than if it’s, you know, pouring down with rain, and there’s 
gales blowing. (P23) 
With an array of rituals, idiosyncrasies, moral intuitions, and at times 
impressionistic judgements, even if ethics is ‘situated’—constrained by the limits of 
the committee structure, the predominance of scientific experts, or the desire for 
consensus and efficiency—any given REC’s output, as with the input, is uncertain. 
For example, certain cues in the course of ethics review (e.g. the type of research 
under review, a REC’s trust in the researcher, the quality—i.e. lack of errors and 
comprehensiveness—of the IRAS form and attendant documents) can help make an 
outcome more predictable, but not necessarily certain. As the Scientific Officer 
above alludes to, there is always an element of uncertainty in the outcome of an 
application after REC review. As well, intra-REC precedent (i.e. comparing current 
applications to past applications and decisions) occasionally was invoked in 
deliberations to serve as a reference and maintain consistency, but this was not done 
systematically—which puts my findings in contradistinction to Stark’s and Jaeger’s 
findings in the US. One member told me he could only recall two instances in over 
20 years of serving on a REC where precedent was invoked. The norm seemed to be 
that each application was reviewed on its own merits. Instead, group experience, or 
a ‘memory within the group’ (P19), predominated the aiding of a decision. As one 
REC Chair phrased it, ‘group moral maxims that we all generally share’ (P10) 
helped determine if the past opinions were relevant to the current application. 
Collective memory and experience, along with these ‘group moral maxims’, 
maintained order and propelled the REC towards a decision that they believed 










Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. Photographs of REC meeting rooms in an NHS Health 
Board and hotel, respectively. Attending researchers sit at a right angle to the REC Chair 
and Manager so that they can feel ‘at ease’, as one REC Manager told me. REC members 
usually sit in the same seats or area of the room at the monthly full committee meetings. REC 










Figure 6.3. Photograph of one of the HRA’s five Regional Offices in England 
(Jarrow).  
 
This Regional Office contains an open floor plan and currently has approximately 20 
employees. White boards along the wall help HRA staff manage the flow of information and 
maintain order in RECs. A REC Manager explained their use to me: ‘We use whiteboards in 
our centre. I don’t think all centres use them, but we find it invaluable for the REC Manager, 
for the REC Assistants […] What we do on our whiteboards, we have a record of the current 
REC meeting, and I think there’s enough space for the next meeting, and then a PR meeting, 
which is once a month, and then sub-committee meetings for amendments and things we 
have twice a month. So the REC Assistant would look after the sub-committee, and the REC 
Manager would usually look after the main committee and PR, and that PR can vary around 
the country. So as soon as we receive it we accept it on the database and then we try and write 
everything down on the white marker boards’ (P15). 
 
Liminality draws our attention to rituals and how they play a crucial role in 
regulatory coordination. The rituals in ethics review serve to organise the REC’s 
actions, reinforce their authority, but also drive collaboration and coordination with 
other actors, particularly researchers (and less frequently or successfully, with their 
managing regulators). Rituals constitute embedded processes of ethics review that 
work to create shared meanings, establish order, build feelings of community, and 
encourage trust in the process and outcome. At the same time, in considering the 
ways in which an activity (e.g. research) may be regulated by a network of 
regulators (e.g. RECs, MHRA, HRA) through a variety of rituals (e.g. rituals of 
consent, rituals of placement at meetings, rituals of words and phrases), we see that 
229 
 
rituals have a tangible impact on the regulatory actors’ behaviour, particularly when 
those rituals are disrupted by regulatory changes, or impositions ‘from above’, such 
as the HRA’s ShED exercise or Proportionate Review. Liminality invites us to 
identify and pay attention to symbolically and practically significant rituals and 
how they organise REC’s regulatory behaviour and structure their relations with 
other actors. 
 iv) Ethics as an act of faith 
As a final key finding discovered when peering inside the ‘black boxes’ of RECs, 
ethics review can be an act of faith shared between the REC and researchers. This 
finding aligns with Hedgecoe’s observation that RECs and researchers can interact 
as ‘work groups’ and co-construct ‘organisational deviance’ through ‘cultures of 
production’ that contain various features, including trust that RECs place in 
research applicants’ abilities and openness.548 REC members receive ‘marvellous bits 
of paper’ in research applications, some of which may be ‘meaningless’ (P12), and 
yet they must make a definitive judgement on what they see and hear. For 
applications from commercial sponsors especially, REC members feel they must act 
on faith to trust the researcher or research team to act ethically. For them, there is a 
risk—but an acceptable one—in approving an application based on their assessment 
of ‘bits of paper’ and perhaps a 15-minute discussion with the Chief Investigator or 
another member of the research team.  
A vital component that makes this act of faith acceptable to the REC, researchers, the 
HRA, and others is the face-to-face meeting with the researcher. This meeting 
follows the presentation of the application by the Lead and Second Reviewers and 
the general discussions around the conference table. As we have seen, REC 
members place a tremendous degree of value on meeting the researcher (or research 
team) in person, and likewise, though I did not interview them, researchers seemed 
to value the face-to-face meetings as well.  
                                                     
548 Hedgecoe, ‘A Deviation from Standard Design?’ (n 175). 
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There are two purposes behind asking a researcher to attend a REC meeting. The 
first is to discuss key issues in the application that may be resolved in the meeting, 
thus saving time and perhaps even turning an application from a provisional to a 
favourable opinion. Efficiency and research promotion drive this purpose. As one 
REC member told me, ‘…because we can ask them questions straightaway and 
sometimes they can give answers very quickly, it just resolves the problem in a way’ 
(P20). The second purpose is to get a sense of whether researchers seem 
trustworthy—something that cannot be investigated nearly as thoroughly through a 
document review alone. RECs want to get a sense of the researcher’s character and 
probity. A good presentation by a researcher is almost as valuable as a well put-
together application. If the REC is comfortable that a Chief Investigator has 
participants’ welfare at heart—and some members believe this is ‘easy to convey in 
an interpersonal interaction’ (P14)—then it will go a long way towards delivering a 
favourable opinion. Given that a number of researchers choose to apply to the same 
REC, either because the REC is in their local area or because they think highly of the 
particular committee, the rapport and trust established between REC and researcher 
can lead to more efficient—but potentially also shortcutted—reviews: 
So [this researcher had] done all that she’d needed to do to use [the medical 
device]; she just hadn’t explained it particularly well in the IRAS [form]. 
And she put us completely at ease [in the face-to-face meeting] that the 
safety wasn’t going to be an issue. So along comes the second application 
[from the same researcher a couple months later]. It has essentially the same 
defect in terms of explaining the safety. But because we knew it was her, we 
knew it wasn’t an issue and we didn’t need to spend any time on it, because 
it was the same piece of kit. The same researcher, and she’d convinced us 
beforehand. So that was very helpful. (P14) 
At the same time, the inability for the REC to observe the researcher in action, to 
monitor what is actually occurring, given its ex ante positioning in the research 
lifecycle, troubles some members. Even if they have a good ‘feeling’ based on the 
face-to-face meeting, how sure can they be that the researcher will conduct the 
study ethically? Again, faith must be placed in the researcher to act ethically: ‘All 
we’re approving is the paperwork in effect, and we have no control about what 
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actually goes on’ (P8). To sustain this faith, RECs must work together with other 
actors to share responsibilities, approve studies that are designed to be ethical 
throughout, and inculcate virtuous behaviour in researchers. And, in working with 
other actors, RECs must connect across regulatory spaces. I unpack this as the 
second theme. 
6.2.2 Regulatory connectivity 
Law and science occupy an uncertain relationship with RECs as there is an apparent 
misalignment between what the HRA and other managing regulators expect of 
RECs on paper and what occurs in practice. The GAfREC indicate that RECs are not 
responsible for assessing the scientific quality and legality of an application; they are 
neither a scientific review nor legal advisory body. In regard to science, the GAfREC 
state that: ‘A REC need not reconsider the quality of the science, as this is the 
responsibility of the sponsor and will have been subject to review by one or more 
experts in the field (known as ‘peer review’).’549 In regard to law, the GAfREC state: 
‘It is not the role of the REC to offer a legal opinion on research proposals, but it 
may advise the researcher, sponsor or host organisation whenever it considers that 
legal advice might be helpful to them.’550 In regard to regulatory responsibilities, 
interestingly, the GAfREC encourages RECs to defer to other bodies where 
responsibilities may overlap: ‘Where others have a regulatory responsibility, a REC 
can expect to rely on them to fulfil it. If the law gives another body duties that are 
normally responsibilities of a REC according to this document, RECs do not 
duplicate them.’551 
Even if RECs ‘need not reconsider’ scientific quality, need not offer a ‘legal opinion’ 
on research proposals, and should not ‘duplicate’ other bodies that have regulatory 
responsibilities (e.g. MHRA, HTA), it still remains the case that often they perform 
all three roles.  
                                                     
549 GAfREC (n 1), para 5.4.2(a). 
550 ibid para 3.2.11. 
551 ibid para 5.4.2(c). 
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Ethics and science 
REC members find it to be a ‘constant struggle to try and separate out the idea’ that 
RECs already should be assured that the science is ‘good’ and that the application 
has had appropriate peer review. As a body partially comprised of past or current 
researchers, it is a challenge for many to disentangle science and ethics, as even 
HRA regulators recognise: 
…you have a certain number of experts ‘round there who are all jobbing 
scientists and jobbing researchers, or much of them are, or at least 
acquainted with research at that level, you know, who can’t help but pick 
over the carcass and the bones of the methodology… It’s really 
difficult…where does ethics stop? Where do you stop thinking it’s an ethics 
issue? But I think they do predominantly, a lot of committees do focus on 
the methodology, talk about the methodology. (P1) 
Indeed, the HRA seems to implicitly acknowledge this potential for a connected 
ethics/science regulatory space in its push for committees to include a statistician 
among their membership. The GAfREC too provide ambiguous guidance, stating: 
‘The REC will be satisfied with credible assurances that the research has an 
identified sponsor and that it takes account of appropriate scientific peer review.’552 
How does a REC satisfy itself with such credible assurances? A good deal of 
discretion is given to them. Not surprisingly, even REC members who are not 
‘jobbing scientists’ also think it vital to ensure the science ‘is right’. Three different 
members repeated to me a well-worn line in research ethics: Bad Science is Bad 
Ethics. But they also acknowledged that they cannot simply mimic scientific review 
committees. In consequence, RECs engage in a secondary form of self-policed science 
review. There were times that I observed RECs expressing uncertainty with the 
scope of their scientific review, particularly in their communications with 
researchers.  
For example, when a statistician expressed serious concern about the stated 
scientific accuracy of a CTIMP application, the Vice Chair remarked, ‘this is a 
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MHRA issue, though’. The statistician countered that the MHRA advises on 
research design, but not accuracy. Self-policing itself, the REC as a whole discussed 
how best to express this to the applicants, deciding that they could not say in the 
opinion letter that they disagreed with the scientific design, but instead they would 
ask the researchers to more clearly explain their rationale for the study design, given 
‘concerns’ the REC had. In other instances where I observed that RECs felt the 
science of a proposed research project was not up to par, they policed themselves in 
terms of not having it colour their overall assessment of the application; their 
concerns would be expressed in the opinion letter, but the opinion was to be based 
on a constricted view of the ‘ethics’. There was an ongoing challenge in teasing out 
the ethics from the science. Invariably, the resulting opinion was not a favourable 
one—not surprising in itself when we see that only six applications were granted 
‘favourable’ outright (which equates to five per cent of the total new applications I 
observed).553 The evidence suggests that RECs constrain themselves within their 
own linguistic and operational paradigm or ‘space’, implicitly recognising there is 
another space (i.e. science) that they ought not to enter explicitly. Through these 
constraints or work-arounds, RECs can satisfy themselves that the ethics of an 
application has been fully reviewed to their satisfaction, and in a way that does not 
penetrate too deeply or too explicitly the scientific space. 
Is this an instance of ‘double jeopardy’554 or ‘ethics creep’555? I do not believe so. The 
ethics/science divide is, I submit, an artificial boundary incapable of being rationally 
adhered to in this process of review.556 RECs do not seek to expand their 
                                                     
553 This practice endorses Hunter’s argument that bad science is poor ethics, but not 
necessarily bad ethics, and thus not grounds for rejection alone. See David Hunter, ‘Bad 
Science Equals Poor Not Necessarily Bad Ethics’ in Jennifer Gunning and Soren Holm (eds), 
Ethics, Law and Society: Volume III (Ashgate Publishing 2007). 
554 Stephen Humphreys, Hilary Thomas and Robyn Martin, ‘Science Review in Research 
Ethics Committees: Double Jeopardy?’ (2015) 10 Research Ethics 227. 
555 Kevin Haggerty, ‘Ethics Creep: Governing Social Science Research in the Name of Ethics’ 
(2004) 27 Qualitative Sociology 391. 
556 See also Angus Dawson and Steve Yentis, ‘Contesting the Science/Ethics Distinction in the 
Review of Clinical Research’ (2007) 33 Journal of Medical Ethics 165 (arguing that the 
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jurisdictional control557 over science; if anything, REC members admit hesitancy in 
assessing scientific quality. The process of ethics review necessarily entails a 
verification of the scientific quality.558 The CIOMS Guidelines endorse this position 
in their latest version, which states: ‘Although in some instances scientific review 
precedes ethical review, research ethics committees must always have the 
opportunity to combine scientific and ethical review in order to ensure the social 
value of the research.’559 And, my empirical findings accord with those of other 
researchers who found that scientific issues (e.g. sampling; choice of methods; the 
research question; the measuring instrument; analysis; bias; feasibility; equipoise) 
are frequently raised in opinion letters to researchers and are often considered a 
quality problem by RECs.560 One REC Chair explained the connectivity thusly:  
[An application] might have the best question in the world, it might have 
the best hypothesis, but if the way the research is designed has not been able 
to answer that question, then there is a danger that time, effort, and money 
are all going to be wasted. Participants’ time could be wasted and for me 
that is unethical and shouldn’t be allowed to happen. (P3) 
RECs want to be satisfied the science is sound, and unverified reliance on the 
scientific review alone will not suffice.561 If ethics review is partly an act of faith, 
                                                     
science/ethics distinction is incoherent and that RECs have an ‘obligation’ to consider a 
study’s science). 
557 The phrase ‘jurisdictional control’ can be traced earlier to an analysis of the sociology of 
professions. See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert 
Labor (University of Chicago Press 1988). 
558 This runs against the logic circulating in the EU Clinical Trials Regulation No 536/2014, 
which separates ethics review from the review of the science. Controversially, the latter 
review explicitly includes assessment of the risk-benefit ratio. Unsurprisingly, research 
ethics scholars are critical of the effects the Regulation will have on REC operations and the 
protection of research participants. See e.g. Eugenijus Gefenas and others, ‘Application 
Challenges of the New EU Clinical Trials Regulation’ (2017) 73 European Journal of Clinical 
Pharmacology 795; Carlo Petrini, ‘What is the Role of Ethics Committees after Regulation 
(EU) 536/2014?’ (2016) 42 Journal of Medical Ethics 186. 
559 CIOMS Guidelines (n 16), Guideline 23, Commentary. 
560 Emma Angell and others, ‘An Analysis of Decision Letters by Research Ethics 
Committees: The Ethics/Scientific Quality Boundary Examined’ (2008) 17 BMJ Quality & 
Safety 131. 
561 See also Sarah Edwards, ‘The Role, Remit and Function of the Research Ethics Committee 
– 2. Science and Society: The Scope of Ethics Review’ (2010) 6 Research Ethics Review 58. 
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faith must be undergirded by some reference to reality: science is a significant 
element of that reality. To the extent there is a ‘problem’ of overlap, it is not one of 
ethics creep by RECs or colonisation of other fields, but rather one of a science 
paradigm that is prevalent within RECs (unsurprising when we consider that so 
many members are current or former medics or scientists) and of a failure in 
regulatory frameworks to acknowledge the necessary overlap in review as between 
ethics, science, and law. If RECs are constituted to review, among other things, risk 
to participants, they necessarily must have due regard to the scientific design that 
generates such risk, and not merely regard to the value of the science alone.  
Previewing discussion to come, some REC members suggest that they could focus 
less on the science in their reviews if there was better support for a research design 
service at the nascent stage when researchers are planning their studies. Stewards 
such as Scientific Officers in the Scottish RECs cannot perform this role alone: 
It’s great having Scientific Officers, but it’s, like, how far can we go in to the 
science of the application? And there isn’t an obvious other person to send 
[researchers] to, you know, ‘cause you’re thinking, oh I should…the science 
of this…this hasn’t been designed very well, this study. …they’re 
overlapping, aren’t they, science and the ethics. But you, kind of, feel that 
you can only go so far down a certain line. So it is a great service up here, 
but, you know…there’s always something missing, isn’t there. (P27) 
Ethics and law 
Similarly, many REC members think it necessary to have due regard for relevant 
laws. An ethics opinion is not a legal opinion, but it is certainly informed by the law. 
And for some RECs, such as the Scotland A REC, they must have due regard for 
legislation in their functions.562 Statutory regulations now ascribe very specific 
functions to ethics committees (e.g. the Clinical Trials Regulations 2004, Mental 
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Capacity Act 2005). REC members are aware of the importance of law in 
undertaking their reviews, as a REC Chair told me: 
When I joined my committee back in 2003…when I first applied I was 
turned down, and the reason I was turned down was because one of the 
questions I was asked was whether the ethics committee should consider the 
law or not. And my response was, ‘yes, we should consider the law’. And 
that was the reason I was turned down. It was the wrong answer! At the 
time, the view was ethics committees consider ethics and the law to lawyers. 
Nowadays, that would be the right answer. You cannot undertake an ethical 
review without considering the law, and very many bits of it. But whether 
we reference it an awful lot, I don’t think we do. Other than the Data 
Protection Act… (P3) 
Yet unlike scientific quality, which most REC members feel is important to consider 
and discuss regularly, as the REC Chair above indicated, rarely did RECs explicitly 
consider the law when discussing an application at a meeting, and members did not 
suggest to me that they consulted the law when conducting an ethics review. 
Rather, I observed that RECs encouraged researchers to see it as their (and their 
sponsor’s) responsibility to assure compliance with the law, both when designing 
their study and when conducting the research. REC members agreed that their 
opinion is not a ‘legal opinion’, but they strive to ensure their opinion is intra vires—
providing an ethics opinion that sits within the bounds of legality. Most of my 
interlocutors did not a feel a lawyer was needed on a committee. As a member of 
NREAP told me:  
…the ethics committee is not making a legal judgement – what they’re 
doing is providing advice that’s consistent with the legal framework that 
they’re having to operate within. That’s how I see it. Now, is that operating 
according to a legal framework or not? I think it is. And it’s daft to say the 
law doesn’t have a grip on ethics committees. It does. But it’s not on 
everything. Again, you might say, well practice is around consent, or data 
management, being engaged with the common law as well as statute. I don’t 
think you can escape from it, but you don’t have to be a lawyer to be on an 
ethics committee. (P4) 
The HRA does provide training on relevant areas of the law, such as patient 
confidentiality; data protection; research involving children; the Mental Capacity 
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Act 2005; and the Human Tissue Act 2004. For REC members, that is seen as 
sufficient. After all, they are charged with only having ‘regard to statutory 
provisions for ethical review of particular types of research’.563 Much of the 
assurances about legality provided previously from the R&D (i.e. research 
governance) directorate or R&D offices in England are now from the HRA Approval 
team. REC members do not want to render an opinion that is blatantly illegal, but 
nor do they want to carry the weight of expectations that their opinion is as much 
legal as it is ethical. As with science, the ethics opinion necessarily incorporates 
consideration of the law. The spaces are connected, but not necessarily blended. As 
one member of the Scotland A REC told me, again in liberal overtones: 
I think there is a bit of a tension between training people in, say, the Data 
Protection Act, that you are sort of handing them a mantel, in a sense, and 
empowering them to believe they understand the law and, therefore, are 
making legal decisions around data protection. I think that’s a mistake; that 
it ought to be around the sort of ethical issues involved in handling data and 
whether it’s appropriate, and whether it’s clear and open, and people 
understand what the deal is and it’s a fair choice that’s being offered. (P12) 
The liberal approach manifests itself most clearly when RECs confront grey areas of 
the law. RECs must make a good judgement that is consistent with the law, even if 
they may be unsure of whether their opinion is suitably legal. For example, when a 
REC reviews an application where adults with incapacity might be enrolled in the 
study, a specific checklist is consulted so that members ensure that all relevant 
elements of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 
2000 are observed. The HRA assures RECs the checklist is not meant to be seen as 
rigid; rather, it serves as an aide memoire (for the Lead Reviewer in particular) to 
consider when reviewing an application. 
Other times, RECs are genuinely uncertain of the legal effects of a research study. 
One REC in England I observed, for instance, was uncertain whether researchers 
looking to start a UK-wide Research Database required a separate REC approval in 
                                                     
563 GAfREC (n 1) para 3.2.10. 
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Scotland. In another REC meeting I observed, a REC member queried other 
members what would happen if participants lost capacity during a Phase 1b CTIMP. 
The REC Chair recalled that under The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) 
Regulations 2004, if a patient has capacity to consent at the beginning of the trial, 
that consent continues through for the duration of the trial, unlike for research 
studies under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. But he also expressed some doubt. He 
then looked at me and said, ‘Edward?’ I pointed to my ‘Observer’ name plate, 
reminded the REC of my duty to not speak, and everyone laughed. ‘Oh, twist his 
arm!’, the Chair joked. ‘Okay, I’ll look this up and get back to everyone on what the 
rules are’, he added.  
Members of the Scotland A REC have particular expertise with the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (AWI Act), and those who have served for a long 
time on the committee are critical of the Act’s provisions relating to research. 
Indeed, this REC’s special focus on the Act seemingly enables them to be more 
flexible in their interpretation of the Act than other RECs I observed, who are 
mindful in obeying research-related provisions of legislation such as the Human 
Tissue Act 2004 (only one section of which applies in Scotland). The AWI Act’s 
provisions state that research on an incapacitated adult is forbidden unless: (1) 
research of a similar nature cannot be carried out on an adult who is capable in 
relation to such a decision; and (2) the purpose of the research is to obtain 
knowledge of the causes, diagnosis, treatment, or care of the adult’s incapacity; or 
the effect of any treatment or care given during the adult’s incapacity which relates 
to that incapacity. One of the conditions of such research is that consent must be 
obtained from any guardian or welfare attorney who has power to consent to the 
adult’s participation in research or, where there is no such guardian or welfare 
attorney, from the adult’s nearest relative.564 What does this mean for research 
studies on emergency treatment? A strict interpretation would suggest that it can 
hardly ever be performed. However, Scotland A REC members find that both ethics 
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and law have shades of grey in interpretation, and part of their role is to craft an 
ethics opinion that respects the spirit of the law without taking an overly 
conservative approach: 
People often say, well, of course, ethics is very grey but the law is very black 
and white. And you go, well, no, actually it really isn’t. And I think there 
is…yeah, and I think that’s the problem actually with the AWI thing and 
this absolute requirement for consent. It’s never been tested in court, got no 
idea if there is actually an absolute requirement. No one has ever challenged 
it and said, well, hang on a minute, I wouldn’t normally ask people [for 
consent] who are capable. There is no other way of doing it, this is a really 
important question, it’s an emergency situation, for example. It’s just a 
complete nonsense. I think you could well find that actually a judge might 
say, yeah, you’re right, it's complete nonsense and start to refine it, but 
there’s never been that. So there’s this belief that it’s against the law but 
actually as you know, laws don’t really work like that. (P12) 
For Scotland A REC members, there is a desire to work beyond a literal 
interpretation of the AWI Act’s research provisions so as to acknowledge situations 
where consent is not an absolute requirement; they take a flexible approach in their 
interpretation.565  
In sum, the connections between ethics, law, and science cross-cut across spaces. 
RECs and other actors such as the HRA Assessment Team (who assess governance 
and legal compliance as part of HRA Approval) can receive the same pile (or digital 
file) of documentation, but approach them with differing perspectives. A REC 
strives to focus its assessment on ethical issues, but inevitably there is some 
duplication in the process, as RECs and other bodies move across fluid spaces of 
ethics, law, and science. The research application and its attendant documents 
involve a network of regulatory actors and resources embedded in several 
interconnected and overlapping jurisdictional spaces. These documents form a 
                                                     
565 Such an approach accords not only with the work of Stephens, Atkinson, and Glasner (n 
356), but also with those who plead for RECs to work by ethical principles and pragmatism 
when laws work against public interest and individual patient interest by thwarting 
otherwise ethical research. See e.g. Charles Warlow, ‘Should Research Ethics Committees be 
Observing the Law or Working by Ethical Principles?’ (2005) 1 Research Ethics Review 23. 
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dynamic nexus or focal point that circulate throughout the network. The HRA 
wants its guidance for REC members on relevant legislation (e.g. Mental Capacity 
Act 2005) reflected in the REC opinion letters, but this is more of a quality control 
check than anything else. Adding reference to the law changes the force of an ethics 
opinion letter. As one REC Manager (P15) told me, ‘they’re not just ordinary letters 
that we do. I think of them as legal documents’. If a researcher appeals a REC 
decision, the HRA and another REC can always look at the initial REC and trace 
what has happened, including whether there was inappropriate information or 
opinion given about relevant legislation. In this sense, then, a REC must not only 
always be aware of the legal implications, but also strive to provide adequate 
assurance that a participant’s legal rights are being protected.566 This is a shared 
task; other actors involved in health research regulation also must play a part in 
reaching an outcome that is ethical, scientifically robust, and legal. Despite what the 
GAfREC state, and despite what some critics label a fundamental problem, RECs do 
engage in scientific and, to a lesser degree, legal review. This is seen as a 
responsibility that may be shared with, but not delegated to, other bodies.  
To conclude this theme, RECs are embedded in multiple overlapping, 
interconnecting regulatory spaces. The liminal space of a REC floats within and 
between these spaces. The evidence suggests that in regards to science and the law, 
the REC space is the connecting bridge between these other spaces. In this sense, the 
REC is truly liminal. Rather than viewing these overlapping regulatory spaces as a 
problem, we would be better served to view them as evidence that regulators can 
act as facilitators and stewards—that is, they can help researchers and others 
navigate the various spaces. 
 
                                                     
566 Christopher Roy-Toole, ‘Research Ethics Committees and the Legality of the Protocol: A 
Rejoinder and a Challenge to the Department of Health’ (2009) 5 Research Ethics Review 33. 
241 
 
2.3 Regulators as facilitators and stewards 
A final theme to emerge from the empirical investigation concerns the nature of the 
interactions between RECs and their managing regulators, the variation in 
mechanisms to work through the (ostensibly) twin roles of participant protection 
and research promotion, and the value of regulatory stewardship in guiding 
researchers across the stages of the research lifecycle. It is within this last 
subcategory that liminality once again appears, through the guise of leaders 
shepherding others across thresholds. My findings reinforce Szakolczai’s contention 
that in liminal moments, there is often an independent actor serving as a ‘master of 
ceremonies’ to guide people (and things) through rituals, moments, or periods of 
transition.567 It is here where I wish to bridge to Chapter 7 in drawing out 
implications for health research regulation as it concerns embedding ‘processual 
regulation’ and regulatory stewardship more visibly into regulatory frameworks. 
Aligned interests, complicated interests, and shared responsibilities  
The REC members I interviewed viewed themselves relationally, as key nodes in a 
network of regulatory spaces that, together with other actors, perform tasks that aim 
to mediate between science and society and between the spaces themselves. Vis-à-
vis researchers, members found that only in rare instances would researchers fail to 
appreciate the value of an ethics review, dismissing it as a bureaucratic step that 
they should not have to face.568 Quite often, REC members reported that researchers 
view RECs as a helpful body that can improve their research and ensure risks 
towards participants are minimised. In turn, REC members viewed their committees 
as stewards that could encourage researchers and support them in conducting robust 
and ethical research.  
Members expressed to me that the interests of RECs, researchers, and managing 
regulators are aligned, and the common bond is in facilitating meaningful research. 
                                                     
567 Szakolczai (n 467). 
568 REC members tend to dismiss these researchers as ‘older researchers who don’t fill in our 
IRAS application forms, don’t know how to, because they get their juniors to do it’. They are 
viewed as unchangeable; RECs simply must wait ‘until they retire’ (P23). 
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We should recall that a good number of REC members are or have been researchers 
themselves; they do not sit in a silo, viewing research from only one side. As a REC 
Chair explained it, ‘it’s all tied up’ (P3), and as another Chair added, REC members, 
researchers, and other stakeholders form a common community: ‘I don’t see it as 
two different communities. I see it as one community trying to learn together. We all 
have common aims—researchers, research ethics committees, the public—and that’s 
relevant, meaningful, and valid research. And promoting that I think is a shared 
task’ (P10). Linking this to the above discussion about scientific quality and the 
discussion to follow about research promotion, I found that RECs are confident in 
suggesting changes to applications to support researchers, not just in terms of ethics, 
but also in terms of scientific quality. This is something that the HRA recognises and 
encourages: 
[REC members are] strongly encouraging in terms of what different parts of 
the application could be changed or how things could be done slightly 
better. They’re just good at giving advice to researchers. Often we receive 
feedback from the researchers saying it was really helpful to attend the 
meeting and encouraging. And one thing—we have used the satisfaction 
reports and we added a question to it to say, ‘do you think the REC review 
enhanced your study?’. And we felt that that was quite a brave question for 
us to put on. We weren’t sure what sort of feedback we’d get, but I think 
about 75 per cent are saying, yes, they do feel the REC review enhanced 
their study. So that’s been really good to see as well. (P26) 
While the relationship between RECs and researchers may be seen as healthily 
aligned, as already noted above, the relationship between RECs and the HRA is 
more complicated. As we saw from Chapter 3, for years, RECs, and especially 
LRECs, operated as local fiefdoms. The move towards centralisation with COREC 
and the NRES caused entrenched positions to be taken. One regulator told me that a 
running joke among RECs was that every time NRES put out guidance to RECs, it 
was dismissed as yet ‘another missive from central bunker’ (P1). 
None of the members I interviewed took such a negative view of the HRA, but their 
assessments were certainly mixed. A REC Chair described the relationship today as 
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‘collaborative’ and ‘a team effort’ (P3) with regard to sharing aims. A few other REC 
members I spoke with were generally supportive of the HRA, finding there is a 
‘reasonable open channel’ (P7) of communication with them. However, others I 
spoke with felt that they were ‘completely unaware of what goes on at the HRA’ 
and that constant regulatory changes serve as a distraction. A REC member 
expressed her frustration to me as such: ‘Who do they [the HRA] think they’re 
collaborative with? To me, they send an email to the REC Managers and then the 
REC Managers forward that on. That’s as collaborative as it gets.’ She explained that 
she and other members adopt a cynical approach to dealing with the HRA: 
So I think at the last meeting that you were at, somebody said, ‘what’s this 
for, what’s HRA Approval mean?’ […] And honestly, as a REC member, we 
don’t really get told anything in a way that is digestible, understandable. 
And, to be honest, it wouldn’t actually change how we reviewed the 
documentation anyway. A study is a study regardless. With my researcher’s 
hat on, my real world job, we have to be very aware of what’s going on, and, 
to be honest, it’s not communicated brilliantly. Because all my colleagues, 
our mantra is don’t bother to learn the system because the next time you 
come to put in an application it will be completely different. So let’s go with 
the flow. If we do it wrong they’ll tell us. (P8) 
Similarly, members offered mixed assessments about the ShED exercise and 
Proportionate Review. Focusing on the former, members felt that ShED provides the 
HRA some idea of whether and where RECs are broadly consistent or inconsistent. 
One member described it as ‘very helpful’ for training purposes and improving 
‘everybody’s education’ in terms of what to ‘look for’ in an application (P7). 
Similarly, an HRA regulator explained that they find ShED adds a lot of value in 
highlighting where the differences are across RECs and how they can ‘be addressed 
through further training’ (P17). The same REC member who adopts a cynical 
approach to dealing with the HRA, however, described ShED as ‘absolute dross’:  
Oh God, when we used to get them at [XXX] we used to go, ‘oh, not another 
one, what is the point?’ So we’d do it, and I will tell you this, I always 
realised that I was always leading on it, and then the REC Manager 
admitted to me, ‘oh yes, because I know it will get done properly […], we 
need to make sure it’s done properly so we look good.’ Okay. Honestly, 
everybody’s heart sank every time we got one. So you’d review it, and you 
244 
 
would do it properly, and then several months later you’d get this 
consolidated report of, well, so many committees said this and so many 
committees said that. …And the point of that is? So what is the actual 
answer? […] What is that actually teaching us? I’ve no idea. […] …utter 
nonsense. There must be a better way of doing it. I mean, it’s to ensure 
consistency. […] Maybe it’s useful for them because they can tick a box. 
That’s me being cynical again. But I can’t say I’ve ever learnt anything from 
doing it. (P8) 
The HRA seems to have heard some of these criticisms. A Scientific Officer told me 
that the HRA acknowledges members are ‘quite unenthusiastic about’ the exercise 
(P26), and are working to improve the individual feedback to RECs. The HRA 
believes that individual feedback will provide RECs an ‘incentive to review [the 
ShED application] well and show how good they are, in a way’ (P26). Yet even with 
these improvements, in my chats with members over lunch or coffee breaks at the 
meetings, scepticism seemed to predominate. Two members told me the last time 
their REC received a ShED application, they were assigned as Lead and Second 
Reviewers. Yet they were not told it was a ShED application, much to their 
frustration, and so they ‘wasted three hours on it’, complete with typed up notes. 
‘ShED is about the principles, not the practice. And they never told us! Needless to 
say, the HRA got some choice words from us’, one of the members told me. 
Laughingly, he then added that their REC had not received another ShED 
application since. 
Beyond the coffee chats, I also observed ongoing frustration with the HRA when a 
ShED application appeared before one of the RECs. The Lead Reviewer began her 
presentation by stating, ‘I’ve put at the top of my paper, “Many queries”’. The 
members laughed and nodded in agreement. The Lead Reviewer then added that 
she only realised after the fact that it was not a real application. Reading from her 
typed up HRA Ethical Review Form, which included sections highlighted in yellow 
that warranted particular discussion, she read out a litany of problems. ‘Well done 
so far!’ the REC Manager said as she was copying down each ‘problem’ noted by the 
Lead Reviewer. ‘Are there any other ones?’ she asked. ‘As if that wasn’t enough’, a 
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member retorted. Nevertheless, other members then chipped in to add several more 
concerns. It became quickly evident to me that as part of this ‘game’, the more 
‘ethical problems’ spotted by a REC, the more favourably the HRA would view 
them. A long-standing member, visibly frustrated, stated that previous ShED 
exercises had ‘somewhat normal applications. But I gave up halfway through this 
one because I found it an insult, with a bunch of doctored information’. Other 
members verbally voiced their agreement. In response, the REC Manager explained 
the background to this particular ShED application. Apparently, a private clinical 
trials unit sent this ‘case’ to the HRA’s Director of Operations with a list of all the 
issues to spot. The REC Manager, sympathising with the committee, added that she 
had already explained to the HRA her problems with this kind of ‘spot the error’ 
game, including how it is a poor use of the REC’s meeting time. All REC members 
agreed with this assessment. The long-standing member added: ‘I think the Shared 
thing is a good idea. But this…’, she trailed off, waving her hand over the 
application. The consensus from the members was that the application contained 
too many small issues and not enough ‘meaty ethical issues’. A member opined that 
a lot of the issues in the ShED application had been seen in real applications, but 
they were points more for researchers to pick up and learn from than for REC 
members. The discussion closed with the REC Manager asking the REC if there 
were ‘main ethical issues to flag’. The REC members listed what they considered to 
be the main issues, with the REC Manager taking careful notes.  
For some, then, the HRA is seen as being an active central regulator that is serving 
the interests of the research community, but not always those of the REC 
community. And indeed, the evidence suggests that there is more of an alignment 
between RECs and researchers than between the RECs and their managing 
regulators. Some REC Chairs are unclear who to contact when they have broad 
ethical questions or concerns. REC Managers and Regional Managers are seen as ‘so 
overworked and busy just managing the day job of running committees’ that they 
lack ‘any kind of mental space’ (P11) for addressing broader concerns or issues. 
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Members indicated that they would appreciate more interaction with the HRA to 
understand the context of the next-generation regulations—but only to a certain 
degree. Just as they would appreciate more value for the work they do, members 
also want to retain their independence. A growth in procedural regulation and 
centralisation causes some to worry that they are ‘being told how to think’ (P10); 
achieving a balance between quality ethics review (through consistency and 
standards set by managing regulators) and independent ethics review (freedom for 
an individual and a group to engage in ethics deliberation) is a constant struggle. 
In sum, RECs view themselves as having aligned interests with other actors in 
regulatory spaces. Specifically, they perceive a close bond with researchers, sharing 
the same goal of facilitating meaningful and ethical research. RECs and HRA also 
share this goal, but the relationship is more strained. The HRA is not always 
perceived as working collaboratively with RECs and at times interjects itself into 
their ethics of space, causing tension and political controversy. What it suggests is 
that there is a plurality of regulatory spaces and a relationship between regulatory 
actors that constitutes a space at times filled with tension. But it also suggests that 
there are spaces between spaces. As we will see, there is a stewardship role within 
these spaces that works for Scotland and could work for others. If RECs perceive 
aligned interests, the question remains how they work to operationalise those 
interests. Specifically, how do they work through protection and promotion?   
Working through protection and promotion  
I now return to the driving question of this thesis—that of how RECs act among 
themselves and interact with other actors within the context of ‘next-generation’ 
regulation that aspires to both protect research participants from harm and also 
promote health research through streamlining perceived regulatory barriers. To the 
extent any hypothesis had been formed going into the empirical research, I was 
expecting a number of REC members to express concern on two levels: first, that 
they had noticed a recent change in the regulatory architecture governing their 
practice as ethics reviewers; and second, that this change—an imposition of research 
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promotion—was having detrimental effects on their ability to protect research 
participants. 
As I quickly discovered, REC members expressed a different viewpoint. For them, 
protection and promotion can be a challenge to work through (and may even be 
seen as in ‘tension’), but it is a twin role they recognise and support. Protection and 
promotion is therefore viewed not as a recent development or challenge in light of 
the Care Act 2014 or other statutory regulation, nor is it necessarily ‘felt’ by REC 
members. Rather, statutory regulation instantiating research promotion is a form of 
next-generation regulation that embeds in law what has been occurring in practice 
for a number of years. That it is now embedded in law does not translate into a shift 
in the relationship between RECs and the managing regulators, nor with researchers 
themselves. No member I spoke with was aware of explicit instructions issued by 
the HRA or other managing regulators encouraging or mandating them to look 
towards facilitating research while protecting participants. There is no explicit 
change in approach, and none felt that protection has been or is being sacrificed on 
the altar of a research promotionist agenda. Some even think RECs have become 
more protectionist in certain areas, such as no longer permitting researchers to look 
through patient notes without consent. 
Many view research facilitation as an example of their REC’s independence and a 
key role for them to play, particularly for research that is independent (i.e. not 
funded by major pharmaceutical companies) or may otherwise be neglected (e.g. 
rare disease research). And, the aligned interests between RECs and researchers is 
such that the latter come to appreciate the assistance RECs provide in tweaking their 
application, be it on research design or a more standard ‘ethical’ component such as 
the consent process. The RECs I observed and members I spoke with want 
researchers to come to them with enquiries; they see part of their role as being 
educational for researchers. They want researchers to regard ethics review as a 
favourable experience where RECs offer guidance and suggestions to improve their 
research study, foremost ethically but also scientifically. In this way, if researchers 
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apply to the same REC, the REC would hope researchers take on board the issues 
they raised with them in a previous ‘round’ so that there is a general improvement 
of standards. 
This said, some recognise that the twinned protection and promotion role has 
become more pronounced compared to the previous generation before COREC and 
subsequent efforts to centralise and standardise the Research Ethics Services in the 
UK. If protection was the ‘be-all and end-all’ of RECs in the prior generation, next-
generation regulation encourages all to view research as a civic good that requires 
promotion; part of the HRA’s role is to ‘help facilitate the setup’ of research (P2) and 
provide confidence to the public that good research is being conducted. Research 
promotion is intertwined with a bioeconomic imaginary that sees the UK as a 
favourable jurisdiction in which to conduct research and bring economic benefit to 
the country.569 As an HRA regulator explained: 
I think there’s been a wholesale change if we just focus, say, on ethics 
committees, a change of emphasis… Before when I joined 20 years ago, 
running ethics committees, it was all about protection of the individual 
participant and that was pretty much it. That was the be-all and end-all, 
that’s what we were there to do, protecting the individual participant. […] I 
think over time that’s changed that now we see research as a kind of civic good, 
something that people should have access to. You know, we need to break 
down barriers so that everyone can get access to research, so I think there’s a 
shift between being protected from research and now being given access to 
it because it’s a good thing. Also, our dual mission now is this sort of 
protection of the individual but facilitating ethical research and the whole 
making the UK a good place to do research, so that it comes in a UK PLC 
business kind of focus to what we’re doing, that it’s not about just protecting 
individuals, it’s about making sure that the UK attracts research and money, and 
so that’s the change, and people will have their views about that. I remain 
neutral on that. […] I think I just observe that that’s been that shift, that 
things have become, well, commoditised, I suppose, in a way that research is part of 
UK PLC, attracting research here, doing research, making research easier, less 
bureaucratic, everything else, is all good for the, as I say, UK PLC. So there’s 
                                                     
569 Salman and others (n 411). 
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been a shift there, I think, for ethics committees. Now whether that has been 
reflected in the people who sit on ethics committees… (P1) 
RECs, however, are not consciously aware of any political pressure to realise this 
bioeconomic imaginary. As many are themselves researchers (or former 
researchers), they are cognisant of drivers that exert a strong influence on research 
promotion through streamlining initiatives, such as HRA Approval, the IRAS 
application, and changes in regulations that build the UK’s research capacity and 
seek to harness patient records from the NHS. But they view their role, and the 
HRA’s role in this drive, as but a ‘small piece of a much larger jigsaw’ (P5). Their 
independence is well-preserved and they do not fear a present or future context in 
which they are pressured to ‘skim’ through application materials. ‘I’ll be honest 
with you’, a Scottish REC member confided in me, ‘sometimes I think the UK wants 
to be seen as a biomedical hub and it is becoming a biomedical hub and it’s good 
that it becomes a biomedical hub, but it should never be at the expense of ethics and 
of protecting patients, never’ (P20). This member was adamant that RECs would not 
allow this to happen. 
If the HRA regulator I interviewed above is uncertain whether REC members 
embody this dual mission of protection and promotion, accepting that it is indeed 
present in REC practice, there is also widespread variation regarding how this dual 
mission is to be worked through. As I came to discover, in the absence of specific 
guidance on how to reconcile protection and promotion, members approach this 
twin role through various heuristics. The HRA regulator speculated that protection 
and promotion is an irreconcilable tension, or as one REC member labelled it, ‘an 
inherent contradiction’ (P14), which simply must be acknowledged: 
I think we just acknowledge that tension [between protection and 
promotion]. Well, some people say there’s no tension, other people say 
that’s clearly a tension between those two things and you can’t do both and 
there’s a conflict of interest in doing both. I would love to tell you there was 
some practical way in which we sort of tell people how you balance 
that…like this is how you balance these two competing…but in practice, there 
is no guidance. We don’t have a position on how you do that, we just hold 
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these truths to be self-evident. You’ve got to protect but also you have to promote. 
(P1) 
Yet later, when I pushed for clarification on how the HRA expects to foster an 
environment of protection and promotion if they do not offer practical guidance for 
their ‘satellite’ REC regulators on how to work through this dual role, several 
interlocutors came to view protection and promotion not as twin aims to be 
balanced, but rather, as aims to be treated sequentially, working from protection as a 
primary question that establishes a track record of trust, and only after to address a 
secondary question of research promotion: 
I suppose it’s resolved by you treat[ing] them sequentially. The first one is 
you have to make sure that it’s safe, risk-free and protected, and ethical, and 
if it is, well, you do everything you can to promote and facilitate that. So 
maybe it’s resolved by that sort of sequential looking at it. You’re not holding 
them at the same time, you’re focusing first of all on the protection. Once 
you’re assured of that protection, then we need to make sure that we don’t 
then hang around on giving a decision for six months or something, that our 
processes are…that we can give that full due consideration to the protection 
in the time that we need to do that, but also make sure we deliver those 
opinions sort of rapidly so that that facilitates the research and it can go 
ahead. (P1) 
…the protection is almost you have to get in the right order. We can’t promote 
until we have something to promote and in order to promote it we need to 
make sure that everything is safe, is protected, because otherwise there’s no 
point promoting something that no one has any trust in. […] In order to 
build up trust you need a track record. You can’t just say, trust us, we’re the 
NHS. It doesn’t work. People don't work like that. I would say track record 
is more important. (P2) 
Some REC members reiterated to me that ‘participant safety and the ethics are 
always going to come first’: 
Standing back and looking in, definitely it’s most important to promote 
research. Absolutely. But as a REC member, when that 12-inch thick pile of 
paperwork lands on my desk, my job is, as I see it, to read and evaluate 
those documents to make sure that those studies are scientifically sound or 
ethically sound and, on balance, no harm is being done to any participant. 
That’s the bottom line. Whatever goes on from a management, HRA point of 
view, at that point I don’t actually care. I care about that cancer patient or 
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that healthy volunteer, that’s what’s important and that’s what I’m 
assessing, as I see it, for me. (P8) 
In contrast, on the ground, facing research applications, other REC members saw 
protection and promotion as working together, as ‘all tied up in one’ (P3), with RECs 
and researchers both aiming for high quality research. But how exactly do they 
work together? RECs will not often ‘stop research from happening’ (P3). The vast 
majority of research still goes ahead; indeed, the RECs I observed were extremely 
hesitant in rendering an unfavourable opinion and spent a significant amount of 
meeting time working an application with a number of issues or concerns into a 
provisional opinion. When the RECs did render an unfavourable opinion, they 
aimed to phrase the letter in a positive light, ‘welcoming a resubmission’ to the REC 
provided the researchers took their (suggested) points into account. 
Some see the ‘proportionate’ approach taken by RECs to research applications as a 
mechanism to instantiate research promotion. By treating a ‘simpler’ study with a 
lighter touch than a more ‘complex’ or ‘risky’ study—typically seen as Phase 1 
CTIMPs—RECs are contributing to the research enterprise. Others see protection as 
being ‘balanced’ against promotion—or as one described it, as a ‘halfway house’ 
(P14)—with promotion as a value that can reign in a tendency to go overboard with 
protection: 
The idea that RECs are there to support ethical research for the common 
good, I think, is an appealing principle. It’s one that I certainly support. But 
it’s also one in which you’re trying to balance the interests of the 
vulnerabilities of participants, the resources in healthcare and those kinds of 
thing. RECs definitely do feel very much, and they ought to, as they’re there 
to offer a layer of protection for participants. But they can overstep the mark 
on that I think, and sometimes become too protectionist, or make some kind 
of claim about their own expertise, which oversteps what they can do. (P4) 
Both a REC Chair in England and a Scientific Officer in Scotland opined that balance 
manifests in weighing the rights of the community against the rights of the 
individual, a balance that is difficult to achieve but fundamental to modern 
research. The primary interests will always be participants, but in contrast to the 
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Declaration of Helsinki’s Paragraph 8 precautionary intonation that medical research 
can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research 
participants, sometimes, the REC Chair told me, we must ‘recognise that there’s 
more than one person at this party and that we have to accommodate their interests’ 
(P10); RECs must support research for the benefit of the community. Humorously, 
he added that RECs should promote research as a civic good to the community, to 
‘educate them and say, actually, research is a good thing for you. Research, like 
Guinness, is good for you’ (P10). 
Research applications that are poorly designed disappoint REC members, not 
because it wastes their time, but because the underlying question may be valuable 
and could ‘save some lives’. ‘We want to find a way; we always want to find a way’, 
the Chair of one REC said as they were agonising over the potentially too 
burdensome consent process for patients in an emergency setting. ‘I love the idea of 
this proposal’, a Secondary Reviewer of a CTIMP said at one meeting, who went on 
to express concerns about how the researchers planned to execute it (specifically, the 
changing of dosages). ‘It’s such a shame’, he lamented. ‘The study needs to be done, 
but perhaps in a different way.’ Others agreed. ‘I think it should be done, but 
they’ve got to get the application right.’ Following a face-to-face interaction with the 
research team, the REC reached consensus on a provisional opinion, in which they 
would reiterate their concerns and hope to prod the research team to consequently 
redesign part of the CTIMP. 
Whether through ‘balance’, ‘ranking’ or ‘proportionality’, RECs strive to work 
through protection and promotion, performing a twinned task that aligns their 
interests with that of their managing regulators, researchers, participants, and the 
public at large. The ways in which RECs help researchers navigate through thorny 
regulatory and ethically challenging areas can vary. In Chapter 7, I argue that this is 
in fact a benefit of next-generation regulation. Law has provided sanctioned spaces 
in which RECs and other actors can engage in ‘regulatory play’, with more 
flexibility to work through challenges and interact with others. Before I turn to this 
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argument, however, in the final part of this theme, I want to further suggest that 
actors within and connected to RECs serve as ‘stewards’ who help guide researchers 
(as well as sponsors), and their protocols, across stages of the research lifecycle.  
Regulatory stewardship  
Regulatory stewardship can be defined as the prudent guidance of one or more 
actors across regulatory thresholds—without which there is risk of impairment or 
harm—with a view to collective betterment.570 In this thesis I have already hinted at 
the importance ascribed to specific actors within regulatory spaces, and specifically 
those actors connected with RECs. Regulatory stewardship draws attention to more 
than the REC; it highlights the role actors within or connected to them play in 
helping researchers, sponsors, and REC members navigate difficult regulatory 
spaces and improve the overall quality of research. In addition to the HRA, certain 
REC actors, namely the REC Chair, REC Manager and Scientific Officer (as well as 
the REC as a unitary actor), play a critical role in assisting researchers (and 
sponsors) navigate the demands of putting an application together—they are 
regulatory stewards that help researchers cross thresholds—serving as ‘ethical 
research promoters’.  
How does regulatory stewardship manifest in the operations of regulatory actors? 
An HRA regulator provided me with early insight in describing that Authority’s 
vision for improving regulatory pathways, in part by providing support and 
working in partnership with other actors:  
…ethics committees 90 something per cent of the time say yes to research, so 
actually that’s an arbitrary milestone and actually it’s unhelpful because 
people are running towards it, putting in poor quality [research], which 
means that further downstream there are blockages. So what we want to do 
is try and allow there to be less [sic] blockages downstream by improving 
                                                     
570 See Graeme Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship in Health Research: 
Making the Invisible Visible?’ Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (in press). Parts of 
this chapter’s subsection on regulatory stewardship are adapted from the article, of which I 
am a co-author. 
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the quality upstream and by providing support upstream and along the way 
we should be able to help with that.  
[…] 
Medical research is hard. We see 6,000 applications a year for medical 
research; it is hard, and we need to be helping these people realise their 
ideas rather than just being what’s seen as a bureaucratic block at the 
beginning of something that is a very long process. Also, I guess there’s the 
obligation there again not to waste money by blocking things, not to stop 
things because they are illegal. Obviously we can't let them go through, but 
it’s providing the support to enable people to realise their goals on an 
ongoing basis. But again, I think it’s working in partnership with other 
people. (P2) 
The HRA’s role as a regulatory steward is manifest at varying levels. At a high level, 
there is guidance on the HRA website for researchers, in terms of best practices, 
policies, and regulations. HRA interlocutors told me they aim to provide researchers 
and sponsors with as much information as they can upfront so that when an 
application comes to the REC, it is as good as it can be at that point in time. At a 
more granular level, the HRA in the past has, on an interim basis, created 
‘Application Managers’, who help researchers navigate through complex cases that 
straddle regulatory regimes, such as those involving multiple domains (e.g. data, 
tissue, and devices), and piloted an ‘Ethics Officer’ role that was referenced in 
Chapter 3,571 and that I will discuss briefly below. In Chapter 7, I argue that in 
embedding regulatory stewardship into the regulatory framework, there is room for 
the HRA to improve their granular practices. 
Regulatory stewardship is manifest in the REC itself. REC members, individually 
and as a group, see themselves as providing a kind of upstream pastoral support to 
researchers. They serve to protect the rights, interests, and welfare of research 
participants, but equally, they feel as though they serve to promote ethical research 
by working with researchers. RECs are removed from the ‘real happening’ of 
research, but in any event, their role is not to monitor the day-to-day practice of 
                                                     
571 Chapter 3 (n 248). 
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research. There is a distinction to make here between a steward and a policeperson. 
A policeperson monitors, enforces, and sanctions; a steward helps others navigate 
terrain and inculcates values and principles that are embodied and instantiated in 
everyday practices.572 A REC’s role is to evaluate the ethical acceptability of a 
research study and to help researchers (and to some degree, sponsors) navigate 
complex regulatory terrain, insofar as that regulation is of an ethical nature, though 
we have seen that this necessarily overlaps with science and law. It is also a REC’s 
role to encourage researchers to comply with approprate regulatory and 
professional standards in the way they conduct themselves as researchers. 
Researchers are in a position to inform RECs of the latest trends and issues in 
research, as well as to report back to them their experiences in working through 
ethics reviews and other regulatory processes. Viewed together, this dynamic is 
mutually reinforcing.  
To be clear, the stewardship practised by REC members is not necessarily direct and 
deliberate (and indeed RECs cannot write an application or protocol for a 
researcher), but through nudges, comments, and responses to queries, members 
help assuage or even persuade research applicants to improve the quality of their 
research design or work around a false roadblock in law (e.g. a misinterpretation 
that data protection law or adults with incapacity law is stricter than it really is 
regarding research). Even though a few REC members and Managers were hesitant 
to view RECs as promoting research or serving as advisors to researchers (‘we’re not 
there to spoon-feed the researchers on how to do their job’, one Manager told me), 
in practice, across all five RECs I observed instances of a stewardship function at 
every meeting. From this I gathered that for some members, research promotion is 
an unconscious role that is wrapped up in the process of their review. Ethics review 
is not a static event of compliance with a checklist of standards (though three 
members complained that it can feel as such with the HRA Ethical Review Form). 
Instead, it is a dynamic process whereby researchers, the application, and protocol 
                                                     
572 Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship’ (n 570). 
256 
 
are carried across thresholds by various actors, including the REC, who suggest 
‘better ways’ to devise a study and thereby shepherd it forward.  
A few examples from my observations illustrate this finding. Scotland A REC 
members remind researchers that if they ask participants for consent to follow-up 
their medical records, it allows them five years of follow-up without any additional 
cost. Not infrequently, other RECs offer suggestions to improve recruitment 
numbers for a study, pleasantly surprising the attending researchers. ‘Not a 
question, but a suggestion’, a statistician remarked to one group of researchers. 
‘Speak with a local statistician and mention “case control” to them. What you’re 
doing isn’t wrong, but you may be able to get more out of what you’re doing.’ 
During a face-to-face encounter with a researcher proposing a substantial 
amendment to a genetic research study, the researcher explained that her original 
protocol and PIS stated that all data related to the participant would be destroyed if 
the participant chose to withdraw. A REC member intervened at this point and 
encouraged the researcher to think about modifying the documents, should she 
want to retain the data collected and analysed up to the point of withdrawal. The 
researcher, unaware of this possibility, thanked the REC member for this 
suggestion, but then wondered whether this approach would properly constitute 
withdrawal and would respect the participants. The REC Chair replied that ‘there’s 
no clear answer’ but thought withdrawal would be unlikely anyway. He 
encouraged the researcher to ‘think about it’. 
Face-to-face interactions with researchers also illustrate this stewardship role. A 
Scotland A REC member relayed a story about the fluid ontological boundary 
between ‘research’ and ‘audit’ in contrast to its strict regulatory boundary: 
We had one very interesting study from [England] that was […] wanting to 
study care homes, and it was just going to be…it was a sociological study, 
and of course in the care homes were the people with incapacity. And we 
advised them that in Scotland, if they did this as an audit of what was going 
on in care homes, it would be very appropriate to go ahead. If they did it as 
research, then they couldn’t look at patients in the care home who 
had…lacked capacity, because what they were trying to study had nothing 
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to do with their disease. It took about four letters to the committee, to the 
researchers. So we gave them a solution. All they insisted on saying was, 
yes, they agree, we’ll do this as an audit on one care home in Scotland, but 
because in their perception it had to be seen as being research, to get the 
funding or to get validated or whatever it was down south, they didn’t 
grasp that we were trying to open up the way to let them do it, it wasn’t 
actually going to involve any interventions in patients that were in the care 
home. But they just couldn’t actually do it without getting consent from 
everyone if they did it as a research study. (P18) 
REC members are encouraging of regulatory stewardship at different levels, from 
the more complex cases involving interpretations of law, to simpler instances of 
ensuring an IRAS application is correctly filled in. One member considered it useful 
to ‘triage’ the application before it comes to the REC (perhaps in coordination with 
sponsors or R&D offices), looking at mundane issues such as grammar but also 
regulatory issues. This suggests a need for stewardship at an earlier stage of 
research design and approval and, indeed, throughout the research lifecycle. Better 
triaged applications would lead to higher quality, more error-free applications at 
REC meetings, allowing RECs to focus their time on substantive issues. Instances of 
why this would be useful were observed in REC meetings. During one, the REC 
Manager explained to the REC that the researcher ticked a certain box in the IRAS 
project filter, which opens up certain questions for the IRAS ethics application form. 
Had the researcher clicked ‘basic science’ instead, it would have been much clearer 
for everyone when it came to performing the ethics review. The REC Manager 
further explained the application was transferred from one HRA Regional Office to 
another, which caused it to fall through the cracks. Neither a REC Manager nor 
Regional Manager went back to the researcher to support her before she submitted 
the application, and the application was accepted in the early round of the 
validation process. ‘It has snuck through validation, unfortunately’, the REC Chair 
sighed. 
Though the REC itself can serve as steward, regulatory stewardship is evidenced 
most clearly in the work of actors in greater positions of authority or influence 
within a committee, namely Scientific Officers and the REC Chair and Manager, all 
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of whom have closer contact with researchers. Between the monthly full committee 
meetings, REC Chairs receive a volume of correspondence from researchers asking 
for advice. REC Chairs told me they are happy to provide support because ‘it helps 
to create the right environment’ and achieves the shared end goal of ‘high quality 
good research that’s going to make a difference to people’s lives’ (P3). Through this 
support service, REC Chairs see themselves as ‘…promoting research. I think the 
committee, as the committee’s representative, I am promoting research in the UK 
and encouraging it, and trying to get it started as quickly as possible’ (P3). Similarly, 
REC Managers see their role as stewarding researchers through the application 
process: 
I’m here to try and help the researcher really to make sure that their 
information gets put across as well as possible. […] Part of my role is almost 
trying to pre-empt the questions that the committee will be raising as well. 
So, something obvious that’s missing and I know the committee will look 
for, I can ask the researcher beforehand and that’s to try and facilitate to try 
and get the application through for them as smoothly as possible. (P25) 
Throughout my year-long observations and interviews, the four Scientific Officers 
in Scotland’s Research Ethics Service were universally praised for their role in 
providing educational and regulatory support.573 The CSO created the position in 
2008 in response to the 2004 Lord Warner Report’s recommendation.574 Appointing 
one Scientific Officer in each of Scotland’s four main regions was seen as a way to: 1) 
have Scottish RECs conform to national standards, rather than local Health Board 
standards; 2) allow for Scottish RECs to better link with the CSO to ensure best 
practices were disseminated and ensure RECs were using the same documentation, 
databases, rules, and guidelines; and 3) help researchers get their applications 
through more efficiently and make Scotland an attractive destination in the UK to 
conduct research. Scientific Officers sit side-by-side with REC Managers on a daily 
basis, which unlike in England, allows for constant interaction and more efficient 
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England who are submitting applications to an English REC to contact a Scientific Officer for 
advice. 
574 Lord Warner Report (n 232). 
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communication with researchers and sponsors. Their side-by-side interaction with 
RECs also helps prevent RECs from getting bogged down in unnecessary details: 
…we [Scientific Officers] are appreciated by the committees – that we can 
kind of just protect them from just getting bogged down with too many 
queries and things. Where we absolutely come into our own is all the 
queries at the pre-application stage are completely directed towards us and 
nothing goes through to the committee members or Chairs at that stage. 
And I think that makes a big difference. (P24) 
Scientific Officers provide researchers and sponsors with guidance and support on a 
variety of matters, including compliance with correct documentation and 
conformity with legal requirements, all of which could impact the success of their 
ethics application and their research as a whole. At the same time, Scientific Officers 
help guide REC members in evaluating research applications, particularly when it 
comes to understanding the regulatory context of a given application: 
….the other part was making clear that the committees are not just there to 
be a gatekeeper, but they’re also there to try and facilitate research. So we 
should be talking to...the Scientific Officers should be talking to researchers 
about how to do research, especially to sponsors about what the committee 
expects to see, and also to the members to explain that if you get a difficult 
application or an application that mentions previous ones, we should be 
helping the committee understand what’s going on with applications, and 
keeping committees, committee members up to date with training. (P16) 
Scientific Officers not only help researchers with the ethics component of their 
application; they can also help guide them to other regulatory steps needed for 
approval: 
The other thing is to remind [researchers] that ethics isn’t the be all and end 
all. You’re going to need R&D approval; that’s going to take roughly this 
amount of time. And part of our job, which I might come back to, is because 
we have interactions with those people, we give researchers some guidance. 
[…] So if I give advice to somebody, they might say, it’s nothing to do with 
ethics. And so I’m not doing this from an ethics point of view, I’m doing this 
as it facilitates research point of view, because I know that R&D will ask for 
this. […] [Researchers] forget that part of [our] job is a facilitatory role and 




A Scientific Officer (P24) explained that if RECs see patterns of a local university 
submitting applications that ‘aren’t up to scratch for different reasons’, then they 
look to identify what the specific problem areas are and work with the university to 
remedy them for improved future applications. Another Scientific Officer (P27) 
distinguished the REC’s task of ethics review (which, in her mind, is focused more 
on compliance with standards) from the ‘office’ in which she sits, which focuses 
more on science and ethics advice service, with researchers viewed as ‘clients’:  
There’s the committee and there’s the office. And I think in the office we 
perceive the applicant, as it were, like our clients. So you do all that you can 
to help them get through the process so that you’re not blocking that 
application. So we’re quite…we’re trying to be very friendly and, you know, 
trying to tell them the information that they need to give us. But sometimes 
it is a bit like Chinese…you know…well not quite Chinese whispers, but, 
you know, you’re trying to help them through the process so we have that 
strong feeling. (P27) 
England has not gone the route of Scientific Officers, but the HRA has been equally 
keen to support researchers. Unlike Scotland, however, embedding regulatory 
stewardship within a specific actor has presented challenges. As explained to me by 
an HRA regulator, the HRA conducted an ‘Ethics Officer’ pilot as a potential avenue 
for supporting researchers through the application stage by providing them with 
advice on preparing for attendance at the REC meeting following submission of 
their application. According to the regulator, it was not a success. REC Chairs, who 
took the lead as Ethics Officers, attended other REC meetings as supporters of 
researchers. REC members apparently felt uneasy or even threatened by having an 
‘outsider’ REC Chair attend their meeting and comment on an application, which 
they felt was their responsibility (and considering the above discussion about black 
boxes between RECs and an ethics of space, we come to understand why). More 
recently, the HRA contemplated rolling out a ‘REC Application Review and Advice 
Service’ that encouraged REC Managers to conduct an ‘enhanced check’ on an 
application submitted to their REC. This would involve looking at the study 
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documents and thinking about potential administrative issues that need fixing. One 
HRA regulator explained that an example would be if a REC Manager  
…knew that their committee were likely to ask for a certain aspect of the 
information sheet to be changed, […] they would pick that up with the 
applicant and say you’re likely to be asked to change this, you can either 
change it now before the meeting, but you may still be asked to make extra 
changes after the meeting depending on what the committee say in their 
review. (P26) 
Of course, this role differs from what Scientific Officers do, as the latter also provide 
help on matters of scientific design and legal interpretation. A further twist is that 
with the introduction of HRA Approval in England, HRA Assessors are picking up 
administrative discrepancies and inconsistencies as well. If, for example, the 
protocol said one thing but it was described differently in the PIS, both HRA 
Assessors and REC Managers would be picking this up. Due to the duplication 
‘between the two teams’ (P26) and the concern that it could cause more confusion 
for applicants in terms of being contacted by two different people for two sets of 
issues, the HRA has scaled back on REC Managers conducting enhanced checks, 
such that this is only now done for phase I studies in healthy volunteers, which are 
not eligible for HRA Approval and thus not looked at by an HRA Assessor. 
Regardless, my impression is that HRA Approval is more of a ‘compliance check’ 
process than an opportunity for stewardship whereby actors within the HRA not 
only remove barriers, but also help facilitate better research. Stewardship, to the 
extent it operates currently within the HRA, will be found in other processes carried 
out by other actors. 
To this end, the HRA now encourages: 1) researchers to consult the HRA’s online 
decisional ‘toolkits’; 2) researchers to email queries to HRA staff; and 3) REC 
Managers to look carefully at the research applications before the REC meetings and 
‘think about what ethical guidance they might want to point their committees in the 
direction of’ before the meeting (P26). The HRA also wants to ‘empower’ REC 
Managers to think about what laws and ethical guidance the REC might want to 
take into consideration when reviewing applications so that the discussion is 
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‘focused more on the ethical issues’ (P26) and so that in the opinion letters, there is 
more explicit reference to guidance to explain the REC’s reasons for why they are 
requesting changes to the application or rendering a provisional or unfavourable 
opinion.  
Whether this is a role that REC Managers can successfully take on, given their 
competing demands, remains to be seen. The Scientific Officers I spoke with 
contrasted their roles to REC Managers on numerous grounds, including the 
educational differences between them. Scientific Officers have tended to hold PhDs 
in a science discipline; REC Managers may or may not hold university 
undergraduate degrees. Because REC Managers are not scientifically trained, they 
may be unable to read an application as expertly to understand the ethical, 
scientific, and legal issues at play. Regardless of these challenges in England, the 
HRA is committed to providing a robust ethics guidance and support service to 
researchers. As I will argue in the next chapter, however, more can be done to 
embed regulatory stewardship in the health research regulatory framework, and the 
HRA should take a leading role here. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Informed by anthropology of regulation, this chapter has empirically examined the 
ways in which practices, people, and entities are structured in and by health 
research regulation, and vice versa. I set out to answer the research questions posed 
in Part I by presenting qualitative research findings undergirded by regulatory 
theory and liminality. The findings reveal a critical understanding of REC practices 
and the form and function of health research regulation. The findings also reveal a 
processual and experiential understanding of RECs and the ways in which they 
affect and are affected by regulation.  
I had entered my year of empirical research with the expectation that I would be 
exploring how RECs experience and react to changes in statutory regulation. 
Contrary to what I was expecting, and critically for the purposes of this thesis, the 
263 
 
empirical data suggest that modifications to the health research regulatory space at 
the levels of statutory law and central regulatory authorities have not so much 
‘trickled down’ to the day-to-day practices of RECs, as the day-to-day practices have 
long reflected what has only recently been enacted in law.575 RECs, managing 
regulators, and researchers share a common goal of promoting research that is safe 
and of high quality. Actors in these regulatory spaces carry similar interests and 
shared responsibilities, helping each other to cross boundaries and deal with major 
moments of transition in the research lifecycle. However, a concern that emerges 
from the research, and which I address in Chapter 7, is that the respective roles, 
competencies, and influences among the actors are not always clear, and the 
regulatory conversations are sporadic and at times weak between regulators, 
though relatively strong between regulators and regulatees. Consequently, spaces 
can appear within the health research regulatory space where hazards may occur. 
In the next chapter, I suggest a normative model of what a new regulatory 
framework, informed by these empirical findings, ought to look like. The empirical 
data suggest that RECs’ knowledge control and gatekeeping activities have the 
potential to reach beyond the ex ante stage. The hybrid protectionist-promotionist 
model that operates in practice fosters an environment that both protects research 
participants and also facilitates responsible health research in the country through 
proportionate regulation and coordinated alignment of ethics review and other 
regulatory processes. This can be operationalised not only at the initial stage(s) of 
the research lifecycle, at the moment of research design and initial application, but 
also, I will argue, throughout the lifecycle in partnership with other regulatory 
actors where ongoing opportunities for ‘regulatory play’ can emerge. 
                                                     
575 What remains unknown (and outwith the scope of this thesis and its methodology) is 
whether earlier regulations, such as the RCP Guidance dating back to 1984, influenced REC 
practices such that REC members transformed from (to use an extreme scenario) 
conservative paternalists to liberal facilitators of ethical health research. 
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Thus, in Chapter 7, I take up Veatch’s important observation about the failure of 
health research regulation to offer a theory of what should happen when a proposed 
research project involves a conflict of principles,576 arguing that, in the absence of an 
expressed theory of how these two objectives should be achieved, a theory (or 
decision framework) should be crafted that may not invariably hinge on balance. In 
so doing, I address arguments from scholars such as Whitney, who argue that there 
are ‘two major moral considerations in research with human subjects’ that ethics 
committees must ‘balance’: the rights and welfare of research subjects and the 
‘shared interest in better treatments for disease’.577  As I have said, ‘balance’ is not 
necessarily the appropriate mechanism and indeed, the findings demonstrate that 
REC members and regulators are attuned to other possibilities. If we envision RECs 
as evaluating research studies in stages and acting as gatekeepers and stewards at 
several thresholds, how can health research regulation, including at the level of legal 
architecture, take up the insights from liminality to provide a suitable space to 
capture these stages of dual commitment and realms of possibility? How might a 
regulatory framework, that legally must be ‘proportionate’,578 enable regulatory 
stewards to take charge in accommodating potential harms and maximising 
research outcomes? And how can law create a regulatory space within which there 
is more room to protect and promote, a space for more epistemic latitude—a realm 
of possibility—for RECs to ‘roam in’ and experiment together with other actors, 
including those who may have cross-cutting motives? We now turn to see how the 
empirical findings from an anthropology of regulation may help build an evidence-
based regulatory framework.
                                                     
576 Veatch, ‘Ranking, Balancing, or Simultaneity’ (n 118). 
577 Whitney, Balanced Ethics Review (n 89) vii. 




Chapter 7  
The liminality of RECs—charting a framework 
for regulatory stewardship 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined the ways in which actors—particularly RECs—
are structured in and by health research regulation, and vice versa. I set out to 
answer the research questions posed in Part I by presenting qualitative research 
findings that are set within an anthropology of regulation methodology 
undergirded by regulatory theory and liminality. The findings reveal a critical 
understanding of REC practices and the form and function of health research 
regulation. The findings also reveal a processual and experiential understanding of 
REC practices and the ways in which they affect and are affected by regulation. 
Research ethics review is an essential component of health research regulation and 
the ethics review system overall appears to be viewed favourably, at least in 
comparison to previous decades. At the same time, though, the evidence suggests 
that several regulatory components can be refined. 
Having made this theoretical and empirical contribution, I now want to chart the 
possible ways in which we might begin to answer the broader “so what?” question 
that Chapter 6 engenders. In this chapter, then, I unpack further the significance of 
liminality of RECs and the ability of actors within the health research regulatory 
space to serve as ‘regulatory stewards’. I do so by taking up the normative 
dimension of anthropology of regulation, suggesting a normative model of what a 
regulatory framework for health research oversight ought to look like if it were to 
incorporate the findings from this empirical investigation. This would include 
explicit endorsement of regulatory stewardship and a charting of how protection 
and promotion can and should work together. To be clear, I focus only on 
suggestions that relate to my research questions and the empirical findings; I do not 
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address matters such as how to improve consistency within and across RECs, 
Proportionate Review, consent forms and PISs, professionalisation of REC members, 
or patient and public involvement (PPI). These issues are important but not directly 
related to the concerns that speak to the overall original contribution of this thesis, 
namely suggesting a regulatory framework that encourages a greater recognition of 
liminality, as expressed through regulatory stewardship.  
This proposed framework has application at two levels, which can be seen as both 
top-down and bottom-up: 1) the government and managing regulators (e.g. 
Department of Health, HRA, CSO), and 2) the REC, ipsilateral regulators (e.g. 
MHRA, HTA), and regulatees (e.g. researchers, sponsors, institutions). As the 
evidence in Chapter 6 indicates, RECs are embedded in multiple overlapping, 
interconnecting regulatory spaces, yet their roles and the roles of other actors are 
not always manifest in regulation. Further, the regulatory conversations between 
regulators, namely between RECs and the HRA, can be sporadic and at times 
weakly effective as compared to the regulatory conversations between regulators 
and regulatees (here, being RECs and researchers). This can cause disconnected 
spaces to appear within a given regulatory space where hazards may occur. A 
reformulated framework could work to improve regulatory conversations between 
actors, provide ongoing opportunities for ‘regulatory play’ to emerge, and shift the 
burden and emphasis away from more procedural work and towards flexibility and 
experimentation in ethics review. What I suggest, in other words, is a refinement of 
the extant framework, not wholesale change. Nonetheless, this is a refinement that 
can be worth exploring to reveal the full range and weight of the impact of RECs 
within and throughout regulatory practices in health research regulation. 
In what follows, first, I expand on the significance of the liminality of RECs and 
unpack the concept of regulatory stewardship. I argue that the latter serves as a 
manifestation of liminality and deserves greater instantiation in regulation. I draw 
on extant examples within the UK’s Research Ethics Services that demonstrate how 
regulatory stewardship can play a vital role for researchers in navigating complex 
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regulatory terrain. Then, I return to Veatch’s reminder of the need to offer a theory 
of what should happen when a proposed research project involves a conflict of 
principles or values—in this context, the potential for protection versus promotion. I 
then conclude with a proposal for a more processual regulatory framework that 
enables regulatory stewards to assist in accommodating potential harms and 
maximising research outcomes, and that creates a regulatory space within which 
there is more room for regulators to protect and promote, including room to 
experiment in working through these principles together with other actors. 
7.2 The liminality of RECs—regulatory stewardship 
The evidence from the empirical research indicates that ethics review is less an 
administrative process, where ethical considerations of proposed research end once 
a favourable opinion is given, than it is a process of ongoing support, dialogue, and 
education. If we accept Farsides’s claim that ‘[t]he goal of an ethics committee is to 
facilitate ethically sound practice, and to encourage researchers to honour their 
moral responsibilities towards participants’,579 we must further accept that this 
cannot be adequately accomplished within a regulatory framework that charges 
ethics committees to engage merely in regulatory verification of ethical standards, 
scientific value, and accordance with law.  
Facilitation of ethically sound practice and inculcation of moral responsibilities in 
researchers necessitates a framework of regulatory stewardship (defined as the 
prudent guidance of one or more actors across regulatory thresholds—without 
which there is risk of impairment or harm—with a view to collective betterment580), 
whereby a range of actors, including RECs, work with researchers and others not 
just to achieve regulatory compliance, but also to work through stages in the research 
lifecycle, all the while instilling ethical norms of good scientific conduct. Thus, I 
claim stewardship is a stand-alone regulatory role and collective responsibility that 
                                                     
579 Calliope (Bobbie) Farsides, ‘The Ethics of Clinical Research’ in Eckstein (ed), Manual (n 96) 
13. 
580 See Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship’ (n 570).  
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should be assumed by different actors at multiple stages. For their part, RECs 
should have an expanded role to play in the research lifecycle, but as I will discuss, 
they should not cover each and every stage. As regulatory stewardship permeates 
health research, all actors should view each other as crucial links in a chain that 
moves ethical research from design to approval to recruitment and action, and 
ultimately, to health improvement. With different actors embodying roles at 
different stages, connected by communicative channels that allow for a ‘passing of 
the mantle’, stewardship helps us think differently about what is going in research 
and how each link connects to the other. 
Chapter 6 illustrated in several ways how RECs are liminal actors. Relative to each 
other and to publics, RECs are black boxes, existing in multiple spaces, despite a 
surprising degree of group homogeneity in approach and rituals. RECs engage in 
various mechanisms to evaluate research applications (e.g. balance, ranking, 
negotiation) that manifest themselves at a lower level of abstraction—‘good research 
design’, ‘competent investigator’, ‘favourable balance of harm and benefit’, 
‘adequate informed consent’—which in turn yield ‘ethical’ judgements. Embodying 
a liberal approach that aims to eschew a paternalistic stance towards participants, 
RECs adopt a pragmatic ethics that is informed by members’ intuition, feeling, and 
experience.  
RECs do not fit the mould of a classic risk-based regulator; for example, we saw that 
they are also attuned to potential burdens as well as issues surrounding scientific 
design and law. Returning to the discussion first opened in Chapter 2, we saw that 
RECs’ operative ethical deliberation is the facilitation of a context in which a fair 
choice is offered to participants whereby they can decide whether to participate in a 
study that presents ethically acceptable risks and burdens and is likely to answer, or 
at least contribute to, the research question it purports to address. Members adopt 
rituals in undertaking the process of ethics review that work best for them as 
individuals and as a committee. Through teamwork and consensus, they render an 
opinion that mediates the demands of science and society and achieves a kind of 
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optimisation of the similarly appreciated values of protection and promotion. The 
opinion allows a research protocol to transition ‘from a mere proposition of involvement 
with participants to an actual plan of action with participants. This implicates a range of 
actors, and importantly, it further transforms individuals (be they healthy 
“volunteers” or patients) into active research participants’.581 
Given the fluid jurisdiction between ethics, science, and law, and given their active 
role in steering behaviour, what kind of regulators are RECs? Can we accurately 
label them ‘ethics committees’? Earlier in this thesis, I suggested that as RECs 
become institutionalised and professionalised, acting as multi-faceted and 
multidisciplinary micro-regulators of health research (concerned with e.g. 
minimising risks, ensuring scientific and social value), and as more national and 
international regulations come into force that impact health research, RECs might be 
expected to act more as ‘health research regulatory committees’. Indeed, the 
evidence from my empirical research suggests that RECs are not mere consultation 
groups. They do certainly engage in some form of ethics deliberation and 
discussion, but much more regulatory work is also being performed alongside other 
actors, including researchers. ‘Health research regulatory committees’ may well be a 
more accurate name to reflect what they do.582 And, if we do treat RECs more as 
health research regulatory committees, we would be well served to rethink their 
roles and the regulatory frameworks that govern them to better incorporate the 
regulatory processes they undertake. 
Returning to a quote that largely inspired my research questions, what can we make 
of Beyleveld’s claim that a ‘dog cannot serve two masters, and the role of RECs, in 
fact, is solely to try to prevent unethical research. The facilitation of research is the 
role of other bodies’?583 Let us recall that liminality draws our attention to how 
                                                     
581 Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra and others, ‘Reconfiguring Social Value in Health Research 
Through the Lens of Liminality’ (2016) 31 Bioethics 87, 89 (emphasis in original). 
582 See also McGuinness (n 102) 695 (‘RECs act as regulatory authorities with concerns 
beyond those of ethical deliberation. I argue that RECs are regulatory rather than advisory’). 
583 Beyleveld (n 111) 73. 
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actors experience and react to change, and that the evidence from Chapter 6 
suggests that, if anything, recent changes in the law reflect already-existing practices 
of RECs. RECs, managing regulators, and researchers share a common and desired 
goal of promoting research that is safe and of high quality.584 The relationship 
between RECs, researchers, and participants cannot, I submit, be likened to master-
dog. Actors in these regulatory spaces constitute one ‘species’ (albeit of varying 
familial nodes) that carry similar interests and shared responsibilities, helping each 
other to cross boundaries and deal with major moments of transition in the research 
lifecycle. My investigation has not indicated that RECs are guided by a single 
principle of participant protection. Research promotion is also very much present 
and at play—and welcomed—in their functions. 
As we saw, regulators can have a problematic relationship between each other, 
much more so than between regulators and regulatees. The HRA strives to chart a 
regulatory environment that enables researchers to bring a research study to light in 
a smooth and efficient manner; a critical component of this charting involves 
interactions with RECs. The relationship between the HRA and RECs can be 
politically fraught, though, drawing RECs into struggles for power with their 
managing regulatory authority. There is a strong desire by RECs, including REC 
Chairs and Managers, to preserve the sanctity of their black box and ethics of space. 
RECs simultaneously want more guidance from the HRA on regulatory 
developments such as HRA Approval and limited imposition on their everyday 
workings. That possible imposition of power is exemplified in the HRA’s Ethical 
Review Form, which influences the processes of ethics review. The ‘balance’ 
managing regulators must achieve between sound coordination and overreaching 
diktat is a difficult one, particularly in a country with devolved administrations. The 
relatively limited communication channels with the HRA generally are viewed not 
as problematic per se; indeed they may be beneficial. The HRA sees itself as 
                                                     
584 Such a finding accords with Hedgecoe’s empirical research, which found that NHS RECs 
can proactively promote research. See Hedgecoe, ‘Research Ethics Review’ (n 116). 
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providing a steering (i.e. catalysing), not controlling role, for RECs. For many REC 
members, that relatively light-touch approach is a value that reinforces the RECs’ 
independence (or phrased somewhat differently, preserves their autonomy) and 
ability to reach decisions without fear of external pressure or loss of power over 
their domains of control.  
More profoundly, the interactions between RECs and their managing regulators 
suggest that something other than ‘decentred’ regulation is occurring. There is 
evidence of increasingly ‘centred’ regulation where the state, through the HRA, 
CSO, and other authorities, is exercising growing influence, but not necessarily 
control. There is also evidence that, as Scott and others have written about regarding 
regulatory spaces,585 the resources relevant to holding regulatory power and 
exercising capacities in human subjects research are dispersed. Never have the 
resources in this space been restricted to formal, state authority derived from 
legislation. Historically, and continuing through the present, those resources have 
included expertise and organisational capacities shared between state and non-state 
bodies, including sponsors and funders.  
RECs do serve to control access to the potentiality of research involving humans, 
but controlled access through their ‘event licensing’ system is buttressed by a 
facilitative ideology set within an ‘ethics of space’—a conscious desire to promote 
research and in turn, advance human health. And this, arguably, is the ‘ethics’ in the 
REC. Ethics is not about compliance or control, but rather about debate, reflection, 
values, argument, and justification. Legitimate and diverse disagreement can (and 
ought) to occur. As a matter of regulatory practice, then, an ethics of space must 
accommodate diversity, disagreement, and dissent across applications and across 
time. This in turn suggests that by their nature, liminal regulatory spaces must be 
provided for RECs and applicants alike to explore and deliberate on the ‘ethics’.  
Not surprisingly, a substantial majority of REC members I interviewed and 
                                                     
585 Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space’ (n 367). 
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observed did not view protection and promotion as creating an ontological conflict. 
Rather, their practice of working through both seems to instantiate the Declaration of 
Helsinki’s Paragraph 23 recommendation to not only consider, comment on, and 
potentially approve a research protocol, but to offer ‘guidance’ on it as well.586  
More questionable, though, is whether this practice instantiates Paragraph 8 of the 
Declaration of Helsinki and the GAfREC guidance, i.e. that the goals of research and 
the researcher, while important, should always be secondary to the dignity, rights, 
and wellbeing of the research participant. Certainly, the dignity, rights, and 
wellbeing of research participants were always considered and respected in the 24 
meetings I observed, but it cannot be said that the interests of researchers and 
research were ‘always’ treated as ‘secondary to the dignity, rights, safety and well-
being of people taking part in research’.587 Instead, the interests of researchers, 
research, and participants were often treated as aligned or even merged. Some REC 
members and regulators actively questioned the absolutist position taken in ethical 
guidelines that prioritise the individual over society. REC practices demonstrate 
that to protect is to promote. The blurring of the role hierarchy, or this long-standing 
ambiguity of role hierarchy in the UK if we consider the RCP Guidelines, reflects, as 
with the fluidity of science and ethics review, an incongruence between certain 
regulatory strategies and general practices that the HRA and other managing 
regulators may need to reassess.  
Does this finding of regulatory connectivity impact the overall quality and 
effectiveness of health research regulation? Not in terms of REC practices, I would 
argue, but it does invite questions about the role RECs and other actors can play if 
provided more room to ‘roam’ throughout the regulatory space. RECs, I would 
argue, engage in a pragmatic form of instantiated regulation, translating written 
regulatory guidance from the HRA and other managing regulators into practical 
action that capitalises on the relative interpretative flexibility of their regulatory 
                                                     
586 Declaration of Helsinki (n 17) para 23. 
587 GAfREC (n 1) para 3.2.2. 
273 
 
texts.588 They enact situationally-specific ways to implement the risk-calibrated 
regulations (from the SOPs, GAfREC, and so on) that govern their practice in 
determining the ethical acceptability of research applications. And, their role as 
regulatory steward reflects a collectively negotiated, practical, doable solution that 
satisfies the spirit of the regulations. RECs indeed have more regulatory flexibility 
than first appears and part of this flexibility is based on ‘interpersonal trust in 
instantiating and maintaining system trust’.589 Even so, later in this chapter I want to 
argue that more flexibility should be provided in the regulatory framework to enable 
specific actors to engage in this stewardship role and experiment with different 
ways of working through the stages of the research lifecycle. Liminality can help us 
both to recognise uncertainties that may arise across the research lifecycle, embrace 
them to a certain extent, potentially even exploit them, and pay attention to what is 
required to work through them. 
I want to argue for regulatory stewardship’s embeddedness in the regulatory 
framework because the empirical data suggest that RECs’ knowledge control and 
gatekeeping activities have the potential to reach beyond the ex ante stage. The hybrid 
protectionist-promotionist model that operates in practice fosters an environment 
that both protects research participants and also facilitates responsible health research 
through proportionate regulation and coordinated alignment of ethics review and 
other regulatory processes. This can be operationalised not only at the early stage(s) 
of the research lifecycle, at the moment of research design and initial application, 
but also throughout the lifecycle in partnership with other regulatory actors where 
ongoing opportunities for ‘regulatory play’ can emerge. Crucial to this argument are 
the findings from my research and analysis, which suggest that the currently 
existing arms-length approach from law is beneficial. By avoiding clearly defined 
roles of RECs and their procedural and substantive aspects, the law is actually 
helpful in promoting the normative behaviours that I recommend.   
                                                     
588 Stephens, Atkinson, and Glasner (n 356). 
589 ibid 808.  
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In what follows, I propose changes to the extant regulatory framework by 
suggesting elements of regulatory stewardship that allow for RECs to act as ‘work 
groups’ with their managing regulators, as well as regulatees. In so doing, I contend 
that if the ‘regulatory conversations’590 that RECs engage in with other actors are 
structured well (e.g. steps are enacted to avoid regulatory capture or inequity), one 
can mitigate the concerns about co-constructed ‘organisational deviance’ that 
Hedgecoe warned about in his discussion of the TGN1412 drug trial scandal at 
Northwick Park Hospital.591 Embedding regulatory stewardship, I contend, allows 
RECs to better engage with the processual and experiential dynamics of health 
research and instantiate a processual-oriented mode of regulation.  
First, however, I propose a framework for working through protection and 
promotion, namely a deliberative and accommodating mode supported by a 
looping mechanism of transition for a research protocol that transforms it into 
something ‘ethical’ within a given moment of time and within particular spaces. 
Research passes through multiple liminal phases; ethicality is not guaranteed across 
each stage. As different actors and regulatory and ethical implications arise with 
each stage, RECs and others can play a crucial role in helping research and 
researchers follow these processes through each stage. Of course, stewardship is 
only as good as its weakest link in the chain. As different actors come into the fold 
across the research lifecycle, the mantle of stewardship through each of these stages 
must be passed smoothly and efficiently. Key to this is an effective regulatory 
design that enables robust and dynamic communication among all actors. 
7.3 Working through protection and promotion 
We have seen that REC members can utilise several different mechanisms to work 
through protection and promotion. As Michael Dunn writes, ‘…aligning normative 
justification with policy and practice in research ethics is likely to require the 
introduction of novel governance frameworks that support an ethics committee’s 
                                                     
590 See Julia Black, ‘Talking about Regulation’ (1998) Public Law 77.  
591 Hedgecoe, ‘A Deviation from Standard Design?’ (n 175).  
275 
 
adjudication between general principles upon which people can reasonably 
disagree’.592 Here, I want to return to Veatch’s observation about the failure of health 
research regulation to offer a theory of what should happen when a proposed 
research project involves a conflict of principles (albeit, in Veatch’s context, the 
Belmont Report’s ethical principles).593 In the context of this thesis, the absence of an 
expressed theory of how the two objectives of protection and promotion should be 
achieved necessitates the crafting of a theory (or decision framework).  
Whitney argues that there are ‘two major moral considerations in research with 
human subjects’ that ethics committees must ‘balance’: the rights and welfare of 
research subjects and the ‘shared interest in better treatments for disease’.594 My 
concern with this argument is that Whitney falsely assumes that ‘balance’ is an 
operative mechanism that can adequately reconcile the two objectives of participant 
protection and research promotion. ‘Balance’, I argue, is both an empty metaphor 
(for a scale of measurement) that is cognitively ambiguous in health research and 
also a mechanism that wrongly antagonises the values at stake.  
Regarding the former claim, there is no mechanism within ‘balance’ that enables one 
to weigh competing claims. As Patterson and Lee write: ‘On the one hand, 
“balance” evokes the precision of the objective scale; on the other, it evokes the 
democratic value of equity. As a result, “balance” connotes a process that is 
simultaneously precise and fair.’595 If there is no agency of balance, balance becomes 
a rhetorical construction of fairness and (pseudo-)objectivity. At most, one can trust 
that individuals and groups intersubjectively reach an acceptable balance between 
protection and promotion, whereby acceptability reflects a range of ethical 
acceptability. Regarding the latter claim, the evidence in my research suggests that 
                                                     
592 Michael Dunn, ‘Getting the Justification for Research Ethics Review Right’ (2013) 39 
Journal of Medical Ethics 527, 528. 
593 Veatch, ‘Ranking, Balancing, or Simultaneity’ (n 118). The three core principles identified 
in the Belmont Report are: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. 
594 Whitney, Balanced Ethics Review (n 89) vii. 
595 Patterson and Lee (n 117) 35. 
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protection and promotion are not seen as oppositional values. ‘Balance’ would fail 
to capture the iterative, communicative, and fluid nature of ethical deliberations that 
seek to have protection and promotion work together. In sum, balance as a 
mechanism is insufficient. The values of protection and promotion, I submit, are 
simply unsuitable for a utilitarian calculus that positions them as oppositional. And, 
to the extent this ‘balance’ currently happens, it may well suffer from the same flaws 
or weaknesses as the risk-benefit calculus noted by several scholars.596  
Thus, I advocate instead an iterative view of protection and promotion defined by 
process and tolerance, where both protection and promotion are generally treated 
simultaneously and relationally. Specifically, protection and promotion should be 
treated as twin objectives for regulators. The liminality of RECs suggests that there 
is a need for a deliberative space within which RECs both can negotiate the risks 
relevant to a research application and work with researchers to get to a point where 
the application can be deemed ethically acceptible. This deliberative space ought to 
be protected to capture and promote the fluid, processual nature of those 
deliberations. Tolerance indicates that within this space, REC members should feel 
comfortable debating the strengths and weaknesses of a research study, and 
achieving some consensus position on how much risk they are willing to tolerate. 
This risk toleration, in turn, needs to be considered relative to the notion of research 
promotion. Thus, rather than viewing protection as a bright-line test, tolerance 
accomodates the fluid nature of ethics deliberation and the relative nature of risk, 
i.e. a higher tolerance of greater risk if it is seen as reasonable in relation to the 
benefits to participants and society. 
Moreover, I claim this approach should be iterative as the REC’s regulatory roles 
should manifest themselves not only at the singular stage of ethics review, but also 
before and after in the research lifecycle. An ethically approved research study does 
not necessarily remain ethical throughout its duration. Both time and space can 
                                                     




impact this judgement and liminality encourages actors to follow processes through 
their stages of transition. ‘Ethical research’, as determined by achievement of 
protection and promotion, must continually be created and re-evaluated as a 
research study progresses. Feedback loops (that is, opportunities for, and various 
channels of, communication, dialogue, and negotiation) should be built into the 
regulatory framework to prevent a static and putatively binding approach to ‘ethical 
research’, thereby encouraging greater regulatory conversations that allow RECs to 
continually ensure research is ethical—which is to say, protecting participants and 
optimising its social and scientific value as it evolves.  
Such an iterative view of protection and promotion would better recognise the 
liminal and thus processual enterprise of health research. It would also 
operationalise the language already contained in the Care Act 2014,597 the latest 
edition of the RCP Guidelines, 598 and HRA guidance for REC members.599 Further, it 
would reinforce the Declaration of Helsinki’s Paragraph 8: ‘While the primary 
purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never take 
precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.’600 A couple 
of my interlocutors expressed concern that this statement might imply the interests 
of science and society should not be considered in any assessment. As a REC Chair 
told me, ‘you may attach less weight to them, but you need to attach some sort of 
weight to them’ (P10). But if this assessment was treated as a weighing (i.e. 
balancing) of interests, undoubtedly they would always be weighed in favour of 
‘individual research subjects’. Thus, the problem is that balancing would fail to 
reflect the REC’s role as not merely internally consultative—deliberations among 
                                                     
597 Care Act 2014, s 110(2) (stating that one of the HRA’s objectives is ‘to promote the 
interests of those participants and potential participants and the general public by 
facilitating the conduct of research that is safe and ethical’) (emphasis added). 
598 Royal College of Physicians, Guidelines on the Practice of Ethics Committees (n 95) 4 (‘RECs 
have a duty to encourage important ethical research’). 
599 Health Research Authority, ‘Information for Potential Research Ethics Service Committee 
Members’ (n 56) (‘The key duty of a REC is to protect the interests of research participants 
whilst at the same time facilitating ethical research’). 
600 Declaration of Helsinki (n 17) para 8. 
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themselves as to whether participants are adequately protected—but also as a 
promoter of ethical best practice that necessitates ongoing dialogue with other actors, 
foremost researchers themselves.  
Such an approach to protection and promotion would, I submit, work to avoid a 
‘bureaucratisation of ethics’, where research ethics is treated as equivalent to REC 
processes (and in particular, approval of consent forms and PISs) and the scope of 
ethical concerns is narrowed to the front-end of approvals of research proposals. 
Coupling this approach with regulatory stewardship allows for smoother 
navigation of spaces that emerge in-between actors and between stages in the 
research lifecycle. An iterative view allows RECs to escape the institutionally 
delineated time-space trap where their work is fixated on a specific moment in time 
and within a specific space of the committee meeting, and thereby possibly avoid a 
‘permanent liminality—where uncertainties and anti-structures prevail’.601 RECs, 
along with other actors, may instead come to be seen as stewards that help guide 
health research through multiple thresholds: from research design, to ethics 
approval, to participant recruitment and consent, to data generation, to data 
analysis, to knowledge translation, and so on. 
Having set out to offer a theory of working through protection and promotion that 
incorporates liminality as an analytic and normative frame, I now turn to suggest a 
normative model of what a new regulatory framework for health research oversight 
ought to look like if it were to explicitly endorse regulatory stewardship and chart 
how protection and promotion can work together. As Chapter 6 explained, 
regulatory stewardship can be defined as the prudent guidance of one or more 
actors across regulatory thresholds—without which there is risk of impairment or 
harm—with a view to collective betterment.602 While stewardship is a relatively 
                                                     
601 Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression’ (n 2) 174. 
602 See Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship’ (n 570).  
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well-known concept in the literature,603 regulatory stewardship is not. I argue that it 
can demonstrate considerable added value for all actors implicated in the network 
of health research ethics oversight in delivering and benefiting from efficient and 
effective navigation of regulatory landscapes. In so doing, I also chart the nature of 
regulatory stewardship’s features and functions, and the different types of stewards 
that can exist to take on different functions. 
7.4 Charting a new regulatory framework 
In what follows, I propose three elements (some with sub-parts) to improve the 
current regulatory framework for research oversight of health research involving 
human participants. These elements flow naturally from the empirical results and as 
such should be charted. I begin with the element that imposes the least transaction 
cost and reflects most accurately what already occurs in practice, based on my 
research, and thus requires minimal regulatory change. I end with the element that 
may be more potentially disruptive to the current system and thus requires more 
extensive reform. The elements are proposed with a view towards a realistic, 
practical view of current resource constraints, both within the NHS and within 
RECs themselves. It is clear that RECs must be properly resourced to fulfil the roles 
expected of and practised by them. Moreover, regulatory administration must be in 
lock-step with research growth: to the extent the UK’s research environment is in 
good health, so too must be the regulatory actors responsible for regulating 
research. The overall approach taken here is one that encourages greater 
cooperation among and integration of regulators and regulatees.  
7.4.1 Regulatory flexibility 
As this thesis has argued, RECs operate within a hybrid regulatory design: social 
control of research is divided between state (e.g. MHRA, HRA, NHS R&D offices) 
and non-state actors (e.g. volunteer REC members, sponsors), decision-making 
                                                     
603 See e.g. World Health Organization, ‘Stewardship’ 
<http://www.who.int/healthsystems/stewardship/en/>; Lynn Jansen, ‘Between Beneficence 




combines central and regional or local controls, and a multiplicity of actors are 
engaged in regulatory policymaking.604 Hybrid design is seen as fostering greater 
regulatory flexibility, but we have seen that within the health research regulatory 
space, RECs are increasingly tacking towards the state; a reverse ‘decentred’ 
regulation is occurring that may limit the potential for regulatory flexibility. RECs 
may feel curtailed in their ability to adapt ethical frameworks or standards to a 
given research study when faced with the threat of sanction from above. As I have 
argued, an ethics of space must accommodate diversity, disagreement, and dissent 
across applications and across time. Likewise, researchers may feel curtailed in their 
ability to adapt their research as it develops, still within reasonable ethical 
boundaries, out of fear of falling foul of an already-approved protocol. In both 
instances, a culture of caution and rigidity can come to dominate decision-making. 
RECs and researchers therefore should be enabled to decide and act on matters 
within a range of reasonableness. Not only will this allow the flourishing of sound 
and ethical health research grounded in conscience rather than compliance, it will 
allow RECs and researchers to adapt regulatory responses to changing 
environments (both within a specific research study and across types of research). 
For example, REC SOPs have served to greatly improve clarity and consistency in 
structure and processes, but positivistic rule-following is not the only value at stake 
in ethics review; ‘responsible conduct often runs obliquely to compliance with 
rules’.605 The length of REC SOPs have become colossal (a document now running to 
over 300 pages), and one wonders if something—flexibility and an opportunity to 
innovate—is getting lost in the drive to conform to such numerous standards. 
Through issuance of guidance with best practices, RECs should be encouraged to act 
with greater discretion to enable them to develop more innovative, experimental, 
and strategic approaches to their reviews. To this end, Rid has called for a 
comprehensive and detailed ethical framework for risk–benefit evaluations centred 
                                                     
604 See also Sydney Halpern, ‘Hybrid Design, Systemic Rigidity: Institutional Dynamics in 
Human Research Oversight’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 85.  
605 Johnsson and others (n 102) 40. 
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on social and scientific value.606 I support this call, provided, however, that such a 
detailed ethical framework allows for RECs to experiment in how they undertake 
such evaluations. A rigid application of a framework, especially one that is 
comprehensive, may well lead to pushback or failure. As another example, 
managing regulators should reduce procedural requirements that restrict what 
RECs can accomplish in conducting reviews both within and outwith scheduled 
monthly full committee meetings (e.g. rushing to get through six applications in 
three hours). Checklists should be treated as aide-memories, not rigid forms to 
judge REC performance. As Johnsson and colleagues write: ‘If ethical guidelines are 
to actually inspire researchers to make better decisions, they must have a 
sufficiently high level of abstraction to give room for deliberation. They must never 
be allowed to degenerate into checklists.’607 
Perhaps the best example of enhanced regulatory flexibility, though, is greater 
tolerance for an ethics of space that encourages deliberation and debate over 
protection and promotion.  
An ethics of space to tolerate deliberation of protection and promotion 
The evidence from the empirical research suggests that REC members treat 
participant protection and research promotion as intertwined values that manifest 
themselves through the process of their review and in the course of their 
deliberations at REC meetings. In some cases it may be possible for RECs to focus 
first on protection and only thereafter on promotion, but for the majority of research 
applications, an ethics of space requires room for deliberation and fluidity in the 
assessment of risks, benefits, and social and scientific value. Little change would 
need to occur in the extant regulatory framework to acknowledge the importance of 
‘tolerances’ (as opposed to bright lines or thresholds) in REC deliberation regarding 
whether participants are adequately protected and the ways in which research can 
be improved. Regulations could be more explicit in delineating the functions of 
                                                     
606 Rid, ‘Rethinking Risk–Benefit Evaluations’ (n 399). 
607 Johnsson and others (n 102) 42. 
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RECs to protect and promote. While the GAfREC suggest that RECs have a primary 
role of participant protection and a secondary role of promoting the interests of 
research, researchers, and the public, a clearer charting of functions—treating these 
not as primary and secondary per se, but rather as relational values that are 
deliberated in a fluid manner—would likely improve inter-regulator relations as 
well as researchers’ (and publics’) understanding of what RECs do. RECs, it is 
suggested, have the twin role of participant protection and research promotion, but 
they also have an educational role in increasing knowledge and awareness of ethical 
issues and regulations; an advisory role in guiding researchers, sponsors, and 
institutions; as well as a conciliatory role in helping adjudicate potential conflicts 
between researchers and participants.608 
One area in the regulatory framework that can be developed is in feedback loops. 
These are closely connected to ‘regulatory conversations’ as discussed below. A 
processual-oriented mode of regulation recognises the inherent flexibility and 
fluidity (and indeed uncertainty) in health research, enables adaptive responses to 
changes in law and regulation, and helps guide actors through the research 
process.609 Currently, there is weak association between rendering an ethics opinion 
and learning about its outcome. As I have indicated already, ‘ethical research’ is not 
a static concept; feedback loops in the form of electronic communication and face-to-
face meetings should be strengthened to encourage RECs to engage in dialogue with 
researchers, sponsors, and others to continually ensure research is ethical—that is, 
to maintain a situation in which participants are adequately protected and research 
optimises social and scientific value. Mechanisms also should be developed to foster 
feedback loops where researchers can re-engage in discussions with RECs and the 
HRA so as to adapt regulatory processes—leading to ongoing improvement and an 
evidence-based framework. This would help ensure regulatory processes are 
effective and cost-justified, and also increase expertise in decision-making. A more 
                                                     
608 See HSE Research Ethics Committees Review Group, Review of Research Ethics Committees 
& Processes in Republic of Ireland (Health Service Executive 2008) 7. 
609 Taylor-Alexander and others, ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression’ (n 2) 158. 
283 
 
evidence-based framework would not only enable REC members to improve their 
ability to make good decisions, it would also make the process more transparent 
and enable (managing) regulators and publics alike to evaluate the effectiveness of 
REC decisions in protecting participants and promoting research. 
Enhanced regulatory connectivity between law, science, and ethics 
We saw in Chapter 6 that regulations such as the GAfREC are ambiguous in 
delineating the relationship of science and law to ethics review, and fail to capture 
the inherent connections between these regulatory spaces. A relatively minor 
amendment to the regulatory framework would be to revise the GAfREC and other 
regulations to account for regulatory connectivity that occurs in practice. The REC’s 
opinion is not a legal opinion, but it is necessarily informed by the law. Likewise, an 
ethical opinion cannot be achieved without an adequate investigation of and 
satisfaction with the science. Regulations also should not encourage delegation to 
other regulatory bodies out of concern for potential overlap; such overlaps tend to 
occur inevitably. Rather, regulations should encourage greater synergy, not to 
mention greater efficiencies, among RECs and other bodies such as the MHRA, data 
monitoring committees, and data access committees.610 
7.4.2 Regulatory conversations 
To foster regulatory responsiveness, RECs should be encouraged to engage in 
discussions and negotiations with researchers, sponsors, and other actors before 
submission to the REC as well as after a proposal has received a favourable opinion. 
These conversations may revolve around ethical concerns that have arisen during 
the course of the study, but they may also go beyond this. Figure 7.1 represents 
                                                     
610 An exemplar of regulatory efficiency, defined in terms of reducing the number of bodies 
performing the same or similar functions, is METADAC (Managing Ethico-social, Technical 
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access structure that oversees applications for bio-data (i.e. genetic data linked with 
phenotypic data) and samples from several of the UK’s major cohort studies and aims ‘to 




where opportunities arise for RECs and other actors to engage in ‘regulatory 
conversations’611 with researchers, sponsors, and institutions across the lifecycle. 
Figure 7.1. Lifecycle of health research involving human participants, with 
proposed augmented roles for actors to engage in ‘regulatory conversations’ 
across different elements of the lifecycle. Figure adapted from Anderson and 
others (n 612). 
 
 
                                                     
611 See Black, ‘Talking about Regulation’ (n 590) Black proposes the concept of ‘regulatory 
conversations’ between regulators and regulatees that ‘are both a necessary and inevitable 
part of the regulatory process, almost regardless of the form that process takes’. ibid 104. 
Black argues regulatory conversations promote flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness. 
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Anderson and colleagues identify twelve elements in the lifecycle of health research 
involving human participants: (1) priority setting; (2) education—scientific and 
ethical; (3) protocol design; (4) funding review; (5) ethics review; (6) recruitment; (7) 
informed consent; (8) monitoring; (9) study termination; (10) data analysis; (11) 
knowledge transfer; and (12) quality assurance and quality improvement.612 At first 
glance, it would seem that RECs address only a narrow portion of issues within the 
lifecycle. Yet the evidence from the empirical research suggests that RECs, as health 
research regulators, in fact address many other (but certainly not all) elements in the 
lifecycle.  
A revamped regulatory framework should enable managing regulators (e.g. HRA 
and CSO), RECs (and particularly REC Chairs), and actors such as (or similar to) 
Scientific Officers to support researchers and sponsors in working through other 
elements in the lifecycle, including ethical and regulatory education (i.e. how to 
work through the ethics review process), protocol design, and issues concerning 
recruitment, consent, ongoing review, and knowledge transfer (e.g. communication 
of results). This is not to suggest these regulatory actors must necessarily play a 
substantive role in these other elements of the lifecycle (and indeed such a normative 
position would require consideration of resources and infrastructure). Rather, it is to 
suggest that these regulatory actors should be encouraged to further engage others 
and each other in these additional elements—reflecting to a large degree what they 
already do in practice—with a view towards promoting socially valuable and 
ethical research. Likewise, it is to suggest that researchers and sponsors should be 
strongly encouraged to engage in regulatory conversations with their regulators, 
before, during, and after the launch of a research study.  
 
                                                     
612 James Anderson and others, ‘Research Ethics Broadly Writ: Beyond REB Review’ (2011) 19 
Health Law Review 12, 13-14. 
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Sounding board and discourse ethics 
We saw in Chapters 2 and 3 that a common past criticism of RECs has been that 
they engage in a ‘tick-box’ bureaucratic ethics rather than a deliberative ethics. If 
research ethics is to be seen as more than rigid application of rules and standards, it 
must be allowed to flourish through discourse.613 Johnsson and colleagues argue 
that ethics review should be ‘an arena for researchers to discuss their research, 
receive advice, and practise their ethics skills, and guidelines to be generally 
applicable, value-based and inspirational rather than specific, rule-based and 
regulative’614 (if we take the term ‘regulative’ to mean controlling and compliance-
driven). Regulatory actors such as the HRA, RECs, and Scientific Officers should be 
encouraged to engage in informal dialogue with researchers (as well as institutions 
and sponsors) to offer them guidance through regulatory pathways.615 Similarly, 
researchers and sponsors should be encouraged to speak with regulatory actors to 
provide them on-the-ground information regarding a research study: how it is 
developing, whether any roadblocks or surprises have emerged, or whether there 
has been any deviation between the approved protocol and the actual conduct of the 
research. 
In-person REC meeting attendance by researchers should continue to be strongly 
recommended, but not required. Researchers should be made aware that 
deliberations can be unpredictable (a REC that favourably approves an application 
upon internal deliberation will not need to then speak with the researcher, and thus 
a researcher may risk ‘wasting’ resources in attending). A face-to-face meeting will 
not guarantee a certain outcome, but it may increase the chance that a REC will 
render a provisional opinion as opposed to an unfavourable opinion.616 Thus, a 
                                                     
613 This argument is advanced in David Townend and Edward Dove, ‘Approaching Ethics 
Review Equivalency Through Natural Justice and a ”Sounding Board” Model for Research 
Ethics Committees’ (2017) 36 Medicine and Law 61. 
614 Johnsson and others (n 102) 43. 
615 Klitzman refers to this as ‘curbside consults’ with researchers. See Klitzman (n 123) 330-
31. 
616 Peter Heasman, Philip Preshaw, and Janine Gray, ‘Does Researchers’ Attendance at 
Meetings Affect the Initial Opinions of Research Ethics Committees?’ (2008) 4 Research 
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recommendation for face-to-face meetings should clarify the benefits that may 
accrue: not only a decreased risk of an unfavourable opinion, but an opportunity to 
engage with a REC to protect participants and promote ethical research through a 
dynamic, nuanced ethical discourse. Ideally, this encounter should be in-person, but 
if not, managing regulators should ensure there are proper resources for RECs to 
engage in reliable telecommunication (e.g. video or teleconference) with researchers. 
7.4.3 Regulatory stewardship 
Regulatory stewardship involves different actors helping researchers, sponsors, and 
institutions navigate complex regulatory pathways and work through the 
thresholds of regulatory approvals. Collective responsibility also defines regulatory 
stewardship. In the case of health research, collective responsibility involves 
regulators and regulatees alike working together to design and conduct research 
that is ethical and socially and scientifically valuable, and that ultimately aims to 
improve human health. This can only be accomplished if regulators and regulatees 
communicate with one other and make clear who has what responsibility and role 
to be played (if any) at each stage in the research lifecycle. 
To be clear, then, regulatory stewardship involves different actors serving not in a 
protecting capacity alone, but also in a capacity to promote the pursuit of clearly 
identified ends, including ethically robust, scientifically sound research. In so doing, 
stewards can help reduce regulatory burdens and achieve proportionality in 
research ethics review and oversight. While this function is performed currently by 
different non-REC actors relatively well (e.g. NHS R&D Forum,617 MRC Regulatory 
Support Centre,618 institutions that may create regulatory knowledge and support 
                                                     
Ethics Review 56 (finding that researchers’ attendance does not appear to increase the 
likelihood of being given a favourable opinion, but does appear to increase the likelihood of 
being given a provisional rather than unfavourable opinion).  
617 NHS Research & Development Forum <http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk/>. The NHS R&D 
Forum serves as a resource and facilitator of best practices in health research management 
and research strategy development. It offers training courses in areas such as the basics of 
quality research and how to prepare for regulatory inspections. 
618 MRC Regulatory Support Centre <https://www.mrc.ac.uk/research/facilities-and-
resources-for-researchers/regulatory-support-centre/>. The MRC Regulatory Support Centre 
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programmes to support researchers619), more stewardship support can and should 
be provided by RECs and managing regulators such as the HRA. Indeed, a key 
feature of regulatory stewardship is that it may be practised as much by non-state 
actors as by state actors charged with formally proscribing actions under the law. 
Here, opportunities are present for volunteer REC members and others to assist 
researchers and others in manoeuvring complex regulatory regimes. 
We have seen that the four Scientific Officers in Scotland provide an immense 
amount of support to both RECs and researchers; the CSO should consider funding 
academic researchers to conduct an evaluation of Scientific Officers, to see whether 
and how they add value to effective and proportionate regulation. There is no 
Scientific Officer equivalent in the other three nations. The HRA’s current effort to 
shift some of the support service onto REC Managers is likely to be inadequate in 
helping researchers achieve their aims, RECs in receiving higher quality 
applications, and boosting REC Manager morale. Instead, the HRA should take up 
the Lord Warner Report recommendation in 2004620 and create equivalent positions 
in England. To do so, it may not need to create multiple Scientific Officers in each of 
the Regional Offices; instead, it can revive its effort to create a REC Application 
Review and Advice Service staffed by independent experts who may have had 
previous experience in chairing or managing RECs, as well as experience in health 
research and regulation.  
Regulation should more clearly provide channels for RECs (and members within 
them who may have closer contact with researchers and sponsors) and managing 
                                                     
provides expert support and guidance, including freely available online toolkits and 
resources, for those conducting research with human participants, their tissues, or data. 
619 Institutions may have ‘regulatory knowledge and support’ programmes staffed with 
knowledgeable people who assist researchers in the development of health research 
proposals and the REC applications. Such programmes are especially designed for young 
researchers who are often unfamiliar with regulatory requirements and could benefit from 
guidance from experienced research staff. See e.g. University of Edinburgh, ‘Research 
Support and Governance’ <http://www.ed.ac.uk/medicine-vet-medicine/research-support-
development-commercialisation/research-support-governance>. 
620 Lord Warner Report (n 232). 
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regulators to engage with researchers and sponsors in improving the quality of 
research protocols and applications and in working through law, regulation, and 
regulatory approvals. These channels could include online toolkits provided by the 
REC Application Review and Advice Service and one-on-one support via email, 
telephone, or meetings in HRA Regional Offices. 
Regulatory stewardship also could be put on a legal basis. For example, in New 
Zealand, one of the purposes of the State Sector Act 1988, as amended, ‘is to 
promote and uphold a State sector system that […] fosters a culture of 
stewardship.’621 The Act defines ‘stewardship’ as the ‘active planning and 
management of medium- and long-term interests, along with associated advice’.622 
The Care Act 2014 goes to some length to enact stewardship by confirming as a 
matter of law that health research regulatory agencies have responsibilities not just 
to protect research participants’ interests, but also to promote ethical and safe 
research. Yet further legal footing can be provided by declaring that health research 
regulatory agencies are expected to bring a more systematic, comprehensive, 
lifecycle approach to the management of existing regulation,623 which in this context, 
would mean ensuring that regulations are: 1) proportionate; 2) fit-for-purpose; 3) 
enabling for stewards to work with researchers and others in achieving their desired 
ends; and 4) enabling for regulators to articulate how the public interest will be 
promoted through research. Such a legal footing would clarify the value of different 
actors in enacting regulatory stewardship across the research lifecycle, and also 
avoid constricting the roles and procedural and substantive aspects of actors in rigid 
law that can be counter-productive to the value of flexibility that is inherent in 
liminality.  
                                                     
621 State Sector Act 1988, as amended 2013 [NZ], s 1A. 
622 ibid s 32. 





Stewardship is a heterogeneous concept, and given the various actors who can serve 
in a stewardship capacity, regulation should be designed to promote specific (but 
not necessarily narrow) tasks for different actors, such as: state stewards (acting in a 
manner deemed to contribute to the public interest, e.g. as established by law); 
operational stewards (e.g. REC Chairs, Managers, or Scientific Officers who help 
usher researchers through the complexity of established procedures such as ethics 
application processes); and ethics stewards (e.g. RECs that act to protect participants 
and promote research). At the same time, as I and colleagues have argued 
elsewhere:  
It would follow also from this that researchers must be trained in, and made 
aware of, this central role in making (good) research happen. As a 
minimum, this would require researchers to acknowledge their role in 
contributing to streamlined regulation by responsible discharge of duties to 
work with regulators effectively.624  
By stating clearly what roles each actor should play at the different stages in the 
research lifecycle, and how each actor should work with others to move from one 
stage to the next (i.e. how and when ‘the mantle should be passed’), health research 
regulation could achieve more robustly the twin aims of participant protection and 
research promotion. 
7.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I further unpacked the significance of liminality of RECs and the 
ability of actors within the health research regulatory space to serve as regulatory 
stewards. I did so by charting how protection and promotion can and should work 
together, and by suggesting a normative model of what a new regulatory 
framework for health research oversight ought to look like if it were to explicitly 
endorse regulatory flexibility, conversations, and stewardship. I suggested that an 
iterative view of protection and promotion defined by tolerance for fluidity would 
better recognise the liminal and thus processual enterprise of health research. I also 
argued that regulation would be well served if it accounted for the roles that RECs 
                                                     
624 Laurie and others, ‘Charting Regulatory Stewardship’ (n 570). 
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and other actors (such as Scientific Officers) can play across the lifecycle of research 
by engaging in ‘conversations’ with researchers and sponsors (among other actors, 
such as funders). Providing such a space for flexibility and experimentation across 
the research lifecycle would allow for greater opportunities for ‘regulatory play’ to 
emerge, and in so doing foster an environment that both protects research 
participants and also facilitates responsible health research through proportionate 
regulation and coordinated alignment of ethics review and other regulatory 
processes. 
In the concluding Chapter 8, I recap the arguments of this thesis, my main research 





Chapter 8  
Summary and future directions for research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has provided insight into the everyday workings of RECs and other 
regulatory actors in light of ‘next-generation’ health research regulation that seeks to 
both protect participants and promote research. It has done so through an empirical 
investigation—set within an anthropology of regulation methodology—of the 
nature of health research regulation and of the behaviours and experiences of actors 
within regulatory spaces, and the ways in which they themselves affect and are 
affected by processes of regulation. Further, it has positioned liminality and 
regulatory stewardship as key components in a regulatory framework for health 
research. 
The research set out to explore how and why RECs make the decisions they do, and 
how the dynamics of RECs and central ‘managing’ regulators play into decisions in 
an emerging regulatory backdrop of twinned ‘protection and promotion’. It also set 
out to go inside RECs to ask and examine how they, as individual members and as a 
collective body, see themselves in a changing regulatory environment. In addition, 
perspectives were gathered on the roles of RECs and the relationship between the 
HRA and RECs. In so doing, I queried the precise nature of the interaction between 
central regulators and RECs, and queried the functional operations and deliberative 
processes of RECs in an era of twinned regulatory objectives of participant 
protection and research promotion. To date, this topic has received little coverage in 
the literature despite its significance, much less through a qualitative study from a 
regulatory perspective. 
This final chapter draws together the findings from this body of work and lays out 
the original contribution to which claim is made in this thesis. First, I recap the 
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findings from Parts I through III of the thesis. Second, I revisit and respond to the 
research questions. Finally, I consider possible next steps for the research. 
8.2 Thesis recap 
8.2.1 Part I – Chapters 2 and 3 
Part I began by providing a conceptual framework and historical regulatory tracing 
of RECs. Chapter 2 argued that RECs have been central in regulating the ethical 
acceptability of health research—and by extension, much of health research’s very 
existence—since the late 1960s. They serve as gatekeepers that determine whether a 
proposed research study is ethically acceptable and therefore may proceed. Since its 
formation in late 2011, the HRA has been tasked with both protecting research 
participants from harm and also facilitating a productive research environment by 
streamlining health research regulation. The HRA is a central regulatory body that 
is seen to help make the UK once again an attractive place to conduct health 
research such as clinical trials. The HRA, particularly through its RES, and 
equivalent bodies such as the CSO, is working to make REC processes more 
effective and efficient. I therefore raised the question of whether the roles and 
practices of RECs are shifting in response to ‘next-generation’ regulation such as the 
Care Act 2014, and whether modifications to the health research regulatory space at 
the levels of statutory law and central regulatory authorities (i.e. central 
administrators) ‘trickle down’ to the day-to-day practices of RECs.  
Chapter 3 traced the regulatory development of RECs and health research 
regulation within the UK, with a view to demonstrating both the growth of health 
research regulation and the increasingly central role that RECs play in regulating 
health research. Tracing history over the past half-century, we saw that as health 
research gained prominence in the UK as both a driver of scientific knowledge and 
economic development, self-regulation of health research—ad hoc peer review by 
fellow scientists based on professional norms and local customs—gradually gave 
way to stricter, stronger, more centralised forms of regulation, particularly through 
policies and guidelines set by the UK’s constituent governments. The central claim I 
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made is that while to a certain degree, research promotion has always been 
embedded in the regulatory techniques of RECs, it has not until now been 
instantiated in law with the creation of the HRA and rules promulgated under the 
Care Act 2014. Participant protection and research promotion have had an uneasy, 
unequal, but sustained marriage across the RECs’ lifespan. And along the way, REC 
members have faced the challenging task of working in regulatory spaces that 
demand that they work with various regulatory actors and that they not only 
operate within the (shifting) regulatory spaces’ confines, but also help shape their 
contours. It is this finding that led me to query whether this instantiation of research 
promotion in law has a (hitherto absent) trickle-down effect that impacts the day-to-
day practices of RECs, and if so, how, or indeed, whether the law is only now 
coming to reflect an everyday practice that has long existed.  
8.2.2 Part II – Chapter 4 and 5 
Part II described the methodology and methods. In Chapter 4, I explained the 
research approach, theoretical underpinnings, and analytical concepts that drove 
my thesis. I argued that there is a need for an empirically-grounded discussion of 
regulatory practice, but that extant socio-legal and legal anthropology approaches 
are insufficient to answer my research questions. Therefore, I proposed an 
anthropology of regulation that blends the theoretical with the empirical, and which 
affords critical methodological improvements to common research approaches. As 
anthropology of regulation draws explicit attention to processes, passages, and 
change, I further drew on the anthropological concept of liminality, which served as 
a sensitising concept in addition to concepts provided by regulatory theory. 
Together with regulatory theory, liminality helped me to better understand the 
nature of transformations of actors within the regulatory space, the form of 
regulation in this space, as well as the behaviours and experiences of actors as they go 
through processes of change. 
In Chapter 5, I described the research methods undertaken for my empirical work 
that define an anthropology of regulation, including the justification for 
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undertaking a ‘research trinity’ of document analysis, semi-structured interviews, 
and naturalistic observation. I explained how my research methods serve as the 
most robust platform for answering my research questions and making sense of the 
empirical data.  
8.2.3 Part III – Chapters 6 and 7 
Finally, Part III presented the empirical research findings from the interviews and 
observations and extended the examination of protection and promotion from an 
historical basis in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, I presented three main themes from my 
findings: the ‘black boxes’ of ethics review; regulatory connectivity; and regulators 
as facilitators and stewards. I found that RECs serve as liminal actors; relative to 
each other and to publics, they are black boxes existing in multiple spaces, despite a 
surprising degree of group homogeneity in approach and rituals. Significantly, I 
also found that RECs and other actors can serve as ‘regulatory stewards’ in helping 
researchers and others navigate difficult regulatory spaces and improve the overall 
quality of research. They can play a critical role in assisting researchers navigate the 
demands of putting an application and protocol together; as regulatory stewards, 
they can help researchers cross thresholds—serving as ‘ethical research promoters’. 
Contrary to my early expectations, and critically for the purposes of this thesis, the 
empirical data suggested that modifications to the health research regulatory space 
at the levels of statutory law and central regulatory authorities have not so much 
‘trickled down’ to the day-to-day practices of RECs, as the day-to-day practices have 
long reflected what has only recently been enacted in law. The data also suggested 
RECs, managing regulators, and researchers share a common goal of promoting 
research that is safe and of high quality. Actors in these regulatory spaces carry 
similar interests and shared responsibilities, helping each other to cross boundaries 
and deal with major moments of transition in the research lifecycle. This led me to 
further investigate how, normatively speaking, protection and promotion ought to 
be worked through, as practised by RECs, the HRA, and other actors (such as 
Scientific Officers), and what a model of a new regulatory framework for health 
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research oversight ought to look like if it were to explicitly endorse regulatory 
stewardship.  
Chapter 7 unpacked the significance of the liminality of RECs and the ability of 
actors within the health research regulatory space to serve as ‘regulatory stewards’. 
I charted how protection and promotion can and should work together. Specifically, 
I argued that protection and promotion should be treated as twin objectives for 
regulators. The liminality of RECs suggests that there is a need for a deliberative 
space within which RECs can both negotiate the risks relevant to a research 
application and also work with researchers to get to a point where the application 
can be deemed ethically acceptible. This deliverative space ought to be protected to 
capture and promote the fluid, processual nature of those deliberations. Within this 
space, REC members should feel comfortable debating the strengths and 
weaknesses of a research study, and achieving a consensual position on how much 
risk they are willing to tolerate. This risk toleration, in turn, needs to be considered 
relative to the notion of research promotion. Thus, rather than viewing protection as 
a bright-line test, a tolerance perspective accomodates the fluid nature of ethics 
deliberation and the relative nature of risk, i.e. a higher tolerance of greater risk if it 
is seen as reasonable in relation to the benefits to participants and society. 
I concluded that a reformulated regulatory framework could work to improve 
regulatory conversations between actors, provide ongoing opportunities for 
‘regulatory play’ to emerge, and shift the burden and emphasis away from more 
procedural work and towards flexibility and experimentation in ethics review. 
Three principal elements, flowing from the empirical research, were offered to 
improve the extant framework and were organised by starting with those less 





 Regulatory flexibility 
o I argued that the regulatory framework should provide RECs 
sufficient room to roam in an ethics of space that accommodates 
diversity, disagreement, and dissent across applications and across 
time. This requires little change to the current system, as RECs are 
already permitted to protect and promote. However, room for 
improvement is called for in two areas, namely feedback loops and 
enhanced connectivity among the regulatory spaces of law, science, 
and ethics. 
 Regulatory conversations 
o  I argued that to foster greater regulatory responsiveness, RECs 
should be encouraged to engage in discussions and negotiations with 
researchers, sponsors, and other actors before submission to the REC 
as well as after a proposal has received a favourable opinion. These 
conversations may revolve around ethical concerns that have arisen 
during the course of the study, but they may also go beyond this. 
RECs are not expected to play a role in each element of the research 
lifecycle. Rather, I suggested that RECs, along with other actors, 
should be encouraged to engage in regulatory conversations with 
each other, before, during, and after the launch of a research study, 
clarifying both their respective roles and when they should intervene 
to assist in helping move research across the stages of the lifecycle. 
 Regulatory stewardship 
o I argued that regulatory stewardship involves different actors 
helping researchers and sponsors navigate complex regulatory 
pathways and work through the thresholds of regulatory approvals. 
Collective responsibility, as a component of regulatory stewardship, 
requires relevant actors to work together to design and conduct 
research that is ethical and socially and scientifically valuable and 
that ultimately aims to improve human health. This can only be 
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accomplished if a framework delineates how and when regulators 
and regulatees should communicate with one another and makes 
clear who has what responsibility and role to be played (if any) at 
each stage in the research lifecycle. To this end, I suggested that a 
regulatory framework for health research could chart different kinds 
of regulatory stewards, such as operational stewards (e.g. REC 
Chairs, Managers, or Scientific Officers that help usher researchers 
through the complexity of established procedures such as ethics 
application processes) and ethics stewards (e.g. RECs that deliberate 
in an ethics of space to protect participants and promote research). 
8.3 Revisiting the research questions 
Three research questions drove this thesis. The primary question was: 
How do RECs act among themselves and interact with other actors within a 
reformed health research regulatory space that aspires to both protect research 
participants from harm and also promote health research through streamlining 
perceived regulatory barriers—and what might this mean for the bond of 
research and ethics as seen through the ostensible REC processes of ethical 
deliberation and decision-making?  
Two subsidiary questions that flowed from this primary question were: 
1. What is the precise nature of the interaction between central regulators and 
RECs in the health research regulatory space?  
2. What are the functional operations and deliberative processes of RECs in an 
era of twinned regulatory objectives of participant protection and research 
promotion? 
Returning to these questions, we can now satisfactorily summarise the responses as 
follows. While there has been reform in the health research regulatory space at the 
level of legal architecture to foster an environment that promotes health research in 
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addition to protecting participants (particularly through the method of streamlining 
perceived regulatory barriers), there has not been a consequential change in how 
RECs act among themselves. Legal reform such as the Care Act 2014 reflects 
already-existing, everyday workings of RECs. RECs are remarkably similar to each 
other in terms of demographics and practices, yet they are relatively black boxed to 
each other; they operate in fairly splendid isolation despite having a fair degree of 
homogeneity in culture. This said, an area of concern in light of recent regulatory 
reform is the nature of the interaction between RECs and their managing regulators, 
namely the HRA. Perhaps because of their homogeneity in culture, there is a strong 
desire by RECs, including REC Managers, to preserve the sanctity of their black box 
and ethics of space. Initiatives by the HRA that try to improve the regulatory 
pathways for researchers can backfire if there is improper consultation with RECs. 
As we saw, regulatory tension or failures are more likely to exist between regulators 
than between regulators and regulatees.  
Finally, we can say that while the bond of research and ethics remains strong, there 
is some room for improving the regulatory framework. RECs, managing regulators, 
and researchers share a common goal of promoting research that is safe and of high 
quality. Actors in this health research regulatory space carry similar interests and 
shared responsibilities, helping each other to cross boundaries and deal with major 
moments of transition in the research lifecycle. The respective roles, competencies, 
and influences among the actors in these spaces are not always clear, and the 
regulatory conversations are sporadic and at times weak between regulators, 
though relatively strong between regulators and regulatees. To avoid dangerous 
spaces from appearing within the health research regulatory space where hazards 
may occur, in Chapter 7 I suggested several elements to improve the regulatory 




8.4 Future directions for research 
Having considered the core contribution which this body of work makes, a final 
task lies in considering how this work can be further developed. Areas for future 
investigation include:  
 evaluation of the added value Scientific Officers bring to health research 
regulation and consideration of how they can be brought into the Research 
Ethics Services in the three other nations; 
 assessment of how NHS R&D offices are coping in light of HRA Approval 
(e.g. how do R&D officers now see their role; what is their relationship with 
HRA Assessors and other regulatory actors?); 
 cross-jurisdictional comparisons of health research regulation to evaluate 
similarities and differences among RECs, managing regulators, and other 
actors. Such an assessment may lead to formulation of best practices for 
health research ethical oversight; 
 horizon-scanning to assess the potential impact of ‘Brexit’ on UK regulatory 
flexibility (i.e. will a formal de-coupling from EU regulation lead to 
regulatory fragmentation, harmonisation, or something else?); 
 how regulatory flexibility might afford opportunities for ‘regulatory play’, 
i.e. opportunities to think beyond rules and engage in innovation and 
experimentation (‘sandboxes’ to design and experiment without fear of 
falling foul of regulatory infraction);  
 deeper understanding, through empirical investigation, of the actual 
blockages and perceived impediments to health research so as to promote a 
culture of confidence and proportionate regulatory practices; and  
 charting a path for collective responsibility for the (co-)design and delivery 
of health research and health improvements therefrom. Such investigation 
may explore how actors other than regulators (e.g. researchers, sponsors, 
publics) can view themselves as responsible for designing and delivering 
ethical and scientifically robust health research. 
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In each of these areas, anthropology of regulation can play an invaluable role in 
investigating empirically (particularly through observation) the form and function 
of regulation across different contexts (e.g. locales, cultures, time periods). It allows 
the researcher to uncover the experiences and practices of regulators and regulatees 
and the ways in which they understand themselves and their roles. In so doing, it 
can also problematise the notion of regulation, challenging us to consider the 
multiple phenomena that it may constitute and the ways in which it manifests and 
shapes behaviours. Anthropology of regulation, underpinned by regulatory theory 
and liminality, helps us make sense of the nature of regulation as a form of social 
control (an ontological concern), as well as how regulation structures our living in 
the everyday and in the in-between (a functional concern). Analytically, it has the 
potential to contribute to deeper understandings of local dynamics and contexts, as 
well as the multiple roles regulation plays in a complex world as a social form of 
control. Finally, it can offer normative prescriptions that are developed from the 
empirical investigation to guide actors in achieving regulatory goals. 
Undoubtedly, there are numerous further lines of inquiry that flow from this 
research. The findings of the empirical research demonstrate a wide applicability to 
a diverse array of settings. While such inquiries are left for the future, this thesis has 
in its own right contributed to a deeper theoretical and practical understanding of 
the precise nature of health research regulation; the roles of actors within regulatory 
spaces; and the processual, iterative realisation of the public interest aim of health 
research oversight—namely to protect the rights, interests, and welfare of research 
participants and to promote valuable research that advances human health for the 
















Appendix 1: Interview guide for REC members 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 to explore the dynamics of interaction between RECs and regulators, 
policymakers and other actors in the health research regulatory space;  
 to determine the characteristics of different components of research ethics 
and RECs; 
 to gather reflections on their experience(s) as REC members; 
 to examine whether the practices/functions of RECs have changed in 
response to new regulations (e.g. Care Act 2014) and new actors (e.g. 
Health Research Authority); 




 introduce myself, PhD project and funder; 
 general informed consent information, e.g. how the data will be used, 
confidentiality, timing (~60 minutes), permission to audio-record and 
transcribe interview 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Overarching Idea: REC members’ life experiences (within and outwith research ethics) may 
shape their views as a REC member. 
 What is your role in the REC (chair, administrator, member, etc.)? What 
does your activity in this role consist of? 
 How long have you been involved as a REC member? 
 How did you get involved in your REC?  
 How many hours/week on average do you spend working on REC 
matters? 
 Are you also actively involved in research? If so, what role(s) do you 
play (PI, co-PI, etc.)? What kinds of projects are you involved with (e.g. 
clinical trials, epidemiological studies)? What per cent of your time is 
spent doing research? 
 How did you learn how to do ethics review – through training sessions? 
Reading? What were your expectations? Were the trainings or readings 
helpful? Did they match your later experience? If not, how and why? 
 What has been your experience in serving as a REC member? What 






2. REC CHARACERISTICS 
 
Overarching Idea: REC members may have widely varying ideas as to what constitutes a 
‘good’ REC and ‘good’ ethics review – and how (if at all) ethics is instantiated in 
reviewing/monitoring a research project. 
 What is the ‘usual procedure’ in your REC for reviewing (and 
monitoring, if at all) the ethical standards of research proposals? 
 Are clinical trials research proposals reviewed differently from other 
types of health research proposals? If so, how? 
 How closely are the SOPs and GAfREC followed in your REC operations 
and in ethics review? Is reference ever made to any laws or regulations? 
If so, which ones and in what ways? 
 Approximately how much time is spent at your REC meetings discussing 
each research proposal, as opposed to other matters (e.g. 
administrative)? Do you think the amount is too much, too little, or 
adequate? 
 What do you think makes a REC work well or not in monitoring and 
responding to research ethics issues? 
 In assuring ethical research, what do you think constitutes a ‘good’ REC 
Chair/Committee and what should be their roles? 
o If a REC Chair: When is the Chair’s discretionary authority 
exercised? 
 What administrative support is available to your REC? 
 Do you and other REC members feel able to keep up with the workload 
satisfactorily?  
 Is your REC ‘more cautious’ about some research/researchers than 
others? Why? 
 Do you think that health research is adequately guided throughout the 
research lifecycle? Should RECs or other bodies (e.g. HRA) do more to 
guide researchers and research participants across the research lifecycle, 
not just at the preliminary stage of ethics review?  
 Have you seen problems in research noncompliance with REC rules or 
mandates? If so, what kinds of problems? How comfortable are you with 
PI self-reporting? Are annual review forms submitted to RECs sufficient? 
 Has your REC discussed sanctions against PIs? Has your REC ever 
discussed reporting research ethics problems to an outside body (e.g. 
researchers’ employer and sponsor and the care organisations where the 
research takes place)? If so, what kinds of issues arose? Do challenges 
arise in reporting problems to outside bodies? If so, how? 
 What does ‘good’ ethics review look like for you? What supports this, 
and what gets in the way of it? Do you do things you should not do, and 





3. REC LOCATION / HEALTH DISTRICT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Overarching Idea: REC members’ experiences may differ from one REC to another (i.e. no 
two RECs are like in organisational dynamics); and RECs may have complicated 
relationships with NHS Trusts/Health Boards. 
 Have you served on RECs in more than one location? If so, where and for 
how long? 
 Do you think local contexts or settings affect RECs’ roles and decisions? 
If so, how? Or are local context issues best addressed by R&D offices? 
 How do you think your REC is viewed within your health district by 
researchers and NHS bodies? 
 What kinds of conflicts, if any, has your REC faced with your health 
district? Have these conflicts been resolved? 
 Have you or your REC ever had input from your health district, 
Research Ethics Service or the HRA/CSO concerning research ethics? If 
so, how and concerning what? 
 
4. PI CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Overarching Idea: REC members may recognise the limited ability to work with researchers 
throughout the research lifecycle as opposed to the preliminary stage before any research even 
begins. There may be uncertainty about what happens after ethics approval, including the 
potential downstream social value to accrue. 
 Would you like additional data about PIs or studies concerning the 
ethical dimensions? If so, what kind of data? 
 Do you find that PIs treat your REC with respect? Take advantage to be 
educated about relevant policies? Maintain accurate records? Respond in 
a timely and appropriate way to REC requests? 
 Does your knowledge of the PI affect how you look at his or her 
protocols? If so, how? 
 Do you think the face-to-face – i.e. a dialogue-based approach – to ‘doing 
ethics’ with the PI works, works well, is optimal or sub-optimal? How 
often does this happen? Do you want it to happen more often?    
 Do you think your REC can or should guide PIs through the research 
pathway, including beyond the preliminary stage of ethics review? Is 
there a distinct role for the Chair, Deputy Chairs, or Administrators in 
this regard? 
 
5. THE ROLE OF CONSENT 
 
Overarching Idea: Consent is seen to play a sine qua non role in health research regulation, 
for various or even arguably misplaced reasons. 
 Do you think there is an appropriate degree of emphasis placed on 
consent in health research regulation?  
 What do you think should be the role of consent in health research?  
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 How do you think RECs should treat consent, including in the 
information sheet, the form itself, and the process of communication that 
occurs between researchers and participants?  
 
6. NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Overarching Idea: Protection and promotion may not necessarily be twinned objectives for 
RECs. 
 Can you describe the relationship between your REC and regulators and 
other bodies involved in health research (e.g. HRA/RES, CSO, NHS R&D 
offices)? 
 Is the relationship cooperative? If it is cooperative, do you feel like you 
produce ethics review in partnership with regulators, or do you view 
them as distant, top-down regulators? 
 What are the perceived practical changes, if any, with recent regulatory 
reform such as the Care Act 2014 and establishment of the Health 
Research Authority? Has there been a perceptible change in your REC 
with this regulation, and if so, when were these changes first apparent? 
 Do you perceive a regulatory shift that now seeks to both protect 
research participants and also facilitate responsible health research in the 
country through proportionate regulation and alignment of REC 
processes? If so, do you think this shift will become (or has become) 
operationalised in REC practices? Should it?  
 How do you think a suitable alignment between research participant 
protection and research promotion can be achieved in practice? 
 What would constitute research ‘promotion’ in the operations of a REC?  
 By what standards do you think RECs are evaluated/measured to 
determine whether they are functioning appropriately (i.e. efficiently or 
effectively) to achieve the demands set by regulation? 
 
7. FUTURE HORIZONS 
 
Overarching Idea: RECs are an important regulatory body in their own right, but are only 
one regulator (and actor) among many in the health research regulatory space. There is a 
potential role for RECs to act as a Shepherd, guiding ethical researchers and research 
documents throughout the research lifecycle. 
 Do you think RECs are performing well overall? If not, what are the 
perceived problems? How could they be improved? 
 Would any changes help your REC’s ability to monitor research ethics? If 
so, what? 
 Would your REC benefit from more training in monitoring or 
responding to research ethics? If so, how? In what form (e.g. conference, 
printed materials, website)? 
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 If there has been a shift in REC functions and practices in light of the new 
regulation and actors such as the HRA and CSO, what impact might this 
have on research, researchers, and research participants? 
 




 thank participant for their time; 
 reminder of confidentiality;  
 ask for potential to re-contact if there is a follow-up element in the research;  





Appendix 2: Interview guide for regulators/policymakers 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 to explore the dynamics of interaction between regulators, policymakers 
and other actors (especially RECs) in the health research regulatory space;  
 to determine the characteristics of different components of research ethics 
regulation; 
 to gather reflections on their experience(s) as regulators or policymakers; 
 to examine whether the practices of research ethics oversight have 
changed in response to new regulations (e.g. Care Act 2014) and new 
actors (e.g. Health Research Authority); 
 to understand how regulators check whether regulations have been 
operationalised, how comfortable they are with changes when regulations 
are actually implemented, and how far they consider regulation as an 
evolving, potentially co-produced dynamic. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 introduce myself, PhD project and funder; 
 general informed consent information, e.g. how the data will be used, 
confidentiality, timing (~60 minutes), permission to audio-record and 
transcribe interview 
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Overarching Idea: Regulators’/policymakers’ life experiences (within and outwith research 
ethics) may shape their views as a regulator/policymaker. 
 What is your role in the regulatory or policymaking body? 
 How long have you been involved with the current regulatory or 
policymaking body? 
 How did you get involved in the regulatory or policymaking body? 
 How many hours/week on average do you spend working on regulatory 
matters that impact RECs, if any? 
 Can you summarise your current activity in the regulatory or 
policymaking body (a day-in-the-life as a regulator/policymaker)? 
 What has been your experience in serving in your capacity? What stands 









2. RESEARCH ETHICS AS POLICY AND REGULATION 
 
Overarching Idea: Law and regulation play a critical role in shaping health research that is 
ethical and therefore protective of participants, but also valuable and therefore beneficial for 
society. 
 What do you think is the role of law and regulation in governing health 
research? 
 How has the role of law and regulation changed over time, if at all? 
 What is the role of a regulator or policymaker in this space: to enforce 
law and regulation, to monitor compliance, or something else? 
 Is there a perception (by others) of under- or over-regulation of health 
research, or a right balance? What evidence do you have for this 
response?  
 How do you see the role of RECs in the entire regulatory framework? Do 
you think RECs are under- over-regulated?  
 Who are other important actors in health research, aside from regulators 
or advisory groups (HTA, HEA, CAG, HRA) and RECs? Is each actor 
seen as playing a critical role, or some more than others, and if so, how? 
 
3. THE ROLE OF VARIOUS ACTORS 
 
Overarching Idea: RECs are an important component in the health research regulatory 
space, but they are far from being the only actors. 
 Can you describe the relationship between your 
regulatory/policymaking body, RECs and other bodies involved in 
health research (e.g. HRA, NHS R&D offices)? 
 Is the relationship cooperative, or is the impression one of top-down 
‘command-and-control’ with a central regulatory body like the HRA 
setting standards or rules that other bodies must/are expected to follow? 
 In your own role, how do you interact with the various bodies 
(regulatory and otherwise) in health research? Do you interact with some 
more than others, and if so, how and why? For example, how does RES 
interact with the rest of the HRA, and other bodies such as the CSO in 
Scotland? 
 Do you view RECs as co-regulators of health research (along with the 
HRA, CSO, etc.)? 
 In your view, are certain bodies more important than others in both 
protecting research participants, and also promoting health research? For 
example: NHS Heath Boards/Trusts, R&D offices, sponsors, etc.? 
 Do you think RECs interact or cooperate well with these other bodies?  
 Do you think the various bodies in health research interact well together? 
Is the HRA making good headway, as the Care Act 2014 requires, to 
make some of these work more closely together? Do you think sponsors 
and/or NHS Trust/Health Boards and R&D offices should take on more 
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responsibility or should also cooperate more closely with the regulatory 
bodies? 
 
4. THE ROLE OF RECS 
 
Overarching Idea: Regulators/policymakers may have widely varying ideas as to what 
constitutes a ‘good’ REC and ‘good’ ethics review – if they consider RECs to actually engage 
in ‘ethical’ review.  
 Do you think that health research is adequately guided throughout the 
research lifecycle? Should RECs or other bodies (e.g. HRA, research 
sponsors) do more to guide researchers and research participants across 
the research lifecycle, not just at the preliminary stage of ethics review?  
 Have you seen problems in research noncompliance with REC rules or 
mandates? If so, what kinds of problems? How comfortable are you with 
PI self-reporting? Are annual review forms submitted to RECs sufficient? 
Is there a role for sponsors here? 
 Do you believe RECs engage in ‘ethical’ deliberation, or do you see their 
function more as risk assessment committees?  
 Should RECs also undertake some form of scientific review of a research 
study? 
 What does ‘good’ ethics review look like for you? What supports this, 
and what gets in the way of it? As a regulator/policymaker, do you do 
things you should not do, and equally, are there things you do not do 
that you think you should do – in the interest of robust health research 
regulation? 
 Do you think local contexts or settings affect RECs’ roles and decisions? 
If so, how? 
 In your capacity as regulator/policymaker, have you ever specifically 
communicated with a REC concerning research ethics? If so, how and 
concerning what? 
 
5. THE ROLE OF CONSENT 
 
Overarching Idea: Consent is seen to play a sine qua non role in health research regulation, 
for various or even arguably misplaced reasons. 
 Do you think there is an appropriate degree of emphasis placed on 
consent in health research regulation?  
 What are your views on alternatives to consent (e.g. authorisation by 
competent authority, public interest grounds to ‘waive’ consent)? Might 
this depend on the different types of health research, e.g. clinical trials vs. 
data vs. tissue? Or something else (e.g. trustworthiness of researchers, 
regulators, etc.)? 
 What do you think should be the role of consent in health research?  
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 How should RECs treat consent, including in the information sheet, the 
form itself, and the process that occurs between researchers and 
participants? Can or should RECs do more to emphasise communication 
among themselves, researchers, and in turn, researchers and 
participants? To what extent does your assessment look at the broader 
governance picture of a research protocol and how consent sits within it? 
 
6. NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Overarching Idea: Protection and promotion may not necessarily be twinned objectives for 
RECs. 
 As you are aware, there have been some recent regulatory changes in 
health research (e.g. HRA creation in late 2011, Care Act 2014, proposed 
revision to the Research Governance Framework, ‘HRA approvals’ etc.). 
What do you think the factors were that led to these changes?  
 What are the perceived practical changes, if any, with recent regulatory 
reform such as the Care Act 2014 and establishment of the Health 
Research Authority?  
 Do you perceive a regulatory shift that now seeks to steer a research 
environment that both protects research participants and also facilitates 
health research in the country through e.g. proportionate regulation and 
alignment of REC processes? If so, do you think this shift will become (or 
has become) operationalised in REC practices? Should it? 
 How do you think a suitable alignment between research participant 
protection and research promotion can be achieved in practice? 
 What would constitute research ‘promotion’ in the operations of a REC? 
Is there a role here for regulators and RECs to co-produce regulation? 
 What happens when things go wrong? How far do you think RECs rely 
on law to help them work out a problem, or how far do other factors play 
a role? 
 By what standards do you think RECs are evaluated/measured to 
determine whether they are functioning appropriately (i.e. efficiently or 
effectively) to achieve the demands set by regulation? 
 
7. FUTURE HORIZONS 
 
Overarching Idea: RECs are an important regulatory body in their own right, but are only 
one regulator (and actor) among many in the health research regulatory space. The HRA 
plays a critical role, but ultimately the ‘success’ of health research regulation is defined by 
how each REC views its ability to be more than a (preliminary) gatekeeper – namely as a 




 Do you think RECs, sponsors and other actors in health research 
(regulation) are performing well overall? If not, what are the perceived 
problems? How could they be improved? 
 Would any changes help RECs’ ability to monitor research ethics? If so, 
what? 
 Would RECs benefit from more training in monitoring or responding to 
research ethics? If so, how? In what form (e.g. conference, printed 
materials, website)? 
 If there has been a shift in REC functions and practices in light of the new 
regulation and actors such as the HRA and CSO, what impact might this 
have on research, researchers, and research participants? 
 
Do you have any other points that you wish to discuss? Do you have any questions? 
 
CLOSING 
 thank participant for their time; 
 reminder of confidentiality;  
 ask for potential to re-contact if there is a follow-up element in the research;  
































Ethical Review Form (Lead Reviewer/REC Member) 
The HRA has an established role to promote transparency, largely through RECs and the 
publication of research summaries; this will now be extended to include the publication of the 
summary of REC opinion. 
The lead reviewer(s) should complete this form in preparation for the REC meeting. The form 
may also be used by other REC members. The REC Chair should use the headings as an 
aide memoire to structure the discussion at the meeting. Completed forms should be given to 
the REC Manager who will arrange for them to be destroyed once the minutes of the meeting 
have been ratified. 
Meeting Date: 
REC Reference Number: 
Study Title: 







1. Social or scientific value; scientific design and conduct of the study (IRAS A6, A7-14, A 57-
62, A75) Evaluation of a treatment, intervention, or theory that will improve health and well-being or 
increase knowledge. RECs should take into account the public interest in reliable evidence affecting 
health and social care.              Use of accepted scientific principles and methods, including 
statistical techniques, to produce reliable and valid data. Is the research question important and 
necessary? Is the research design and proposed statistical analysis able to answer the question? Is 
there equipoise; are all treatment arms viable options for the research participants? 
 Public Involvement - Is there involvement of patients, service users, the public, in the 
design, management, and undertaking the research? (IRAS A14-1) 











2.  Recruitment arrangements and access to health information, and fair research  participant 
selection (IRAS A16, A 17-1, A17-2, A 27-29, A46, A47). Inclusion and exclusion of potential 
research participants. Selection of research participants so that vulnerable individuals are not 
targeted for risky research and the rich and socially powerful not favoured for potentially beneficial 
research. The benefits and risks of research should be distributed fairly among all social groups and 
classes, taking particular account of age, disability, gender, race, religion or belief and sexual 
orientation, as well as economic status and culture. How are research participants recruited? How 
does participation impact on their clinical care? Are compensation arrangements in place? 
Insurance (negligent/ non-negligent harm). 












3.  Favourable risk benefit ratio; anticipated benefits/risks for research participants (present 
and future) (IRAS A 18- 25 & part B3 if radiation, and part B 5 if samples).Minimization of risks. Is 
there evidence of the consideration of any benefits/risk for individual research participants, 
past/future research participants, including whether the risk/intervention is sufficiently minimal to 
require no SSA. Are benefits/risk clearly identified for the research participant? Have steps been 
taken to minimise or eliminate the risk, hazards, discomfort, and distress and enhancement of 
potential benefits; risks to the research participant are proportionate to the benefits to the research 
participant and society? Is the balance between risk and benefit equitable? 













4  Care and protection of research participants; respect for potential and enrolled research 
participants’ welfare & dignity (IRAS A25, A50-53, A 76, A 77). 
*permitting withdrawal from the research                                         *  protecting privacy through 
confidentiality   *informing participants of newly discovered risks or benefits           * informing 
participants of results of research *maintaining welfare of participants                                                  
*what will happen at the end of the study *provision of appropriate indemnity and insurance                                                                                                      
Trial Registration (IRAS A50) Are trial registration arrangements in place? (note, this is a 
condition of the favourable opinion, and is mandatory for the first four categories of study on IRAS) 
Data protection & research participant’s confidentiality (IRAS A 36 - 43) Where and how 
(anonymised/coded) and for how long will data be stored? What purpose will be served by the data? 
Who will access? Are research participants informed that access to their medical notes may be 
required? Arrangements made to deal with incidental disclosure? 









5  Informed consent process  and the adequacy and completeness of research participant 
information (A30 -34, A46, A49 & PIS).Provision of information to research participants about the 
purpose of the research, its procedures, potential risks, benefits, and alternatives, so that the 
individual understands this information and can make a voluntary decision whether to enrol and 
continue to participate. Is the language used clear and understandable to the research participant it 
is aimed at? Does it include all the procedures as describe in the protocol? Have uncertainty and 
randomisation been explained to the research participant? Is consent taken as part of a process with 
research participants having adequate time to consider the information, and opportunity to ask 
questions? Is it clear to what the research participant consents or assents? Is there any inducement 
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or coercion? Are vulnerable research participants involved? Is consent obtained to allow GP’s to be 
informed? (Is the Welsh version an accurate translation of the given English version? Wales only) 








6.  Suitability of the applicant and supporting staff  (investigator CV & IRAS question A47, A48)            
Applicant and supporting staff are suitably qualified and have experience relevant to the proposed 
research. Medical research involving human subjects must be conducted only by individuals with the 
appropriate scientific training and qualifications. Research on patients or healthy volunteers requires 
the supervision of a competent and appropriately qualified physician or other health care 
professional. Are the local facilities and arrangements suitable? Have community issues been 
considered? Have any conflicts of interest been considered?  








7.   Independent review (IRAS A 54-56)                                                                                                                    
Review of the design of the research trial, its proposed research participant population, and risk-
benefit ratio by individuals unaffiliated with the research. The REC may be satisfied with credible 
assurances that the research has an identified sponsor and that it takes account of appropriate 
scientific peer review. 








8.  Suitability of supporting information                                                                                                             
E.g. GP letter, interview schedules, questionnaires, lone working  policies etc. 









9.  Other general comments.                                                                                                                                    









10.  Consider and confirm the suitability of the summary of the study (IRAS A6-1).                                    
This summary will be published on the HRA website in this format together with the summary of the 











Appendix 6: Glossary of acronyms 
 
AHRC  = Arts and Humanities Research Council 
AMS  = Academy of Medical Sciences 
BMJ  = British Medical Journal 
CAG  = Confidentiality Advisory Group 
CBS  = Central Booking Service 
CIOMS = Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
COREC = Central Office for Research Ethics Committees 
CRC  = Clinical Research Committee (NIH) 
CSO  = Chief Scientist Office 
CTIMP = Clinical Trial of an Investigational Medicinal Product  
DHEW = Department of Health, Education and Welfare (US) 
DoH  = Department of Health 
ESRC  = Economic and Social Research Council 
FDA  = Food and Drug Administration (US) 
GAfREC =  Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees 
GTAC  = Gene Therapy Advisory Committee 
HARP  = HRA Assessment Review Portal 
HEI  = Higher Education Institution 
HFEA  = Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
HRA  = Health Research Authority 
HTA  = Human Tissue Authority 
ICH GCP = International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical  
Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human 
Use Guideline for Good Clinical Practice 
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IRAS  = Integrated Research Application System 
IRB  = Institutional Review Board 
LREC  = Local Research Ethics Committee 
MHRA = Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency  
MoDREC = Ministry of Defence (MoD) Research Ethics Committee 
MRC  = Medical Research Council 
MREC  = Multi-site Research Ethics Committee 
NHS  = National Health Service 
NIH  = National Institutes of Health (US) 
NIHR  = National Institute for Health Research  
NPSA  = National Patient Safety Agency 
NREAP = National Research and Ethics Advisors’ Panel 
NRES  = National Research Ethics Service 
OECD  = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OREC  = Offices of Research Ethics Committees  
ORECNI = Office for Research Ethics Committees Northern Ireland 
PIS  = Participant Information Sheet 
PPI  = Patient and Public Involvement 
PRS  =  Proportionate Review Service 
RCP  = Royal College of Physicians of London 
RCUK  = Research Councils UK 
REB  = Research Ethics Board 
REC  = Research Ethics Committee 




RED  = Research Ethics Database 
REIC  =  Edinburgh Law School Research Ethics and Integrity  
Committee  
RES  = Research Ethics Service 
RGF  = Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care 
R&D  = Research and Development 
ShED  = Shared Ethical Debate 
SOPs  = Standard Operating  Procedures 
UKECA = United Kingdom Ethics Committee Authority 
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Szakolczai, Árpád. ‘Liminality and Experience: Structuring Transitory Situations 
and Transformative Events’ in Agnes Horvath, Bjorn Thomassen, and Harvald 
Wydra (eds), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality (Berghahn 2015). 
Taylor-Alexander, Samuel and others. ‘Beyond Regulatory Compression: 
Confronting the Liminal Spaces of Health Research Regulation’ (2016) 8 Law, 
Innovation and Technology 149. 
Tinker, Anthea and Vera Coomber. University Research Ethics Committees: Their Role, 
Remit and Conduct (King’s College London 2004). 
Thomassen, Bjorn. Liminality and the Modern: Living Through the In-Between (Ashgate 
2014). 
Thomassen, Bjorn. ‘Thinking with Liminality: To the Boundaries of an 
Anthropological Concept’ in Agnes Horvath, Bjorn Thomassen and Harald 
Wydra (eds), Breaking Boundaries: Varieties of Liminality (Berghahn Books 2015). 
Thompson, Andrew and Emma France. ‘One Stop or Full Stop? The Continuing 
Challenges for Researchers Despite the New Streamlined NHS Research 
Governance Process’ (2010) 10 BMC Health Services Research 124. 
Thompson, Ian and others. ‘Research Ethical Committees in Scotland’ (1981) 282 
British Medical Journal 718. 
351 
 
Toulmin, Stephen. ‘How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics’ (1982) 25 Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 736. 
Townend, David and Edward Dove. ‘Approaching Ethics Review Equivalency 
Through Natural Justice and a ”Sounding Board” Model for Research Ethics 
Committees’ (2017) 36 Medicine and Law 61. 
Turner, Victor. The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Aldine Transaction 
2008 [1969]). 
van den Hoonaard, Will. The Seduction of Ethics: Transforming the Social Sciences 
(University of Toronto Press 2011). 
van Gennep, Arnold. The Rites of Passage (University of Chicago Press 1960 [1909]). 
Veatch, Robert. ‘Human Experimentation Committees: Professional or 
Representative?’ (1975) 5 Hastings Center Report 31. 
Veatch, Robert. ‘Ranking, Balancing, or Simultaneity: Resolving Conflicts among the 
Belmont Principles’ in James Childress, Eric Meslin and Harold Shapiro (eds), 
Belmont Revisited: Ethical Principles for Research with Human Subjects (Georgetown 
University Press 2005). 
Vibert, Frank. The New Regulatory Space: Reframing Democratic Governance (Edward 
Elgar 2014). 
Warlow, Charles. ‘Clinical Research Under the Cosh Again’ (2004) 329 British 
Medical Journal 241. 
Warlow, Charles. ‘Should Research Ethics Committees be Observing the Law or 
Working by Ethical Principles?’ (2005) 1 Research Ethics Review 23. 
Warnock, Mary. ‘Moral Thinking and Government Policy: The Warnock Committee 
on Human Embryology’ (1985) 63 The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly. 
Health and Society 504. 
Weatherall, David. ‘Commentary’ (1982) 8 Journal of Medical Ethics 64. 
Webley, Lisa. ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane 
and Herbert Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 
2010). 
While, Alison. ‘Ethics Committees: Impediment to Research or Guardian of Ethical 
Standards?’ (1995) 311 British Medical Journal 661. 
352 
 
Whitney, Simon. ‘Institutional Review Boards: A Flawed System of Risk 
Management’ (2016) 12 Research Ethics 182. 
Whitney, Simon. Balanced Ethics Review: A Guide for Institutional Review Board 
Members (Springer 2016). 
Wilkinson, Iain. Risk, Vulnerability and Everyday Life (Routledge 2010). 
Williams, BT. ‘NHS Locally Organised Research Scheme: Regional Research 
Committees and the Way They Work’ (1978) 1 British Medical Journal 85. 
Wilson, Duncan. The Making of British Bioethics (University of Manchester Press 
2014). 
